



# C o m p a r a t i v e Media S Y S T E M S

European and Global Perspectives

Edited by

Bogusława  
Dobek-Ostrowska  
Michał  
Głowacki  
Karol  
Jakubowicz  
and  
Miklós  
Sükösd

 CEU PRESS

 CoSt

VISIT...

LANZAROTE  
*Caliente*.COM

## **Comparative Media Systems**



# **Comparative Media Systems**

## **European and Global Perspectives**

Edited by

*Bogusława Dobek-Ostrowska*

*Michał Głowacki*

*Karol Jakubowicz*

*Miklós Sükösd*



Central European University Press  
Budapest—New York

© 2010 by Bogusława Dobek-Ostrowska, Michał Głowacki,  
Karol Jakubowicz, Miklós Sükösd

Published in 2010 by

*Central European University Press*

An imprint of the

Central European University Share Company

Nádor utca 11, H-1051 Budapest, Hungary

*Tel:* +36-1-327-3138 or 327-3000, *Fax:* +36-1-327-3183

*E-mail:* ceupress@ceu.hu

*Website:* www.ceupress.com

400 West 59th Street, New York NY 10019, USA

*Tel:* +1-212-547-6932

*Fax:* +1-646-557-2416

*E-mail:* mgreenwald@sorosny.org

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,  
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means,  
without the permission of the Publisher.

ISBN 978-963-9776-54-8 cloth



COST is supported by the EU RTD  
Framework programme



ESF provides the COST Office  
through an EC contract

### **Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data**

Comparative media systems : European and global perspectives / edited by Bogusława  
Dobek-Ostrowska ... [et al.].

p. cm.

Papers presented at an international conference, "Comparing media systems: West  
meets East," organized by the Department of Communication and Journalism at the  
University of Wrocław, held April 23-25, 2007, at Kliczków Castle, Wrocław, Poland.

Includes index.

ISBN 978-9639776548 (hardcover)

1. Mass media--Europe, Eastern--Congresses. 2. Mass media--Social aspects--  
Europe, Eastern--Congresses. 3. Mass media--Political aspects--Europe, Eastern--  
Congresses. 4. Mass media policy--Europe, Eastern--Congresses. I. Dobek-Ostrows-  
ka, Bogusława.

P92.E95C66 2010

070.1094--dc22

2009051871

Printed in Hungary by  
Pátria Nyomda, Budapest

# Table of Contents

|                                                                                                                                           |     |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| Editors' Introduction .....                                                                                                               | vii |
| Preface by Daniel C. Hallin and Paolo Mancini .....                                                                                       | xi  |
| 1. Introduction. Media Systems Research: An Overview .....                                                                                | 1   |
| <i>Karol Jakubowicz</i>                                                                                                                   |     |
| 2. Comparing West and East: A Comparative Approach<br>of Transformation .....                                                             | 23  |
| <i>Hans J. Kleinsteuber</i>                                                                                                               |     |
| 3. In Search of a Label for the Russian Media System .....                                                                                | 41  |
| <i>Hedwig de Smaele</i>                                                                                                                   |     |
| 4. Introducing Turkey to the Three Media System Models:<br>The Content of TV News in Eleven Countries.....                                | 63  |
| <i>Volkan Uce and Knut De Swert</i>                                                                                                       |     |
| 5. A Perspective from the South: Triggers and Signs<br>of Change .....                                                                    | 77  |
| <i>Adrian Hadland</i>                                                                                                                     |     |
| 6. The Reform of the Public Radio and Television System<br>in the United Kingdom and in Spain (2004–2007):<br>A Comparative Analysis..... | 97  |
| <i>Carles Llorens and Isabel Fernández Alonso</i>                                                                                         |     |
| 7. Public Service Broadcasting in Ukraine:<br>To Be or Not to Be?.....                                                                    | 115 |
| <i>Olexiy Khabyuk</i>                                                                                                                     |     |
| 8. Actors, Evolution, and Production Models<br>in the Commodification of Spanish Television .....                                         | 127 |
| <i>Laura Bergés Saura</i>                                                                                                                 |     |

|                                                                                                                                            |     |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| 9. The Global Journalist: Are Professional Structures<br>Being Flattened?.....                                                             | 153 |
| <i>Wolfgang Donsbach</i>                                                                                                                   |     |
| 10. Czech Journalists after the Collapse of the Old Media<br>System: Looking for A New Professional Self-image.....                        | 171 |
| <i>Jaromír Volek</i>                                                                                                                       |     |
| 11. Preserving Journalism .....                                                                                                            | 195 |
| <i>Auksė Balčytienė and Halliki Harro-Loit</i>                                                                                             |     |
| 12. Main Professional Dilemmas of Journalists in Poland.....                                                                               | 209 |
| <i>Lucyna Szot</i>                                                                                                                         |     |
| 13. Comparing Media Systems and Media Content:<br>Online Newspapers in Ten Eastern and Western<br>European Countries .....                 | 233 |
| <i>Hartmut Wessler, Malgorzata Skorek, Katharina Kleinen-von<br/>Königslöw, Maximilian Held, Mihaela Dobрева, and Manuel<br/>Adolphsen</i> |     |
| 14. Political or Commercial Interests? Poland's Axel Springer<br>Tabloid, <i>Fakt</i> , and Its Coverage of Germany .....                  | 261 |
| <i>Maren Röger</i>                                                                                                                         |     |
| Contributors.....                                                                                                                          | 283 |
| Index .....                                                                                                                                | 289 |



## Editors' Introduction

In this foreword, we want to go beyond perfunctory introductory remarks and review—however briefly and selectively—the extraordinary intellectual effort over the last half a century devoted to classifying media systems and/or press theories and normative media theories. More than that, we wish to look to the future. We want to understand if it will still be possible to speak about media systems as traditionally understood and to classify them, and what theoretical and methodological approaches may be particularly suited to this task.

First, of course, we must recount the origins of this book. Over a hundred researchers from various countries (Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Spain, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States) diagnosed contemporary media systems during the International Media and Communication Conference “Comparing Media Systems: West Meets East,” organized by the Department of Communication and Journalism at the University of Wrocław (April 23–25, 2007, Kliczków Castle, Wrocław, Poland).

Dedicated to analyzing media systems, the conference was inspired by the monograph *Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics* (2004) by Daniel C. Hallin and Paolo Mancini. There, the authors presented a general model based upon the media in the developed countries in Western Europe and North America. Sixteen Western European countries, plus the United States and Canada, were located at different positions inside the triangle, in accordance with media characteristics of each country. Participants in the conference were invited to extend this analysis to media systems in the post-communist countries—above all, the new members of the European Union.

In doing so, conference organizers were inspired by research conducted by a team headed by Professor Anker Brink Lund (Copenhagen Business School—Center for Business and Politics, Denmark), in collaboration

with associate professor Lars Nord (Mid Sweden University, Sweden), and associate professor Johann Roppen (Volda University College, Norway). They also profited from cooperation with Professor Miklós Sükösd and participants in COST A30 Action: "East of West: Setting a New Central and Eastern European Media Research Agenda" (2005–2009).

Twelve panels in all were held during the conference. Papers presented during those panels used the four variables employed by Hallin and Mancini to analyze selected media systems in a broad comparative perspective. They covered the development of the mass press in Western and Eastern European countries, the process of commercialization of the press, the growth of tabloids, and the role of foreign media groups in post-communist countries. Political parallelism in mature and new democracies was diagnosed, using different components and indicators of parallelism that can be used to assess how strongly it is present in a media system, with a special focus on media content, organizational connections, tendency for the media personnel to be active in political life, the political affiliation of journalists and their career paths, the partisanship of media audience, and journalistic roles, orientations, and practices. Comparative studies of professionalization in countries with differing democratic experiences have ascertained different levels of journalistic autonomy, different practical routines, common standards, and professional practice, as well as the public service orientation, followed by the links between professionalization and political parallelism. Special conference sessions focused on the role of the state in media systems, covering issues such as legal provisions regulating access to government information, media concentration, ownership and competition, political communication, laws regulating broadcasting content, and the role of public service broadcasting in new European democracies.

The conference "Comparing Media Systems: West Meets East" yielded a rich crop of scholarly endeavor and led to the publication of several volumes.

The year 2008 saw the publication by the University of Wrocław Press of a book entitled *Comparing Media Systems in Central Europe: Between Commercialization and Politicization*. There, researchers from Austria, the Czech Republic, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia pointed out some common features that can be used to describe the relations between mass media, politics, and economics in this part of Europe.

Ten other conference papers were published in the first volume of the *Central European Journal of Communication*, the official journal of the Polish Communication Association. In them, media and communication researchers from Estonia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States examined their national

media systems within four major dimensions considered by Hallin and Mancini.

This volume contains 14 more conference papers pre-selected by the editors and ultimately evaluated and chosen by Hallin and Mancini.

One thing is certain: media and communications research will continue to need some tools enabling comprehension and analysis of media and journalism. Efforts to develop new typologies of “media systems” and media and journalism roles will probably continue. What we should guard against, however, is accepting those typologies as templates for perceiving reality, as that may constrain our ability to see it for what it is.

Papers included in this book offer a great richness of empirical data and theoretically inspired analysis. That in itself shows that the authors have retained, indeed insisted on, their ability to go beyond preconceived approaches in order to critically examine media reality in different geographical and social contexts. Their contributions will help the reader gain an insight into various aspects of media operation in a wide cross-section of countries and regions.

An expression of gratitude to Daniel C. Hallin and Paolo Mancini is also in order for inspiring the holding of the conference itself, for their role in selecting papers, and for providing a Preface in which they acknowledge that the papers have given them “new suggestions for continuing and deepening the research and the theoretical discussion that we started with *Comparing Media Systems*.”

*Bogusława Dobek-Ostrowska*  
*Michał Głowacki*  
*Karol Jakubowicz*  
*Miklós Sükösd*

COST—the acronym for European Cooperation in Science and Technology—is the oldest and widest European intergovernmental network for cooperation in research. Established by the Ministerial Conference in November 1971, COST is presently used by the scientific communities of 35 European countries to cooperate in common research projects supported by national funds.

Web: <http://www.cost.esf.org>

The COST A30 Action “East of West: Setting a New Central and Eastern European Media Research Agenda” is a 4 year long (2005–2009) COST research project that has established an outstanding network, bringing together approximately 70 distinguished media and communications researchers from 27 countries in Western and Eastern Europe. The main objective of the Action is to increase the knowledge concerning media production, media reception and use, and the political implications of the transformation of the media landscape in the Eastern and Central European context. The Action aims at organizing a European social science research network with a clear focus on emerging problems of Central and Eastern European media in a comparative perspective. The Action is also building a network of media studies and communication research centers, higher education programs and departments in Western and Eastern Europe.

Web: [www.costa30.eu](http://www.costa30.eu)

## Preface

*Daniel C. Hallin and Paolo Mancini*

From the papers in this collection, we have learned a great deal about the media and politics in specific countries. More importantly, this collection has given us new suggestions for continuing and deepening the research and the theoretical discussion that we started with our book *Comparing Media Systems*. In many ways the papers in this collection cast doubt on whether the three models proposed in our book can be applied unchanged—and we are happy to endorse that finding. Our models are not intended as universal patterns that are somehow inherent in the nature of media and politics. We conceive them as concrete, historical patterns that can be observed in the groups of countries we studied. We have always hoped that people studying other regions would not try to apply them unmodified, but instead would follow our approach, in the sense of developing models of their own. Several authors of this volume point out how difficult it is to fit their own country into one or another of our models. We would stress that we do not believe this is the best reading of *Comparing Media Systems*, to focus on the three models as pigeonholes in which to place particular cases.

When referring to our models, in spite of the difficulties we just pointed out, many authors in this collection, as in other works, see many similarities between the media system of their own country and what we called the Polarized–Pluralist or Mediterranean Model. As we observed in the book, the historical experience of the Liberal and Democratic Corporatist countries is quite distinct from that of most countries in the world, and the Polarized Pluralist is likely to have the most relevance for understanding media systems in other parts of the world. This is particularly true for the countries in Eastern Europe that emerged from a long period of dictatorship and other countries outside Europe that underwent very different social and historical experiences from those of North America or Northern Europe. So the comparison with the Mediterranean region is appropriate and potentially useful. But certainly our Polarized Pluralist Model should not be applied in a mechanical way, as though it could replace the role of the Liberal Model in earlier literature as a universal

model that we would expect to be able to apply around the world. Scholars of other regions should be sensitive to the ways in which the systems they are studying differ from the Mediterranean countries (which, after all, differ significantly among themselves) and should move toward developing new models.

On a related note, there is another problem with the interpretation of our book. Many see in our book a preference for the Liberal Model—despite our stated intentions to avoid such a preference—or, if not a preference for the Liberal Model, then a view that the Polarized Pluralist Model is deficient compared with the other two. So we want to reaffirm that we do not think the analysis of our book justifies that kind of normative judgment of the different systems. The Liberal Model, and in some other ways the Democratic Corporatist model, do appear more responsive in important ways to the needs of a differentiated society in which an autonomous system of professional journalism performs functions of criticism in the face of social and political power. At the same time we tried to stress that the Liberal Model runs the risk of becoming more and more commercialized, becoming subordinated to the needs of advertisers and other economic powers and therefore overlapping the system of economics. It also has its own political constraints, even if it is substantially differentiated from the system of political parties. In any case one of the main points of our analysis is that particular media institutions develop under specific historical conditions. Outside of these conditions, it is not clear that those institutions can be exported to other social and political contexts without substantially changing their meaning. That is something we should always keep in mind whenever particular models are proposed as norms, professional practice, or media policy.

One final point about the reception of our book: the application of our book in new research often seems to focus on the three models that we employ to summarize patterns that characterize our three clusters of countries. This, of course, is only one part of the framework and approach of our book. The other is the sets of variables, or dimensions, we use to compare media systems, and to discuss the relation between characteristics of the media and political systems. As we said, the main goal of our research was to propose an interpretive framework for comparing systems of the relationship between the mass media and politics, not to label particular systems in different parts of the world. The function of the models is to show distinctive patterns of relationships among variables and among elements of media and political systems, and of historical development. But the part of our book that may be most useful for research beyond the countries we already studied is that in which we try to define and discuss the variables that need to be observed when involved in some

comparative study. In other words, we ask people to look essentially at the dimensions that are to be analyzed when going comparative. We fear that our models may appeal partly as a shortcut to comparative analysis: it is much easier to simplify the analysis by labeling a case using the three models.

Of course, our list of variables is not universal any more than the three models are, and this is the problem any analyst will face when looking beyond Western Europe and North America. The variables we propose—particularly the political system variables—are born out of the history and experience of Western Europe and North America and their social and political context. The list of media system variables will probably be useful as a starting point when looking beyond our countries, but we are sure that it cannot be conceived as complete, particularly in the specific values of the variables that we have conceptualized. In other contexts it may be necessary to stress different features that may not be so important in the countries that we studied.

For example, from the essays included in this collection, we may have underestimated the role of the state—particularly in its more authoritarian dimensions. Looking at the European experience and particularly at the experience of Nordic countries, we had in mind a sort of essentially “positive” role of the state both as dirigiste state and welfare state supporting pluralism in media system. In this collection several scholars stress that the state may have a “negative” role, representing corruption and nepotism, for instance, or strongly supporting a biased information flow. Those roles of the state obviously do exist in the countries of our study, but they may be more central in other systems, and worth more complex theorization.

In many Eastern European countries civil society has also played an important role. This too is something that we probably did not pay enough attention to; civil society is present in our study in particular historical forms, as represented by the kinds of organized social groups that were especially important in the Democratic Corporatist system, and which often had important ties to the party system. But the experience of civil society in the former Communist countries probably differs from that in Western Europe and North America. In Eastern Europe civil society combines particularly active and concerned people in society with those who have an economic autonomy that makes them free from the state and from party politics. In some way this civil society is a new actor that was born out of the experience of Soviet dictatorship. This collective actor was open to the influence of Western societies and able to maintain an active role in discussing new ideas and proposals. When the old regime disappeared, this part of the society was able to influence the political and cul-

tural change, strongly affecting the mass media system and being active within it.

From this collection we received some criticisms of, and some enhancements to, our hypothesis. At the same time, some of our conclusions were confirmed. Both from the papers with a comparative view and from those dealing with the situation of a single country, there is clear evidence of the importance of the homogenization process that took place in recent years, particularly in Eastern Europe after the collapse of the Soviet regime. Because of a dramatic and very rapid commercialization, organizational structures and professional skills and procedures originally developed in liberal democracies suddenly spread all around the world. This happened both in contexts that had already experienced liberal democracies, but where professional models of journalism deviated from the original liberal one, and in countries that had just achieved democracy. In both situations this implied the adoption of the most typical features of what has always been defined as liberal or Anglo-American professional journalism. In part this has meant substantial autonomy of journalists from political power. But at the same time, this often took place in the absence of a clear and strong professional identity able to defend reporters from all the risks posed by the sudden commercialization. A poor professional education, together with all the mirages offered by the new commercial system and a habit of subordination to the needs of the ownership—this is a principal challenge noted in many papers in this collection.



# Introduction

## Media Systems Research: An Overview

*Karol Jakubowicz*

### I.

“Press theories” are described by Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm (1956) as concepts of what “the press should be and do.” Normative media theory has been described by McQuail (1994, 121) as dealing with ideas of “how media ought to, or are expected to, operate.” Hallin and Mancini (2004, 1) say that they want to propose some answers to the question posed by Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm: “Why is the press as it is? Why does it apparently serve different purposes and appear in widely different forms in different countries?”

Summing up 50 years of the development of media system classifications and typologies, Thomass (2007) has identified the following main trends:

- Comparative media system analysis has long been bound to the approach to measure media practice of systems in other countries against the background of one’s own socio-philosophical foundations, but not to consider the discrepancy between such ideological foundations and empirical practice.
- Media system typologies developed from normative to empirically based approaches.
- The number of categories to describe the media systems grew slightly.
- An intensified view of the political system, as being the characteristic environment, has been developed.
- Underlying theories reflect the theoretical achievements of social sciences and communications studies.
- The models have not proved able to describe change in media systems—they are relatively static.
- Media system analysis, which started from a static description, is getting more dynamic.
- Online media have not been considered until now.
- Comparative media system analysis is a key approach to understanding globalization.

Looking at it differently, a considerable number of normative media theories have been developed, building on the “Four Theories of the Press” by Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm (1956). While in many cases sharing their normative approach, authors of new proposals in this regard sought to extend the framework to cover regions or social and systemic situations. Thus, to name but a few additions to the original framework:

- Denis McQuail (1987) added two new theories: democratic participant and development theories;
- Raymond Williams (1968) distinguished commercial, paternalistic, authoritarian, and democratic systems;
- Hachten (1981) added a “revolutionary concept of the press,” in which the media lead society in a struggle to overthrow the existing system;
- Sparks and Splichal (1988) identified two basic categories of media systems: commercial and paternalist, the latter encompassing all forms of control of the media by the state or the power elite.

Figure 1 shows how some of them can roughly be related to the original four concepts.

*Figure 1. Press Theories and Other Typologies of Media Systems*

|                     |                               |                       |                           |                      |               |
|---------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------|----------------------|---------------|
| 1                   | libertarian                   | social responsibility | Soviet Communist          | authoritarian        |               |
| 2                   | democratic participant theory |                       | development communication |                      |               |
| 3                   | Western                       |                       | development               | communication        |               |
|                     |                               |                       | Communist                 | authoritarian        |               |
| 4                   | market (Western)              |                       | advancing (Third World)   |                      |               |
| Marxist (Communist) |                               |                       |                           |                      |               |
| 5                   | commercial                    | paternalist           | authoritarian             | Democratic           |               |
| 6                   | Commercial                    |                       | Paternal                  |                      |               |
| 7                   | libertarian                   | social-libertarian    | social-centralist         | social-authoritarian | authoritarian |

1. Press “theories” (Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm 1956); 2. McQuail’s (1987) additional theories (his typology also encompasses the other four); 3. Hachten’s (1981) “concepts” of the press; 4. Altschull’s “systems” (cf. McQuail 1987, 23); in brackets—“systems” distinguished by Martin and Chaudhary (1983); 5. Williams’ (1968) “systems”; 6. “Systems” distinguished by Sparks and Splichal, (1988); 7. Lowenstein’s “philosophies” of press systems (Merrill and Lowenstein 1979).

*Table 1. Communication Values and Corresponding Media Systems*

| <b>Basic Value</b>               | <b>Freedom</b>                              | <b>Justice/Equality</b>                                                                                      | <b>Solidarity (bottom-up)</b>                                                                  | <b>Order (top-down)</b>                              |
|----------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>Social Context</b>            | Free market system                          | (Social) democratic model                                                                                    | Media attached to various sub-groups of society                                                | Totalitarian/authoritarian system                    |
| <b>Goal</b>                      | Unrestricted freedom of communication       | Equal, fair access to media, fair reflection in media of society in all diversity                            | Increasing commonality and sharing of out-look, voluntary attachment                           | Control/compliance/conformity                        |
| <b>Main regulatory mechanism</b> | Light regulation, market mechanism prevails | Heavy regulation: public interventionism to ensure equality in access to, and use of, means of communication | Heavy regulation: arrangements for access and positive representation of sub-groups in society | Totalitarian regulation: centralized, command system |
| <b>Underlying philosophy</b>     | Market-driven exclusion, negative freedom   | Inclusion, democracy, positive freedom                                                                       | Sympathetic recognition of alternative perspectives                                            | Political exclusion, hegemony, homogenization        |
| <b>Communicators</b>             | Everyone with the means to do so            | All social groups                                                                                            | All sub-groups                                                                                 | Only “approved” voices                               |

Adapted from McQuail (1992).

Another attempt to develop an alternative to the original four theories, and to match particular perspectives of the media with norms of journalistic performance, was undertaken by James Curran (1991). Curran identified four “perspectives on the media”: liberal, a Marxist critique of the liberal perspective, communist, and radical democratic. Of these, the “radical democratic” perspective deserves special attention here. Curran states that “radical democratic” is another term for “social democratic.” This perspective has much in common with both the democratic-participant media theory (cf. McQuail 1987) and with what Robert Picard has called a “social democratic” version of press theory (see McQuail 1992, 64;

Nordenstreng (1997) calls it a “democratic socialist” theory). In terms of the dimensions Curran uses to describe the different perspectives, the radical democratic one perceives the public sphere as the public arena of contest; the political role of media as representation/counterpoise; the media system as based on the principle of a controlled market; the journalistic norm as an adversarial one, entertainment as “society communing with itself,” and reform of the media system as possible to implement by means of public intervention. Accordingly, this perspective provides legitimation for public intervention into the communication processes, and even for collective ownership, so as to ensure true media independence from vested interests, access and diversity of opinion, as well as to promote inclusion and pluralism, which—according to this perspective—market forces cannot be relied upon to provide.

Yet another way of classifying media systems has been proposed by McQuail (1992, 66–67), who views “basic communication values”—those of freedom, justice/equality and order/solidarity—as a point of departure for such an exercise. The adoption of one of them as the foundation of a media order has far-reaching implications for all aspects of media operation.

It should be added that McQuail treats “order/solidarity” as one value, but accepts that it is open to more divergent definitions and evaluations. He explains that “order” may be seen as imposed from above, while “solidarity” may be voluntary and self-chosen. For this reason, and for purposes of analytical distinction, they are presented here as separate values, giving rise—when taken to their logical conclusion—to divergent media systems. Differences between “justice/equality” and “solidarity” lie primarily in the social and political orientation of the former value and the cultural and psychosocial orientation of the latter.

Let us add that a media system designed to ensure justice/equality has much in common with the social–democratic press theory. Along the same lines, the proposal by Keane (1991) to use public funds and public institutions to ensure positive freedom to communicate for all groups in society, the media’s independence from vested interests, feedback, access, social participation in, and social accountability of, the media—is clearly designed to promote equality in communications.

Thus, when Hallin and Mancini (2004) launched their own effort (it requires no presentation here, but will be critically assessed below) to classify and compare media systems, they had a vast body of work to look back upon. Furthermore, the appearance of their book has by no means stopped efforts to classify media systems. It has actually stimulated further thinking in this field.

One effort to complete the Hallin/Mancini models has been undertaken by Roger Blum (2005; here discussed entirely on the basis of Thomass

2007), whose point of departure is the idea that world regions have common features in their mediascape and that similarities of mentalities and cultures in a given world region explain the reasons for the similarities of media systems prevalent in it. Therefore, Blum introduces further categories into the analysis in order to be able to describe not only the political system but also cultural features as explaining variables for different types of media systems.

Blum looked at such dimensions as media freedom, media ownership, funding of media, media culture, and orientation of media, and combined these dimensions with some of Hallin/Mancini's into a synthesis. Thus, he integrated media-centered and policy-centered elements into his model. Every one of the dimensions can follow either a liberal line, a regulated line, or a line in between.

*Table 2. Categories for media systems (Blum 2005)*

|                                               | <b>A: liberal</b> | <b>B: middle</b>    | <b>C: regulated</b>  |
|-----------------------------------------------|-------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| 1. Government system                          | democratic        | authoritarian       | totalitarian         |
| 2. Political culture                          | polarized         | ambivalent          | concurring           |
| 3. Media freedom                              | no censorship     | cases of censorship | permanent censorship |
| 4. Media ownership                            | private           | private and public  | public               |
| 5. Funding of media                           | market            | market and state    | state                |
| 6. Parallelism of media and political parties | low               | moderate            | high                 |
| 7. State control of media                     | low               | moderate            | high                 |
| 8. Media culture                              | investigative     | ambivalent          | concurring           |
| 9. Media orientation                          | commercial        | divergent           | public service       |

By combining these dimensions and their incidence in particular regions, Blum identified six types of media systems, which can be described as follows:

1. The Atlantic–Pacific “liberal model” has a media system which is oriented toward commerce and autonomy and is investigative. A typical example is the United States. Australia and New Zealand may belong to this model as well;
2. The Southern European “clientelism model” has a commercial-populist-oriented TV sector and an elitist public-service-oriented

- print sector. Blum finds it in Portugal, Spain, Greece, Malta, and Cyprus, and perhaps in Eastern Europe;
3. The Northern European “public-service model” has a public-service orientation in broadcasting and the print sector. It includes Germany, Scandinavia, the Benelux states, and France, as well as modernized Eastern European countries such as Estonia;
  4. The Eastern European “shock model,” including strong state control of the media within a formal democratic frame, represents a media system where the government often interferes and breaches media freedom, as is the case in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Iran, or Turkey;
  5. The Arab–Asian “patriot model” postulates that the media are bound to support development aims and involve censorship. Blum names Egypt as typical of that model, and also lists Syria, Tunisia, Morocco, and Asian countries like Indonesia;
  6. The Asian–Caribbean “command model” represents countries where the government has an absolute control of the media except that the market is used for funding them. China is representative for that model, which fits as well for North Korea, Vietnam, Burma, or Cuba.

The use of these dimensions and typology allowed Blum to create a classification of media systems covering more countries than Hallin and Mancini do. It is not entirely clear, however, how particular countries were assigned to particular categories. Blum did not explain how he created the models and why no other combination of specification is necessary.


In the developing world, there has been a significant movement to resist Western models as exclusively based on Eurocentric history, theory, and practice, and explore alternative ethical and normative bases for public communication: “Unlike the individualistic, democratic, egalitarian and liberal tradition of Western political theory, some societies value their consensual and communal traditions with their emphasis on duties and obligations to the collective and social harmony” (Mehra 1989, 3; cited in Christians, Glasser, McQuail, Nordenstreng and White, forthcoming).

This approach is also adopted by Yin (2008, 47), who proposes a new “two-dimensional press model” (instead of the “traditional one-dimensional models, reflecting Western philosophical emphasis on the concept of freedom”), which in addition to freedom includes “a key Asian cultural emphasis on the concept of responsibility.” She argues that the Asian emphasis on the concept of responsibility is a result not only of Confucian moral influence (which extols cooperative and harmonious relations and according to which the strength of a country is regarded as more

important than the profitability of a company, and the well-being of a family is more important than individual rights and freedom), but also of the socio-economic realities of Asia, where development journalism originated and is still being pursued and where guerrilla warfare or religious and ethnic rivalries can flare up as a result of provocative news articles. Given Asia's cultural and philosophical heritage, says Yin, many of the axiological and philosophical underpinnings of Western press theories and systems have to be redefined. For example, Confucian societies are hierarchical and vertical, believing in meritocracy instead of democracy, and equality in human relations is a foreign concept to them. Where Western cultures value the independence and rights of the individual, Asian ones emphasize the importance of the state and family. Individual freedom and happiness are secondary to public good and responsibility. Freedom to explore in the free marketplace of ideas is replaced by a focus on teaching people what is right and what is wrong. Social order and stability are more important than civil liberties. Harmony takes precedence over competition.

On this basis, Yin proposes the following way to classify media systems:

*Figure 2. Freedom–responsibility coordinate system and resulting media systems*



Yin provides the following examples of these four types of media or media systems:

- Free and responsible: public service broadcasting in the United Kingdom and the United States, civic and public journalism in the United States, community and development journalism in India and Pakistan;
- Free and not responsible: profit-oriented media in market systems, where tabloidization reigns supreme, including some Eastern European countries, but also many media outlets in China; also partisan press, or media which allow themselves to be used as political tools;
- Responsible but not free: such press systems tend to exist in more traditional societies where the emphasis is on the group rather than on the individual and where cultural traditions or religions have a major impact on public life, such as Islamic countries;
- Not free and not responsible: North Korea or Turkmenistan, where there is very little information but plenty of glorification of state leaders in the press.

As it can be seen, Yin extends her typology to non-Asian countries. She says that by adding the dimension of press responsibility, she brings in cultural values important not only to the West, but also to the East, and can therefore present a fuller description of a press system. Yes, but this is meant to be an avowedly culture-specific typology of media systems, with special philosophical underpinnings of, for example, the concept of responsibility, which Yin clearly distinguishes from that of the social responsibility press theory. How, then, can it be a universally applicable typology, if elsewhere the dimensions of press systems applied by Yin are understood differently?

## II.

Following the enormous success of “Four Theories of the Press,” many media scholars have, as we have seen, sought to propose their own typologies and classifications, only to be followed by others with a still different proposal. The results have usually been disappointing, as no typology can do justice to all the complexities of a particular media system. We can actually say that the job of developing a truly universal and adequate classification of media systems is becoming increasingly difficult, and may actually border on the impossible.



Let us use the Hallin–Mancini framework briefly to consider this proposition.<sup>1</sup>

The first problem is that of defining media systems. If we are to compare media systems, first we should decide what they are. As it happens, the authors actually refrain from defining media systems. Instead, they state media systems are not homogeneous and are characterized by a complex coexistence of media operating according to different principles. Hallin and Mancini (2004, 12) also cite Denis McQuail's view that in most countries the media do not constitute any single "system," with a single purpose or philosophy, but are composed of many separate, overlapping and inconsistent elements, with appropriate differences of normative expectation and actual regulation. Therefore, they do not really speak of media systems but of "models" of such systems.

Nevertheless, McQuail (2000, 192–210) has described the media system as "the actual set of mass media in a given national society," characterized by such main dimensions as scale and centralization, degree of politicization, diversity profile, sources of finance, and degree of public regulation and control. Cardoso (2006, 24) cites Peppino Ortoleva, according to whom a media system refers to the set of interconnections between technologies and organizations that guide the diverse forms of communication. It is a category of an essentially institutional and economic origin that helps us to explain, on the one hand, the evolutive dynamics of the media and, on the other hand, how each society establishes, among the diverse media, a division of the roles, which is born out of the complex socio-cultural processes but later finds its legitimation in the companies and legislative frameworks.

Even if it was possible at one time to define media systems in this way, i.e. in terms of particular societies or "national societies," today—given globalization (also of media markets), transnational flows of content (also via the online media) and media concentration, internationalization of media regulation, etc.—such approaches are seen as a case of "methodological nationalism" (see, e.g., Mihelj, Koenig, Downey, and Štetka 2008). Instead, new theoretical imagery is proposed, characterized by the metaphors of "flows," "networks," and "scapes." In any case, media systems are no longer exclusively related to single political systems. Political systems regulate only some media, while the new technologies, etc.,

---

<sup>1</sup> We will draw here on the work of the project "Beyond Hallin and Mancini: Reconsidering Media Systems In a Democratic Perspective," operating within Working Group 2 "Democratic Theory and the Democratic Performance of the Media" of COST A30 Action "East of West: Setting a New Central and Eastern Media Research Agenda."

are taking over from the traditional media and exploding the traditional state-bound frame of reference.

If so, then two conclusions suggest themselves: (i) Hallin and Mancini have not really provided a methodological tool for comparing media systems; (ii) it is increasingly difficult to isolate discrete media systems as units of analysis, so the entire frame of reference for their analysis and comparison is beginning to break down.

True, in his preface to Cardoso's book, Castells speaks of "an increasingly diversified media system, which is made of the interplay between the different forms of communication, each one with its own logic, its own traditions, and its own set of values and interests inscribed in their institutional organization... the emergence of a new media system has different manifestations and consequences in various cultural, social, and institutional contexts. Even with the global diffusion of technology, and with the global networking of media business, what happens in California or Italy is different from what happens in Portugal or Brazil. Thus, both for analytical purposes and for policy design, it is essential to understand this process of transformation in its common features and in its cultural specificity" (Castells 2006, 17). Nevertheless, any systematic and all-encompassing approach capable of doing justice to these complexities has so far proved elusive.

This is all the more so since the nation-state fails as a unit of analysis for another reason: it is not only too small, but too large, in that an intra-state perspective is also needed, as different segments of the media landscape may operate according to different organizing principles, as identified in Hallin and Mancini's approach.<sup>2</sup>

As noted by Thomass (2007; see above), the new technologies and online media have so far not been taken into account in classifying media systems. Today, it is no longer conceivable to leave them out of the analysis, but at the same time these new media (Cardoso 2006) are too new to know how they will change and affect "communicative spaces" that are hybrid and comprise different elements: socialware, in addition to hard- and software, social media, user-generated media, and so on.

---

<sup>2</sup> It is pointed out, for example, that Hungary is evolving from a Polarized Pluralist system to a mixed system in which three different sectors of the media sector function according to different economic/market principles, political dynamics, and professional journalistic norms: (i) The dominant commercial sector basically represents principles of the Liberal Model; (ii) the public-service sector is moving from government/state control (Polarized Pluralism) to classic public service; and (iii) the partisan media sector represents, in a new technological setting, partisanship similar to classic Polarized Pluralism (but not always related to the state).

Also as noted by Thomass (2007), the models used in various typologies have proved unable to describe change in media systems—they are relatively static. They may be getting somewhat more dynamic, but not enough to explain the dynamics of change, adaptation and spatio-temporal organization of these specific configurations. Path-dependent history—and this is what most typologies, including that of Hallin and Mancini, are—determines where media are, but not where they are going.

In this context, we might note Huang's (2003) call for a "transitional media approach." Normative media theories, he says, came into being in certain historical settings, and so they lack the ability to adapt to changing social and media environments. Many researchers put dynamic and complex media realities into various normative pigeonholes. Instead, the author argues, it might be more productive to advance a "transitional media approach" that should:

- Be *non-normative*, as it should view human communication as a history of transition and make change and adaptation its primary orientation. Transition is a general and universal media phenomenon and all media systems should be analyzed as more or less dynamic and complex. A certain society's media system is a dynamic and complex body that is connected with, and fundamentally determined by, that society's changing political and socio-economic environment and cultural tradition. A transitional media approach attempts to revisit or balance the normative media approach by questioning its theoretical sufficiency in conceptualizing the changing media systems in the real world.
- *View media change as a historical process through both revolution and evolution.* A normative media approach focuses on radical or revolutionary media changes in order to regroup media systems into various normative models. A transitional media approach, by contrast, pays attention to both revolutionary and evolutionary media change and treats both of them as a transitional process that is far more complex than certain normative press models are able to handle. A transitional media approach maintains that certain revolutionary media change is neither the beginning nor the end of change or transition; it is instead more like a result and a part of "daily" evolutionary change of human communication. Although evolutionary media change takes a silent and gradual route, it does not necessarily mean it is not important or less significant than radical media change. In the eyes of the normative media approach, current Eastern European media systems might be well put into the Western lib-

eral pattern. From a transitional media perspective, however, media change in the region is far from a simple story of the “victory” of democracy, but an ongoing media transition with many and complex meanings.

- Be *culturally open-minded*, i.e. view human communication as a socio-historical phenomenon from a wide range of theoretical perspectives. It maintains that media transition in various societies may take different paths in different political, cultural, and socio-economic contexts, and therefore may lead to different and often complex media systems. More importantly, the approach calls for understanding these varieties and complexities from a cultural and historical perspective, rather than judging them from a one-dimensional philosophy or ideology.

Huang calls these proposals “initial” and justifiably so, as no criteria are provided to enable us to decide when the media have reached in their process of change a point of maturity when they can no longer be considered “transitional” and can be studied (possibly with the use of different criteria than those suggested by the author for “transitional” media) as a “system” or “space” of some lasting power.

To continue our discussion of the Hallin and Mancini approach, the range of variables they use to analyze media systems is clearly insufficient. While concentrating on political factors, they pay only scant attention to economic, market, and cultural variables—all of crucial importance in shaping the media, their operation, and their audiences.

Finally, the correspondence between their models and the reality on the ground in particular countries covered by their analysis has been found by many commentators to be imperfect, if not, indeed, wide off the mark.

Thus, at the very least, if one were to apply their method, one would need to go “beyond Hallin and Mancini” in many ways, by extending the analysis to new regions; incorporating a supra- and infra-state perspective; including in the analytical framework the impact of the new technologies and new modes of social communication made possible by them; and introducing new variables: economic, social, and cultural ones.

### III.

However, perhaps an altogether different method should be sought. Instead of seeking to develop an all-encompassing typology of “media systems” that might again fail to do justice to the complexities of media landscapes in particular regions, cultures, and societies, the solution might be to identify a number of “building blocks” that go into the making of media

operation in different contexts, and then simply use them to analyze particular media systems. Comparative analysis would be made possible by identifying which “building blocks” have been employed in particular countries or societies, instead of trying to pigeonhole their media into one or another preconceived “system.”

This could perhaps be done with the use of the “basic communication values,” as proposed by Denis McQuail (see above), so that analysis would identify which values and in what proportions and forms are behind media operation in particular countries. It may also be that this was the original concept behind an important forthcoming contribution to the debate on normative media theories, press theories and media systems, i.e. *Journalism in Democratic Societies: Normative Theories of the Media*, by Christians, Glasser, McQuail, Nordenstreng, and White (forthcoming). For reasons of space, we can offer only a very sketchy presentation of their approach.

The authors’ methodological point of departure is to separate three levels of analysis—philosophical traditions, political systems, and media systems—but also to show how these different levels are intimately related. Each of these three levels has its own logic and merits its own analysis, but for an overview they are presented by the authors side by side:

*Table 3. Levels of Analysis*

| <b>PHILOSOPHICAL</b>        | <b>POLITICAL</b>           | <b>MEDIA</b>          |
|-----------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------|
| <b>Normative traditions</b> | <b>Models of democracy</b> | <b>Roles of media</b> |
| Corporatist                 | Administrative             | Collaborative         |
| Libertarian                 | Pluralist                  | Monitorial            |
| Social responsibility       | Civic                      | Facilitative          |
| Citizen participation       | Direct                     | Radical               |

The authors warn that this presentation should not be taken literally as a table where the three entries in a line would directly correspond to each other. There is no one-to-one correspondence between types in the three different levels. None of the four historical traditions of normative theory corresponds exactly with a given democratic political model, nor with a given media role.

The first level of analysis is the most general and deals with the historical contexts and debates that have generated philosophical traditions to give guidance to public communication, including media and journalism. They tend to link norms of good public communication with deeper explanatory justification in terms of conceptions of the human, of society and the good life.

The second level of analysis allows a more precise discussion of the media's contributions to the working of democracy. Different societies have developed their own practices of democracy, according to variations in historical circumstances and political cultures. For these reasons, the typology identifies the main alternative political models of democracy, each of which makes somewhat different normative demands on the media of public communication.

At the third and lowest level of generality, the authors focus on the media themselves, especially their journalistic task, recognizing that journalism is more clearly and explicitly related to the defense of democracy.


The authors do not suggest placing each concrete case in the real world to one and only one pigeonhole. Accordingly, contemporary journalists may represent in their professional thinking several streams of the normative tradition simultaneously. Media institutions or individual communicators are typically composites of different and sometimes contradictory traditions. Thus the three typologies should be seen as vehicles of analytical understanding rather than sets of fixed locations limiting actual phenomena.

The overall reference point is democracy. The authors believe that anchoring the normative in democratic culture and political systems avoids the problem of moral relativism. However, they recognize that there have been and could be many combinations of democratic institutions in different historical and cultural contexts that provide guarantees of liberty and equality and the respect for human existence that this implies. For example, in a democracy, the media could be called on for a more collaborative role in some circumstances, without violating principles of liberty and equality, but at other times a role of radical change agent would be more appropriate.

At the philosophical level, the authors distinguish four major stages that have evolved in two-and-a-half millennia of debate over the way public communication should be carried on. Each historical context of the debate usually takes up all three levels—the philosophical underpinnings, a system of just and responsible governance, and the concrete mode of carrying on “good” public communication. Each configuration of normative values, such as the insistence that all citizens have a right to participate in the democratic process, tends to be linked with the search for what constitutes good and just public communication in a particular historical context.

Each tradition expresses a set of values that are relatively consistent with each other and which emerged in a particular historical situation.

Figure 3. Four normative traditions



### *The Corporatist Tradition*

This tradition has its origins in the direct democracies of the relatively small Mediterranean city-states in antiquity but is still influential today as a foundation for public communication in many parts of the world, especially in India, Asia, and Islamic cultures.

The relatively high degree of value consensus underlying a corporatist worldview often leads to media that are more respectful of authority. Democracies with a high degree of development mobilization may appeal to a corporatist world view and a collaborative approach in politics. The media are expected to be cooperative on matters of national interest and in relation to other social institutions such as religion, education and the family. Media elites are likely to be closely aligned to social, political, and cultural elites, and dominated by a policy of national cultural unity.

### ***Libertarian Tradition***

The second tradition might also be called “liberal-individualist,” since it elevates the principle of freedom of expression to the highest point in the hierarchy of values that the media are expected to uphold. Many of the central libertarian values were also the values and thinking of the entrepreneurial class. An article of faith is that individuals can freely own, and owners can use, the media for whatever purpose they wish within the law. The marketplace will ensure that the interests of all participants will be best served by a free media market and the benefits to the whole community maximized accordingly. There is no public right to publish nor any collective “right to know.” The enemy of liberty is government and the state, and no good can come from public intervention to secure some supposed public objective. Freedom is essentially freedom from control or regulation. The media are free to oppose or cooperate with the state as they wish.

### ***Social Responsibility Tradition***

The third tradition of thinking retains freedom as the basic principle for organizing public communication, including the media, but the public or community also has some rights and legitimate expectations of adequate service. A minimalist version expects the media themselves to develop self-regulatory mechanisms of accountability, based on voluntary promises in response to demands from the public and other social agents. The development of professionalism is thought to play a key part in this process. A more interventionist expression of the responsibility tradition comes in the form of press subsidies and laws to ensure diversity or innovation, as well as the founding of publicly owned media, especially public service broadcasting.

### ***Citizen Participation Tradition***

The fourth tradition, while more recent than the others named, already has a history of three or four decades. The basis of legitimacy for this tradition is the idea that the media belong to the people, with an emancipatory, expressive, and critical purpose. They are typically engaged in some form of struggle for collective rights. Where political change is achieved, they may expire or become institutionalized as the true voice of citizens, without being beholden to the market or government authority. Citizen participatory media rightly are placed at the end of the vector opposed to the more centralized authoritarian control of the media. This



tradition has mainly emphasized the role of local community, as well as small-scale and alternative media. This thinking furnishes a critique of big media and also sets up certain criteria of desirable operation. Even large-scale media can have a concerned and responsive attitude to their audiences and encourage feedback and interactivity. They can employ participatory formats and engage in surveys and debates that are genuinely intended to involve citizens.

As for models of democracy, the following are distinguished:

- *Pluralist Democracy*—in this model, priority is given to individual freedom, the market is seen as the main engine of welfare, and the role of the state is restricted to what is necessary for the orderly running of a free-market society. The media market—because of concentration and unrestrained pursuit of profit—may not serve the needs of pluralism by failing to give access to competing voices. A democratic social order is not necessarily well served by libertarian media. The media can choose or avoid roles in society as they wish.
- *Administrative Democracy*—emphasizes the need for institutions of professional administration and other expert bodies to look after the people's welfare. It requires a symbiosis between social-responsibility theory and social-democratic politics. The attitude of the state towards media (as expressed in words and deeds) is consistent with the principles of administrative democracy. The media are taken to task from time to time for their failures to support governmental and political institutions and not fully trusted to have complete independence. Attempts to increase accountability and retain public broadcasting against the tide of media deregulation reflects this lack of trust and desire to keep residual control.
- *Civic Democracy* (also often called “deliberative democracy”) is based on the proposition that any healthy democracy should be characterized by the active involvement of citizens in formulating opinions and representing certain shared interests, especially at a local level. Solutions typically call for the media to provide increasingly relevant and higher quality information and news, to open their channels to more voices, to listen to the concerns of citizens and reflect them, and to play an activating role on citizenship issues.
- *Direct Democracy*—the requirements of direct democracy for the media are primarily that there should be media channels available that allow all significant voices and claims to be heard, especially where they may be ignored by established elites. Direct democracy is likely to be promoted by large numbers of small-scale and grass-

roots media voices or by recognition in the market place of the unmet demand for content that will please some majority or significant minority that is otherwise being ignored.

As for the role of the media and journalism, Christians et al. (2009) identify the following roles:

- *Monitorial Role*—the role of the vigilant informer, which applies mainly to collecting and publishing information of interest to audiences, and also distributing information on behalf of sources and clients that include governments, commercial advertisers, and private individuals. This includes the notion of providing advance intelligence, advice, warning, and everything of general utility for information seekers. The idea can extend to cover fiction and entertainment genres of media, when images and impressions of reality are disseminated.
- *Facilitative Role*—as the main channel of public information, the news media come to be relied upon by other institutions for certain services in many areas, including politics, commerce, health, education, and welfare. The media provide access for legitimate claimants to public attention and for paying clients. Consistent with the normative character of journalism's roles, the news media do not merely report on civil society's associations and activities, but support and strengthen them.
- *Radical Role*—the media serve as a platform for views and voices that are critical of authority and the established order. They give support for change and reform, notably in radical ways. The media may also be a voice of criticism in their own right. This role is the focus of attempts to suppress or limit media freedom and also provides the main justification for freedom of publication. Without the radical role, participatory democracy would not be possible.
- *Collaborative Role*—this refers specifically to the relationship between the media and sources of political and economic power, but primarily to the state and its agencies. Even today, under certain circumstances, the news media are called upon to support civil or military authorities in defense of the social order against threats of crime, war, terrorism, and insurgency, as well as natural emergencies and disasters. The claim to media cooperation can be more general and involve demands that journalism support the national interest, or be patriotic and respect authority. In developing societies, journalism may be directed to serve particular development goals. This role is not just imposed on the news media from outside, but is often consistent

with their everyday activities or chosen under special circumstances of social necessity.

This very brief presentation can hardly do justice to the full depth and complexity of the analysis conducted by the authors, but hopefully it highlights their “ecumenical” approach to various historical, cultural, and philosophical traditions. If their approach is normative, it is in the insistence that democracy should be the framework within which the various traditions and media and journalism roles should be considered. This approach also allows for, in fact assumes, change and evolution.

When the book is published, it will be possible to discuss its merits and weaknesses more fully. It is already apparent, however, that by leaving economic and many social factors, as well as the new technologies, out of account, the authors have not come to grips with the full context that affects the media and their roles in society. Nevertheless, their approach eminently deserves to be applied in comparative studies, as it offers a range of tools and criteria with which to analyze actually existing complexes of media in particular social environments as they are, rather than seeking to place them on a Procrustean bed of some typology.

## Reference List

- Blum, R. (2005). "Bausteine zu einer Theorie der Mediensysteme." *Medienwissenschaft Schweiz*, 2/2005, 2: 5–11 (cited by Thomass 2007).
- Cardoso, G. (2006). *The Media in the Network Society: Browsing, News, Filters and Citizenship*. Lisbon: Centre for Research and Studies in Sociology.
- Castells, M. (2006). "Preface." In G. Cardoso, *The Media in the Network Society: Browsing, News, Filters and Citizenship*. Lisbon: Centre for Research and Studies in Sociology, 17–18.
- Christians, C.G., T.L. Glasser, D. McQuail, K. Nordenstreng, and R. White, *Normative Theories of the Media: Journalism in Democratic Societies*. University of Illinois Press.
- Curran, J. (1991). "Rethinking the Media as a Public Sphere." In P. Dahlgren and C. Sparks (eds.), *Communication and Citizenship: Journalism and the Public Sphere in the New Media Age*. London: Routledge.
- Hachten, W.A. (1981). *The World News Prism: Changing Media, Clashing Ideologies*. Ames: The Iowa State University Press.
- Hallin, D.C., and P. Mancini (2004). *Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Huang, C. (2003). "Transitional Media vs. Normative Theories: Schramm, Altschull, and China." *Journal of Communication* 53 (3): 444–459.
- Keane, J. (1991). *The Media and Democracy*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Martin, L.J., and A.G. Chaudhary (1983). *Comparative Mass Media Systems*. New York: Longman.
- McQuail, D. (1987). *Mass Communication Theory: An Introduction*. London: Sage Publications.
- McQuail, D. (1992). *Media Performance: Mass Communication and the Public Interest*. London: Sage Publications.
- McQuail, D. (1994). *Mass Communication Theory: An Introduction*. London: Sage Publications.
- McQuail, D. (1997). "Accountability of Media to Society: Principles and Means." *European Journal of Communication* 12 (4): 511–529.
- McQuail, D. (2000). *McQuail's Mass Communication Theory*. London: Sage Publications.
- Mehra, A. (ed.) (1989). *Press Systems in Asean States*. Singapore: AMIC.
- Merrill, J.C., and R.L. Lowenstein (1979). *Media, Messages and Men: New Perspectives in Communication*. New York, London: Longman.
- Mihelj, S., T. Koenig, J. Downey, and V. Štetka (2008). *Mapping European Ideoscapes, European Societies*, 10 (2): 275–301.
- Nordenstreng, K. (1997). "Beyond the Four Theories of the Press." In J. Koivisto and E. Lauk (eds.), *Journalism at the Crossroads. Perspectives on Research*, 47–64. Tartu: Tartu University Press.
- Siebert, F.S., Peterson, T., and Schramm, W. (1956) *Four Theories of the Press*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Sparks, C., and S. Splichal (1988). "Journalistic Education and Professional Socialization." Paper presented at the 16th IAMCR Conference, Barcelona, July 25–29.

- Thomass, B. (2007) "Comparing Media Systems: The Development of Analytical Tools and Theoretical Concepts over the Last 50 Years." Paper delivered during the IAMCR Conference, Paris.
- Williams, R. (1968). *Communications*. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
- Yin, J. (2008). "Beyond the Four Theories of the Press: A New Model for the Asian & the World Press." *Journalism Communication Monographs* 10 (1): 5–60.



# Comparing West and East: A Comparative Approach to Transformation

*Hans J. Kleinsteuber*

## Introduction

This is a proposal to introduce the term “transformation” into the comparative study of media systems. Transformation (from Latin: changing the form) refers to a change in form, nature, or function of a system. The term was originally used in other disciplines such as mathematics and physics. Transformation research in the social sciences originated in political science, notably in the 1980s, when processes of political democratization caught the attention of researchers. This was mainly a reaction to the breakdown of authoritarian regimes in the 1970s in Southern Europe and in the 1980s in Latin America. The approach was extended to the post-communist states of Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s. However, this causes problems as the transformation there involved changing totalitarian systems, which were far more affected by communist ideology and Soviet dominance. Nevertheless, transformation research attempts to place processes in different parts of the world in a common framework of analysis. It sees itself as a comparative approach that might be considered helpful for the study of comparative media systems.

There are other terms that describe basically the same field of research. In a general way, “transition” refers to a passing from one state to another. “System change” describes processes of modification inside a system. To make things easier, the output of this research is combined in this text under the heading “transformation,” as it is the most often used term in political science as well as in communication. This article does not claim to develop a new theory; instead it transplants fragments of theory from political science and related fields and applies them for use in comparative media studies.

The American political scientist Samuel Huntington developed a general theory of our age of transition when he claimed that we are passing through a “third wave of democratization” that includes all transformations that are covered here (Huntington 1991). His approach, shaped by history, implies that transformations happened in different countries at certain times and therefore take the shape of a wave. The author of this article would have liked to use the term “wave” for the three periods of

transformation covered here, but as it already carries a different meaning, he will refer to “phases.”

The concept of transformation has a special importance to us Germans, as the process of unification in 1989–1990 was accompanied by a managed transformation of the former German Democratic Republic and its media system. Even though this process is finished, we still see significant differences between both parts of the country, for instance, in media structure and media consumption. This happened despite the fact that West German standards were widely adopted. We also recognized that media had to be an important part of this transformation process, including new beginnings in media ownership, newspaper design, and journalism training (Kleinstauber 2004). This might explain why much of the recent research in media and transformation has originated in Germany.<sup>1</sup>

## **1. Transformation and Comparison**

Transformation itself is a clearly comparative term, as it claims that it is possible to compare processes in different states and the way the transformation change took place there (O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead 1986a).<sup>2</sup> This comparative approach is especially complex as it combines dimensions of space and time. This combination was proposed by Jay Blumler et al., who argue that work is comparative “when the comparisons are made across two or more geographically or historically (spatially or temporally) defined systems” (Blumler, McLeod, and Rosengren 1992, 7). Most systematic comparisons reflect mainly on space, meaning that national systems and their situation today are in the center of attention; the time dimension is mainly included insofar as it explains historical differences or future developments. The approach of transformation adds an additional dimension, as it combines subjects of comparison in space and time: It selects similar processes of change in different world regions at different times in history. In addition it is also related to area studies that claim that large regions or clusters of states (e.g. Latin America) follow similar patterns of system structures (Kleinstauber 2004a).

---

<sup>1</sup> To get an overview of the global transformation situation, see [www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de](http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de). This index includes the countries of the world and is put out by the Bertelsmann Foundation, owner of the largest European media company, Bertelsmann.

<sup>2</sup> The authors of this famous comparative project have rather cosmopolitan backgrounds. O'Donnell was born in Argentina and worked in the United States for much of his life. Schmitter is Swiss and holds academic positions in the United States and Europe. Whitehead is British and works in the United States.



The area approach causes problems, however, as there are considerable differences in the respective parts of the world. For example, the transformation region of Southern Europe included Greece, Portugal, and Spain—which all changed from dictatorship to democracy in the 1970s—but not Italy. Also, in the Balkans, transformation followed very different patterns and—in the case of the former Yugoslavia—is not yet finished. In the same way, not all Latin American countries became military dictatorships in the 1970s; the focus here is mainly on Brazil, Argentina, and Chile. Some other countries remained remarkably stable democracies like Costa Rica or stable authoritarian regimes like Cuba. The argument is instead that—if transformation processes occurred—this happened during certain time windows, and the resulting patterns show significant similarities.

This concept seems applicable to the situation of Central and Eastern Europe following the collapse of the Soviet Union after 1989, even though the countries were totalitarian and experienced a much more thorough transformation process. The cluster of Central and Eastern European countries included here consists of those that were Soviet satellites in the former Warsaw Pact. Not included are former Soviet republics, including Russia and the newly independent states. Given the present media situation of Russia and other former Soviet republics, one can talk about “defective democracies” or “blocked transformation,” reflecting the fact that not every transformation necessarily ends in a democratic system. Of course, even with these restrictions, we are speaking about a rather heterogeneous region that nevertheless has a common starting point, transforming out of communist regimes.

Finally I will limit my argument to the traditional media of print and broadcasting. Their transformation took place inside the borders of the nation-state and was part of a nationally inspired media policy. International influences were limited. But of course the world looks quite different today compared to 30 years ago, when the era of transformation started; globalization has advanced much further, and Internet-based media play an increasingly important role.

## **2. Transformation and Media Systems**

Media systems may be seen as a group of units that are combined in order to work and function independently. Media systems are characterized by stability, autonomy, and only gradual change that usually means adaptation to a changing environment. Therefore the student of media systems looks mainly at organizations, structures, market conventions, the journalistic profession, and so on. By contrast, the focus of transformation is

much more oriented towards the collective and individual actor, especially those that demand, support, and manage change. As a consequence, comparative media are best studied based on a systems approach, while transformation research works better with action theory. This does not mean that there is an either/or situation. Instead transformation accepts that there is a stable, though undemocratic, media system before transformation, and there will be another consolidated system after transformation. Only during a defined time window does the system change take place, in which agents see the chance to make a (new) choice and interact with the situation to influence it according to their priorities.

The paraphrasing of transformation as system change has consequences for the field of comparative media systems. System change describes a situation of intensive pressure to adapt to a new situation, but it also implies that this change is limited, that there was a stable media system before transformation and there will be another one after the process. System change does not refer to a total new beginning, as is typical for revolutions, which involve breaking down and building up from scratch. Thus transformation is the appropriate term to define the type of change that is typical for the third wave of democratization as described by Huntington.

### **3. Concepts of Transformation**

The study of transformation focuses on the change from authoritarian to democratic systems. As a defining term it clearly differs from the concept of democratization, which only refers to the transformation of the political system and the end of a dictatorship. Transformation is a much broader concept, based on the assumption that change also includes other sectors like the economy, society, culture, or even the perception of a nation. Systematic research on these questions started with the comparative analysis of transformation experiences up to the 1980s, based on international experiences (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986). We find different theoretical frameworks for the study of transformation, but all of them typically concentrate on actors. This is important, because it is a system that is being changed. These actors may be found on the side of government, but also in parties, interest groups, civil society organizations or NGOs (Merkel 1996–2000). Unfortunately, the political scientists doing this type of research on transformation were rarely interested in the media. Consequently, most case studies emphasize that in the present wave of transformation, elites were definitely more important than the “masses” or the “people” (as compared to earlier waves, such as the American and

French Revolutions). Transformation was mostly an ordered and controlled process, administered jointly by elites of the old regime and representatives of the opposition. Often members of the old elite changed sides and supported change. These observations lead to the interesting question of whether media managers and journalists belong to this elite or whether they stay outside and identify with the “people” whose demands they voice (Tzankoff 2001, 21).

Media have always been an integrated part of a dictatorship, as their content has to be controlled one way or another by the rulers. But the implications are quite different: Media might be economically independent from the state, remain in private hands, and act as commercial enterprises, but still be a part of dictatorially controlled information process. Transformation at the end of a dictatorship might mean that a system of censorship and repression is abolished, as was the case in Southern Europe and Latin America. Or it might refer to a much more intensive movement to take control away from the state and/or the dictator and place it into other hands. In the old communist regimes media were seen as an integral part of the party and state apparatus, and their role was to act collectively for “agitation and propaganda,” to use a term coined by Vladimir Lenin. As a consequence, the role of the media tends to be significantly different in the various transformation regions.

Media play a special role in this respect. In a Western understanding of media freedom, they should not be part of the governmental system. Instead they are interpreted as a “fourth branch of government”; they have to be autonomous and should be protected from interference so they can play their controlling role. Taking this into account, political and media transformation are two separate things. A central point is that the political system is being transferred from autocracy to democracy, whereas the media system has to be opened, so that it may provide the services essential to democratic procedures. Diversity of opinions, pluralism, and independence from the state apparatus are the normative demands (Thomas 2001, 53ff). Democratization of the media is not on the agenda.

#### **4. Approaches in Comparative Transformation Research**

The academic study of transformation started with the experience of political change in the former dictatorships of Southern Europe in the 1970s (Greece, Spain, and Portugal). Of course, media transformation had taken place before this third wave, e.g. in defeated Germany after the end of World War II. There are basic differences, though, as 1945 was seen as the starting point in the postwar history of both Germanys, and

the media system started at “zero hour” virtually anew, according to rules determined entirely by the occupying powers. Compared to this radical rebuilding process forced from outside, the transformation processes of these three phases are based much more on internal change that takes into account the existing media system. Much of the change was initiated by national political bodies that were themselves in the process of transformation.

Central in the interest in comparative transformation research was and is the question of what was common to all, regardless of time and space. As an outcome the transformation period is usually subdivided into three phases:

- the old regime: end of autocratic regime;
- transformation: the institutionalization of democracy;
- new system: consolidation of democracy (Merkel 1999, 120).

For the success of transition processes, two elements are especially important:

- the pre-autocratic experiences with democracy;
- the achievements of the consolidated democracy (Merkel 1999, 122).

This scheme may easily be transferred to the role of the media. In the old system the forces in power attempted to control the media and repress independent news and opinion making. The instruments of control in the respective transformation clusters were quite different though: state or monopoly party ownership of the media, censorship and repression and opposition media, prosecution of critical journalists. As a common result there were no media that could act independently from the regime, which implied that in the very initial steps of a democratic transformation, the media usually played no central role.

However, as soon as the old regime crumbled for whatever reason—e.g. widespread public protests, internal change of the old regime elite, economic failure, lost war—some media and their journalists were usually among the first to change sides and used the newly found freedom for critical reporting. They sided with those in opposition to the ruling powers. Some of the journalists usually played a decisive role in this phase, as they had been well aware of the shortcomings of the old regime and already secretly supported the forces for change. In some Central and Eastern European countries, like Poland, journalists were well trained, shared common interests and values, much like their Western counterparts, and were certainly aware of their professionalism, which was not respected by the repressive system (Curry 1990). This starting point makes them a natural ally of other transformation actors in parties, parliaments, associations, protest movements, etc.

During this period of actual transformation, some of the media appeared as the spearhead of change, while others naturally defended the old order. Interest in media reporting increased tremendously among the population, which had little trust in the old, censored media. A study points out that in communist countries the criticism was “read” by citizens as confirmation of their negative opinion about the regime and its ideology. “But when the official media started publishing the criticism at the general, systemic level, this greatly intensified the negative feelings among the masses and convinced them that the downfall of the regime was an imminent possibility” (Novosel 1995, 16). As such, the formerly passive media, during this second step, often became a central intensifier. By entering the final stage of consolidation, a new and more democratic level is reached. At this time much of the old media system might have broken down and been replaced by a new order, or it might have survived without much damage. Usually, the pure freedom that journalists enjoyed during the transformation turmoil disappeared, and new authorities set clear boundaries for them.

This is of course only a rough sketch of the results of comparative transformation research. Obviously there are tremendous differences between the national processes of change, based on different histories, economic systems, journalistic traditions, and cultural variations. It makes a difference if literacy is limited (as in Latin America, where TV plays a dominant role), and if the dictatorship lasted a long time (as in Central and Eastern Europe and Southwest Europe) or was only temporary, following a military coup d'état (as in Greece or parts of Latin America). The depth of economic transformation also plays a major role. Media owned by the old state regime were often transferred to new owners, whereas existing commercial media sometimes were not greatly affected by the process of change.

## **5. The Three Phases of Transformation**

*The first phase:* This happened in three Southern European countries that either had a long-lasting Catholic-Fascist regime (Spain, Portugal) or suffered temporarily under a military regime (Greece, between 1967 and 1974) (O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead 1986b). All these countries had developed print media systems much earlier that were seriously limited during the authoritarian regime, but remained privately owned. Especially in Spain and Portugal, opposition print media were outlawed, journalists threatened, and some kind of censorship was introduced, but the press remained basically in private hands. Electronic media and especially television were established during the long authoritarian period and

placed under state control. International ownership was nonexistent during those years and information isolation was high, due to language barriers and little contact with the outside world.

The print media of the dictatorship mostly remained intact during and after transformation and adapted to the new environment. They were challenged by new media ventures that sprang up during the transformation phase. The situation in Spain is typical. The most-read paper today, *El País*, which is associated with the Social Democrats, was established in 1976, shortly after the death of Generalissimo Franco—that is, during the transformation years. By contrast, the leading paper of the Franco era, *Abc* (established 1903), has survived as a conservative publication to the present day and is the country's third-largest newspaper (de Mateo 2004). Radio and television had been in the hands of the dictatorial state and were therefore especially discredited; they were transformed into public broadcasters, based on the European model. But their reputation remained low and in addition they were soon confronted with the rise of commercial broadcasters; some politicization also continued. As a result, public broadcasters tend to be relatively weak—for instance, the Spanish TVE. It is organized as public broadcaster, but not financed by monthly fees and therefore depends on state subsidies and advertisements. This situation contributes to the shape of the Mediterranean media model described by Hallin and Mancini as the “Polarized Pluralist Model,” where political parallelism played an important role (Hallin and Mancini 2004, 89–142). Given this idea, one might argue that during the years of dictatorships, the parallelism was limited to media of the governing regime and extended to opposing positions during transformation.

*The second phase:* In Latin America the reference countries are Brazil (dictatorship 1964–1985), Chile (1973–1990) and Argentina (1976–1983); the peak of transformation was during the 1980s and early 1990s. During their turbulent histories these countries developed the typical Latin American model of media system: Print media were available, but only for the ruling elite, whereas radio and later television quickly become leading mass media (Fox 1997).

The dictatorships started with a coup d'état that put the military in a governing position (O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead 1986c). During the first several years after the seizure of power, a bloody regime was introduced that especially persecuted intellectuals, among them many journalists. Opposition media were destroyed; the surviving media saw their chance and actively supported the regime. A system of censorship was not established, but opposition voices were routinely repressed.

Influence from international media was not controlled much, as their impact was considered to be low, and they were not seen as threatening by the military rulers. After this extreme phase, the systems became less repressive and introduced a cautious course of liberalization. As a result opposition media had a chance to emerge.

The military dictators had to cope with an already developed media system and attempted to control it by rather open repression—for example, journalists were prosecuted, exiled, or killed. But all the print media remained in private hands, and those with an opposition stance were usually driven out of the market or economically ruined. Other media purposely went along with the dictators and had the chance to expand on a market with fewer competitors. This pattern can be clearly studied in Brazil, where the former newspaper company *El Globo* became the leading television actor during the dark years, even as some of the earlier competitors were destroyed or severely weakened (Grünewald and Kirsch 2004; Kirsch 1998). This strategy proved especially successful as there was no public broadcasting in Latin America to counteract the market leader. So, when media freedom was guaranteed in the constitution of 1988, the media market was already highly monopolized. The Brazilian pattern is also typical of Latin America, where the leading media companies were and still are family businesses, e.g. *Rede Globo*, which had been founded by the late Roberto Marinho. Televisa S.A. in Mexico, under control of the Azcárragas family, is in a similar position. It grew in accordance with the former hegemonic party, PRI, and maintains its dominant position in the post-PRI years of democracy (Schleicher 1994).

As a concurring effect of transformation, there was a strong process of political democratization in Latin America that was usually supported by a portion of the old media that quickly adopted to the new situation. As a result there was little change in the media. In Chile, for example, a central problem of the present center-left government is that it is still confronted with much the same media structure as at the end of the Pinochet era (1990). In fact, the major change in the media system of these Latin American states took place during the years of the authoritarian rule, when competitors were destroyed and the remaining market leaders could dominate the consolidation period. Also, foreign influence was nonexistent as Latin America (again following the U.S. example) traditionally follows a policy of national licensing of broadcasters, a policy that was imposed by the nationalistic military rulers. It is still practised today.

Besides commercial broadcasters, Latin America also has a tradition of state-managed broadcasting, which was originally intended to support education, culture, minorities, and so on. As a consequence of the nearly

totally commercialized media systems, some politicians concentrate on the few state TV channels that they keep under control. Hugo Chavez of Venezuela is an example here; he founded the news channel Telesur together with other Latin American governments. As a reaction to the resulting polarization between state and commerce, we find in a number of Latin American countries (like Chile and Venezuela) strong civil society movements towards introducing a public broadcasting model following the European example.

*The third phase:* In Central and Eastern Europe the beginnings are quite different from the earlier phases. The hegemonic power of the region, the Soviet Union, had exported its media system of total control by the communist party, often administered by the state, to all countries under its control. Content of news media was supervised by specific organizations that spread the daily interpretations of official policy. Space for independent opinions was extremely limited, independent media were prosecuted, and critical journalists lost their jobs. In the countries of “real socialism” there were media producers with some formal independence, owned by “mass organizations” (like trade unions, small dependent parties, women, youth, etc.), but no commercial ventures independent from the state could enter the market. An integrated part of this control regime was the supervised training of journalists, membership of journalists in dependent organizations and many other measures that were not to be found in the earlier transformation countries.

However, in between these countries we find some differences. In the former Soviet Union a censorship authority, named “Glavlit,” controlled all media output, whereas in the former East Germany and other countries, this was done by journalistic self-control and eventual punishment. This system of internal censorship was supplemented by a regime of controlled access to international news to keep critical ideas out. Again, this regime was not monolithic; in Poland, for example, some Western magazines were available. Because of the close link of these countries to the former Soviet bloc, in an extension of the Hallin and Mancini classification, they should be called jointly the “Eastern European/Post-communist media model countries” (Jakubowicz 2007, 303).

Under these circumstances change could only be started with an initial opening in the Soviet Union. The transformation process began with the years of Gorbachev’s perestroika (1985–1991). His policy during these crucial years was based on a philosophy of glasnost, a general opening of politics, society, and the media. He even appealed to the journalists to support his policy of change and help him in fighting off the old powers (Paletz, Jakubowicz, and Novosel 1995). The breakdown of the old order



was accompanied by journalists who enjoyed the new freedom and cautiously changed sides. When the Soviet system crumbled altogether, beginning in 1989, many newly founded media outlets—mainly in print and radio—sprang up, some of which have survived to this day. As we now know, the transformation process partially collapsed in Russia, and the system still has semi-autocratic features that are deeply felt in the strangled media (Trautmann 2002; Vartanova 2004). The result may be categorized as a “blocked” transformation that requires a different approach to analyze.

Similar processes could also be observed during the first years of transformation in the states of Central and Eastern Europe. Theories of post-communist transformation or transition apply here (Jakubowicz 2003, 5–35). Some of the old media disappeared, but most were transformed and changed hands, getting a variety of new owners; some were businessmen turned functionaries; sometimes employees became the owners; and often Western companies bought them up. The old state broadcasters were changed according to the Western public model, but often strong elements of control by the majority government (and quick changes if this government changed) remained. In any case an intensive and deep change in ownership and control took place that could not be found in the first two phases of transformation.

The role model for change in politics and economics was the Western liberal model. This implied that the media system would become a system of its own, whereas before it was a part of the politico-economic system of planning. During this process the media system had to be opened, so that it might provide diversity of opinions, pluralism, independence from the state, and so on (Thomaß 2001, 53ff). These are normative requirements, of course, as the reality proved to be much more complex. A special problem of this transformation was that the change in the political system and in the media had to take place at the same time, a situation that the theory of media change had not foreseen (Thomaß 2001, 55). Exactly this problem was also discovered by political scientists: Claus Offe recognized that transformation in Central and Eastern Europe suffered under something that he called the “dilemma of simultaneity,” meaning that the countries not only had to introduce a new political system, market economy principles, and modernize in many other ways, but that many of the countries also had to (re)create the nation, and that some split up (like the Czech Republic and Slovakia), violently fell apart like Yugoslavia, or moved unprepared into independence, like the successor states of the former Soviet Union (Offe 1994). All these problems of course were reflected in the media system.

An additional problem was and is the transatlantic competition between followers of the Western European model of the dual (public-commercial) broadcasting system and the totally commercial model of the United States. Both models have been propagated, often connected with economic interests behind them. One may translate this competition into the concept of Hallin and Mancini as one between the “North Atlantic or Liberal Model” and the “North/Central European or Democratic Model” (Hallin and Mancini 2004, 89–250). In any case, the system of economic planning was substituted by a market economy, state ownership (ideologically by the “people”) was often turned into private ownership, sometimes favoring a few clever investors that had no interest in the professional and quality side of the media. As a result, liberalization, privatization, and deregulation took place at the same time, often seen as a “shock therapy” to all who were affected (including journalists), e.g. with the Balcerowicz Plan in Poland (Kopper et al. 1998; Hadamik 2001; Planeta 2002). As part of the consolidation process, the achievements of the new order were guaranteed by new media laws and often written into the new constitutions (as in Poland in 1997, where freedom of the press was guaranteed in Article 14, and freedom of opinion in Article 54).

Following the difficult economic situation in the transformation states, the introduction of market economies, and the European policy of not limiting foreign ownership in broadcast licenses, a large share of the media assets of most EEC countries went to Western media conglomerates.

## **6. The Three Phases in a Comparative Perspective**

As a next step the transformation process in Central and Eastern Europe will be compared to that of the first and second phases.

1. The relationship between the dictatorial regime and the media turns out to be quite different in the three phases analyzed. In the case of the temporary military dictatorships, much of the original media system remained intact and was not challenged as long as it went along with the new power holders. Quite different was the situation in Central and Eastern Europe, where practically all of the traditional media from pre-war times—with the possible exception of former communist publications—were abolished or changed ownership. Instead of the media, controlled by the regimes of Central and Eastern Europe, a totally new structure of media was established that acts mostly outside of governmental control.

2. At the end of the transformation process, a broad range of political currents and parties entered the scene in Central and Eastern Europe and most of them were somehow related to publications, some of them new, others reoriented media from communist times—one could call it a type

of new political parallelism. In the area of the first phase, most of the old media survived unchanged; some were newly established and represent the post-authoritarian freedom in the media. In Latin America, opposition media were closed down so that the market position of the remaining media was strengthened. The old media survived, adapted to the new situation, had a clear starting advantage, and made the founding of new media outlets difficult.

3. Only in the countries of the third phase did a fundamental change take place in the field of print media. The former press of the government, the communist party and the mass organizations was either closed down or sold to new owners who gave them new political orientations. Very few publications remained under the control of post-communist parties. By contrast, the old press in the first and second phases remained largely unchallenged.

4. The first-phase countries of Southern Europe had a well-developed state sector in broadcasting that was built up largely during the era of authoritarian government. It was transferred into public broadcasters, often in a gradual process with much of the old staff working on. The second-phase countries of Latin America had no state sector in broadcasting, or only a small one that did not change much and still exists; even today it remains mostly under the control of the president and the ruling majority. Public broadcasting based on the European model does not exist anywhere. In the third-phase countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the former state broadcasters were—as in the first phase—transferred to public broadcasting, sometimes by keeping much of the old personnel. Often these public broadcasters work under the close control of the respective governmental majority and are often seen as a voice of the governing elite.

5. In the first-phase countries commercial broadcasters were introduced in the 1980s, much as in other parts of Western Europe, and they were supervised by the same regulatory scheme. In the second-phase countries not much changed as the commercial principle was already predominant. In the third-phase countries commercial competition to public broadcasting was purposely introduced in the 1990s, often to counter the influence of the former state broadcasters that had turned public. Compared to the core public service systems of Western Europe in Britain, Northern and Western Europe—the “Democratic-Corporatist Model” of Hallin and Mancini—the position of public broadcasters in all three transformation regions is either relatively weak or non-existent (Hallin and Mancini 2004, 143–197).

6. By the end of the transformation process in all three areas, new and independent media outlets had been founded. The extent is quite differ-

ent though. They had a good chance to survive in the first-phase countries, where they usually represent the left-of-center part of the political spectrum. It turned out to be much more difficult in the second-phase countries, where the established media, after being strengthened by the dictatorship, did everything to keep the new competitors down. In the third-phase countries many new media outlets were established during the period of transformation, but most of them could not survive, whereas a few became leading opinion-makers.

7. In terms of internationalization of control, we find significant differences. In the first-phase countries today we observe some international activity (e.g. European magazine publishers are active), which falls very much in the general course of the media landscape inside the European Union. Portugal is a special case, because it feels that it has to defend its culture against a strong media influx from much larger Brazil, whose TV companies became strong actors on the Portuguese market. In the second-phase countries the nationalistic attitude of the military dictators protected the favored media companies from international competition. Instead national champions arose with a very strong market position that have survived to the present, like *Rede Globo* or *Televisa*. In the third-phase countries, Western companies offered help and soon started to buy up print companies and establish new commercial broadcasters. Today a significant share of media in all third-phase transformation states is controlled by outside companies, mostly from Western Europe, some from the United States.

8. The dominating trend in all three transformation areas is that of an increasing commercial homogenization, as forecasted by Hallin and Mancini in their convergence thesis (Hallin and Mancini 2004, 251–295). In the first- and third-phase countries, the principle of public broadcasting is relatively weak; in the second-phase countries, it is nonexistent.

9. As a result of the opening up during the transformation process, civil society actors had a chance to establish non-public and non-profit media like community radio and campus radio. In Southern Europe this process followed the “radio libre” pattern of other Romance-language countries. In the second-phase region the movement of community radio remained generally quite strong, as it is the only way to escape the hegemony of central commercial actors and add local flavor to communication. Also in the third-phase countries a lively structure of community media survived. This observation also applies to Germany: The unification process left little autonomous media in Eastern Germany, which led to the founding of a significant number of local radio stations and public access radio and television initiatives.

10. In all three areas the relative independence of journalists during the years of transformation quickly disappeared and was substituted by the media owners setting the directions. Journalist-controlled media have survived but only to a very small extent. In all transformation regions the position of journalists is relatively weak. At the end of the transformation process, journalists followed mainly the Western example and founded independent professional associations and trade unions, often with the assistance of Western partners (like the International Federation of Journalists) to protect their interests. As such they follow a trend that is international and not so different from the rest of the world.

It should have become clear that the transformation processes in the three phases followed a comparable pattern, for the most part. But if one looks at the interrelationship among politics, economy, and culture, deep differences remain. In the first phase the result of transformation was that the countries ended up in more or less a similar state as their Southern European neighbors, something that is also reflected in Hallin and Mancini's research, which does not differentiate between regular and transformation states. In the second-phase countries, the dictatorial period has deeply changed the balance of the media system, whereas little has happened since then, in spite of democratization. Nowhere was the transformation process so deep and intensive as in the third phase, where virtually nothing remained from the old order.

This is a very general description of the changes that come with transformation. Of course there are always specifics when it comes to individual countries or regions. In some of the third-phase countries, other interesting phenomena can be observed. One in particular should be mentioned here: the "feminization" of the journalistic profession, as it was analyzed in Bulgaria, because of swift adaptation to the transformation process and acceptance of low payment by women (Tzankoff 2002; Indzhov 2005). In general it seems that women could cope better with the profound change that came along with transformation and were able quickly to occupy new positions that had been created in the new media environment.

## **7. Conclusion: A Fourth Phase?**

So far it has been demonstrated that the theory of transformation offers a framework to understand processes of ordered change in the past. But there is also a normative side to it, as it emphasizes that change is possible, that it is based on specific actors, and that the media play a crucial role in it. Whoever wants to strengthen democracy in the remaining authoritarian regimes around the world has to concentrate on the media and the people who work in them, because they happen to be important allies

(Blankson and Murphy 2007). Journalists usually understand well the internal workings of a dictatorship but fear making their intimate knowledge public. Strengthening the position of journalists and helping them to establish professional standards also support the actors of future transformation. Much of the media development assistance, offered by European countries and international organizations like UNESCO, is based on this assumption. A fourth phase of media transformation will come, which we must be prepared for.

The reflection on three phases in three different areas of the world underlines that some important regions have been left out, such as the Arab world, sub-Saharan Africa, and parts of Asia. Some Asian countries have a long tradition of media freedom, like India. Others have already transformed their political system and opened their media system, notably South Korea and Taiwan. Several countries are undergoing some kind of transformation right now, among them Indonesia and Thailand (Ritter 2008). China is in a very special situation nowadays; commercially and educationally, it is opening to the world, yet censorship remains strong in the old and new media.

Perhaps comparative transformation research may help here: A study on media and transformation in Taiwan underlines that the process of overcoming the Chiang Kai-shek dictatorship (beginning in 1986) and establishing free media could well be explained by existing transformation research, though it hardly ever focused on Asia so far. According to this study, transformation followed partly the Central and Eastern European pattern, but in terms of continuation of the old media actors, it also resembles Latin America (Chang 2006). Interestingly enough, in Taiwan a public broadcaster was newly established that is expected to stabilize the process of democratization. This might be seen as an example for other parts of the world, like Latin America.

The transformation process in South Korea showed similar patterns. There the old media survived, controlled—as in Latin America—by some leading families. What is fascinating in South Korea is that the unchanged media situation led to mistrust of the audiences and a crisis of participation. The very highly developed communications infrastructure (including broadband in most homes) was employed to create alternative media outlets and a special online public sphere based on citizen journalism. The Internet newspaper *Oh My News* is the best example (Lee 2005).

In general, transformation research is able to open new perspectives on the comparative study of media systems. But much still has to be done before there are truly free media systems in every part of the world.

## Reference List

- Blankson, I.A. and P.D. Murphy (eds.) (2007). *Negotiating Democracy: Media Transformations in Emerging Democracies*. New York: State University of New York Press.
- Blumler, J., J.M. McLeod, K.E. Rosengren, (eds.) (1992). *Comparatively Speaking: Communication and Culture across Space and Time*. Newbury Park: Sage.
- Chang, H.T. (2006). *Medien und Politik im Demokratisierungsprozess auf Taiwan*. Münster: LIT.
- Curry, J. (1990). *Poland's Journalists: Professionalism and Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- De Mateo, R. (2004). "Spain." In Kelly, M., et al., 224–235.
- Esser, F., B. Pfetsch, (eds.) (2004). *Comparing Political Communication: Theories, Cases, Challenges*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Fox, E. (1997). *Latin American Broadcasting: From Tango to Telenovela*. Luton: University of Luton Press.
- Grünewald, A., and T. Kirsch (2004). "Medien in Brasilien." In Hans-Bredow-Institut, 804–819.
- Hadamik, K. (2003). *Transformation und Entwicklungsprozess des Mediensystems in Polen von 1989 bis 2001*. Ph.D. dissertation, Dortmund.
- Hallin, D.C., and P. Mancini (2004). *Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hans-Bredow-Institut (ed.) (2004). *Internationales Handbuch Medien*. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
- Huntington, S.P. (1991). *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Indzhov, I. (2005). *Die Fernsehtransformation in Bulgarien*. Frankfurt/Oder: Ph.D. dissertation (electronic resource).
- Jakubowicz, K. (2007): "The Eastern European/Post-Communist Media Model Countries: An Introduction." In Terzis, G., 303–314.
- Jakubowicz, K. (2003): "Social and Media Change in Central and Eastern Europe: Framework and Analysis." In Paletz/Jakubowicz, 3–44.
- Kelly, M., G. Mazzoleni, and D. McQuail (eds.) (2004). *The Media in Europe: The Euromedia Handbook*. London: Sage.
- Kirsch, T. (1998). *Brasiliens bewegte Bilder. Die Entwicklung der brasilianischen Film- und Fernsehwirtschaft unter besonderer Berücksichtigung staatlicher Interventionen*. Frankfurt: Lang.
- Kleinstaub, H.J. (2004). "Germany." In Kelly, Mazzoleni, and McQuail, 78–90.
- Kleinstaub, H.J. (2004a). *Comparing Mass Communication Systems: Media Formats, Media Contents and Media Processes*. In Esser/Pfetsch, 64–86.
- Kopper, G.G., et. al. (eds.) (1998). *Medientransformation und Journalismus in Polen*. Graz: Vistas.
- Lee, E. (2005). *Korea im demokratischen Aufschwung*. Leipzig: Universitätsverlag.
- Merkel, W. (1999). *Systemtransformation. Eine Einführung in die Theorie und Empirie der Transformationsforschung*. Wiesbaden: VS.
- Merkel, W., et al. (eds.) (1996–2000). *Systemwechsel 1–5* (5 volumes). Opladen: Leske + Budrich.

- Novosel, P. (1995). *The Iron Law of Communication*. In Paletz, Jakubowicz, and Novosel, 9–17.
- O'Donnell, G., and P.C. Schmitter (1986). *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.
- O'Donnell, G., P.C. Schmitter, and L. Whitehead (eds.) (1986a). *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.
- O'Donnell, G., P.C. Schmitter, and L. Whitehead (eds.) (1986b). *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- O'Donnell, G., P.C. Schmitter, and L. Whitehead (eds.) (1986c). *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Latin America*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Offe, C. (1994). *Der Tunnel am Ende des Lichts: Erkundungen der Transformation im Neuen Osten*. Frankfurt: Campus.
- Paletz, D., and K. Jakubowicz (eds.) (2003). *Business as Usual: Continuity and Change in Central and Eastern European Media*. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton.
- Paletz, D., K. Jakubowicz, and P. Novosel (eds.) (1995). *Glasnost and After: Media and Changes in Central and Eastern Europe*. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton.
- Planeta, P. (2002). "Media and Communication Landscape in Poland." In Gerd Kopper (ed.), *Arbeitshefte Internationaler Journalismus*. Bochum: Projekt.
- Ritter, M. (ed.) (2008). *Medien und Transformation in Südostasien: Fallstudien zu Indonesien, Malaysia, Thailand, Kambodscha, Laos und Vietnam*. Erfurt: TKG.
- Schleicher, I.M. (1994). *Televisa S. A. in Mexiko*. Münster: LIT.
- Thomaß, B., and M. Tzankoff (eds.) (2001). *Medien und Transformation in Osteuropa*. Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher.
- Thomaß, B. (2001). *Kommunikationswissenschaftliche Überlegungen zur Rolle der Medien in Transformationsgesellschaften*. In Thomaß and Tzankoff, 39–64.
- Terzis, G. (ed.) (2007). *European Media Governance: National and Regional Dimensions*. Bristol: Intellect.
- Trautmann, L. (2002). *Die Medien im russischen Transformationsprozess—Akteur oder Instrument der staatlichen Politik?* Frankfurt: Lang.
- Tzankoff, M. (2001). *Die deutsche Transformationsforschung nach 1989—Ein Überblick*. In Thomaß and Tzankoff, 9–37.
- Tzankoff, M. (2002). *Der Transformationsprozess in Bulgarien und die Entwicklung der postsozialistischen Medienlandschaft*. Münster: LIT.
- Vartanova, E. (2004). "Russia." In Kelly, Mazzoleni, and McQuail, 191–203.



# **In Search of a Label for the Russian Media System**

*Hedwig de Smaele*

What could be worse than socialism?  
Whatever comes after it.  
(Russian joke from the early 1990s,  
cited in Kon 1996, 185)

## **Introduction**

The Soviet Union presented a clear, coherent, and distinct media model in line with its general political, economic, and ideological model. It was labeled the communist model, the Soviet model, or the Marxist model. It was characterized by state (and party) ownership, centralization, partisan journalism, and (ideological) censorship. The post-communist Russian model, by contrast, seems to lack coherence. There is private ownership but also heavy state control. There is a ban on censorship but also pressure on journalists to write or not to write about certain things. There is decentralization but also a highly centralized state television. There are Western-style journalists who present the facts, but there are also those who are mere publicists. What should such a system be called? Is there one model at all? And why is the Russian media system as it is?

In this paper we will review the labels that have been proposed to name the Russian media system as well as the broader social system, and we will discuss the usefulness for Russia of labels applied to other Central and Eastern European countries. Our main goal and challenge, however, is the positioning of the Russian media system within the typology of media systems proposed by Hallin and Mancini (2004). We will try to single out the main characteristics of the Russian media system by using the four major dimensions considered by Hallin and Mancini: 1) the development of media markets, 2) political parallelism, 3) the development of journalistic professionalism, and 4) the degree and nature of state intervention in the media system. We will compare our findings on Russia with the main characteristics of the three media models—Polarized Pluralist, Democratic Corporatist, and Liberal—in order to conclude whether one of these labels can be applied to Russia, or not, or only partially.

## 1. Labels for Post-Communist Russian Society

The Soviet Union labeled itself a “socialist democracy” (*sotsialisticheskaya demokratiya*) in the 1977 Soviet Constitution (Article 9). The Western world preferred to call the Soviet Union an authoritarian state or indeed a totalitarian dictatorship. The latter was described by Friedrich and Brzezinski (1956, 9) as consisting of an ideology, a one-party system, a centrally directed economy, a terroristic police, a communications monopoly, and a weapons monopoly. It was a regime of monopolies or, indeed, a monopolistic and “total” regime.

The 1993 Constitution of the new Russian Federation describes Russia as a democratic federal rule-of-law state (*demokraticheskoe federativnoe pravovoe gosudarstvo*) (Article 1). The democracy formally adhered to is no longer tied to the conditional modifier “socialist.” This time, the adjectives describing “democracy” are conceived of by external as well as internal observers and critics to indicate some form of limited democracy. Russian democracy has been labeled many things, including a “pseudo democracy” (Diamond 1996), “illiberal democracy” (Zakaria 1997), “delegated democracy” (Weigle 2000, Remington 1999), “authoritarian democracy” (Sakwa 1998), “military democracy” (Dunlop 2002) or even “totalitarian democracy” (Goble 2000). The label “market economy” is accompanied by adjectives such as “pseudo” (Truscott 1997), “bureaucratic,” “monopolistic,” or “oligarchic” (Illarionov 1996, Truscott 1997). More frequently used (especially in the early years of privatization) is the term “capitalism,” with joint epithets from “robber capitalism” (Soros in Fistein 1999) and “crony capitalism” (Olcott and Ottaway 1999), through “family,” “oligarchic,” “gangster,” and “administrative–oligarchic capitalism,” to “political capitalism” (White 2000, 141; Staniszkis 1991, 38–56; Malfliet 1995, 43). Zhelev (1996, 6) talks about “quasi-capitalism” and Karol (1997, 11) about “capitalisme mafieux.”

These labels given to Russia suggest that congruence with the democratic, Western model is at best superficial and imperfect. They indicate change—and a direction of change—but also continuity. The direction of change after the collapse of communism is clearly incorporated in concepts such as Westernization, Europeanization, and even normalization, in which a “normal” situation equals Western free-market economy and democracy (as “the norm”). The concept of globalization has some attraction within Russia, because it indicates that not only in Russia, but worldwide, a new era has begun, the era of a post-industrial or information society (see for example Putin 1999; Prokhorov 1998, 119). In all comparisons with the global but Western model, Russia is at a disadvantage. The explanation for its imperfect congruence is sought in the stubborn-

ness of the communist past. The communist legacy is considered a temporary obstacle, for which time will—or at least may—bring a solution.

Other labels, however, focus more on the indigenous Russian system and try to characterize the specificities of the system as a system on its own. Particularly fitting is the label suggested by Lilia Shevtsova (1996): “elite corporatism.” In her book *Putin’s Russia*, Shevtsova (2005) also uses the metaphor of “elected monarchy” (or “elected autocracy”) to describe Yeltsin’s rule, and sketches thereafter the evolution from the late Yeltsin years to the Putin era as the evolution from “oligarchic authoritarianism” to “bureaucratic authoritarianism.” Both elite corporatism and oligarchic authoritarianism point to the concentration of power in the hands of an elite—the oligarchs, big business groups close to the Kremlin. The concept of bureaucratic authoritarianism—a concept applied earlier to Latin American regimes—indicates Putin’s subordination of technocrats and big business to the bureaucracy. Elaborating on the authoritarian character of the Russian regime, in contrast to democracy, Russia has also been called a “semi-authoritarian regime” (Olcott and Ottaway 1999) as well as a “multi-party authoritarian system” (Zhelev 1996). The economic philosophy has been labeled “market authoritarianism” (Shevtsova 2005, 325). The dominant role of the state in all spheres of society brings Elena Vartanova (2006) to the label of “etatism”; Russia is called an “etatist authoritarian” or “Eurasian etatist” regime.

## 2. Labels for Post-Communist Russian Media

The labels for the media system correspond with the broader social labels, as media evolve in tandem with society and cannot be separated from their political and economic environments. Here too, many labels incorporate a comparison with a Western model and are goal-oriented. Others are more indigenous labels. Still others limit themselves to temporary categories such as “transitional model” (Curran and Park 2000), “post-socialist” (Giorgi 1995), or “post-communist” media (Sparks 1997).

All attempts to classify the Russian post-communist media model under the general Western model have been unsatisfactory. Colin Sparks (1998) called the media systems in post-communist countries “varieties of the European model.” He uses the label “European” mainly in contrast to “American” or “Anglo-Saxon.” European, in this context, refers to a relatively high degree of government intervention and regulation in contrast with the *laissez-faire* mentality and the commercial approach of the United States. Slavko Splichal (1994) is more specific when he speaks about the “Italian model” as a variety (an extreme one) of the European model. As characteristic of both the Italian and Central and Eastern

European media system, he names the strong degree of partiality, the integration of political and media elite, and the absence of a consolidated professional ethic shared by all journalists (Splichal 1994, 145–146). These characteristics correspond closely with the dimensions distinguished by Hallin and Mancini (2004), especially the dimensions of political parallelism and professionalism. The features that Splichal detects in Central and Eastern Europe can also be found in the Russian media system. The labels “European” or “Italian,” then, do not point to the elements of change, but to the aspects of continuity, to the aspects of the media system (the integration of media and politics, partiality, and state control) that remained unchanged by the post-communist transformation. Crucial elements of the European model that are absent in the Russian media system are the notion of citizen (in contrast to consumer) and the notion of public service (i.e., social responsibility). Commercialization clearly is an element of change, not of continuity, but one that has more in common with the American (libertarian) model than with the European model and one that is inspired by economic rather than political or cultural elements. Economic factors play an important role in Fabris’s (1995) scenarios of the “Westification” or “Germanification” of the Eastern European media. In these scenarios, Eastern Europe can be considered an additional market and investment opportunity for the Western European, or German media industry. In contrast to Central and Eastern Europe, the Russian media system has not been subjected substantially to the influence of foreign capital. The applicability of these scenarios to Russia is, for that reason, limited. A third scenario that Fabris suggests, however, might be relevant for Russia. This scenario—“the continuation of two media cultures”—is based on the thesis that authoritarian practices overrule the social and media democratization processes in the country. Between the domain of “state” and “market,” no place is left for civil society. Western European (or American) influences, therefore, remain limited to the domain of the market: “Although the Western media model or media ‘logic’ has prevailed, in principle, it seems likely that more traditional and indigenous Eastern European media philosophies and behavior patterns will survive, at least for some time” (Fabris 1995, 229). Labels such as the authoritarian–corporate model (Zassoursky 1997, 1998, 1999) or the neo-authoritarian model (Becker 2004) tend to confirm Fabris’s suggestion. Models increasingly co-exist, fuse, or combine in a new form. Jakubowicz (1999, 16) observes this process in Poland: “The normative theory of the media applied in practice in Poland today is thus a combination of the libertarian, social-responsibility and authoritarian press theories.” In other countries of the former Soviet Union, Jakubowicz (1999, 18) sees a combination of Soviet and authoritarian press theories. Korko-

nosenko (1996, 60) finds it “very unlikely that absolutely original, new media models will arise.” And Mihai Coman (2000, 53–54) recognizes that “post-communist media did not create a new ‘model’—they represent a mixture of the already known ‘models,’ combined in proportions which vary in accordance with the historical, geographical and cultural characteristics of each country in the region under discussion.”

### **3. Towards a Place for Russia in the Typology of Hallin and Mancini**

Hallin and Mancini (2004) build on the thesis of the classic *Four Theories of the Press* (Siebert et al. 1956) that there are stable connections between media systems and political systems. They propose a set of four principal dimensions for comparing media systems: the structure of media markets, including, in particular, the degree of development of the mass-circulation press; the degree and form of political parallelism; the development of journalistic professionalism; and the degree and form of state intervention in the media system. On the basis of a comparative study of 18 countries, they identify three distinct media system “models,” as ideal types, while acknowledging that many media systems can (and must) be understood as mixed cases. The three ideal type models are the Polarized Pluralist, the Democratic Corporatist, and the Liberal Model. The characteristics of media systems correspond with the characteristics of political systems, summarized in terms of five principal dimensions: the relation of state and society, and particularly the distinction between liberal and welfare-state democracy; the distinction between consensus and majoritarian government; the distinction between organized pluralism (or corporatism) and liberal (individual) pluralism; the development of rational–legal authority; and the distinction between moderate and polarized pluralism. The authors also include the political history (patterns of conflict and consensus) in their analysis and identify the three models by the geographical region in which they predominate: the Polarized Pluralist or Mediterranean Model, the Democratic Corporatist or North/Central European Model, and the Liberal or North Atlantic model. But what model predominates in Eastern Europe—and in particular, in Russia?

Hallin and Mancini (2004, 306) suspect that the Polarized Pluralist Model has the highest relevance for Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Like the Southern European countries (such as Italy, Spain, and Portugal), Russia is a “late” (third-wave) democracy. Its political history is, like that of Southern Europe, marked by conflicts and polarization. Both regions have experienced collective, patrimonial societies associat-

ed with clientelism and were (are) characterized by dirigisme, a strong involvement of the state in the economy, a “welfare state” (relatively speaking), and only a weak development of rational legal authority. Thus there are similarities in sociopolitical history and organization. What about the media in both regions of the world?

### ***1. Development of Media Markets***

The Polarized Pluralist Model as understood by Hallin and Mancini (2004, 73) is characterized by an elite-oriented press with a relatively small circulation and a corresponding centrality of electronic media. Freedom of the press and the development of commercial media industries generally came late; newspapers have often been economically marginal and in need of subsidies. Hallin and Mancini (2004, 97) point to the importance of historical “timing”: “it seems unlikely that any country that did not develop mass circulation newspapers in the late nineteenth century ever will have them.” So what about Russia, nowadays as well as in the 19th century and before?

Jay Jensen and Richard Bayley (1964) describe the development of the Russian press between 1553 and 1917 as largely similar to that of the Western press, but considerably delayed and interrupted by the October Revolution. The technology of printing was introduced in Russia in 1553, about 100 years later than in Western Europe. The first Russian newspaper, *Vedomosti*, was published in 1703 by Peter the Great—again about a century later than in Western Europe (the German *Aviso* and *Relation*, for example, date from 1609, and the Flemish *Wekelijcke Tijdinghe* dates from 1629). While the first Western European newspapers were the product of private “gazeteers,” commercial printing and publishing houses (*vol'naya tipografiya*) in Russia were tolerated only from 1783 onwards. “This chronology alone indicates that something existed in Western culture and society to push printing forward that was not present in Russia,” concludes Marker (1985, 8). That something might be the Renaissance, humanism, the Reformation—and trade. “In most Western countries, news media developed parallel to a flourishing class of traders willing to make decisions based on information,” notes Iosif Dzhaloshinskij (cited in Fossato 2000). This was not the case in Russia.

The press in Russia developed, from the beginning, among thinkers. They were writers and opposition activists, or, alternately, people close to the government. These people started publishing newspapers not to disseminate information, but to influence events (Dzhaloshinskij, cited in Fossato 2000).

There is a clear parallel with Southern Europe, where the media similarly developed “as an institution of the political and literary worlds more than of the market” (Hallin and Mancini 2004, 90). As with Russia, the Mediterranean region was characterized by the rather weak development of the bourgeoisie, and early newspapers were tied more to the aristocracy, “whose wealth was based in land rather than trade” (Hallin and Mancini 2004, 91). Likewise, the vast territory of Russia and the high rate of illiteracy were not conducive to a flourishing newspaper distribution.

In the 19th century Russia experienced alternating periods of liberalism and repression. Alexander II (1855–1881) abolished serfdom (1861), reformed the judicial and educational systems, and reduced censorship. Literacy increased, the number of readers grew, and the daily newspaper became, as in Western Europe but on a smaller scale, a “mass product.” The loyal press was complemented with an opposition, often underground, press whose spokesmen no longer represented the aristocracy but different social classes (*raznochintsy*). Alexander III (1881–1894) declared war on terrorists, nihilists, anarchists, Marxists, and socialists. Control over press, libraries, and schools was intensified. The next and last czar, Nicholas II (1894–1917), could not resist calls for the creation of an assembly (duma) in 1905 and civil liberties: freedom of conscience, freedom of speech, and freedom of assembly. Between 1906 and 1914, Russia’s press was freer than it would be for a long time to come (Jensen and Bayley 1964, 414). In 1913, 859 newspapers were published in Russia, with a total circulation of 2.7 million (Markham 1967, 77). The number of newspapers per 1000 citizens was fewer than 100 and probably only about 20 (Press Reference 2007).

The “normal” development of the press was interrupted by the Soviet regime, installed after the 1917 October Revolution. The decree on the press (October 27/November 9, 1917) declared all “counter-revolutionary” newspapers illegal and led to the closure of thousands of newspapers. After one year the private press was “virtually eliminated” (McNair 1991, 36). Only state and party (including semi-public) organizations were allowed to publish newspapers. At the same time, illiteracy was reduced, and from the 1930s onwards, the number of publications went up and circulation figures increased dramatically. The number of newspapers per 1000 Soviet citizens grew from 200 in 1940 over 320 in 1960 to 660 in 1980 (Press Reference, 2007). In 1990 the Soviet Union had more than 8,000 newspapers and 1,500 magazines, with a total circulation of 180 million (McNair 1991, 47). The organ of the Communist Party, *Pravda*, had a circulation of 10.5 million (Richter 1995, 12).

There are reasons to assume that press circulation numbers in the Soviet Union were artificially high. Sales prices were kept artificially low; there was no direct connection between the sales price of a newspaper and its cost. Half of the papers were very local “factory newspapers” or “kolkhoz/sovkhoz papers,” and one family traditionally read more than one paper (these could include central, district, factory, and other papers). There was a high percentage of “obligatory” subscriptions due to one’s Party membership or position at work. As with every aspect of life in the Soviet Union, newspaper distribution was “planned” from the top down: “A Soviet citizen cannot simply buy or subscribe to the paper of his choice; he receives the paper that is specified for him according to plan” (Merrill 1983, 34). Supply and demand were not in balance. The most “boring” newspapers (such as *Pravda* or *Izvestiya*) were distributed in high numbers, while the more popular ones (such as *Vechernaya Moskva* or *Sovetskij Sport*) circulated in reduced numbers (Androunas 1993, 13; Hopkins 1970, 138; Lendvai 1981, 23–24). Information was one of the most sought-after commodities (Ellis 1999, 6) and therefore in high demand.

After the golden years of glasnost, which concluded the Soviet period, newspapers suddenly had to adapt to market standards. State subsidies were withdrawn, prices went up, and circulations declined sharply. Total newspaper circulation decreased from more than 160 million in 1991 to 86 million in 1993 (Benn 1996, 474), 34 million in 1997 (Pankin 1998b), and 30.5 million in 1999 (EIM 1999). Circulations in the millions, as were seen the Soviet Union, are history. Even the newspapers that weathered the transition, such as *Izvestiya*, *Trud*, *Komsomol’skaya Pravda*, *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, and *Argumenty i Fakty*, saw their circulations decline by factors of 42, 33, 25, 16 and 11.5, respectively (Gubanov 2000, 16). There has since been some recovery in circulation; recent figures show that just over 100 papers are sold in Russia for every 1,000 inhabitants (BBC Monitoring, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4315129.stm>).<sup>1</sup> This ratio is slightly more than that of Greece or Portugal but less than that of Italy or Spain.

In most Mediterranean countries besides France, the local press is also relatively underdeveloped. Russia appears to be an exception, although

---

<sup>1</sup> The World Association of Newspapers admits that “no reliable circulation figures exists for the Russian press as a whole.” The National Circulation Service (NCS), based in Moscow, is responsible for monitoring and auditing press circulation in Russia. However, only around half of the country’s leading papers have signed up for the service. This means that for some papers reliable figures can be difficult to obtain (BBC Monitoring, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4315129.stm>).



this is a relatively recent, post-communist trend. The communist regime favored a strong centralization of the press. “Central” or “all-union” papers (*vsesoyuznye gazety*), produced in Moscow and distributed all over the Soviet Union, represented only 3 percent of the titles in 1990, but 73 percent of the total circulation (Richter 1995, 9). In 1993 the proportion had already changed, with the central press representing 5 percent of the titles but only 52 percent of the total circulation (Benn 1996, 474). And in 1998 the ratio was reversed, with the regional press representing 70 percent of the total circulation, leaving only 30 percent to the central press (Goble 1999). While many families previously subscribed to both a regional and a central newspaper, now they only kept the regional one.

Tabloid or sensationalist popular newspapers are not a feature of the press in the Mediterranean region. Nor were they part of the homogenous Soviet press. There was a minor variance in style, from very formal (*Pravda*) to more informal (*Trud* or *Komsomol'skaya Pravda*), but a sensationalist press was absent, emerging only in the last years of the Soviet Union. The monthly *Sovershenno Sekretno*, devoted to political scandals, criminality, and human interest, made its debut in 1989. The tabloid *SPID-Info*, launched the same year, ignored all political and economic news and covered gossip and sensation. Their circulations are among the highest in Russia (3,200,000 copies for *SPID-Info* and 2,300,000 copies for *Sovershenno Sekretno* in 2000) (<http://www.mediaatlas.ru/>). Most newspapers have followed a trend towards “tabloidization.” Newspapers can be divided into “quality papers” such as *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, *Kommersant*, *Izvestiya*, and *Vedomosti*, and “popular papers” such as *Pravda 5*, *Vechernaya Moskva*, *Komsomol'skaya Pravda*, and *Moskovskij Komsomolets*. The first group follows the example of leading Western papers such as the *Independent*, *Le Monde*, or the *Times* and gives priority to political and economic news. The popular papers neglect foreign news and seek human interest. Again—and unlike the Soviet Union—the more popular newspapers sell the most copies.

The most popular medium, however, is undoubtedly television. Russia has become a “watching nation” instead of a “reading nation.” In 1999 the overall audience of the print media equaled 80 percent of the whole population, while the leading medium, television, got the attention of about 95 percent of all Russians, and radio of about 82 percent (Varanova 2001, 24–25). Television now has not only the audience but also the respect and credit previously given to print media. Television became the most important source of information: About 40 percent of Russians watch news programs broadcast from Moscow every day, while the overall audience of the national press does not exceed 20 percent. Likewise,

about 40 percent of Russians get their knowledge of local events from local television, compared to 19 percent who get information from the local press (Vartanova 2001, 25).

## 2. *Political Parallelism*

In the Polarized Pluralist Model political parallelism tends to be high; the press is marked by a strong focus on political life, external pluralism, and a tradition of commentary-oriented or advocacy journalism. Instrumentalization of the media by the government, by political parties, and industrialists with political ties is common. Public broadcasting systems are, in the terminology of Hallin and Mancini, “politics over broadcasting” systems.

The lack of autonomy of mass media and their use as a tool has been constant throughout the history of Russia. The social subsystems of politics, economics, law, and media have never been clearly differentiated from one another. In czarist Russia, the czar represented the legal, executive, and juridical power (Malfliet 1999, 36) and was often personally engaged in information matters (e.g. Peter the Great, Catherine the Great). In the Soviet Union, the Communist Party took over all these tasks. The political, economic, juridical, and media systems were closely integrated and connected by the ideology of Marxism–Leninism and the Party organization. The mass media were considered instruments of the vanguard party. Stalin used not only the term “instrument” (*oruzhie*) but also the word “weapon” (*orudie*) to describe mass media (*Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya* 1952, Vol. 10, 8). The most important principle as described in handbooks for journalists was “partiality” or *partijnost'* (de Smaele 2001, 38–42). Article 50 of the 1977 Constitution guaranteed citizens of the USSR freedom of speech, of the press, and assembly, meetings, street processions, and demonstrations, but “in accordance with the interests of the people and in order to strengthen and develop the socialist system.” Freedom of speech was made instrumental to social goals.

The instrumental view of the mass media survived communism. Mikhail Gorbachev depended on the mass media to promote his glasnost policy (1985–1991) and to win the population over to his reforms. The media function of mobilization was kept untouched; only the goal of mobilization changed slightly, from stagnated communism to dynamic socialism. Boris Yeltsin was the self-appointed patron of press freedom (1991–2000), but in return he too expected the mass media to support his reforms loyally. Newspapers favorably disposed towards Yeltsin's regime were financially rewarded (Richter 1995, 15–16). In the run-up to the presidential elec-

tions of June 1996, the mass media were massively mobilized to secure Yeltsin's second term as president (Belin 1997, EIM 1996). Moscow students of journalism throughout the 1990s were taught the lasting value of *partijnost'* (Prokhorov 1998, 157–188) and the educational, ideological, and organizational functions of mass media rather than its informational function (Prokhorov 1998, 46–48). Vladimir Putin started to fight the oligarchs' power (2000–) but did not get rid of the traditionally instrumental media. The grip of government over the media became stronger. Like Gorbachev and Yeltsin before him, Putin might seek in the unique socio-political setting of Russia and its process of democratization a justification to curtail media autonomy (de Smaele, 2006).

One difference between communist and post-communist Russia is that not all journalists are instruments of the same government or party. Instead, they are at the disposal of divergent “patrons.” Yeltsin's Russia evolved into a corporate or oligarchic system with competing power groups of politicians, bankers, media tycoons, business people, and bureaucrats. The media are not an independent “Fourth Power” but serve the (political–economic) groups of power. The result is a pluralistic but not an independent press. Alexei Pankin (1998a, 30) speaks of a unique result: “genuinely pluralistic unfree media.” In the sense of the representation of a broad range of political expressions, opinions, and interests, post-communist Russia is hardly less pluralistic than older democracies and probably even more so. External pluralism is clearly the norm. However, a pluralism that derives its right to exist from the presence of different power groups in society is an uncertain pluralism. Hence, when the various power groups join forces because they feel threatened in their positions, as was the case in the 1996 presidential elections, this pluralism dies. The same happens when the various power groups are replaced by one—a strong government.

### **3. Professionalization**

“Professionalization of journalism is not as strongly developed in the Polarized Pluralist Model as in the other models: journalism is not as strongly differentiated from political activism and the autonomy of journalism is often limited,” write Hallin and Mancini (2004, 73). Professionalization is thus used by Hallin and Mancini in a specific sense: “the degree of differentiation of journalism from other occupations and forms of social practice” (Hallin and Mancini 2004, 79). This is expressed, for example, in a (weak or strong) consensus on journalistic standards and (limited or strong) development of professional self-regulation (Hallin and Mancini 2004, 113).

In this respect, low or high levels of “professionalism” are directly connected to high or low levels of instrumentalization (cf. political parallelism). Russia, again, joins the Polarized Pluralist Model. Russian journalism is an extension of the worlds of literature and politics, rather than an autonomous institution. As early as 1881, the Russian writer Saltykov-Shchedrin said about himself: “*ya ne tol’ko literator, no i zhurnalist, che-lovek partii*” (I am not only a writer, but also a journalist, a man from the party) (cited in Berezhnoj 1996, 90). The adage of Soviet journalism is expressed by Vladimir Lenin, in 1905, and again by the Hungarian Adalbert Fogarasi in 1921 (article on the communist press reprinted in Mattelart and Siegelau 1983, 152): “The Communist press must be written not by journalists who are also party members, but by party members who can write.” Party loyalty and ideological commitment meant far more than journalistic ability. This did not really change when, in the 1950s, a number of major Soviet universities (with Moscow as the flagship, starting in 1952) created professional faculties of journalism with regular five- and six-year programs leading to a degree in journalism (Press Reference, 2007). The curriculum included a large number of “political” courses such as Marxism–Leninism, the history of the Communist Party, and political economy. Party membership remained a condition for career-building. The flow between politics and journalism was manifest. In the late 1980s half of the journalists started their careers as political propagandists or party functionaries; the other half were educated as journalists, mainly at one of the universities (Medish 1990, 258). The USSR Union of Journalists (*Soyuz Zhurnalistov SSSR*), created in 1956, had 85,182 members in 1987, out of approximately 100,000 journalists (Mickiewicz 1997, 26). More accomplished journalists or those who had published books became members of the prestigious USSR Union of Writers (Press Reference 2007). This observation again parallels the Mediterranean region, where newspapers typically “valued more highly writers, politicians and intellectuals,” and journalism was “a secondary occupation” (Hallin and Mancini 2004, 110).

In post-communist Russia, the notion of advocacy—and consequently instrumental—journalism remains strong. Educational training of journalists in Moscow did not fundamentally change and continues to emphasize the principle of *partijnost’* next to—at first sight contradictory—principles such as fairness (*pravdivost’*) and objectivity (*ob’ektivnost’*). Patriotism (*patriotizm*) and national pride (*natsional’naya gordost’*) are encouraged, as are other typical “Russian values” such as *narodnost’* and *massovost’* (orientation towards the people, the masses). Other -isms are added: cosmopolitanism (*kosmopolitizm*), internationalism (*internationalizm*), “democratism” (*demokratizm*), and humanism (*gumanizm*).

(Prokhorov 1998, 157–188) The rhetoric changed but not the idea of “one true ideology”; *besprintsipnost*’ (the absence of principles) is rejected (Korkonosenko 1995, 82).

Svitich and Shiryaeva (1997) observe on the basis of longitudinal research throughout the 1990s an evolution from an initial rapprochement to the West towards a return to indigenous traditions and partiality. Andrej Zolotov, journalist of the *Moscow Times* (cited in Jones 1999), concludes in 1997: “Overall, the attempt to introduce a news-driven journalism that would be fair by North American standards failed. It is now clear that the Russian press is going to be different. It will be partisan.” Nadezhda Azhgikhina (1999, 39–41), a journalist at *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* and lecturer in journalism at Moscow University, sees a return as well to the literary origins of the press: “Ten years later, one can see that several of the principles of that period are returning to the profession: a new interest in the essay is appearing; many publications have rejected their proclivity for slang and begun once again to write in a pure literary language; interest in the analytical article has awoken again, addressing problems of history, economics and culture.”

Journalists tend to be integrated into oligarchic groups and clientelist networks. The journalists’ ties to owners, or rather patrons, weaken professional solidarity (Hallin and Mancini 2004, 59). The monolithic Union of Journalists disappeared and was replaced by the Russian Union of Journalists and a number of informal, independent unions, none of them enjoying the status and authority necessary to act as a strong professional organization. There is only limited social recognition of the press as a collective, autonomous, and legitimate social actor, a limited system of common professional ethics and a limited agreement on journalistic standards. Self-regulation is in its infancy. In June 2005 the Public Board for Press Complaints was established by initiative of the Russian Union of Journalists. The Board examines complaints filed by readers, listeners, and viewers regarding breaches of professional ethics and standards of conduct. A federal law enacted July 1, 2005, established the Public Chamber, which can be called a self-regulation body, but which has been initiated by the government according to the model of the French “Conseil économique et social.” The Public Chamber monitors compliance with freedom of expression.

#### **4. The Role of the State**

In Polarized Pluralist systems, “the state plays a large role as an owner, regulator, and funder of media, though its capacity to regulate effectively is often limited” (Hallin and Mancini 2004, 73). Again, and in general,

this statement applies strikingly well to Russia. The role of the state in (and vis-à-vis) media corresponds to the more general role of the state in society. From czarist Russia and the communist Soviet Union to post-communist Russia, the state pervaded all sectors of life. Under communism, there was a high level of dissatisfaction with a wide range of Soviet institutions and practices (the secret police, terror, the purges, the collective farm system) but rather widespread acceptance of the basic principles of the authoritarian welfare state (Bauer, Inkeles and Kluchkhohn 1959). The concept of a government as “a just but benevolent father” (Bauer et al. 1959, 119–120) is attractive to the majority of Russians even today. Vladimir Putin (1999) named etatism (*gosudarstvennichestvo*) in his millennium speech as one of the traditional Russian values, next to patriotism (*patriotism*), *derzhavnost'* (the belief in a great Russia) and social solidarity (*sotsial'naya solidarnost'*). Russia still is, and wants to be, a collectivist society rather than an individualistic one. There is considerable distrust of a “common good” separated from the “state” (“what good is for the state has to be good for the people”), which is in sharp contrast to the Democratic Corporatist Model.

*The role of owner.* The state (government) is a dominant player on the Russian media market, as the Russian czar and the Communist Party and government were before. The major state media holding VGTRK (All-Russian State Television and Radio Company, Vserossiyskaya Gosudarstvennaya Teleradiokompaniya) includes national television channels Rossiya, Kul'tura (since 1997), Sport (since 2003), and 24-hour news channel Rossiya-24 (since 2006), 80 regional television stations, RTR-Planeta worldwide satellite service, several national radio stations (Radio Rossii, Mayak, Mayak-24, Radio Kultura, Radio Yunost), information portals Strana.ru and CMI.ru and the national television and radio archive Gosteleradiofond. The most widely received channel, First Channel, is 51 percent owned by the state, and 49 percent is in private but government-friendly hands. Privately owned stations (eg. NTV) are often owned by industrial groups either controlled by the state or with close connections to the government (such as Gazprom) and so can be called semi-state. On the press market, the government (*Rossiiskaya Gazeta*), the presidential administration (*Rossiiskie Vesti*), and the parliament (*Parlamentnaya Gazeta*) all publish their own newspapers. Local newspapers are very often owned or controlled by local authorities. The most important news agencies (ITAR-TASS and RIA-Novosti) are likewise government-owned, as are many of the transmission facilities and printing houses.

*The role of funder.* In the Soviet Union, state subsidies were the only (or by far the most important) means of financing media. In post-com-

munist Russia, media organizations have roughly three sources of income: government subsidies, subsidies (sponsorship) from media conglomerates, and advertising revenue. On the advertising market, state and private media are in competition, as state media also advertise. Government subsidies come in two main forms: in the form of direct financing of television stations that belong fully or partially to the state (e.g. First Channel, Rossiya) and in the form of financial support of certain categories of television programs (educational, cultural, social, children's programs). Although the financial backing of the program sector is carried out on a competitive basis, no criteria and standards to measure "social significance" have been developed and the Ministry of Media has been accused of partiality during project selection. Next to direct state (and corporate) subsidies, also indirect subsidies (tax breaks, reduced utility rates) are in use. And next to overt subsidies, also covert subsidies play an important role (de Smaele and Vartanova 2007).

*The role of regulator.* One of the more accepted roles for the state is that of regulator, although opinions vary to what degree the state should perform this role. The minimal role for the state ("hands off government") in the Liberal Model is not the model adhered to in Russia. The role of the state as regulator and arbiter conflicts in Russia with the role of dominant player on the media market itself. Next to providing the basic framework wherein media function (such as the Law on Mass Media and the Law on Advertising), the government regulates the broadcasting market to an extensive degree. Russia (still) lacks a broadcasting law; in the absence of a law, broadcasting is under the direct control of the President, and broadcasting activities are primarily regulated by means of presidential decrees and government orders and indirectly by multiple other laws (on advertising, elections, and terrorism). The fragmented regulation of broadcasting implies a low level of protection of broadcasters. Licensing is in the hand of a government body (the Federal Service for Monitoring Compliance with Legislation on Mass Communications and Protection of Cultural Heritage) instead of an independent organ. The president appoints the chairmen of national television channels Channel One, Rossiya, and Kul'tura. Regulations limiting concentration of media ownership are weakly developed. As in the Mediterranean countries (Hallin and Mancini 2004, 122), "the political alliances media owners have built with politicians and the often extremely close personal relationships among them are surely a central reason for this." Private business owners have political connections, which are essential to obtaining government contracts and broadcast licenses and in many other ways necessary for the successful operation of a business. Politicians can pressure media owners by selectively enforcing broadcasting, tax, and other laws. Access to

information likewise depends on personal connections more than on universal laws (de Smaele 2004).

*The role of censor* can be added to those of owner, funder, and regulator. Through much of Russian history, the state has served as a censor. Severe and systematic censorship dates back to the end of the 18th century under Catherine the Great and Paul I (Marker 1985, 213). The “Iron Code” (1826) of Nicholas I is written in the same spirit as the later Soviet censorship practice: journalists were not only told what to write *not* about but also what to *write* about in the first place. People had to be (ideologically) educated. The Soviet censorship institution, installed in 1922 (known by its acronym *Glavlit*), was in essence the rebirth of the czarist *Glavlit* (which existed between 1865 and 1917). State, military, and other secrets appeared as a broad denominator to censor ideological sensitive materials. In post-communist Russia, the inadmissibility of censorship is included in the 1993 constitution (Article 29.5) and the 1991 Russian Federation Law on the Mass Media (Article 3). The protection of “state and other law-protective secrets,” however, thwarts and subverts the principle of freedom of information. Self-censorship is still widespread, as it was in the Soviet Union. Expensive court cases concerning defamation scare off media and trigger self-censorship (Lange 1997, 160; Aslamazyan 1999, 2). Additionally, the use of violence against journalists is another effective control mechanism.

## **Conclusion: A Polarized Pluralist Model, a Polarized Corporatist Model, or Simply an Authoritarian Model?**

As Hallin and Mancini (2004, 306) suspected, the Polarized Pluralist model has the highest relevance for Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. But, again as Hallin and Mancini guessed, this is not without caveats.

Russia has much in common with the Southern European countries described under the Polarized Pluralist Models. Its history has likewise been shaped by sharp political conflicts involving changes of regime. The media typically have been used as instruments of struggle in these conflicts. Their histories “pushed toward the politicization of the media” (Hallin and Mancini 2004, 61). Today, as in the past, the news media in Russia, as in Southern Europe, display a high degree of external pluralism and act as advocates of political ideologies. And “commitment to these ideologies tends to outweigh commitment to a common professional culture” (Hallin and Mancini 2004, 298).



*Table 1. Pattern of Variation in Four Media System Dimensions, on the Analogy of Hallin and Mancini 2004, 299*

|                           | Polarized Pluralist | Democratic | Liberal Corporatist | "Russian"   |
|---------------------------|---------------------|------------|---------------------|-------------|
| Development of mass press | Low                 | High       | High                | Low (?)     |
| Political parallelism     | High                | High       | Low                 | High        |
| Professionalization       | Low                 | High       | High                | Low         |
| State intervention        | High                | High       | Low                 | (Very) High |

The schematic representation of the "scores" of Russia on the four Hallin and Mancini media system dimensions gives the following result (as presented in Table 1). Professionalization, in the sense of journalistic autonomy and professional solidarity, is considered "low," while political parallelism, in the sense of instrumental use of media by political groups and identification of media with political orientations, is considered "high." The development of the mass press, particularly mass circulation, might be more contestable as the discontinuous history of czarist (low), communist (high), and post-communist Russia (low) shows. However, the verdict is about post-communist Russia, not about its past. The degree of state intervention is high—in fact, very high. The Russian government acts as an owner, funder, regulator, and censor of media. This role exceeds that of the state in Southern European countries grouped under the Polarized Pluralist Model. This fourth dimension, therefore, raises the question about the limits of the model: Where does the Polarized Pluralist Model end and a new model begin?

Politicization of the media in Russia is not the "work" of political parties but of political-industrial cliques and government. Commercialization has not distanced media from politics as commercial media are equally closely tied to political groups: "money in the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] is still made through connections in the government, and in this game it helps to own newspapers and stations as instruments of political influence" (Pankin 1998a, 33). The merging of the world of politics and business is particularly characteristic of Russia. In this respect, Russia does not fit the "simplified" tripartite model summarized by Hallin and Mancini (2004, 76).

At a very general level we could summarize the differences among these systems thus: In the Liberal countries the media are closer to the world of business and further from the world of politics. In the Polarized Pluralist systems they are relatively strongly integrated into the political

world. And in Democratic Corporatist countries the media have had strong connections to both the political and economic worlds, though with a significant shift away from political connections, particularly in recent years.

Because the worlds of business and politics have merged, media in Russia are not close to politics *or* business but to politics *and* business. Business is politics.

Stressing the corporatist element in Russian media—the role of political–industrial clans and conglomerates—and on the analogy of social labels such as elite corporatism or the corporate–authoritarian system, one could conceive of a label such as the Polarized Corporatist Model as a derivation and modification of the Polarized Pluralist Model. Stressing the influential role of the state in Russian media and society, labels that point to (neo-)authoritarianism or etatism seem to be an evident choice. Hallin and Mancini (2004, 1) explicitly limited their analysis to “the developed capitalist democracies of Western Europe and North America.” Russia might appear as a “border country” once again, not only straddling the geographical border between Europe and Asia (which inspired labels such as “Eurasian”), but also the border between democracy and autocracy. “Post-communist” is not a bad label after all, stressing the path-dependence and the importance of history. The label, however, has a limited tenability and is useful only as long as trends remain unclear. The instrumental use of media, advocacy journalism, the integration of media and political elite, strong government intervention, a distrust of a “common good” separated from the state (connected to the civil society), and a particularist attitude towards sharing information are consistent characteristics of this approach. The labels used to describe post-communist Russia usually point to one or more of these aspects. The Liberal Model seems the furthest away and is for this simple reason a questionable goal to promote in a short time. The Polarized Pluralist Model, however, seems to be within reach.

More general lessons, taught by Hallin and Mancini but also by the classic *Four Theories of the Press* (Siebert et al. 1956)—to name the evident example—stood the test of time. History is important. And similar histories collide. Media and political systems co-develop throughout history. This is not different in Russia.

## Reference List

- Androunas, E. (1993). *Soviet Media in Transition: Structural and Economic Alternatives*. Westport, CT; London: Praeger.
- Aslamazyan, M. (1999). "1998 US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices." *Post-Soviet Media Law & Policy Newsletter* 56 (July 15): 2–7.
- Azhgikhina, N. (1999). "A Taste of Freedom in Russia: Journalism between the Past and the Future." *Media Studies Journal* 13 (3): 32–41.
- Bauer, R.A., A. Inkeles, and C. Kluchkhohn (1959). *How The Soviet System Works: Cultural, Psychological, and Social Themes*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Becker, J. (2004). "Lessons from Russia. A Neo-Authoritarian Media System." *European Journal of Communication* 19 (2): 139–163.
- Belin, L. (November 1997). *Politicization and Self-Censorship in the Russian Media*. Paper presented at the national conference of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Seattle, Washington. Retrieved September 12, 1999 from <http://www.rferl.org/nca/special/rumediapaper/index.html>.
- Benn, D.W. (1996). "The Russian Media in Post-Soviet Conditions." *Europe-Asia Studies* 48 (3): 471–479.
- Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya* (2nd ed.) (1949–1958). Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Nauchnoe Izdatel'stvo.
- Berezhtoj, A.F. (1996). "Na puti k organizatsii zhurnalistskogo obrazovaniya v Ros-sii." In *Fakul'tet Zhurnalistiki. Pervye 50 let. Stat'i, ocherki*, 78–95. St. Petersburg: Izd. Sankt-Peterburgskogo Universiteta.
- Coman, M. (2000). "Developments in Journalism Theory About Media 'Transition' in Central and Eastern Europe 1990–99." *Journalism Studies* 1 (1): 35–56.
- Curran, J., and M.–J. Park (eds.). (2000). *De-Westernizing Media Studies*. London: Routledge.
- de Smaele, H. (2001). *Massamedia in communistisch en postcommunistisch Rusland (1917–2000). Factoren van continuïteit of van verandering?* Doctoral thesis, Ghent: Universiteit Gent.
- de Smaele, H. (2004). "Limited Access to Information as a Means of Censorship in Post-communist Russia." *Javnost/The Public* 11 (2): 65–82.
- de Smaele, H. (2006). "In the Name of Democracy: The Paradox of Democracy and Press Freedom in Post-communist Russia." In K. Voltmer (ed.), *Mass Media and Political Communication in New Democracies*, 42–58. London: Routledge.
- de Smaele, H., and E. Vartanova (2007). "Russia." In L. d'Haenens and F. Saeys (eds.), *Western Broadcast Models: Structure, Conduct & Performance*, 341–359. Berlin, New York: Mouton de Gruyter.
- Diamond, L. (1996). "Is the Third Wave Over?" *Journal of Democracy* 7 (3): 20–37.
- Dunlop, J.B. (2002). *Russia Confronts Chechnya: Roots of a Separatist Conflict*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- EIM (European Institute for the Media). (1996). *Preliminary Report: Media and the Russian Presidential Elections, 4 July 1996*. Düsseldorf: European Institute for the Media.

- EIM (European Institute for the Media). (1999). *Media in the CIS. A Study of the Political, Legislative and Socio-Economic Framework* (2nd ed.). Brussels: European Commission, The European Institute for the Media. Retrieved January 10, 2000, from <http://www.internews.ras.ru/books/media1999/>.
- Ellis, F. (1999). *From Glasnost to the Internet. Russia's New Infosphere*. London: Macmillan.
- Fabris, H.H. (1995). "Westification?" In D.L. Paletz, K. Jakubowicz, and P. Novosel (eds.), *Glasnost and After. Media and Change in Central and Eastern Europe*, 221–231. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press.
- Fistein, J. (1999). "Soros Says Transition From Closed to Open Society Imperfect." *RFE/RL Bulletin*, October 20. Retrieved November 10, 1999, from <http://www.rferl.org/nca/special/10years/overview5.html>.
- Fossato, F. (2000). "Russian Journalists Not United to Defend Press Freedom." *RFE/RL Report*, July 7. Retrieved August 25, 2000, from <http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2000/07/f.ru.000707152430.html>.
- Friedrich, C., and Z. Brzezinski (1956). *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Giorgi, L. (1995). *The Post-Socialist Media: What Power the West? The Changing Media Landscape in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic*. Aldershot: Avebury.
- Goble, P. (1999). "Turning Away From the Moscow Press." *RFE/RL Report*, January 8.
- Goble, P. (2000). "Toward Totalitarian Democracy?" *RFE/RL Report*, February 21.
- Gubanov, A. (2000). "Pressa: gody 1990–2000." *Sreda* 5 (May), 15–18.
- Hallin, D.C., and P. Mancini (2004). *Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hopkins, M.W. (1970). *Mass Media in the Soviet Union*. New York: Pegasus.
- Illarionov, A. (September 1996). "The Transition to Capitalism: Will Reforms Be Undone, Modified, Corrupted, or Continued?" Paper presented at the Conference "Five Years into the Transition: Where is Russia Headed?" Washington, D.C.: National Endowment for Democracy and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Jakubowicz, K. (1999). Normative Models of Media and Journalism and Broadcasting Regulation in Central and Eastern Europe. *International Journal of Communications Law and Policy* 2. Retrieved February 5, 2000, from [http://www.digital-law.net/IJCLP/2\\_1999/ijclp\\_webdoc\\_12\\_2\\_1999.html](http://www.digital-law.net/IJCLP/2_1999/ijclp_webdoc_12_2_1999.html).
- Jensen, J., and R. Bayley (1964). "Highlights of the Development of Russian Journalism, 1553–1917." *Journalism Quarterly* 16 (3): 403–415.
- Jones, A. (1999). "Two Steps Forward, One Step Back: Russian Journalism in the Post-Soviet Era." In A. Jones, *The Press in Transition: A Comparative Study of Nicaragua, South Africa, Jordan, and Russia*. Doctoral thesis, University of British Columbia. Retrieved from <http://adamjones.freesevers.com/russian1.htm> en [russian2.htm](http://adamjones.freesevers.com/russian2.htm).
- Karol, K.S. (1997). "La Russie otage d'un capitalisme mafieux." *Le Monde Diplomatique*, August 11.
- Kon, I.S. (1996). "Moral Culture." In D. Shalin (ed.), *Russian Culture at the Crossroads: Paradoxes of Postcommunist Consciousness*, 185–207. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Korkonosenko, S.G. (1995). *Osnovy teorii zhurnalistiki: Uchebnoe posobie*. St. Petersburg: Sankt-Peterburgskij gosudarstvennyj universitet.
- Korkonosenko, S.G. (1996). *Dinamika teorii zhurnalistiki v sovremennoj Rossii*. In

- Fakul'tet Zhurnalistiki. Pervye 50 let. Stat'i, ocherki*, 58–76. St. Petersburg: Izd. Sankt-Peterburgskogo Universiteta.
- Lange, Y. (1997). *Media in the CIS. A Study of the Political, Legislative and Socio-economic Framework*. Brussels: European Commission, The European Institute of the Media.
- Lendvai, P. (1981). *The Bureaucracy of Truth: How Communist Governments Manage the News*. London: Burnett Books.
- Malfliet, K. (1995). *De ex-communistische landen: Nieuwe spelregels*. Leuven: Davidsfonds.
- Malfliet, K. (1999). *De geest van het Russische recht: Een voorstudie*. Leuven, Amersfoort: Acco.
- Marker, G. (1985). *Publishing, Printing, and the Origins of Intellectual Life in Russia, 1700–1800*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Mattelart, A., and S. Siegelaub (eds.) (1983). *Communication and Class Struggle. Vol. 2. Liberation, Socialism*. New York: International General.
- McNair, B. (1991). *Glasnost, Perestroika and the Soviet Media*. London, New York: Routledge.
- Medish, V. (1990). *The Soviet Union* (4th ed.). Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
- Merrill, J.C. (ed.). (1983). *Global Journalism: A Survey of the World's Mass Media*. New York, London: Longman.
- Mickiewicz, E. (1997). *Changing Channels: Television and the Struggle for Power in Russia*. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Olcott, M.B., and M. Ottaway (1999). *The Challenge of Semi-Authoritarianism*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: Democracy and Rule of Law Project. Retrieved December 23, 1999, from <http://www.ceip.org/programs/democr/Semi-Authoritarianism%20WP.htm>.
- Pankin, A. (1998a). "Economic Constraints on Media Independence and Pluralism in Eastern and Central Europe." *Balkanmedia* 7 (1): 27–34.
- Pankin, A. (1998b). "Krizis kak shans." *Sreda* 6 (August). Retrieved July 22, 2000, from <http://www.internews.ras.ru/sreda/6/1.html>.
- Press Reference. (2007). Russian Federation Press, Media, TV, Radio, Newspapers. Retrieved April 17, 2007, from <http://www.pressreference.com/No-Sa/Russian-Federation.html>.
- Prokhorov, E.P. (1998). *Vvedenie v teoriyu zhurnalistiki. Uchebnoe posobie* (2nd ed.). Moscow: RIP-kholding.
- Putin, V.V. (1999). *Rossiia na rubezhe tysyacheleti*. Retrieved January 5, 2000, from <http://www.government.gov.ru/government/minister/article-vvp1.html>.
- Remington, T. F. (1999). *Politics in Russia*. New York: Longman.
- Richter, A. (1995). "The Russian Press after Perestroika." *Canadian Journal of Communication* 20 (1): 7–23.
- Sakwa, R. (1998). "Russian Political Evolution: A Structural Approach." In M. Cox (ed.), *Rethinking the Soviet Collapse: Sovietology, the Death of Communism and the New Russia*, 181–201. London, New York: Pinter.
- Shevtsova, L. (September 1996). *After the Elections: The Balance of Power Among Political Institutions*. Paper presented at the Conference "Five Years into the Transition: Where is Russia Headed?" Washington, D.C.: National Endowment for Democracy and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

- Shevtsova, L. (2005). *Putin's Russia* (revised and expanded edition). Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Siebert, F.S., T. Peterson, and W. Schramm (1956). *Four Theories of the Press: The Authoritarian, Libertarian, Social Responsibility, and Soviet Communist Concepts of What the Press Should Be and Do*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Sparks, C. (1997). "Post-Communist Media in Transition." In J. Corner, Ph. Schlesinger, and R. Silverstone (eds.), *International Media Research: A Critical Survey*, 96–122. London, New York: Routledge.
- Sparks, C. (with A. Reading) (1998). *Communism, Capitalism and the Mass Media*. London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage.
- Splichal, S. (1994). *Media Beyond Socialism: Theory and Practice in East-Central Europe*. Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press.
- Staniszki, J. (1991). *The Dynamics of the Breakthrough in Eastern Europe: The Polish Experience*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford: University of California Press.
- Svitich, L.G., and A.A. Shiryayeva (1997). *Zhurnalistskoe obrazovanie: vzglyad sotsiologa*. Moscow: IKAR.
- Truscott, P. (1997). *Russia First: Breaking with the West*. London, New York: I.B. Tauris.
- Vartanova, E. (2001). "Media Structures: Changed and Unchanged." In K. Nordenstreng, E. Vartanova, and Y. Zassoursky (eds.), *Russian Media Challenge*, 21–72. Helsinki: Kikimora Publications.
- Vartanova, E. (November 15, 2006). Russian Media between the West and the East. Lecture. Helsinki: Aleksanteri Institute. Retrieved May 2, 2007, from [http://www.helsinki.fi/aleksanteri/maisterikoulu/opinto-opas/luentokurssit/oppimateriaali/russian\\_media\\_model/Lecture\\_2.ppt#256,1](http://www.helsinki.fi/aleksanteri/maisterikoulu/opinto-opas/luentokurssit/oppimateriaali/russian_media_model/Lecture_2.ppt#256,1), Russian Media between the West and the East.
- Weigle, M. A. (2000). *Russia's Liberal Project: State-Society Relations in the Transition from Communism*. University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press.
- White, S. (2000). *Russia's New Politics: The Management of a Postcommunist Society*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Zakaria, F. (1997). "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy." *Foreign Affairs* 76 (6): 22–23.
- Zassoursky, Y.N. (February 1997). *Media in Transition and Politics in Russia*. Paper presented at the International Conference on Media and Politics, Brussels.
- Zassoursky, Y.N. (1998). "Changing Media and Communications." In Y.N. Zassoursky and E. Vartanova (eds.), *Changing Media and Communications*, 14–31. Moscow: Faculty of Journalism, ICAR.
- Zassoursky, Y.N. (1999). "Open Society and Access to Information: The Role of Russian Media." In Y.N. Zassoursky and E. Vartanova (eds.), *Media, Communications and the Open Society*, 27–37. Moscow: Faculty of Journalism, IKAR.
- Zhelev, Z. (1996). "Is Communism Returning?" *Journal of Democracy* 7 (3): 4–6.

# **Introducing Turkey to the Three Media System Models:**

## **The Content of TV News in Eleven Countries**

*Volkan Uce and Knut De Swert*

### **Introduction**

The influence of media systems, shaped within the historical, cultural, and political contexts of separate countries, is important for understanding political communication in a national context, in addition to being a necessary variable in any comparative study of political communication involving Western countries. To study the way the news media deal with politics and political actors, the three models of Hallin and Mancini (2004) constitute a good starting point for hypotheses. This paper will draw on these models in order to address the question of how politics and political actors are brought to the Turkish people through their main news broadcasts, and more specifically, if the way they are performing is at all comparable with the “European” way. The most important ongoing debate in and about Turkey is the country’s possible accession to the European Union. One of the main arguments of those opposing Turkey’s EU accession is that Turkey is “not European,” and the relationship between media and politics is one of the many aspects that could be taken into consideration in that discussion. The finding of at least three models of media and politics within the European Union member states (possibly more, considering the countries that have recently joined the European Union) is of course an argument to say that a single “European” media system does not exist, just as there is also no widespread uniform European political system. The best we can do to address the “European” question about the Turkish (news) media is to try to find out if Turkey fits in any of the three European and North American models of media and politics. Whatever the answer is, it is a fairer way of evaluating Turkey than by comparing solely with Anglo-Saxon, liberal practice, especially since there are not one but three ways to be “European.” Perhaps Turkey still does not belong to any of the three media systems in the West, and there is a need for an additional Eastern or Southern model of media and politics. In Part 2, we will proceed to a more concrete analysis and check whether the main television news broadcasts watched daily by Turkish people, shaping their political attitudes and political knowledge, have European characteristics, or whether they differ from Euro-

pean broadcasts in many aspects of political news coverage. In this version of this paper, we will present only the hypotheses of this second, media-content analysis.

## 1. Turkey and the Models of Media and Politics: Which of the Three Will It Be?

When Hallin and Mancini (2004) reviewed the media and political systems of 18 Western countries, they found them to cluster into three models of media and politics: the Democratic Corporatist Model (the Nordic countries, the Netherlands, Germany, and others), the Polarized Pluralist Model (Greece, Spain, Portugal, Italy, and, to a lesser degree, France) and the Liberal Model (United States, Canada, Ireland, and, in many ways, the United Kingdom). Even if they did not necessarily expect it to be so, the clustering Hallin and Mancini found is very much geographically based. Mutual influences among neighboring countries, shared culture, and common historical backgrounds help explain this. In the case of Turkey, the geographical situation leaves few other options than to expect a connection with the Polarized Pluralist Model, as this is the model that applies to all the countries in the Mediterranean region and that fits especially well for Turkey's primary source (historically) of contact with Europe—Greece. We start our research with the assumption that if Turkey fits one of the three models, it is most likely to be the Mediterranean or Polarized Pluralist Model. To find out if this is true, we will take up the four major dimensions of media systems Hallin and Mancini (2004, 21) distinguished to build up the models. The first dimension is the *structure and development of the media markets*, where we will take into consideration literacy rates and newspaper circulation, including number of copies, but also target audiences and political and social engagement. The second dimension is political parallelism, i.e. the degree to which the media system matches the political divisions (e.g., political parties). It is found in organizational connections between media and political organizations (e.g., pillarization), membership in political organizations by the media audience, the number of journalists finding their way into politics, and the role the journalists want to play. The third dimension takes into account the development of journalistic professionalism (journalistic autonomy, development of professional organizations, and norms) and the degree of state intervention in the media system (by way of subsidies, regulations, and ownership of media).

The Polarized Pluralist Model, according to Hallin and Mancini (2004, 73), has the following characteristics along those four dimensions:



- An elite-oriented press with a relatively small circulation and a corresponding centrality of electronic media;
- A late development of freedom of the press and commercial media industries;
- Economically marginal newspapers, often in need of subsidy;
- High political parallelism;
- A strong focus of the press on political life, external pluralism of the press, and a tradition of commentary-oriented journalism;
- Only weakly developed professionalization of journalism;
- The state playing a large role as the owner, regulator, and funder of media, but with a low capacity to regulate the media situation effectively once it is commercialized.

We will follow these characteristics on the four dimensions in the assessment of whether Turkey belongs to this model or shows too many specific variations to be part of it.

### ***1.1 The Development of Media Markets***

*Print media*—More than 2,000 newspapers currently circulate in Turkey. Forty of them are national newspapers. All the other newspapers are regional or local. Together with the audiovisual media, the print media is dominated by large multimedia and multi-sectoral groups such as Doğan Group, Çukurova Group, Ciner Group, and Samanyolu Group. All the major newspapers and commercial television channels belong to these multimedia groups. There is a clear pattern of concentrated ownership in Turkish media. Due to the concentrated media ownership, newspapers are, as in the countries that fit the Polarized Pluralist Model, economically marginal.

The number of newspaper readers in Turkey is very low. Total newspaper circulation—the number of copies all newspapers distribute on an average day—is 5.1 million (Medyatava 2007), in a total population of approximately 70 million. We also must add that the most popular newspapers commonly give free gifts along with the newspaper, such as DVDs, books, posters, or calendars. These are just simple tricks to sell more newspapers. And it seems to help: According to the annual reports of the World Association of Newspapers (WAN 2005), newspaper circulation increased by 20 percent between 2000 and 2004. This increase is higher than that in other European countries. Indeed, in some European countries WAN observed a serious decline in newspaper circulation. The decrease in newspaper circulation can be interpreted in two ways. On the one hand it is a move towards the European standard of newspaper circu-

lation. Newspaper circulation is still a fraction of that in countries representing the Democratic Corporatist Model and the Liberal Model. On the other hand it means that Turkey's attitude towards reading newspapers is close to the Polarized Pluralist Model. This is so not only because of the number of newspapers in circulation, but also because of the greater chance that the newspapers used to be elite-oriented. Nowadays most Turkish newspapers seem to be seeking a mass readership. For most newspapers the orientation towards the elite seems to be fading.

*Television*—Until August 8, 1993, the Turkish public broadcaster TRT (Türkiye Radyo Televizyon Kurumu) was the only channel people could legally watch in Turkey. On that day Parliament lifted the monopoly on TV and radio broadcasting by amending the related article of the constitution. Now, less than 15 years later, there are 24 national, 16 regional, and 215 local television stations (Eumap 2005). Although commercial broadcasting was not allowed until 1993, the first commercial TV channel, Star, began broadcasting in 1990 from Germany via satellite. This paved the way for a lot of other commercial TV channels. They all began to operate without licenses, via satellite. Thus the lifting of the monopoly on TV and radio broadcasting in 1993 by the Turkish Parliament was inevitable. This situation was quasi-illegal, but Parliament accepted it, recognizing reality (Baris 2007).

Commercial broadcasting was introduced in an uncontrolled way. The pattern of "savage deregulation" (Hallin and Mancini 2004, 124) was strongly visible in Turkey. During the first years of deregulation, there was no real legal framework. This is a pattern Hallin and Mancini have acknowledged in all countries belonging to the Mediterranean Polarized Pluralist Model, except for France. Also in Turkey, those in power tried to control the situation but did not manage to stop the savage deregulation. After the 1993 termination of the state monopoly on broadcasting, the Radio Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) was established in April 1994 in order to regulate private broadcasting and control the compliance of the broadcasts with the legal framework. RTÜK is entitled to give penalties for channels that did not follow the legal framework. Baris (2007) sees three problems in the broadcasting law. She says that it is restrictive, vague, and too harshly implemented. Because of its vagueness, the law fails to create order amid the savage deregulation.

## ***1.2 Political Parallelism***

According to Hallin and Mancini (2004, 98) political parallelism is relatively high in Mediterranean countries. Political parallelism is also high in Turkey, especially in public broadcasting. Although TRT (the Turkish public broadcaster) covers the most political news of any Turkish television channel, Bek (2004) considers TRT nothing more than the mouthpiece of the government. Bek says the news broadcasts of TRT (and all other programs on that channel) leave very little room for the interpretation, discussion, and criticism of news facts. The domestic news segments are totally dominated by the actors of the government. This domination is so powerful that it can be considered “news of the government” instead of “domestic news.” Bek (2004) finds that merely representing the government gives an actor enough news value to be featured in TRT’s news broadcast. It is doubtful whether these kinds of nonevents are important enough to show on television during the news broadcast. Given these circumstances, it is possible to say the same thing about the Turkish public broadcaster now that Bustamante did in 1989 about Spain, Portugal, and Greece, which is that public service broadcasting, in the full sense of the word, never existed. The main reason for this is the fact that public broadcasting never managed to become independent from the state.

For polarized pluralism, we need deeply rooted polarization in the political spectrum. For Turkey, there is a clear polarization between two sides: the adherents of Kemalism, the nationalistic ideology of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, and the disciples of Islamism, the belief that Islam is not solely a religion, but also a political system. These two sides are both represented by the ideologies of newspapers and television channels.

Most of the media are inspired by the Kemalist ideology. This type of nationalism appears in two forms in Turkish citizens’ daily life through the media: The content of the message can be nationalistic, and there can be other, almost invisible manipulations that awake nationalistic feelings. The latter is called “banal nationalism.” Billig (1995) introduced this phenomenon to the research on nationalism to point out that nationalism is present in people’s lives far more than we would expect. Banal nationalism reminds people of the unity of the nation, underlining—almost unnoticed—the homogeneity of the citizens of a state based on the concept of nation. Billig (1995, 6) describes it as “the ideological habits which enable the established nations of the West to be reproduced.” In other words, banal nationalism is a way to reproduce the nation. Yumul and Özkirimli (2000, 789) applied the concept and the study of “banal nationalism” to the Turkish situation. This study identified clear expressions of nationalism in the Turkish press. Most of the Turkish newspapers have a

red-colored title. This refers to the main color of the Turkish flag. And 13 of the 38 Turkish newspapers combined the red letters with the Turkish flag, a picture of Atatürk, or the geographical outline of Turkey. Additionally, the names of some newspapers—such as *Türkiye* (Turkey), *Cumhuriyet* (Republic), and *Milliyet* (Nationality)—refer to the Turkish nation. Some other newspapers print clearly nationalistic mottos. On every issue, *Hürriyet*, the most popular Turkish newspaper, publishes the same slogan: “Turkey for the Turks.” There is no study on the presence of banal nationalism, but we believe the outcome of such a study will be similar to the study of Yumul and Özkirimli. For example, during national holidays a portrait of Atatürk or a Turkish flag is always visible in a corner of the screen. Without exception, all the television channels demonstrate that they are aware of the importance of that day for the Turkish nation.

The media’s nationalistic attitude also appears in the content of the messages. Turkish media criticized Orhan Pamuk<sup>1</sup> clearly when he mentioned that more than a million Armenians were killed in Turkey. These words were regarded as damaging to Turkish pride. For the media, what Pamuk said was unacceptable (Rohtus 2005, 682). And when he won the Nobel Prize for Literature, the media insinuated that Pamuk received the award because he humiliated the Turkish nation and that it paid off to betray your nation.

Political parallelism also exists on the other side of the Turkish political spectrum. There are television channels (Kanal 7, TV5, Meltem TV, Samanyolu TV, Dost TV) and newspapers (*Zaman*, *Vakit*, *Yeni Asya*) that are pro-AKP. They seem to support everything that the AKP and Premier Erdogan do. The pro-Islamist attitude of these newspapers and television channels is visible in two ways. On the one hand there are the obvious things like the absence of the color red, the ads selling DVDs of animated films on the Qur’an, a lot of attention paid to important days on the Islamic calendar, and the numerous women with headscarves in the live audience. On the other hand a closer look at the content reveals their attitude: The information and the messages have a biased, clearly pro-Islamist perspective. Although the pro-Islamist media is quite popular, the ratings of the nationalist media are much higher. The polarization in the Turkish society also exists in the media, but the nationalist media seem to dominate this domain. Islamist-oriented media are less popular than nationalist media, with the exception of the newspaper *Zaman*, which has the largest circulation of any newspaper in Turkey.

---

<sup>1</sup> Orhan Pamuk is the most famous Turkish writer and he won the Nobel Prize in Literature in 2006. He said these words during an interview with *Tagesanzeiger*, a Swiss newspaper, on February 6, 2005.

### ***1.3 The Development of Journalistic Professionalism***

Law 212—which dates from 1961—regulates the rights of journalists. This law seems impressive on paper, but the problem is that most of the media employees are working outside this legislation regulating the rights of journalists and without permanent contracts. Media workers who are not provided a contract under Law 212 cannot obtain a press card and become a member of the Turkish Journalists Union (Türkiye Gazeteciler Sendikası, TGS), which is the only trade union that has the authority to negotiate collective agreements for journalists. According to Baris (2007), most of the media workers are cautious about union membership due to fear of employer retaliation, which may cause dismissal. There are many small, fragmented associations, but the unionization of the media sector is very low. This leads us to conclude that journalistic professionalism is not welldeveloped in Turkey.

### ***1.4 The Degree and Nature of State Intervention***

In Mediterranean countries the state asserts, and frequently exercises, the right to intervene in all aspects of social life, including the media. As described above (political parallelism) the control of the government on public broadcasting is great. But in Mediterranean countries the state intervenes in the content of not only public broadcasting, but also commercial broadcasters. The days may be gone when a law prohibiting “offenses to the chief of state” could be invoked 350 times, as De Gaulle did during his terms in office (Hallin and Mancini 2004, 120). But there are still countries with a high degree of state intervention. In Greece publications are still shut down for offenses against the president of the republic (Dimitras 1997, 100). Turkey also suffers state intervention in many aspects of social life.


Understanding the power of state intervention in Turkey is possible only with a knowledge of the country’s history. Throughout the history of the 84-year-old republic, one prominent actor was always important: the military. The birth of the Turkish Republic was the answer of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk to the Treaty of Sèvres, which divided large parts of the Ottoman empire between the Allied Powers.<sup>2</sup> The Treaty of Sèvres was and still is regarded by all Turks as a real humiliation. The influence of Atatürk<sup>3</sup> on

---

<sup>2</sup> During World War I the Ottoman Empire sided with the Central Powers, led by Austria–Hungary and Germany. They were defeated by the Allied Powers, led by France, Russia, and the British Empire.

<sup>3</sup> Atatürk means “Father of all Turks.”

the Turkish Republic has been great. The military is responsible for safeguarding the legacy of Atatürk. Four military coups throughout the history of Turkey, involving changes in the constitution, illustrate how serious the military takes its role as protector of the Turkish Republic and the principles of Atatürk. In this context the situation in Turkey is unlike the situation in other countries. When we talk about state intervention in other countries, the actor is clear: it is the government. But when we talk about state intervention in Turkey, there are two possible actors: the government and the military power. Because of the great power of the mili-



tary behind the curtains, it is also called the “deep state.” The knowledge of this fact makes it easier to understand the duopoly above (political parallelism): Most of the media chose nationalism in favor of the deep state and some of the media chose Islamism, in favor of the AKP,<sup>4</sup> the Islamist party in government.

The deep state in particular has a large impact on the media to this day. Article 301, probably the best-known Turkish article, is an instrument in the hands of the state and the deep state to intervene when the media strongly criticize the powerful elites. This article prohibits anyone from insulting the Turkish Republic, Turkishness, the Turkish Parliament, the government, military, or police. People who commit this crime can be punished by imprisonment from six months to three years. The problem with this rule is that it is very vague, and because of its vagueness, it becomes a dangerous weapon in the hands of the elite. It prohibits journalists and intellectuals from criticizing the powerful elites in Turkey.

The conclusion of the structural and historical part of our paper is that Turkey is a clear example of the Mediterranean or Polarized Pluralist Model. There is a clear pattern of “savage deregulation.” There is clear evidence that the development of journalistic professionalism is very low. Political parallelism and state intervention were and are very common in Turkey. When we redraw the figure showing the relation of individual cases to the three models (Hallin and Mancini 2004, 70), we would have to put Turkey along with Greece on top of the pyramid. Formal political parallelism has eroded in Turkey in favor of a more economic parallelism, but this is more a global trend that is certainly not limited to the Turkish situation.

## **2. Content Analysis of Turkish TV News**

As the first part of this paper has shown, Turkey is a representative of the Polarized Pluralist Model. The second part of this paper seeks to go further, to a comparative analysis of (television) news media content. Hallin and Mancini’s model is particularly relevant concerning the relation between news media and politics, which we would like to examine more specifically in the context of the way politics is covered in the news media. Again, we are doing so in order to address the question of how European Turkish media are. We would like to assess Turkish TV-news

---

<sup>4</sup> Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi = Justice and Development Party

media content vis-à-vis its European counterparts: Is Turkish television news treatment of politics comparable with European norms? Given our findings in the first part of the paper, we have reason to believe that Turkish media coverage of politics is not entirely alien to European news media norms, especially not to the other countries that fall under the Mediterranean Polarized Pluralist Model. If we take into account the tendency of the Liberal Model to penetrate both of the other models of media and politics, eroding many of the strongest differences, we would expect Turkish broadcasters to have a good chance to fit in among the Europeans.

But on the other hand, broadcasting media tend to be more free than other media from their given media system. Although it has occurred (for instance, in the Netherlands and Italy), political parallelism is less common for TV stations, not least because they are generally aiming at a general public. Hallin and Mancini (2004, 270) refer to this phenomenon as “television as common ground,” with the prevalence of internal pluralism guided by the principles of political neutrality. In recent decades globalization has pervaded many aspects of life (economic as well as cultural), including media. Many political owners and direct influences have been replaced by economic influences. And in addition to that, we have to take into account that media content is influenced much more than the media system it is manufactured in. The political system, for example, is a clear factor, as is the way the government or parties in power communicate with the media and the public. Research found convincing evidence for the presence of ruling elite dominance (more attention for the government, and the prime minister in particular), in Belgium (Walgrave and De Swert 2006), the Netherlands (Van Praag and Brants 2000), and Germany (Schoenbach and De Ridder et al. 2001). However, the extent of this media bonus was far greater in Germany than the Netherlands, and especially compared to Belgium, even though all three countries belong to the Democratic Corporatist Model.

Nevertheless, we expect some legacy from the three models to have survived to the present. To start with, we would like to compare Turkish *ruling elite dominance* (i.e. purely quantitatively, the presence of political actors and their points of view in the news) in the television news media with norms in other European countries. We saw in the first part of this paper that the government has considerable control over the public broadcaster TRT, including news content (Bek 2004). On this characteristic, Turkey could well be situated outside the common European range of ruling elite dominance in public broadcasting, and likewise prove to be less European, the more the results differ from European counterparts. The question is actually not if, but rather to what extent,



the Turkish public broadcaster will prove to deviate from the normal European ruling elite dominance (if that exists). Even if many theories and research results have proven a certain elite dominance of the news in almost every news broadcast, there is not much reason to expect all European broadcasters to show the same elite ratings. National factors, both national news context as political system variations (such as election system, form of leadership, number of parties, and strength of the government), as well as particular journalistic cultures in each country, ensure that some variation will be visible. It is particularly important in this matter for communications scholars not to oversee the regulations that exist in some countries, limiting the freedom of journalists and editors to decide over their own elite dominance rating or to leave it open to the survival-of-the-fittest principle of news value. In France, Britain, and Italy, for example, the shares of airtime that each political camp is supposed to get is explicitly regulated, which will result in a lesser degree of ruling elite dominance, at least in the campaign periods, but often also outside them.

The tradition of commentary-oriented journalism in the Polarized Pluralist Model is likely to have consequences for today's journalism, despite the pressure that comes from the dominant liberal concept of journalism. Besides that, many elements have been taken into account during the process of the construction of the models, factors that are also expected to have an influence on media content, such as regulation and state control by ownership. At least where they are present, we can hypothesize a great influence of these factors on the media content, in the case of the coverage of political actors. For the Mediterranean model, some of these elements are present. Many elements are not completely covered by the models or are present in more than one model. The political system variables are especially important to keep in mind in analyses like these.

Two other characteristics for which we would like to check the position of Turkish media concern the amount of politics on the main television news, and the extent and scope of the foreign news. If Turkey is European, the focus of the foreign news should not lie (at least not primarily) on other regions in the world. It is also possible to see at least a minimum of coverage on other European countries as a requirement to strive for the label "European."

Of course, in assessing all these dependent variables, we will have to take into account the large differences in Turkey between the public broadcaster, which is government-controlled in almost all possible ways, and a series of commercial channels with almost the same ratings for tel-

evision news that have to survive in highly competitive surroundings. In Turkey, savage deregulation has led to one highly state-controlled state broadcaster that covers politics from the government's perspective, and many less controlled, strongly competitive commercial players that hardly have room for serious discourse about politics. In a very competitive news media landscape with multiple players, there will be more pressure towards more sensational and populist news. In such conditions the news media will more readily tend to target one particular segment of the audience, for example by having a different approach to covering issues and politicians that is of interest to that particular group. In duopoly situations with two evenly matched players, the drive towards objectivity and neutral coverage will be a lot stronger.

The data for this empirical content analysis consists of a sample of television news broadcasts from 11 Western countries over a constructed period of 28 days in the period December 2006–April 2007. Generally, for each country the public broadcaster and the largest commercial news broadcaster are included in the selection with their flagship evening news program. The countries in the sample are chosen across the three media system models of Hallin and Mancini. The Netherlands, Norway, Germany, and Flanders (the Dutch-speaking region of Belgium<sup>5</sup>) can be considered examples of the North/Central European Democratic Corporatist Model. France, Italy, and the French-speaking region of Belgium represent the Mediterranean Pluralistic Model. And the Anglo-American model is also represented by the main TV news broadcasts of Ireland, the United Kingdom, and Canada.

### *Hypotheses*

1. Concerning ruling elite dominance (quantitative presence of political actors):
  - 1a. The Turkish public broadcaster has one of the highest ruling elite dominances in Europe.
  - 1b. The Turkish commercial broadcasters have among the lowest ruling elite dominances in Europe.

---

<sup>5</sup> We divided Belgium because the media systems of the Flemish-speaking and French-speaking regions are completely segregated from each other. Generally, cultural differences between both communities are large and closely related to each region's closest geographical and linguistic neighbors: the Netherlands for Flanders and France for the French-speaking part of Belgium. We include them with the media system of the respective countries.

2. Concerning the color of the tone in the television news:
  - 2a. The Turkish public broadcaster will be relatively neutral; within the minimally colored coverage, the prevailing positive reference will be to the governing actors, and the prevailing negative reference will be to the opposition forces.
  - 2b. The Turkish commercial broadcasters will—in line with Mediterranean journalistic traditions—show a lot of color in the political news coverage, but not especially directed to any particular political actor.
3. Concerning the subjects covered by the news media:
  - 3a. The Turkish public broadcaster will have one of the highest percentages of political content in Europe.
  - 3b. The Turkish commercial broadcaster will have one of the lowest percentages of political content in Europe.
4. Concerning the orientation of the news:
  - 4a. The Turkish news broadcasts are mainly oriented towards coverage of domestic news, and domesticated foreign news.
  - 4b. There is less coverage of other European countries on Turkish television news broadcasts than in news broadcasts of countries that are already members of the EU.

It will be interesting to find out to what extent the Turkish news content can be considered European. To be exceptional in one way or another is not a problem—it is more the general picture that is of interest. Does Turkish television news differ structurally from the European television news broadcasts, or does it generally comply to European standards? And, just as interesting, does Turkish news have more in common with news broadcasts from other Mediterranean countries, or are there too many other influences for the Hallin and Mancini models to be visible in a comparative news content analysis?

## Reference List

- Baris, R. (2007). "Media Landscape: Turkey." Retrieved March 28, 2007, from [http://www.ejc.net/media\\_landscape/article/turkey](http://www.ejc.net/media_landscape/article/turkey)
- Bek, M.G. (2004). "Türkiye'de Televizyon Haberciligi ve Tabloidlesme," *İletişim Arastirmalari* 3.
- Billig, M. (1995). *Banal Nationalism*. London: Sage.
- Dimitras, P.E. (1997), "Greece," in Ostergaard, B.S. (ed.), *The Media in Western Europe: The Euromedia Handbook*, London: Sage.
- Eumap (2005). "Turkey 1543–1571," in *Television across Europe: Regulation, Policy and Independence—Reports, Press Releases, Media Coverage*. Retrieved from [http://www.eumap.org/topics/media/television\\_europe](http://www.eumap.org/topics/media/television_europe)
- Hallin, D.C., and P. Mancini (2004). *Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Medyatava (2007). "Gazete Net Satislari." Retrieved April 9, 2007, from <http://www.medyatava.net/tiraj.asp>
- Rochtus, D. (2005). "Is de Europese schoen te groot voor de Turkse voet?" *Streven* 72 (8), 675–686.
- Schoenbach, K., and J. De Ridder, et al. (2001). "Politicians on the News: Getting Attention in Dutch and German Election Campaigns." *European Journal of Political Research* 39: 519–531.
- Timmerman, C., (1999). *Onderwijs maakt het verschil*. Leuven: Acco.
- Van Praag, P., and K. Brants (2000). *Tussen beeld en inhoud: Politiek en de verkiezingen van 1998*. Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis.
- Walgrave, S., and K. De Swert (2006). "De kanseliersbonus revisited: Over de dominante aanwezigheid van de premier en de regering in het Vlaamse televisienieuws." In Hooghe, M., K. De Swert, and S. Walgrave, *Nieuws op televisie. Televisienieuws als venster op de wereld*. Leuven: Acco.
- WAN (2005). "World Press Trends: Newspaper Circulation and Advertising up Worldwide." Retrieved April 9, 2007, from <http://www.wan-press.org/article7321.html>
- Yumul, A., and U. Özkirimki (2000). "Reproducing the Nation: 'Banal Nationalism' in the Turkish Press." *Media Culture Society* 22 (November 2000): 787–804.

# **A Perspective from the South: Triggers and Signs of Change**

*Adrian Hadland*

## **Introduction**

Unlike any of the 18 countries used in Hallin and Mancini's *Comparing Media Systems* paradigm, South Africa has recently experienced dramatic, profound change in both its political system and its media sector. Indeed, if there is one defining characteristic of the South African media market over the 13 years since the country's transition from apartheid to democracy, change is probably it. Certainly, some trends predate South Africa's first democratic election in April 1994, and indeed existed decades earlier. The country's media sector is still dominated by four or five companies and their products, just as it was a century ago. But in many key areas such as patterns of ownership, diversity, products, audience, and even roles and functions, the South African media today is virtually unrecognizable compared to the early 1990s.

The extent, rapidity, and contemporaneity of the transformation experienced in the South African media sector offers a particular and rigorous challenge to Hallin and Mancini's Three Models paradigm: How does it cope with change? After all, several other critical methodologies, such as political economy, do devote considerable attention to this aspect. The short answer is that Hallin and Mancini's paradigm does not cope very well. *Comparative Media Systems* does offer an account of the process of media system change, and it does set out an understanding for the direction of that change, based on the theoretical underpinnings of the paradigm as a whole. An important part of this chapter will be devoted to elucidating this understanding of both the process and direction of media system change. It will argue that there are a number of key weaknesses within Hallin and Mancini's paradigm, both in how change is defined and understanding how and why change takes place.

Change in an emerging democracy may, for instance, be quite different from the shifts and transformations that older, more stable systems undergo. This naturally has an impact on the degree and pace of change within corresponding media systems. Many post-colonial, developed democracies in Africa, for example, are effectively one-party systems with many of the networks, structures, and values of their authoritarian

and even pre-colonial pasts still very much in evidence. This is a different kind of democracy from the versions that exist elsewhere, most particularly compared to the developed Western states that mostly populate the Three Models paradigm.

Even though mature systems go through a process of constant change themselves, as Hallin and Mancini discern, they are likely to cope with the potential triggers of change more comfortably. They are unlikely, for example, to have to manage a dramatic swing in the value of their national currency or a massive sudden outflow of foreign investment. New market entrants with global connections are unlikely to shift the whole shape of the sector. Newer, smaller systems are more vulnerable. They are buffeted and transformed by phenomena that would cause only marginal shifts over the long term in larger, more stable systems. And with the legacy of pre-democratic values, alliances, and systems pressing for adoption and even formalization, change may also not be in Hallin and Mancini's anticipated direction toward the Liberal Model (which I have termed Liberal drift).

During the course of my PhD research (Hadland 2007), I have attempted to apply Hallin and Mancini's paradigm to the specific case of South Africa. What I would like to do in this paper is not necessarily to delve too deeply into the detail of this exercise, but attempt instead to draw out a number of findings and conclusions. In this way I hope to draw scholars' attention to debates and questions that may find resonance within their own work and thinking. In this way, the intersection of scholarship is encouraged and the experiences of the South made more relevant.

In this chapter, I will be focusing on four findings that I hope will provoke some debate. These findings suggest that *Comparing Media Systems*:

1. does not cope with rapid, dramatic systemic change or with divergent models of democracy very well;
2. expects too much of homogenization, particularly in emerging democracies with powerful majority parties;
3. misses how commercialization can actually enhance the process of political parallelism and state intervention, rather than diminishing them; and,
4. understates the diverse means by which states can intervene in media systems, particularly coercive means.

Before tackling these four findings, I will briefly summarize recent developments in South Africa's political and media systems to provide the context for the discussion that follows.

## **1. The South African Experience**

Few years in South African history will ever hold as much significance as 1994, the year the country became a democratic state, held its first elections with universal franchise, and elected Nelson Mandela as its first black president. Though the world had begun to warm up to the idea of a new South Africa in the lead-up to the April 27 election of 1994—sanctions had eased and foreign investment had started to trickle in—the doors to the world were well and truly flung open in the heady days after the poll. The country's shift from global pariah to universal icon of hope and reconciliation was rapid and largely peaceful.

Naturally and inevitably, the switch had massive repercussions on many aspects of the South African polity, not least on the purveyors of the country's newspapers and magazines. For more than a century, the print industry had enjoyed a tightly structured fraternity with barriers to entry as high as the barbed-wire fences surrounding the country's military establishments. In spite of the fact that, in 1994, 80 percent of South Africa's population was black, a genuinely black press was not allowed to develop. Indeed, laws had been framed during the apartheid era that expressly forbade newspapers and magazines from reporting on black political leaders or parties or even from covering important political and social developments if they occurred in zones designated as black living areas.

With television only arriving in the mid-1970s (very late by world standards) and the broadcast sector tied up in a state monopoly until the early 1990s, there was little opportunity for the convergence of technologies or for the amalgamation of multi-media empires that was in full force in the rest of the world. Apartheid isolation ensured no substantial foreign investment in the mainstream print sector until 1993, leaving largely undisturbed a language- and race-based oligopolistic division of the spoils between two major Afrikaans-language newspaper companies, Nasionale Pers and Perskor, and two English-language ones, Times Media Limited and the Argus Publishing and Printing Company. The sector was clearly ready for a major overhaul.

## **2. Media Change**

In the days following South Africa's first democratic election in April 1994, an extraordinary thing happened in the country's print media sector. People stopped buying newspapers. Across the board, virtually every title, whether daily, weekly, metropolitan, or provincial, experienced a significant decline in circulation (see Table 1). Cape Town's major afternoon

daily, the *Cape Argus*, lost almost 20 percent of its readership between mid-1994 and the end of 1995. The circulation of Durban's *Daily News* dropped from just under 100,000 in the first half of 1993 to 75,960 in the last six months of 1995. And South Africa's flagship Johannesburg-based daily, the *Star*, watched circulation fall from 216,684 for the period January to June 1993 to 165,171 for the last half of 1995 (ABC 2006).

Total daily newspaper circulation fell by 11 percent, or 134,564 copies, between June 1994 and December 1995 (ABC). This collective decline signaled a huge loss of revenue and a dramatic shift within the market and its audience. In most cases, existing titles have been unable to reclaim the lost ground.

But it was not just the quantity of sales that fell in the wake of the birth of a new democracy. It was the quality of print media products too. In 2002 an investigation was launched into the diminishing quality of newspaper and magazine reportage. The South African National Editors' Forum (Sanef) commissioned a comprehensive skills audit of relatively senior local journalists (those with three to five years of experience). It was hoped that the audit would provide important indicators concerning the state of South African journalism. It did, and the result, according to the then-chairman of Sanef and current *City Press* editor Mathatha Tse-du, was "not a nice picture" (2002, 5).

*Table 1: The ABC of Declining Sales*

| Title      | 1994    |         | 1995    |         |
|------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
|            | Jan–Jun | Jul–Dec | Jan–Jun | Jul–Dec |
| Cape Argus | 106,574 | 97,996  | 89,014  | 82,774  |
| Mercury    | 62,925  | 57,813  | 49,874  | 42,690  |
| Sowetan    | 217,823 | 190,586 | 208,358 | 207,849 |
| The Star   | 208,185 | 191,332 | 182,119 | 165,171 |
| Daily News | 93,247  | 87,814  | 81,032  | 75,960  |

*Source: Audit Bureau of Circulations 2006*

The poor skill levels were worse than expected and pointed to deteriorating workforce quality, and thus output, at key levels in the sector. Among the results of the Sanef audit: 82 percent of the South African journalists surveyed showed poor interviewing skills, and many demonstrated a weak grasp of general knowledge, while a low level of reporting skills in general was common (De Beer and Steyn 2002).

Sanef conducted a follow-up study into the skills of first-line managers in news organizations, dubbed Skills Audit 2, in 2004. The results



this time showed substantial management skills weaknesses. First-line (newsroom) managers felt less positive than their reporters about their working environments, particularly in relation to career development and remuneration; were aware they did not communicate as well as they needed to; and demonstrated significant skills gaps in self-management, teamwork, strategic initiative, and coping with multiculturalism and multilingualism (Barratt 2006, 46).

Neither were poor skills levels the only evidence of a diminishing journalistic professionalism in this period. The major trade union for practicing journalists, the South African Union of Journalists (SAUJ), collapsed and was finally liquidated in 2005. Other trade unions, such as the Media Workers Association of South Africa (Mwasa) and the South African Typographical Union (SATU) continued in the sector but accounted for only a small proportion of working journalists. Both Mwasa and SATU were intended primarily for the print shop employees working in the presses. By 2008 no genuine alternative association to the SAUJ had been established or seemed likely.

In general terms, the support and regularization of professionalism in the industry has now been left largely to the editors (who have traditionally been antagonistic to the rights of journeymen journalists in South Africa), through their organization Sanef. Sanef itself suffered various crises of division and disagreement from its inception in 1998 (Barratt 2006). Nor was it only poor skills and the collapsing state of the unions that indicated serious fault lines were appearing in journalistic organizations and reducing professionalism.

Repeated and public ethical blunders such as plagiarism, biased reportage in support of political factions, and wide-scale inaccuracy embarrassed the industry in the post-1994 period. Major cutbacks of staff and training budgets by most media companies in the wake of a gathering recession in the sector from 1999 to 2002 further undermined the professionalization of South African journalists. This was worsened once more by the poor remuneration packages (which still prevail in the industry) that made offers from the private or public sector particularly appealing to young, degreed journalists still serving their apprenticeship in the industry. The result of these trends was the “juniorization” of newsrooms and the diminishing of the role of editors relative to management. A further significant factor in the development of these trends was government’s urgent challenge to the media to transform their organizations racially.

It was not only journalistic skills, circulation figures, and the racial make-up of newsrooms that began to change in South Africa from 1994. The structure and dynamics of the media market itself started to shift. The alternative press, consisting of about a dozen foreign-funded or sup-

ported but influential anti-apartheid newspapers, was mostly closed down in the face of funding and positioning problems (Opatrny 2007). The mainstream sector itself underwent a massive overhaul as black and foreign capital entered the marketplace, for the first time seizing control of a variety of significant media enterprises, including Times Media Limited (TML) and the Argus Publishing and Printing Company. By contrast, Nasionale Pers (Naspers), a formerly monolingual and politically partisan newspaper group, expanded into an imposing, multi-platform, multi-lingual global presence with media activities in some 50 countries.

At present, in 2007, South Africa has 43 daily, weekly, and bi-weekly commercial newspapers, representing a wide range of different audiences and interests (Milne and Taylor 2006). They are owned by four media groups (Naspers,<sup>1</sup> Johnnic Communications Ltd, Caxton & CTP Publishers and Printers Ltd, and Independent News & Media Plc). In addition, the country has more than 50 “knock-and-drops,” or local “free sheets,” owned and distributed by the major media groups as vehicles for local advertising (Milne and Taylor 2006). According to the most recent survey, there are around 100 authentic community-run newspapers around the country, ranging from regular weekly papers to sporadic newsletters distributed by hand (Hadland and Thorne 2004).

The South African newspaper market has seen rapid growth since the year 2000, marked by new entrants into the market and rising overall circulation and readership (Milne and Taylor 2006). Between 2000 and 2005, total circulation of daily newspapers increased by 38.4 percent from 1.13 million per day to 1.57 million (Milne and Taylor 2006, 39). However, much of the circulation growth was due to newly launched titles, leaving the established mainstream papers in a steady downward curve, reflecting global trends.

Overall, circulation levels and market diversity are both at very low levels in South Africa, in spite of the relatively sophisticated nature of the print media industry. By 2000 South Africa had the second-lowest number of print titles in the world relative to population and a circulation per capita that is the world's fifth lowest (Berger 2004, 59).

One of the most striking trends in the post-1994 period has been the commercialization of the South African print media sector. This has been evident in the rapid development of the niche, client magazine, or con-

---

<sup>1</sup> Naspers reorganized its print media business in 2000 and renamed this part of the company Media24. With the date of the change falling in the middle of the research period, I have had to use whichever name is appropriate for the citation. This is more accurate, but possibly confusing.

tract publishing sector. Circulation figures from ABC show unprecedented growth in the publishing and sales of magazines. By 2005, there were about 350 ABC-audited magazine titles (or 20 million magazines) being distributed in South Africa every month. An important aspect of the upward trend in custom magazines has been the challenge it has presented to ethical standards in the industry. The blurring of advertising material and editorial content has become endemic in the South African print sector as a whole, with significant consequences for media status as well as for the industry's long-term financial health (Hadland, Cowling, and Tabе 2007).

According to All Media and Products Survey (AMPS) figures from the South African Advertising Research Foundation (SAARF), 40.4 percent of the adult population read a newspaper at least once a week in 2000, rising only minimally to 40.6 percent by 2005 (cited in Milne and Taylor 2006, 39). This is of course low by developed world standards but is skewed by the large proportion of rural dwellers (almost half of the population) in South Africa, many of whom are beyond the reach of newspaper distribution chains, or who simply cannot afford to purchase regular newspapers. Poverty is also endemic in the rural areas.

But few developments have been more significant to the South African media marketplace in the post-1994 period than the arrival of mass-market tabloid newspapers. Hallin and Mancini state: "So far as we know, no country that did not develop mass circulation newspapers in the late 19th to early 20th century has ever subsequently developed them" (2004, 24). This is clearly not the case in South Africa, where a brand new, mass-circulation newspaper sector has sprung up within the last five years.

In 1994, the biggest selling daily newspaper—which sold an average of 191,322 copies per day in the first half of the year—was the *Star* of Johannesburg (ABC 2006). By 2006, South Africa's top-selling daily was a tabloid, the *Daily Sun*, currently selling about 450,000 copies a day. Indeed a closer look at the rise in the circulation of South African newspapers between 2000 and 2005 reveals that the 38.4 percent increase is entirely accounted for by the *Daily Sun* and the new Zulu-language paper *Isolezwe* (which had an average daily circulation of 86,232 in 2006).

Excluding these two publications, there has been a decline of 10.8 percent in the total circulation of the remaining 17 dailies monitored by the ABC (Milne and Taylor 2006). Between them, the 11 major metropolitan daily newspapers lost daily sales of 121,179 copies over the period. The mainstream newspaper market is generally considered by media executives to be a "mature market" in which products are largely competing against each other for the same audience. As the Naspers annual report

stated in 2003, “most sectors of South Africa’s magazine and newspaper markets are overtraded” (Naspers 2003, 10).

The success of the *Daily Sun* from its inception in 2003 spawned other similar tabloid titles such as the *Sunday Sun* and the *Son*, both owned by Naspers and publisher Deon Du Plessis, and the *Daily Voice* (Independent News & Media Plc). Like their British predecessors, the South African titles were all aimed at the “blue-collar” market: in South Africa’s case, lower-middle class black and colored readers. The figures and trends suggest that rather than cannibalizing the readerships of other mainstream titles, the new titles reached many readers who previously did not buy a newspaper regularly (Du Plessis 2006). In this way, a mass newspaper market was genuinely constructed from scratch in South Africa’s recent past.

A final key trend during the period has been realignment in the relationship between the media and the state. This was inevitable with the regime change from apartheid state to democracy, but it is clear in retrospect that both sides have struggled to come to terms with their new roles and responsibilities. The consequence has been heightened tension between the majority party in government, the African National Congress (ANC), and the media. Johnston identifies a series of “points of conflict” that have developed between the ANC and the print media and characterizes these as follows: “At best, the ANC’s relationship with the political press has been distant and neurotically suspicious; at worst, pathologically hostile” (2005, 13). A number of developments serve to illustrate this shift of relations. They include the state’s growing willingness to intervene in the media in various ways, its reluctance to reform legislation affecting the media, its entrée into mass newsletter publishing, and the establishment of a variety of clientelist-type bonds between government and the nascent community-media sector.

The shift is also evident from the challenge both to and within the media to revisit its traditional, liberal role of Fourth Estate watchdog in a favor of a more conciliatory, less adversarial voice. This has corresponded with an increasingly cozy relationship between majority party political leaders and media owners. Clearly, wide-ranging and important changes have taken place in the South African media in the post-1994 period. And while few would dispute the broad themes of change—journalistic professionalization, state-media relations, the proximity of the media to the political system, and the structure of the market—it is no coincidence that these are the very dimensions singled out by Hallin and Mancini (2004) as the key indicators for comparative media system analysis.

### 3. Political Change

Of course, it is not merely South Africa's media that has undergone fundamental change in the last decade and a half. Perhaps more evident to the world at large has been the seismic change in South Africa's political life. The country's relatively peaceful and rapid transition from apartheid pariah to constitutional democracy was heralded around the world as a massively important moment of human achievement. The "miracle" of racial reconciliation delivered Nobel Peace Prizes to Nelson Mandela and his counterpart, then-deputy president F.W. de Klerk. It also set South Africa on a new path of political and economic development.

There were many hallmarks of this political journey. Some were clearly evident to the whole world, others only to the new breed of legislator who set about reforming 300 years of statutory discrimination. As Calland observed after the country's first five years of democracy: "South Africa's Parliament is unrecognisable from the one that preceded it before 1994... Not only does its membership comprise a majority of black people who suffered under apartheid, serving political parties a number of whom were banned until 1990, but its institutional construction has been almost entirely overhauled" (1999, 100).

Key among these statutory hallmarks were the adoption of an interim democratic constitution in 1993 and its finalization in 1996. These two documents encompassed a total overhaul of the country's political culture and its political, social, and judicial system, encompassing a Bill of Rights, broad equality, and universal suffrage. This new vision of political practice was embarked upon when Mandela's African National Congress (ANC) achieved its anticipated and substantial electoral majority in 1994 and began a systematic recreation of the country's entire legislative framework, abolishing, amending, or creating hundreds of laws. In fact, South Africa's first democratic government passed 534 acts of Parliament in its first five years, in itself a "huge achievement" (Calland 1999, 5). As Nelson Mandela said in his farewell speech to Parliament: "These have been no trivial laws or mere adjustments to an existing body of statutes. They have created a framework for the revolutionary transformation of society and of government itself" (cited in Calland 1999, 5). Not all of the laws that contained anti-press freedom elements were abolished by the new democratic state.

Horwitz has sketched the considerable volume of literature—particularly in the post-1990 period—that grapples with political transitions and the evolving architecture of new democratic institutions (2001). This "'transition theory,' as it is loosely referred to, is the product of reflection upon, and abstraction from, the historically disparate paths to democracy

followed in central and southern Europe and Latin America” (2001, 6). Horwitz identifies South Africa as an example of a “transplacement” transition, according to Huntington’s classic 1991 analytical paradigm (*The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late 20th Century*). This form of transition is usually ushered in as the result of negotiations between powerful groups and most frequently occurs in conditions of stalemate. A common factor is the consensual terrain enjoined by both reformers within the ruling regime and moderates in the opposition (2001, 6–7). I would concur with Horwitz that this does seem to encapsulate important features of South Africa’s political transition. In addition, his observation is cogent that most successful transitions from this category “produce a dispensation that is economically and socially conservative, thus maintaining the central pillars of capitalist society” (2001, 7). The citation of the transition theory literature serves to underline an important point: Democracy has many different forms and encapsulates many different processes. For Hallin and Mancini’s paradigm to gain universal acceptance, it needs to be able to absorb, and explain, these diverse and often divergent elements.

I should point out that I have focused almost all my efforts on South Africa’s print media sector. This is not to negate the import of the broadcast sector nor of the new media forms that have arisen in recent years. The broadcast element of a country’s media system certainly features frequently in Hallin and Mancini’s model, often as an apparent tiebreaker when it comes to the task of clustering. However, while I will allude in passing to the development of the broadcasting sector in South Africa, I cannot hope to absorb its complexity and rapid evolution within the scope of this work. That must wait for a follow-up investigation. I can say that the indications certainly suggest a correlation with the findings of this paper.

In addition, scholars have noted the paucity of literature and research concerning contemporary Afrikaans-language newspapers (Botma 2006). And while I have endeavored to include these titles and their parent companies in the current work, there is inevitably an emphasis on the English-language mainstream press, which reflects the topography of the available scholarship. By South Africa’s media “system,” however, I do mean all print media titles and their supporting organizations, including the growing community media sector, along with broadcast (television, radio, and community radio) and new media outlets.

#### **4. Finding One: Coping with Change**

For Hallin and Mancini, change in media systems is essentially about modernity. It is about the inexorable shift toward a universalized media that is increasingly autonomous (differentiated from other social institutions), professionalized, and self-assured. It reflects on an ultimate zone, if not point, of convergence in which all media systems become essentially Liberal by nature. This homogenization, or Liberal drift, occurs through the dual processes of secularization and commercialization.

In the application of the Three Models paradigm to South Africa's experience, it became clear that while both secularization and commercialization are real and demonstrable processes, there were other critical factors that acted much more directly. I have termed these the "triggers of change." Of the seven triggers identified, several emanate from within the media itself, such as technological change, perceptions of reader sentiment, and the framing of business strategy. The others stem from factors external to the sector, for instance from the global environment, the state, from commercialization, and from the local economy.

The concept of triggers has been drawn out using the tools of political economy, but perhaps the closest precursor can be found in Blumler and Gurevitch (1995), who talk about the "motors" of political communications development (204). These motors are changes in technology, change in the surrounding social and political system, the relationship between journalists and politicians and the nature and interests of the would-be audience (1995, 204–5). While I would certainly agree, and indeed have included, changes in technology as a trigger, "changes in the surrounding social and political system" is much too broad to be a useful analytical tool. The interpersonal relationship between journalists and politicians (on which Blumler and Gurevitch focus their attention), on the contrary, is too narrow. I suggest that in order to more clearly understand the causes and forces of change, rather than just the direction and end result, one needs to isolate the zones in which change arises. These zones contain the potential, as they have already demonstrated, to trigger change in media institutions and quite possibly in society at large. The change generated by each trigger may either enhance or diminish the degree of dependence. This bears a conceptual resemblance to the agents within Bourdieu's fields wrestling for dominance. The difference is that these triggers cross fields, and change in one field can trigger change in another. Significantly, not only can these triggers generate rapid change, but this change may well be in a direction other than that of the Liberal Model. Change is thus more complex and less linear than the Three Models paradigm suggests.

An example is state intervention. While Hallin and Mancini agree on more than one occasion in *Comparing Media Systems* that the state has “always played a large role” in media systems, particularly those in Southern Europe (2004, 119), they do not consign adequate agency to the state in terms of its power to initiate and shape media system change. They certainly do not contend that change with a political system largely determines change within its media system. Hallin and Mancini argue that as a country modernizes, the process of differentiation sees the media system and organized political groups and social institutions diverge: “Differentiation means... that the media system increasingly operates according to a distinctive logic of its own, displacing to a significant extent the logic of party politics and bargaining among organised social interests, to which it was once connected” (2004, 253). As this differentiation becomes more advanced, the structure of the political system affects the media system less and less deeply, because the mass media have become differentiated from it (2004, 283). The more advanced a media system is, in other words, the less the political system will influence it. Conversely, the less advanced a media system is, the higher degree of political parallelism, the more impact the state will possibly have. It is this aspect that Hallin and Mancini have de-emphasized.

The South African experience—and perhaps that of other “emerging” democracies—is that the political system, including the parties and actors within it, continues to impact the structure of the media system in a profound way. In the apartheid era, it was the state that determined who could publish, what could be published and for whom. More than 100 laws underpinned this process, including deeply restrictive regulations that applied, for instance, during states of emergency.

Developments in the political system sparked equally dramatic change in the media sector. The advent of democracy itself created an ideological confusion of purpose within the alternative media sector but also dried up funding from sympathetic, anti-apartheid sources (Opatrny 2007). The end of South Africa’s political and economic isolation, accomplished largely within the domain of the political system, also exposed the entire media sector, after decades of glorious and uncompetitive isolation, to the forces and interests of the global media marketplace.

In the post-apartheid era, state intervention continues to shape the industry in a direct way. As Teer-Tomaselli has argued, “the nation-state, far from becoming irrelevant, has become a key player in driving the project of neo-liberalism, reform and restructuring” (2004, 7). Many of the apartheid-era press laws remain on the statutes, in spite of repeated requests to the contrary. New, post-1994 laws on employment practice, racial transformation, cross-media ownership, black economic empower-



ment, and foreign exchange controls continue to regulate newspaper company development. This is symptomatic of a state that has been persistently interested in harnessing the power of the mass media to consolidate its own. Even though this may ostensibly be for the furthering of democratic objectives, such as greater social equity and the consolidation of the political system, it nonetheless signals not greater differentiation between the media and the state, but indeed the opposite.

As this example suggests, when one introduces countries that have endured far more rapid, more recent, more comprehensive change, the model struggles to cope. It generalizes the causes of change, assumes that change leads to greater differentiation, and overestimates the power of Liberal drift. It is possible that the combination of these counter-tendencies in any one system will be sufficient to permanently constrain, or at best distort, the powerful forces of homogenization and differentiation that underpin the model.

## **5. Finding Two: Liberal Drift**

South Africa has made a recent shift from authoritarianism to democracy, and this has resulted in a blending of the system's paternalistic, authoritarian (and traditional) inclinations together with more modern, pluralist elements. These elements exist in a state of tension. At root are a concentration of power and a diminishment of accountability that may exacerbate emerging democracies' vulnerability to heightened state intervention in the media.

South Africa's political context in the post-1994 era is one in which a powerfully positioned majority party, the African National Congress (ANC), dominates public life and discourse. The ANC has won all three elections in the democratic era, each with growing majorities. In the last election in 2004, the party won more than two-thirds of the electorate's support, giving it effective and substantive power at all three levels of government. The two-thirds majority also gives the ANC the power to amend the country's constitution.

In an environment of single-party dominance within a majoritarian system with a weak level of accountability, this could lead (as it has in South Africa) to repeated bids by an active state to roll back media power and autonomy. This does not mean that democracy itself is in jeopardy. It may mean, however, that the expansion of media freedom is less likely in a democracy that is dominated for long periods by a single political party.

Emerging democracies may present a different category of democracy in which inherent or traditional values militate against the kind of Liberal drift envisaged by Hallin and Mancini. In South Africa's case, this stems

from the lack of accountability within South Africa's political architecture, together with its consensual decision-making style rooted in ancient indigenous practice. The consequence is an increasing concentration of power that is by no means typical of the differentiated media and political systems populating the Liberal Model. This lends credence, furthermore, to critics' concerns (as well as to Hallin and Mancini's own anxiety) that the dynamics of power is an under-represented concept within the Three Models paradigm.

## 6. Finding Three: Commercialization

Commercialization, Hallin and Mancini argue, "has in general weakened the ties between the media and the world of organized political actors" (2004, 282). My research indicates, however, that far from weakening the ties between the media and the political system, commercialization—in the South African case—has in several ways strengthened them.

Commercialization has made the connection with political life and political actors stronger as new opportunities arise to use the media commercially for the state, without appearing to be exerting too much influence. As media companies themselves diversify into different media and different forms, the ties with regulating agencies, government departments and state institutions grows. By 2004 the South African government was spending almost R50 million (about €5 million) a year on advertising. This outlay made it the sixth biggest advertiser in daily newspapers in that year (Nielsen Media Research, cited in Milne and Taylor 2006). Commercialization, in other words, has not necessarily diminished the connection between the media and political structures. It has just changed it.

A variation of this trend has been evident in other countries of the subcontinent where "many state-owned media in Southern Africa are also becoming increasingly commercialised without gaining any autonomy from government" (Berger 2002, 37). It is indeed quite possible that commercialization has strengthened the bonds between the two. This conclusion militates against Hallin and Mancini's notion of differentiation.

In addition, by allowing the state to pay for content, often without signaling that this constitutes advertising (see Hadland, Cowling, and Tabe 2007), the new climate of commercialization allows for a new opportunity for indirect intervention in the print media. The supposition is supported by analysis emanating from other countries and regions, including Central America and Africa. In his work on *gacetilla*—advertising disguised as news—Jose Luis Benavides describes this form of content as a central feature in the finances of contemporary Mexican

print news media (2000, 85). He also argues that it is a “key ingredient in a system of governmental press subsidy, essential in explaining the way in which the Mexican press has served as a propaganda tool for both the Mexican government and the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party” (Benavides 2000, 85). Benavides concludes in his work that government advertising (particularly *gacetillas*) is an important element of “press control” in Mexico (2000, 86).

Tetey notes the common occurrence in African democracies of the withdrawal of government advertising to starve critical media outlets of income. Commercial advertisers are also cajoled into pulling their own advertisements in newspapers considered to be at loggerheads with government. In South Africa, virtually every newspaper, including free “knock-and-drop” titles and community papers, carries some form of government advertising. Commercialism, in the South African context, has thus led to a subtle subsidization of the media by the state. This is creating a dependence on advertising revenue from the state for many titles but is also contributing to the deterioration of ethical values that commercialism and dependence naturally brings with it (see Hadland, Cowling, and Tabe 2007).

## 7. Finding Four: State Intervention

While Hallin and Mancini’s indicators are meant to predict the likelihood of intervention *per se*, *Comparing Media Systems* does not devote much time to analyzing different forms of intervention, particularly of the coercive type in young democracies. This is not surprising, perhaps, as governments in Denmark or Great Britain are unlikely to send paramilitary police into newsrooms to sort out the editor. Sadly, this is a more common phenomenon in newer democracies, particularly in Africa.

Tetey (2001) lists a number of different forms of coercive intervention, which are often in blatant contravention of an African country’s own legal or even constitutional provisions. These, at times unorthodox, modes of intervention noted by Tetey include “various acts of silent or overt reciprocity” among African governments aimed at stifling the media, corporal punishment (as occurred recently to one editor in Côte d’Ivoire), the use of state-owned media to discredit media critics, the passage of laws making insulting the president or members of Parliament punishable offences, the withdrawal of government advertising and a number of “very indirect ways of hurting the media, by using the citizenry or their supporters as agents of intimidation and violence” (2001, 17–20).

We find in South Africa too a disconnection between constitutional rights and actual state practice. Within the deeply sympathetic frame-

work of constitutional rights, many loopholes exist and counter-tendencies have apparently emerged. Old apartheid-era legislation containing stringent anti-press restrictions has been used by the state repeatedly in the new democratic era (see Tomaselli 1997, 8). At times these archaic laws are used to demand the revelation of a source's identities, and at other times to prevent newspapers from publishing articles. This practice has roused the ire of South African editors, and a series of meetings has been held with the highest branches of the state, including the presidency, in the as-yet-unsuccessful bid to resolve the issue (see Barratt 2006).

While the political system has seen the establishment of a constitutional and legal framework that includes fundamental protection for a free press, a powerful democratic state is also more than capable of stalling, if not reversing, the process of differentiation to ensure its own narrative is the one that predominates in the mass media. In this way, it continues to act as a key catalyst for change in the media marketplace. It also seeks continually to intervene in and shape the media system and to deepen its dependence on the political system.

## Conclusion

There are elements of this analysis that may be uniquely South African, such as the very recent development of a mass press. But there is also plenty of reason to suspect that these experiences, and the modifications they infer, may well be applicable not only to emerging democracies in Africa but elsewhere in the world too. Naturally, further comparative research involving other new democracies, particularly those emerging with authoritarian pasts and fragile presents, would allow the usefulness of the modifications I have suggested to be tested further. Certainly, scholars have expressed their anxiety that Africa "is in danger of backsliding democratically" (Berger 2002, 36), and this confers a certain urgency to the task.

Hallin and Mancini ask, "Is media system change simply one result of...changes in society and politics, or might it play some independent role?" (2004, 267). The answer, from the South African case study, would seem to suggest that media system change is very much the dependent variable in a context of rapid political and social realignment. This was indeed the argument in *Four Theories of the Press* (Siebert et al. 1956), the predecessor to *Comparing Media Systems*. Just as it posed the question, "Why is the media like it is?" *Four Theories* continues to challenge comparative media analysis.

It also becomes evident in using the Hallin–Mancini paradigm that South Africa's print media is headed in the wrong direction, if one sup-

poses that the Liberal Model has come to constitute a consensual position on the ideal role and function of the press. This is a worrying and perhaps controversial aspect to the exercise of locating South Africa within the Three Models paradigm.

The evidence suggests that instead of groping its way toward utopian media Liberalism, South Africa is slipping toward Polarized Pluralism. This can be gleaned from many traits that characterize South Africa's media system and its inter-relationship with the world of politics.

In South Africa political parallelism is on the rise, state intervention is increasing, journalistic professionalism is declining, and the media system is shifting in a manner that will heed, and possibly reverse, the processes of differentiation and indeed of democratization. This is a very different tale from the inexorable convergence on a homogenized Liberal Model that Hallin and Mancini anticipate. Even though factors are evident that would support this Liberal drift, including technological and global journalistic trends, these may not be enough to propel a new democracy far across the matrix. Indeed, polarized pluralism beckons. And while Hallin and Mancini refuse to rank the models in terms of their democratic purity, it is evident from their prediction of the Liberal model's eventual triumph that this is the natural and indeed inevitable endpoint of a global, democratic media. My research suggests that vision may be wishful thinking, given the great power of historical trends and legacies and the new forms of democracy represented by the latest generation of adherents.

## Reference List

- Barratt, E. (2006). *Part of the Story: 10 Years of the South African National Editors' Forum*. Johannesburg: Sanef.
- Benavides, J.L. (2000). "Gacetilla: A Keyword for a Revisionist Approach to the Political Economy of Mexico's Print News Media." *Media, Culture & Society* 22 (1): 85–104.
- Berger, G. (2002). "Theorising the Media-Democracy Relationship in Southern Africa." *The International Journal for Communication Studies* 64 (1): 21–45.
- Berger, G. (2004). "More Media for Southern Africa? The Place of Politics, Economics and Convergence in Developing Media Density." *Critical Arts* 18 (1): 42–75.
- Blumler, J.G., and M. Gurevitch (1995). *The Crisis of Public Communication*. London: Routledge.
- Botma, G.J. (2006). "The Structure of Content: The Political Economy of *Die Burger* Western Cape, 2004–5." Unpublished paper presented at the 2006 annual South African Communications Association (Sacomm) conference, *Creating the Media Future*, Stellenbosch.
- Calland, R. (ed.) (1999). *The First Five Years: A Review of South Africa's Democratic Parliament*. Cape Town: Idasa.
- De Beer, A.S., and E. Steyn (eds.) 2002. Focus on Journalism Skills. *Ecquid Novi* 23 (1):11–86.
- Hadland, A. (2007). "The South African Print Media, 1994–2004: An Application and Critique of Comparative Media Systems Theory." Unpublished PhD dissertation, June 2007. Centre for Film and Media Studies, University of Cape Town.
- Hadland, A., and K. Thorne (2004). *The People's Voice: The Development and Current State of the South African Small Media Sector*. Cape Town: HSRC Press.
- Hadland, A., L. Cowling, and F-T. Tabe (2007). *Advertising in the News: Paid-for Content and the South African Print Media*. Cape Town: HSRC Press.
- Hallin, D.C., and P. Mancini (2004). *Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Horwitz, R. (2001). *Communication and Democratic Reform in South Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Jacobs, S.H. (2004). "Public Sphere, Power and Democratic Politics: Media and Policy Debates in Post-apartheid South Africa," Unpublished PhD thesis, Birkbeck College, University of London.
- Johnston, A. (2005). "The African National Congress, the Print Media and the Development of Mediated Politics in South Africa." *CriticalArts* 19 (1&2): 12–35.
- Milne, C., and A. Taylor (2006). *South Africa: Research Findings and Conclusions*. London: African Media Development Initiative, BBC World Service Trust.
- Opatrny, L. (2007). "The Post-1990 Demise of the Alternative Press." Unpublished M.A. thesis. University of Cape Town.
- Siebert, F., T. Peterson, and W. Schramm (1956). *Four Theories of the Press*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Teer-Tomaselli, R. (2004). Transforming State-owned Enterprises in the Global Age: Lessons from Broadcasting and Telecommunications in South Africa." *CriticalArts* 18 (1):7–41.

- Tettey, W.J. (2001). "The Media and Democratisation in Africa: Contributions, Constraints and Concerns of the Private Press." *Media, Culture & Society* 23 (1): 5–31.
- Tomaselli, K. (1997). "Ownership and Control in the South African Print Media: Black Economic Empowerment after Apartheid, 1990–97." *Ecquid Novi* 18 (1): 21–68.
- Tsedu et al. (2002). "Response to Skills Audit," in De Beer, A.S., and E. Steyn (eds). "Focus on Journalism Skills." *Ecquid Novi*, 23 (1): 2.

*Surveys and Reports*

- Audit Bureau of Circulations 2006. [The ABC keeps a running database of certified circulations up to the current quarter and going back many decades. The data used in this thesis was supplied by ABC during the course of 2006.]
- Naspers (Media24) annual reports: 1994–2005.
- Steyn, E., and A.S. De Beer (2002). "South African National Skills Audit." Unpublished report, prepared for the South African National Editors' Forum (Sanef), and the Sanef Education and Training Committee (ETC). Retrieved November 12, 2006, from <http://www.mediatenor.co.za>.

*Interview*

- Deon du Plessis**, Publisher and co-owner, *Die Son*, on October 19, 2005, at the Media24 building in Auckland Park.





# **The Reform of the Public Radio and Television System in the United Kingdom and in Spain (2004–2007): A Comparative Analysis<sup>1</sup>**

*Carles Llorens and Isabel Fernández Alonso*

## **Introduction**

The broadcasting industry is undergoing major transformations, resulting from a growing tendency towards liberalization and commercialization in this sector as well as technological convergence. Within this context the meaning of public radio and television, or, to be more specific, the notion of a public service within the framework of Europe's Information Society, has become a focal point of debate (Council of Europe 2006). In some European countries, such as Denmark or Italy, there have been proposals to privatize some public operator channels, while in other countries this option has been dismissed. Indeed, there is a clear political concern about reinforcing the credibility of public radio and television and their role in the media sector. This is illustrated by the fact that public television and radio have been assigned a central role in the transition to digital terrestrial television, that is, in the digital switchover process.

Thus in the following pages we shall try to contribute to reconstructing the reform of public media in Europe in the early years of the 21st century. With this aim in mind, we have chosen two relevant cases. The first is the United Kingdom, insofar as the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) has traditionally been considered a model in terms of the quality of its programming and the independence of its professional staff and directors. The second is Spain, insofar as the reform is attempting to solve two problems typical of Mediterranean media systems: governmental control and the debts of the public operators. Furthermore, the Spanish reform has been carried out following the recommendations of an independent committee of experts, something that has not happened in any other Mediterranean country.

In this paper we shall describe both reform processes—framed, respectively, within a Liberal media system (the case for the United Kingdom)

---

<sup>1</sup> We are very grateful to Professor Peter Humphreys for reviewing the text and for his insightful suggestions.

and a Polarized Pluralist system (the case for Spain) (Hallin and Mancini 2004), and we shall attempt to identify common characteristics and the most relevant features for each case.

## **1. The British Case**

The BBC—in addition to setting standards of content and professionalism—is one of the largest broadcasting groups worldwide, with approximately 25,000 employees and an annual income of around €6.1 billion (BBC 2006).

The BBC was founded in 1922 as a private company by a group of telecommunications companies. Five years later, in 1927, it came under the control of the British state, legally classified as an independent corporation, which allowed it a high degree of autonomy. The state, through the Crown, granted the British Broadcasting Corporation a Royal Charter that defined its public purposes and the means with which to carry these out. This procedure still survives, and the Royal Charter is modified and renewed every 10 years after negotiations between the BBC and the British government.

Between the two world wars, under the managerial driving force of Sir John Reith, the BBC grew and enjoyed a considerable degree of social influence. Ambitious objectives were set out in accordance with the British notion of “high culture” (from which we have the BBC’s famous motto, “inform, educate and entertain”). The privileged position of the BBC lasted until 1955, when the British government authorized a group of regional private broadcasting companies, the present-day ITV, to exploit the British advertising market in return for the obligation to provide a public service (although the monopoly was maintained a while longer for radio broadcasts). Therefore, while the British television market was the first in Europe (after Luxembourg) to receive private television, competition between the public and private operators was limited to the sphere of programming quality. This competition did not extend to their sources of financing, since each party had their own income sources: the license fee for the BBC and advertising for the ITV. This remained the case until 1982, when Channel 4 appeared as a public channel financed through advertising.

In the early 1990s this situation changed completely with the consolidation of Channel 4; the appearance of a private channel, Channel 5, presently owned by the German group RTL; and above all with the consolidation of Sky, the multi-channel satellite television platform, which was partly owned and controlled by News Corporation. The Arcadia of British television had now disappeared, and by the mid-1990s the BBC’s

future looked bleak because of the proliferation of channels, systems of distribution, and its increasing loss of audience.

Now, a decade later, the situation has changed radically. The BBC has reinvented itself through a process of reflection, consultation, and political pressure, which allowed it to lead audience ratings and the transition to digital broadcasting in the television (Freeview), radio, and Internet sectors. Leaving aside its international broadcasts, the BBC currently has eight national television channels (two analog and six digital) and 10 radio stations (four analog and six digital). According to figures provided by British public television itself, 85 percent of the population in the United Kingdom watch one of the BBC channels every week (reach), and BBC channels account for 35 percent of the weekly viewing time in British homes.<sup>2</sup> For BBC radio, a similar situation prevails: 65 percent of the population listen to the BBC one or more times a week, but the BBC receives much more weekly attention. Of the total time the British public spend each week listening to the radio, 55 percent is spent listening to BBC channels. As for the Internet, BBC leadership is even more evident: a little over half of U.K. Internet users visit the BBC web page at least once a week. Taken as a whole, the radio and television services provided by the BBC have a weekly reach of 92 percent of the total U.K. population and 42 percent of weekly time of the audience (BBC 2006, 141). Part of this success lies in the BBC's particular source of financing and how it is governed and managed, which is explained in the following section.

## ***Financing***

The financing of the BBC is based on an annual tax or license fee levied on each home that has a television set. At present (March 2008) this license fee is £139.50, or around €200. Failure to pay this license fee can lead to prosecution and a fine. The collection of the TV license fee is managed by a private company that pays this money into a specific government fund, which is then passed on to the BBC. The amount of money collected from TV license fees in the fiscal year 2006/2007 totals £3.2 billion, or €4.7 billion per year. Commercial activities also make an important contribution to income, bearing in mind that in the same tax year these generated £810 million, or approximately €1.176 billion. In addition, the

---

<sup>2</sup> According to the BBC “reach” is the percentage of people who watch or listen to television or radio for at least 15 minutes in an average week, and “audience” is the percentage of hours of viewing or listening one channel in an average week. (BBC 2006, 141–142)

British state, through its Foreign and Commonwealth Office, finances the BBC World Service almost in its entirety (BBC 2007, 83). The TV license fee levy is set by the government through a complex process of negotiations with the BBC once every 10 years, since this has to coincide with the renewal process of the Royal Charter. The long-term stability provided by this method of financing allows for long-term strategies and projects.

In 2006 the BBC's directors asked the Blair government for an increase in the TV license fee of 1.8 percent above the rate of inflation during the following decade so that they could develop the potential offered by digital multi-distribution content, lead the switchover to digital terrestrial television, and set up a major production center in Manchester. The political debate did not question the need for some increase in funding but focused on the amount that the BBC said that it needed to fulfill these tasks. BBC directors had originally asked for a progressive increase in the license fee that would run from the present fee of £131 to £154. After in-depth negotiations with the British government, Gordon Brown, chancellor of the Exchequer and future prime minister, imposed stricter conditions by agreeing to scaled increases that are not linked to inflation: a 3 percent annual increase during the first two years, a 2 percent increase for the third to fifth years, and an increase of between 0 percent and a ceiling of 2 percent for the period 2012–2013 (subject to negotiation). This means that in 2013 the BBC would receive a maximum of £151.50 for each home with a television. In addition to the doubts surrounding the increase for the last two years, the BBC will be required to set aside £600 million of its income from the license fee to help fund digital terrestrial television set-top-boxes for pensioners and low-income individuals before the switchover to digital television in 2012 (Tora Conlan 2007).

### ***Management System***

For more than 80 years the general policies of the BBC have been decided by a board comprising 12 members, known as the Board of Governors. These board members nominated the director-general, who in turn appointed the members of the Executive Board, the BBC ordinary management committee. The 12 governors were named by the queen (proposed by the government) from among prestigious individuals, for a term of four years, which could only be extended once. With the passing of time, the governors were widely acknowledged to have performed their role as trustees of the public interest with an admirable degree of independence from the government. However, in recent years they were criticized from some quarters for identifying too closely with the interests of the BBC

itself at the expense of the public interest. The BBC as an institution had its own agenda. This fact was even acknowledged by Michael Grade, the last chairman of the Board of Governors, in the BBC's 2006 annual report. Grade points out that the new BBC Trust was born not to represent the limited interests of the BBC as an institution, but rather to respect the more wide-ranging interests of those citizens who pay the license fee (BBC 2006, 2). Similarly, the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) pointed out in the BBC White Paper that the Trust had to defend the interests of those who paid this tax and not the interests of the BBC's board of directors (DCMS 2006, 46).

The Kelly affair in 2003 is a well-known example of this conflict of interests. The BBC accused the Blair government of manipulating reports to justify participating in the Iraq war, based on one source, the defense expert David Kelly. When he was revealed to be the source, Kelly committed suicide. The affair prompted a legal investigation headed by Lord Hutton, whose report (controversially) exonerated the government and harshly criticized the BBC directors and the Board of Governors for not having monitored sufficiently the professional standards of the journalist in question, who, according to Lord Hutton's report, had not weighed the information carefully enough. Of course, while the affair may have revealed certain journalistic shortfalls in a particular case, it also underlined a general fact, namely the political independence of the BBC.

In the end, a series of factors contributed to the reform of the organization and principles of the BBC: political alignment, the excessively close relationship between the Board of Governors and the BBC and their introspective attitude, and the wishes of the Blair government to introduce the ideas behind Anthony Giddens's "Third Way" (an ideology that proposes greater financial efficiency and democratic control for the public sector) into public radio and television. The underlying purpose was to make the BBC more responsible and controllable without destroying its political independence and quality. The renewal process of the Royal Charter between 2003 and 2006 allowed for incorporating changes into the organization and system of control of the BBC along the lines mentioned above.

### ***The Reform Process***

The reform of the BBC is neither an isolated case nor exclusive to the United Kingdom. It needs to be seen within the context of the recent European tendency to strive for de-bureaucratization and efficiency in public radio and television services, which has triggered the beginning of a reform process in Italy, France, Portugal, and Spain. Another important

factor that explains this reform tendency is the pressure from the European Commission to make state operators more transparent and more closely adapted to EU competition law (Llorens 2005).

The reform of the BBC began in 2003, when a complex process of public consultations and political discussions were set in motion that continued well into 2006. Finally, on January 1, 2007, the new Royal Charter came into effect, and with this there has been an interesting change in the structure and functions of the BBC's management bodies. The Board of Governors has been replaced by the "BBC Trust," similarly comprising 12 members whose nomination and term are practically the same as in the previous body: Based on a selection of prestigious individuals, the government chooses a candidate who is later officially appointed by the queen. Another feature retained from the previous system is the requirement that the BBC's highest level of management consist of representatives from the four nations that make up the United Kingdom: England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. The main role of the BBC Trust consists of protecting the interests of the license-fee payers more effectively. For this purpose, it has been endowed with greater independence from the BBC directors to avoid situations that have occurred in the past when the Board of Governors aligned itself with the directors of BBC. One of the main tasks of the Trust now is to make the BBC directors (the new Executive Board) accountable through the establishment of assessable objectives. Other duties include protecting the BBC's independence vis-à-vis the British government, promoting transparency and carefully monitoring that public money is put to good use (BBC 2006, 9–11). Three of the present BBC Trust trustees were members of the former Board of Governors.

As regards the Executive Board, the Royal Charter does not limit the number of members, but it does impose an important new feature: a minimum of four of the board members, or a third of the board, cannot have executive responsibilities in the company; that is, they must come from outside the BBC. These are known as non-executive members.<sup>3</sup> They are appointed by a Nominations Committee made up of members of the Executive Board itself (the majority being non-executive members), and their proposals must be ratified by the BBC Trust. To reinforce external

---

<sup>3</sup> The purpose of non-executive members is to provide the Executive Board with a broader, external perspective to help in making decisions; such members should act as a "critical friend" (DCMS 2006, 50). Current non-executive members include a general counsel on the board of directors of British Airways, the chief executive of an independent production company, the finance director for the P&O transport company, and a businessman who has founded a number of technology companies.

control of the BBC, non-executive directors are the only members of the Executive Board assigned to the Audit and Remuneration sub-committees. The other category of Executive Board members, known as executive members, consists of those responsible for internal management of the BBC. The way in which they are appointed is different. A small internal committee made up of four members of the Executive Board itself (two executive and two non-executive members) propose candidates at Executive Board meetings. In this case the ratification of the BBC Trust is not required, except in the case of the director-general, who must always be an executive member. Including these non-Executive Board members acts as a check or balance against the company's directors. The duties of the Executive Board basically consist of running the ordinary operations of the BBC based on guidelines established by the BBC Trust.


As regards the BBC's objectives, the new Royal Charter establishes a new set of objectives: sustaining citizenship and civil society; promoting education and learning; stimulating creativity and cultural excellence; representing the United Kingdom, its nations, regions, and communities; bringing the world to the United Kingdom and the United Kingdom to the world; helping to spread new technologies and services to the whole of society; and taking a leading role in the switchover from analogical terrestrial television. But rather than focus in detail on these objectives, we would like to focus on the concepts developed by the BBC for the purposes of defining and assessing them. The key concept is "Building Public Value," an idea developed by Moore (1997), and applicable to all public services. Moore explains that any kind of public service not only has to respond to market failure or the need for a natural monopoly in a given sector, but must also offer an added public value, which has to be measured and assessed. Tony Blair's cabinet embraced the general concept in 2002, and it was applied to BBC when the Royal Charter reform process started in 2004 (Collins 2007, 12–13).

The BBC's final objective is to create public value, that is, to treat viewers and listeners not only as consumers, but also as members of a society with objectives that go beyond financial considerations, offering programs and services that, while attempting to inform, educate, and entertain, also contribute to creating and strengthening more wide-ranging public objectives. However, the key to this concept is putting it into practice and the ability to assess it through a process, which, in the case of the BBC, has already been formally defined (BBC 2004, 8).

Thus the process known as the Public Value Test consists of a combination of qualitative and quantitative evaluations of the BBC's services that carefully weigh their advantages and disadvantages, both financial and social. This consists of ascertaining whether a new service is more

beneficial than prejudicial to society. The BBC Trust must apply this value judgment criteria to each new service or when considering substantially extending an already existing service. The first stage consists of an analysis of the impact that this new service will have on the market: the so-called market impact assessment, which must be carried out by the Office of Communications (Ofcom), the independent regulatory authority for the converging communications sectors established in 2002, prior to the Communications Act of 2003. Ofcom embraced the functions of a number of formerly separate regulatory bodies, notably the Independent Television Commission (ITC), which had hitherto regulated television (apart from the BBC), and the Office of Telecommunications (OfTEL), which had regulated telecommunications, as well as the Broadcasting Standards Commission, the Radio Authority, and the Radiocommunications Agency. In the second stage, the BBC Trust, through its study unit, carries out a second analysis, known as public value assessment, in which the positive and negative contributions of the new service for society are defined, including the financial benefits or drawbacks. The purpose here is to clarify whether it provides Public Value. This public value assessment consists of applying four concepts linked to a combination of qualitative and quantitative indicators: audience, quality, impact, and value for money. One of the important indicators is the total audience (reach). This is the percentage of people who use the BBC services during a given period of time. For the directors of the BBC, in a context of media multi-consumption and audience fragmentation, the traditional share indicator for a multi-platform operator such as the BBC makes little sense, hence the preference for the reach indicator over the share indicator, or over the number of web pages visited on the Internet (BBC 2004, 15).

*Figure 1: Public Value Test and Its Players*



*Source: BBC 2006, 9–11*



Public value assessment, along with market impact assessment, is weighed by the BBC Trust in the definitive Public Value Test, which decides whether the launch of a new service is timely. If so, then the new service is granted a license that details its missions and conditions. In addition, at least once every five years, an independent survey of 10,000 citizens is commissioned to determine the public value provided by each service. With this new system it is hoped that citizens who pay the TV license fee will receive services that provide public value. Furthermore, as these services are defined, private operators will be able to predict more reliably the future state of their markets.

At the time of writing (March 2008), some Public Value Tests have been done, such as the analysis of the content of audiovisual services on demand, iPlayer, which was approved. The iPlayer allows citizens access via the Internet to any of the audiovisual content broadcast by the BBC's traditional channels of distribution within a time frame of seven days prior to or after their broadcast date. Another service approved was the proposal to include BBC channels in a free digital satellite platform known as FreeSat. In March 2007, the BBC Trust decided to suspend the online education service, BBC Jam, and asked the BBC management to prepare new proposals for its online education and learning service, which would then be subjected to a full Public Value Test, including a market impact assessment by Ofcom.

The concept of Building Public Value has meant a change in the BBC's philosophy and the way it operates. A change in orientation has come about on multiple levels: from being aimed at the viewers and listeners (consumers) to attempting to offer "public value" to citizens and society; from being focused on costs and incomes to measuring impact and results; from focusing on new distribution channels to favoring ease of access; from being obsessed with audience share to thinking in terms of reach for the population in general. In other words, the BBC is not trying to extend its portfolio of channels but rather to offer the already existing content in an innovative manner via new distribution systems. However, as Barnett points out (2006, 19), this process means that the BBC loses its freedom and flexibility to launch new services as it was able to do in the past.

## **2. The Spanish Case**

The Spanish public radio and television service, RTVE (Spanish Radio and Television), emerged in 1973 through the fusion of two services, Radio Nacional de España (RNE—Spanish National Radio) and Televisión Española (TVE—Spanish Television). RNE had been providing a public radio service since the Spanish Civil War, and TVE had existed since

1956. During the Franco dictatorship, RTVE was established as a centralized public service, dependent on the Dirección General de Radiodifusión y Televisión, itself incorporated into the Ministerio de Información y Turismo (MIT—Ministry for Information and Tourism). The MIT was set up in 1951 and was responsible for media censorship. The RTVE governing board, the Consejo Rector, was made up of individuals from a range of positions in the MIT and presided over by the Ministry itself (Esteve Pardo, 1984).

Therefore, a substantial part of its history (that is, until 1977, the year the MIT disappeared after the first democratic elections) transpired within the context of a dictatorship, and the other part was in the midst of the prevailing democracy, when its only legal point of reference was the Spanish statutory law, Ley 4/1980 (the statutory law for Radio and Television), until this law was reformed in June 2006.

### ***The 1980 Statute and Its Implications***

The 1980 Statute for Spanish Radio and Television set out the principles and operational organization of RTVE for the prevailing democratic context and was the result of negotiations between the major parliamentary parties during the transition years from dictatorship to democracy: the Unión de Centro Democrático (UCD—Conservative Coalition Party)<sup>4</sup> and the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE—Spanish Socialist Party).

This law created three public companies to manage RTVE: Radio Nacional de España (RNE—National Spanish Radio), Radio Cadena Española (RCE—Spanish Network Radio), and Televisión Española (TVE—Spanish Television). RNE's first channel (general content) was launched in 1937; the second and third (music and culture) in 1965; and in Catalonia in December 1976, Ràdio Quatre began broadcasting. This was the first step in a project that attempted to promote radio broadcasts in the various regional languages of Spain, which were repressed during the Franco dictatorship. For its own part, RCE consisted of broadcasts

---

<sup>4</sup> The UCD was a party formed in May 1977 under the leadership of Adolfo Suárez (who had been president of the Spanish government by royal appointment since July 1976) to put itself forward for election at the first democratic elections, which took place the following month. The breakup of this political party (accelerated by the landslide victory of the Socialists in the 1982 elections) is explained to a large degree by the wide range of interests between the three component ideological families (Christian-Democrats, Liberals, and Social Democrats), as well as the various individuals who made up this party.

linked to the institutional network established by the dictatorship: the Red de Emisoras del Movimiento (REM), the Cadena Azul de Radiodifusión (CAR), and the Cadena de Emisoras Sindicales (CES). They ended up being integrated into Radio Nacional de España as per the Spanish Law, Real Decreto 895/1988. This helps explain the influence of public radio in the present-day radio panorama. As for TVE, the first channel was launched in 1956 and the second nine years later.

So Ley 4/1980 faced the challenge of establishing a model for managing and financing this major network of public companies, which also included the Orquesta y Coro de RTVE (RTVE Orchestra and Choir) and the Instituto Oficial de Radio y Televisión (Official Institute for Radio and Television), more concerned with training professionals than research.

The 1980 statute established the following RTVE governing bodies: a director-general, with wide-ranging powers and nominated directly by the government for a period of four years (equivalent to a government term of office), and a board of directors, comprising 12 members, appointed by the Spanish Parliament, for the same period of time and by a two-thirds majority. The Spanish law Ley 4/1980 itself provided for creating a board of advisors for each of the three RTVE companies, whose mission was to channel the participation of representatives from trade unions, the arts, public administration, and the emerging autonomous communities in the management of public radio and television. However, these advisory boards were never created at a state level.

Concerning the method for financing, this statute was committed to a mixed model without establishing the weighting of funding from public subsidies or income from advertising. It left open the option of setting a license fee for television receivers, which was never established.

The aforementioned management and financing system explains, to a large degree, two of the major problems that have beset RTVE during this period of democracy: the high degree of governmental control and the growing debt. Criticism of interference from the government (which has often had the advantage of an absolute majority in the Spanish Parliament) has been a constant feature since 1980 (Fernández y Santana 2000). The culmination of these criticisms can perhaps be seen in June 2003 when a sentence of the Audiencia Nacional (the Spanish special court for national affairs) ruled that RTVE had treated information covering the June 2002 general strike in Spain in a biased manner. However, this did not result in assigning any political responsibility.

Concerning the issue of debts, this is a phenomenon of the 1990s, brought about by the appearance on the scene of private television (Telecinco, Antena 3 and Canal+), which began to provide services right at the very beginning of this decade and forced a redistribution of the

income available from advertising and, consequently, a loss of revenue from this source for TVE. Up until then, this source of income had allowed for the financing of the entire RTVE organization, to the extent that during the period when José María Calviño was director-general, 1982–1986 (coinciding with the first Socialist government), state subsidies were suppressed. These subsidies were reactivated with the aforementioned appearance of private operators, even though they were more of a symbolic contribution, between 4–7 percent of the total RTVE budget until 2006 (RNE has not broadcast advertising since 1993) (Consejo para la Reforma de los Medios de Comunicación de Titularidad del Estado 2005). These facts explain the recourse (as of 1994) to getting into debt with the Spanish state acting as guarantor, which has finally required the intervention of the European Union on a competition law basis. The European Union warned the Spanish government in 2003 that this backing went beyond the net expenses of the public service that was being provided and could not continue (Llorens, 2005). By this time, RTVE was already registered (as of January 2001) in the Sociedad Estatal de Participaciones Industriales (SEPI), an organization whose objective, among others, is to rationalize public sector companies that are going through particularly complex and difficult times. However, it had been unable to prevent an RTVE-accumulated debt of close to €7.8 billion by the end of 2006.

Alongside this synthesis of the implications of the 1980 Statute for Spanish Radio and Television, we must also point out that the RTVE management and financing models have been replicated in public radio and television set up in the various autonomous regions. These have been created in Spain since the mid-1980s as a result of the provisions laid out in the regulatory Spanish law for a third television channel (Ley 46/1983). After this law was passed, various autonomous parliaments passed their own respective laws to set up public broadcasting, to the extent that, as of the beginning of 2007, only four autonomous communities in Spain (Cantabria, Castile and Leon, La Rioja, and Navarre) did not have their own public broadcasts. As for the other matters, neutral news coverage has frequently been called into question with respect to whichever government is in power, and disturbing levels of debt have been reached: in the case of Catalonia, about €1 billion. This has reached such a point that various autonomous communities have opted for introducing an indirect and private management model of programming, ranging from advertising to even the news programs, which is expressly prohibited by the law for the third channel, and which has generated a considerable number of court disputes (Fernández Alonso 2002).

All of this explains why, in recent years, one of the key issues in Spanish broadcasting policies is the reform of the 1980 Statutory Law. At the

same time, a bill is being drafted that would systematize and update this dispersed set of laws relating to this sector and, in turn, would open the way for creating an independent broadcasting authority.

### ***The Proposals put forward by the Comité de Sabios ("Committee of Experts")***

Thus when the Spanish National Socialist Party took office in March 2004, it promised to create a committee of experts who would draw up a proposal for a reforming Spanish public media, and whose findings would be presented as a bill before the Spanish Parliament by the Madrid government. And to a large degree, this commitment has been fulfilled. No sooner had the PSOE formed a government than it proceeded to nominate the members of a committee for the "Reforma de los Medios de Comunicación de Titularidad del Estado" (Reform of State Communication Media). This was the so-called "Comité de Sabios" (Committee of Experts): two philosophers, Emilio Lledó (chairman) and Fernando Fernández Savater; a full professor of ethics, Victoria Camps, who had significant experience in broadcasting policies; a full professor in communications, Enrique Bustamante, an expert in economics and television policies; and a journalist, Fernando González Urbaneja. The latter member ended up dissociating himself from the findings in the Committee's final report, with an individual vote, which was incorporated into the document itself and which basically translates as his disagreements with the proposals related to the financing of RTVE.

In this report (Consejo para la Reforma de los Medios de Comunicación de Titularidad del Estado 2005) the noteworthy proposals were those directed at divorcing RTVE from government control. The Committee opted for reducing the powers of the director-general in favor of a board of directors consisting of eight members: four elected by the Spanish Parliament by a two-thirds majority and proposed by at least one-half of the parliamentary parties, two elected by the Consejo Audiovisual (Broadcasting Board) by a majority of at least two-thirds of its members, and two designated by the two most represented RTVE trade unions. The term of the board members would have to be six years (not coinciding with parliamentary terms of office), and they would not be eligible for re-election. Every three years, half of the board would be replaced, by equal shares of each of the voters. The director-general, according to the Committee of Experts' proposal, would be elected by the board of directors by a two-thirds majority, after a public selection process, for a period of five years, and similarly the candidate would not be eligible for re-election. Finally, the Committee also opted for promoting the participa-

tion of media experts through informative committees, to safeguard the independence of this public service and the participation of civil society in the management of RTVE, through an advisory committee with a real operating capacity.

As regards the proposals for financing, it was suggested that a mixed financing system should be maintained (possibly including a license fee), in which the weight and influence of advertising should be reduced considerably. The figures put forward were 45–50 percent state funding (the Spanish state would have to take on the accumulated debt), 40 percent (of the RTVE budget) from income generated from advertising, and the remaining 10–15 percent through the sale of programs. Further proposals included a recommendation for a legal obligation against getting into debt, drawing up short and medium-term plans (nine-year plans approved by the Spanish Parliament that have to be formalized in three-year government-RTVE program contracts), and adopting measures designed to promote “transparency in all manner of labor and commercial contracts, reviewing staffing levels and use of the installations, to keep expenses in check in all the ordinary services, functional reorganization of categories, and to promote sales in current markets and break into new markets.”

### ***The Main Features of the Reform***

Bearing in mind what has been explained above, and in line with its commitment to promote RTVE as a new driving force for digital terrestrial television (digital radio in Spain is at a complete standstill), the Socialist government presented a bill to the Congreso de los Diputados (Chamber of Deputies—the lower chamber of the Spanish Parliament) that a few months later, with modifications after parliamentary debate, became the new law for public radio and television (Ley 17/2006).

The most noteworthy features of this law include the new management model, clearly inspired by the proposals from the “Comité de Sabios” which, nevertheless, have been toned down. Thus a board of directors has been set up that has been greatly strengthened with respect to the current Chair of RTVE Corporation. This board will comprise 12 members, elected by the Spanish Parliament (two proposed by the majority trade unions in RTVE), endeavoring to secure parity between men and women, and for a period of six years, which cannot be extended (renewed by halves every three years). The board’s chairperson and of the RTVE Corporation will be elected by a two-thirds majority, by the aforementioned Spanish parliamentary chamber. The recommendations of the

Committee have been adopted concerning the advisory committee and journalist committees.

Turning to the financing model, the mixed financing system has been maintained (without specifying the weight of each of the sources of income), although toned down along the lines of the European Commission's requirements: Compensating for fulfilling public service obligations cannot exceed the net cost of this service, and getting into debt is expressly prohibited, except if financing investments in tangible and intangible fixed assets or addressing temporary imbalances in liquid assets.

In short, the new RTVE law, which for the first time has established a broad definition of a public service and has followed the recommendations of a committee of experts, is a commitment to a complete change of RTVE's management structure in an attempt to make it independent from political control of the Spanish government and, to a lesser extent, of the Parliament. In contrast, however, the new features of the financing model are far less relevant. In fact, the most significant financial measure in the present legislation has been the SEPI rationalization plan, which has resulted in a significant downsizing of the staff and a reduction in programming hours for RTVE's regional language programs in the various autonomous communities. Simultaneously the Spanish state has begun to take on part of its debt (€3.18 billion) as stipulated in the *Ley de Presupuestos* (Spanish National Budget Law) for 2007. All of this is taking place as TVE's first channel progressively loses viewers (in 2006 it was the third-most-viewed channel, with a share of 18.3 percent, behind Tele 5 and Antena 3), while RNE continues to rank as the fourth most-listened-to radio service, with an audience of close to 1.2 million listeners.

To end this section, we would like to issue a warning. The reform is so deep and recent that it is important not to mix structural reforms and new regulation aims with day-to-day operations. Only the facts and the behavior of the new RTVE Board will determine whether the reforms turn out to be a success or a repeat of the same old story, namely, applying idealistic formulas to a country and a political class that are not ready to respect them.

## **Conclusion**

In comparing the Spanish and British cases, we see that there is a common concern (albeit of a different nature) to reform the management model, both for the BBC and RTVE, and, by contrast, a tendency towards stagnation

in the financing models for these two public radio and television corporations.

Regarding the management model, in Spain measures have been taken to strengthen the position of the Spanish Parliament vis-à-vis the government concerning the establishment of the RTVE management structure (and also attempting to ensure that terms for positions held in RTVE do not coincide with Spanish government terms of office). However, in the United Kingdom something quite different is happening. Recent Labour governments favor public television, since they have maintained (with certain nuances) both the system for financing and the independence of the BBC from political power. Nevertheless, the Gordon Brown government is reticent in the face of excessive self-management and lack of control over the BBC, at a time when many British public services are subject to greater supervision. It comes as no surprise, then, that the new Royal Charter requires the BBC Trust to operate independently of the new Executive Board so that it can effectively control the BBC with guarantees based on clearly defined objectives and procedures. Along similar lines, this explains the presence of non-executive members on the Executive Board who come from outside the sphere of British public radio and television sector.

To understand the reasons behind such disparate measures, we need to review the characteristic traits of the Spanish and British media systems. As pointed out by Hallin and Mancini (2004), the Spanish model features strong political parallelism, considerable state intervention, and a low level of professionalization, which are the result of historical-cultural factors such as the long-lasting survival of feudalism (which would explain certain networking and “string-pulling” behavior by journalists) and the Franco dictatorship in the mid-20th century. In contrast, in the British case (with a secular democratic tradition), the media system was defined by completely opposite characteristics: a low level of political parallelism, limited state intervention, and a high degree of professionalization of journalism.

As regards financing models, there are no significant changes; however, there is more financial rationality. In the United Kingdom the license fee is acknowledged as an essential source of income, but the amount has been limited slightly, while advertising continues to be vetoed as a source of income, at least within the national borders. In Spain, state financing has transformed from being indirect (via a debt guarantee) to direct, as RTVE is endowed with funding that covers the net costs of the public service, with no indications that point towards introducing a license fee. Resorting to advertising as a source of income is not limited at the moment. Meanwhile, the Spanish state has begun to take on RTVE’s



accumulated debt, at the same time that drastic measures are being taken to reduce costs (the SEPI rationalization plan). The reasons for this change lie in the expressed desire of the Zapatero Socialist government and the continual warnings from the European Union that prohibit state and regional authorities from continuing to act indefinitely as guarantors for the debts of state region public broadcasters.

Additionally, mention should be made of the call that has gone out from the intellectual and professional sector in Spain to guide the reform, and the lengthy process of public consultation in the case of the United Kingdom. The latter has brought with it a serious major effort to measure the meaning and reach of the public service that led to creating the concept of building public value. By contrast, in Spain, only a first-step definition of this concept has materialized, due to the demands of the European Union, which makes it clear that the member states can only fund those radio and television operations that fulfill an authentic public service function in the terms that they themselves may define.

Finally, we conclude that both cases show a move in the liberal direction, albeit one that was driven by the state. Both reforms were initiated and guided by government ideas and political will, even if in Britain this occurred in a more behind-the-scenes fashion than in Spain. In both cases, though, the policy decisions to move further in the liberal direction were marked by state intervention.

## Reference List

- Barnett, S. (2006). "Public Service Broadcasting: A Manifesto for Survival in the Multimedia Age" (a case study of the BBC's new charter). Paper presented at the RIPE Conference in Amsterdam.
- BBC (2004). *Building Public Value: Renewing the BBC for a Digital World*. London: BBC.
- BBC (2006). Annual Report and Accounts 2005/2006. London: BBC.
- BBC (2007). Annual Report and Accounts 2006/2007. London: BBC.
- Collins, R. (2007). *Public Value and the BBC*. London, The Work Foundation.
- Conlan, T. (2007). "Leaked BBC Licence Fee Deal Confirmed." *The Guardian*. Retrieved March 30, 2007, from <http://media.guardian.co.uk/bbc/story/01993488,00.html>
- Consejo de Europa (2006). *Les médias de service public dans la société de l'information*. H/Inf (2006) 3.
- Consejo para la Reforma de los Medios de Comunicación de Titularidad del Estado (2005). *Informe para la Reforma de los Medios de Comunicación de Titularidad del Estado*. Madrid, February 2005.
- DCMS —Department for Culture, Media And Sport (2006). *A Public Service for All: The BBC in the Digital Age*. London, DCMS.
- Esteve Pardo, J. (1984). *Régimen jurídico-administrativo de la televisión*. Madrid: Instituto Nacional de la Administración Pública.
- Fernández Alonso, I. (2002). La externalización de la producción de los operadores públicos de televisión de ámbito autonómico. Los casos canario y extremeño, *Latina* 46, 2002 [Available online at [www.ull.es/publicaciones/latina](http://www.ull.es/publicaciones/latina)].
- Fernández Alonso, I., and F. Santana (2000). *Estado y medios de comunicación en la España democrática*. Madrid: Alianza Universidad.
- Hallin, D., and P. Mancini (2004). *Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Llorens, C. (2005). "La política audiovisual de la Unión Europea y su influencia en el sistema televisivo español: la televisión pública y la televisión digital," *Sphera Publica* 5: 133–150.
- Moore, M. (1997). *Creating Public Value: Strategic Management in Government*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Royal Charter to be Granted to British Broadcasting Corporation (2006). Available at: [http://www.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/assets/files/pdf/regulatory\\_framework/charter\\_agreement/royalchartersealed\\_sept06.pdf](http://www.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/assets/files/pdf/regulatory_framework/charter_agreement/royalchartersealed_sept06.pdf). [Retrieved March 2007].

# Public Service Broadcasting in Ukraine: To Be or Not to Be?\*

*Olexiy Khabyuk*

## 1. General Preconditions for Public Service Broadcasting

What preconditions must exist to allow the introduction of public service broadcasting? According to the principles of the World Radio and Television Council, genuine public service broadcasting has four core elements (Price and Raboy 2001, 5ff.):<sup>1</sup>

- *Program universality*, i.e. accessibility for all citizens, independent of income level and social affiliation;
- *Diversity and balance* in content, genres, and audience;
- *Distinctiveness of programs* from those of non-public broadcasters in terms of higher quality, content promoting culture, high innovation, etc.;
- *Independence* of broadcasters from political and market pressures.

The general economic conditions in a country are of fundamental importance for the financial endowment of a public service broadcaster. The financial endowment, in turn, is crucial for a public service broadcaster to maintain independence and ensure the principles of universality, diversity, and distinctiveness. As McKinsey & Company state, the funding of a public service broadcaster should ideally meet the following criteria:

- independence from undue state and market influence;
- medium-term predictability;
- growth that keeps pace with or exceeds costs;
- substantial revenue to be prepared for the competition with commercial broadcasters;
- sufficiently simple and equitable payment with maximum acceptance in the society (McKinsey & Company 1999, 27–34).

---

\* The author thanks Manfred Kops for his valuable suggestions.

<sup>1</sup> Similar criteria can be found in various international comparative studies of public service broadcasting models (e.g. in Jarren et al. 2002, 283–286; OSI & EUMAP 2005, 54–65; McKinsey & Company 1999, 11–19) as well as in the recommendations of the Council of Europe (see, for example, Council of Europe 2007).

Below we show that these criteria are best fulfilled by a license fee. The crucial benefit of this kind of funding is that it ensures the broadcaster's independence. Tax-financed broadcasting is permanently jeopardized by undue state influence. By contrast, broadcasters, whose revenues come largely from advertising, are forced to tailor their programs more to the advertising industry's preferences than to those of society (Kops 2006, 32ff.; Kops 2007, 19ff.).

A medium-term predictability of revenues is necessary because the program aims cannot be reached in the short term and require a steady and high expenditure of capital. Among other things, program diversity demands a sufficient in-house production capacity, which requires highly specialized employees. Last but not least, a high-quality program transmission with appropriate technical capacities is required. Public service broadcasting must also be allowed to participate in the newest media-technical developments in order to offer innovative formats.

Empirical evidence shows that funding through taxes and advertising is less predictable than funding by a license fee (McKinsey & Company 1999, 30ff.). In the same context can be valued demand for a higher growth rate of revenues compared with costs and the sufficient funding. Due to the enduring increase of the license fee, the latter is better suited than the other alternatives mentioned, although such an adjustment is not automatically guaranteed. Fluctuating tax and advertising revenues can complicate the build-up of a sustainable competitive position for a public service broadcaster; thus funding through a license fee has advantages in this regard. The experience with state-funded broadcasters is more likely to show that a higher priority is given to the reduction of state budget deficits than the proper functioning of media.

Alongside the advantages of the license fee, this method has one important peculiarity—it must be accepted by society. If the citizens, as the sponsor and beneficiary of public service broadcasting, are not aware how valuable it is for communication in society, they will not be willing to pay. Their willingness to pay also depends to a large extent on their wealth because—as experience shows—citizens will finance more sophisticated individual needs such as societal communication only when their basic needs are satisfied. Moreover, license fees can be collected only if it is legally required. The need for enforcement can be lower if the societal acceptance of a public service broadcasting funded by a license fee is high; it must be high if this acceptance is low. In the latter case, however, the dependence on the state is higher.

In addition to the independence of fund-raising, an independence of fund disposition must be ensured. Moreover, supervision is needed to revise the fulfillment of the public service broadcasting program man-

date. It must be bound to the relevant civil society forces and may not be dominated either by the state or by any civil society groups.

To enforce these requirements, various conditions have to be fulfilled, especially the rule of law. According to Price and Krug (2002) this concept incorporates, at a minimum, clarity and accessibility of legal rules to the public, the abidance of legal norms with principles of fairness, impartiality, and objectivity through public administration as well as judicial support (Price and Krug 2002, 15ff.). Furthermore, effective protection of journalists must be assured. To give the public service broadcasters the possibility to refer to its legally prescribed duties, a right of continuance and development must be legally established. This must also consider the right of each public service broadcaster to enforce its funds by legal action in case of lack of financing. Furthermore, international rules, such as the WTO and the Single European Market, may not interfere with these instructions. Parallel to the institutional self-government the public service broadcaster has to be legally committed to obey the program mandate. An independent sovereign institution, which performs effective control over the law abidance, e.g., the Federal Constitutional Court in the Federal Republic of Germany, is beneficial. However, this is not an inevitable precondition, since the BBC has developed without such an institution.

In addition to the conditions already discussed, the influential socio-political groups have to agree on the design of the public service broadcasting to be established. If a discourse and consensus culture is missing and a “winner-takes-all” mentality applies, a high uncertainty about the personal utility of such a reform persists between the political parties. There is a certain risk that political representatives agree implicitly to default the introduction efforts in order to secure their edge on information for the citizens. These information asymmetries could be abolished by involving intermediary institutions, e.g. accepted NGOs with an international mission and reputation.

## **2. The Previous Introduction Efforts**

In 1997 a law on public service broadcasting was passed by Parliament, but has yet to be implemented.<sup>2</sup> Since then this topic has occasionally been picked up. In spring 2005 the most intensive discussion ever concerning this matter was started. It was initiated by different NGOs and media experts. Some of them later allied with the NGO coalition “Public

---

<sup>2</sup>. See e.g. Tomenko 2005.

Broadcasting.” Joint solutions were proposed within regular meetings of working groups. The broad scope of offered conceptions of the Ukrainian public service broadcasting (from close-to-commercial to alternative-to-state) as well as its funding facilities (revenues from gambling, lotteries, and sweepstakes, license fees, advertising, sponsoring, and state budget) (DW-Radio/Ukrainisch 2005) testify to a lack of understanding of the concept of public service broadcasting.

At the time, the President and the political parties close to the government were apparently quite sympathetic to the implementation of public service broadcasting.<sup>3</sup> One can assume that these decision makers did not give top priority to such a reform due to its high complexity and unstable political situation.<sup>4</sup> Instead, the political elite confined itself to democratizing state broadcasting, especially the TV channel “UT-1.” The discussions came to the end as the latest after law project on public service broadcasting was rejected by Parliament in the second reading on December 25, 2005. Ironically, the voting failed on the votes of the “Orange” deputies. Supposedly, an unfinished law was not to be adopted (Kurashyna 2005).

An adoption of the new broadcasting law can also be regarded as an achievement of the “Orange government.” It envisions a gradual reform of broadcasting. For example, Article 14 calls for two broadcasting councils, each consisting of 17 members, nine of which would be proposed by the parliamentary fractions, four by the president and four by national associations. Their primary mission would be to submit a proposal to Parliament for the nomination and dismissal of the director of the (still) state-owned TV holding, NTKU, and radio holding, NRKU.<sup>5</sup> However, the appointment of the members of broadcasting councils has been blocked by the parliamentary committee for freedom of opinion and information (Ostapa 2007). This action was negated by the State Broadcasting Committee as well on the grounds that the duties and responsibilities of the broadcasting councils were not sufficiently defined (Hansha 2007).

---

<sup>3</sup> The law was vetoed by the president, the license issue blocked by the National Council for Broadcasting (Richter and Golovanov 2006, 35–39). These actions resulted from incompatibility with existing laws and incompleteness of the new public service broadcasting instructions (Khabyuk 2004, 27–28).

<sup>4</sup> Other uncertainty factors include the overlap of authority through the State Broadcasting Committee, the opposition’s lack of willingness to cooperate, and the power struggle between the representatives of the ruling coalition. Furthermore, the civil society groups were too weak and discordant to claim such a reform from government representatives.

<sup>5</sup> The latter are treated by the law very restrictively, so only a few organizations can participate (Instytut Media Prava 2006).

Discussions took a new turn on March 15, 2007, as the mutual declaration on establishing the public service broadcasting was signed by directors and chairmen of the responsible broadcasting regulation bodies (Nrada.gov.ua 2007). Parallel attempts of the director of the State Broadcasting Committee, Prutnik, to launch a new broadcaster as cooperation of the 26 regional state broadcasters led only to setting up a news program (started on August 13, 2007), just in time for the parliamentary elections (September 30, 2007) (Prutnik 2007).<sup>6</sup> In the next few months some objective discussions despite the electoral process could have been conducted. The last milestone in this process was the president's decree of February 21, 2008, on convoking a consulting group to present a plan for introducing public service broadcasting by September 1, defining thereby the role of state broadcasters in such a system.<sup>7</sup> Unfortunately, the group's members shall be only representatives of the National Council for Television and Radio (the private broadcasting regulating authority), the State Broadcasting Committee, state TV and radio companies, the Antitrust Commission, artists and other national organizations, as well as scholars. As a result, many organizations that initiated the discussions mentioned above in 2005 are excluded due to their regional status. It is an open question how acceptable the work results of such a group will be for the whole society or at least for the political elite, as members of Parliament were not even invited to take part in this process.<sup>8</sup>

### **3. Assessing the Preconditions for Public Service Broadcasting in Ukraine**

To reach conclusions about the chances of introducing public service broadcasting in Ukraine under the current circumstances, we will examine how the preconditions considered in Section 2 apply to Ukraine.

The general economic conditions in Ukraine are rather disadvantageous; at least 28 percent of the population lives below the poverty line.<sup>9</sup> As has already been pointed out, this discourages the acceptance of a

---

<sup>6</sup> Apparently the new channel has not yet succeeded.

<sup>7</sup> See <http://www.president.gov.ua/documents/7488.html>.

<sup>8</sup> Telekrytyka 2008.

<sup>9</sup> Unian.net 2008. The Ukrainian Parliament defined the monthly living wage at 605 hryvna (since April 1, 2008), which equals about 70 euros.

license fee in the society.<sup>10</sup> There is also a lack of understanding of the mission of public service broadcasting, and a lack of trust in politics.

Partial funding of public service broadcasting by advertising would be rather difficult. The potential revenue generated through market advertising would not be enough for existing commercial media enterprises to be profitable.<sup>11</sup> By contrast, high revenues could be achieved by providing political advertising.<sup>12</sup> However, this would jeopardize the balance and independence of the public service broadcaster.

The official aggregated budget of Ukrainian state broadcasting now amounts to about €234 million (Ohne Verfasser 2006). These revenues do not allow state broadcasting to compete seriously with commercial broadcasting because of its duty to provide a dozen programs. Moreover, these revenues cannot be forecasted in the mid-term because the needs of state broadcasting were often not met in the past.<sup>13</sup>

The condition of the civil society does not correspond with the standards drafted above.<sup>14</sup> Indeed, in the civic culture sector enormous changes have occurred. For instance, the democratic opposition showed

---

<sup>10</sup> According to a poll conducted by the Institute of Politics in 2005, only 2 percent of the respondents supported funding solely through the license fee, 41 percent argued for a funding from the state budget, 18 percent for a mixed funding from state budget and advertising, and 15 percent for a mixed funding from budget and license fee (Instytut Polityky 2005).

<sup>11</sup> Iwanow 2004; Iwanow 2007; the net advertising market in 2005 amounted to about 433 million euro (IP 2006, 420).

<sup>12</sup> In commercial broadcasting such practice is common because higher profits can be achieved if the broadcasting enterprises are also used for mass manipulation instead of simply garnering advertising or recipient revenues. This was seen in the election campaign of 2006, where large amounts of money were invested (Lindner 2006, 20). The existence of such a demand willing to pay jeopardizes the opinion of pluralism because the position of the client certainly should not be presented in the same order with other opinions.

<sup>13</sup> See e.g. Khabyuk 2004, 24ff.

<sup>14</sup> To analyze its development we used here the criteria of "civilizational competence," defined by Sztompka (1993 88ff.): *Enterprise culture* (indispensable for participation in market economy: innovative persistence, achievement orientation, individualistic competitiveness, etc.), *civic culture* (indispensable for participation in democratic polity: political activism, readiness to participate, rule of law, respect for opponents, etc.), *discourse culture* (indispensable for participation in free intellectual flow: tolerance, acceptance of diversity and pluralism, criticism, etc.) and *everyday culture* (indispensable for daily existence in advanced, urbanized, technologically saturated and consumer-oriented society: cleanliness, orderliness, punctuality, etc.). Enterprise and everyday culture were not taken into consideration below, due to their low importance for this topic.



impressively its basic democratic capability since it mobilized more than 250,000 people for many weeks during the peaceful protests at the end of 2004. In the last few years improvements in the rule of law have been asserted as well.

On the other hand, jurisprudence is still considered mostly corrupt (Bertelsmann 2006, 5ff)<sup>15</sup> The unsecured legal status of journalists is also still a significant problem. They are often accused of injuring the honor and dignity of persons, especially politicians. Spreading the personal data of an official, such as education, marital status, or birth data, is enough to trigger this accusation.<sup>16</sup>

These weaknesses of the rule of law could be resolved by the Supreme Constitutional Court, especially since the latter has already demonstrated its impartiality in the verdict concerning the election fraud in 2004 (Bertelsmann 2006, 7). However, it has scarcely been judicially active since then. Another disadvantage is the vertical power relations in the political system: Directly elected representatives not only appoint the directors at the lower level, but also interfere with their decisions of any sort.

A special adverse consequence of the communist regime is the lack of a discourse culture.<sup>17</sup> Deviation from the party line was not welcomed in the former USSR. The relatively short period of “glasnost,” followed by independence, could not banish ways of thinking that people had learned over decades. Many older people still long for the restricted but clear environment of the Soviet era. Even if not as strongly today as in the first years of the transformation,<sup>18</sup> “Homo Sovieticus” still endures. These individuals aspire to a Russia-oriented integration of the country. The other extreme represents the once-suppressed segments of society that can now express their opinion openly. They demand an admission of guilt from “Homo Sovieticus,” who supported the old system. This pro-European group lacks a discourse culture as well. Between these extremes

---

<sup>15</sup> An amusing table with the usual “bribe prices” of the Kuchma era can be found in Morozenko 2005. One can assume that no major changes have been found in this section. The corruption can partly be put down to the peculiarity of Ukrainian law, namely to the contradictory complex instructions, which make it almost impossible for citizens and enterprises to obey the law fully. This phenomenon produces many legal gaps. The “Bezpredel” (“lawlessness” in Russian) is rooted in Parliament: Only three to five laws will generally be discussed in the caucuses in advance from the 30–40 laws passed on one session day (Kowaltschjuk 2003).

<sup>16</sup> However, verdicts favoring journalists have, fortunately, increased (Iwanow 2007).

<sup>17</sup> See footnote 15.

<sup>18</sup> In a 1997 poll concerning the multi-party system, 35 percent were opposed, 29 percent supported it, and 36 percent were unsure (Lindner 1998, 16).

is located the majority of the Ukrainian population, merging seamlessly in their sympathies from one pole to another. The further existence of a high share of undecided persons shows that bright classes of the population feel despair over the current situation.

The controversy between these groups will be fought out partly over the language, although political views do not coincide with language groups as closely as it might seem. Additionally, political and economic influences from the Russian side increase the divide. The extensive import of TV programs from Russia, which benefits from minimal “culture discount” effects (developed from hegemonic Russian culture and language in the USSR) and poor development of the domestic market for program production, strengthens the Russian language.<sup>19</sup> Political parties are not interested in the arbitration of the language controversy. On the contrary, they try to exacerbate it. For example, during the election campaign in 2004, some mass media depicted the linguistic differences between Western and Eastern Ukraine in an exaggerated and one-sided way.<sup>20</sup>

## Conclusion

It is commonly argued that the Ukrainian media has achieved more independence since the “Orange Revolution.” But impartial reporting remains a distant aim. The introduction of public service broadcasting has long been discussed as a possible solution. The question is which preconditions should be met to allow the introduction of a public service broadcasting that is universal, diverse, distinctive, and independent. The preconditions for compliance with these core elements can generally be classified as economic, sociopolitical, legal, and technological. The general economic conditions in a country are of fundamental importance for the financial endowment of a public service broadcaster, which, in turn, is crucial for its independence. Funding by a license fee has important advantages: It protects the broadcaster from undue state and market influence, and it provides reliable revenues that are high enough to enable competition with commercial broadcasters. However, funding by a license fee requires the agreement of society. Citizens want to be able

---

<sup>19</sup> In the mass media, based on available official data, the Russian language predominates, especially in the eastern regions. The National Broadcasting Council estimates that only 30–35 percent of radio broadcasts in the Donetsk region are in Ukrainian (Nazionalna rada 2006).

<sup>20</sup> The Ukrainian-speaking citizens were depicted as those who allegedly speak a hybrid language of Ukrainian and Russian—“surshyk”—and are not able to learn Russian (Besters-Dilger 2007).

to pay for their basic needs before addressing more sophisticated needs such as societal communication. To impose a license fee, some basic general conditions are essential, especially the existence of the rule of law.

In 1997 a law on public service broadcasting was passed by the Ukrainian Parliament, but has yet to be implemented. In spring 2005 a new intensive discussion on this topic was initiated by different NGOs and media experts (also known as the NGO coalition “Public Broadcasting”). It seems that the president and the political parties close to government supported this idea. But the necessary measures were not made, supposedly due to the unstable political situation and high complexity of such a reform. In March 2007 directors and chairmen of the responsible broadcasting regulation bodies renewed attempts to introduce public service broadcasting by a mutual declaration. The last milestone in this process was the controversial president’s decree of February 21, 2008, on con-voking a consulting group to present a plan of introduction public service broadcasting by September 1, thereby defining the role of state broadcasters in such a system.

However, the environment for introducing public service broadcasting in Ukraine is still disadvantageous, since most of the important pre-conditions have not yet been fulfilled. The general economic conditions for financially independent and competitive public service broadcasting do not exist. Moreover the society is split and lacks an essential discourse culture. Although public service broadcasting would be a valuable tool to help resolve the historical linguistic and cultural division of the Ukrainian people, it cannot be established without basic societal reforms, especially concerning the strengthening of the influence of civil society.

It is unfortunate that in the Information Age such an institution is missing in Ukraine. But the actors should not capitulate. What is possible, and indeed critical, is little steps to establish an elementary, limited-scope and low-budget public service broadcaster that could act as the voice of civil society. This in turn could improve the conditions for the establishment of such a civil society.

## Reference List

- Bertelsmann Stiftung (2006). *Bertelsmann Transformation Index. Country Report Ukraine*. Retrieved March 28, 2007, from <http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/fileadmin/pdf/en/2006/CISAndMongolia/Ukraine.pdf>.
- Besters-Dilger, J. (2007). *The Ukrainian Language in Education and Mass Media*. Harvard Ukrainian Studies 28 (forthcoming). Retrieved March 15, 2007, from <http://home.page.univie.ac.at/juliane.besters-dilger/UKRINEA.DOC>.
- Council of Europe (2007). *Recommendation Rec(2007)2 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the remit of public service media in the information society, adopted on 31 January 2007*. Retrieved March 15, 2007, from <https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1089759&BackColorInternet=9999CC&BackColorIntranet=FFBB55&BackColorLogged=FFAC75>.
- DW-Radio/Ukrainisch (2005). *Erster Schritt zum öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunk in der Ukraine*. Retrieved March 22, 2007, from [www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,1564,1661514,00.html](http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,1564,1661514,00.html).
- Freedom House (2006). *Global Press Freedom Rankings 2006*. Retrieved March 26, 2007, from <http://freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=271&year=2006>.
- Hansha, L. (2007). *Dershteleradio choiche vidklasty Hromadski rady*. Retrieved January 25, 2007, from [http://www.telekritika.kiev.ua/articles/188/0/8482/ganja\\_perechasno/](http://www.telekritika.kiev.ua/articles/188/0/8482/ganja_perechasno/).
- Instytut Media Prava (2006). *Spezproekt: novyy zakon pro telebachennja ta radio-movlennja (vypusk 2)*. Retrieved March 28, 2007, from [http://www.telekritika.kiev.ua/articles/138/0/7070/analiz\\_novogo\\_zakonu\\_pro\\_telebachennja\\_i\\_radiomovlennja/](http://www.telekritika.kiev.ua/articles/138/0/7070/analiz_novogo_zakonu_pro_telebachennja_i_radiomovlennja/).
- Instytut Polityky (2005). *Suspilne telebachennja v ozinzi ekspertiv ta hromadjan*. Retrieved March 23, 2005, from [www.tomenko.kiev.ua/cgi/redir.cgi?url=nov091.html](http://www.tomenko.kiev.ua/cgi/redir.cgi?url=nov091.html).
- Iwanow, W. (2004). *Medien in der Ukraine*. In Hans-Bredow-Institut (Ed.), *Internationales Handbuch Medien 2004/2005* (678–688). Baden-Baden: Nomos.
- Iwanow, W. (2007). *Korotkyj ohljad ukrajnskykh media*. Retrieved March 5, 2007, from [http://www.aup.com.ua/upload/1173091559\\_Review2endukr.pdf](http://www.aup.com.ua/upload/1173091559_Review2endukr.pdf).
- Jarren, O., and R. Weber et al. (2002). *Rundfunkregulierung—Leitbilder, Modelle und Erfahrungen im internationalen Vergleich Eine sozial- und rechtswissenschaftliche Analyse*, Zürich: Seismo Verlag.
- Khabyuk, O. (2004). *Ukrainischer Rundfunk zwischen Staat und Kommerz. Platz für einen Dritten Weg?* Working Papers of the Institute for Broadcasting Economics, No. 180. Cologne: In-house-publishing. Retrieved March 15, 2007, from <http://www.rundfunk-institut.uni-koeln.de/institut/publikationen/arbeitspapiere/ap180.php>.
- Kops, M. (2006). *The German Broadcasting Order: A Model for China?* Working Papers of the Institute for Broadcasting Economics, No. 215e. Cologne: In-house Publishing. Retrieved April 5, 2007, from <http://www.rundfunk-institut.uni-koeln.de/institut/publikationen/arbeitspapiere/ap215e.php>.
- Kops, M. (2007). *A Revenue-Based Methodology for the Classification and Comparison of Broadcasting Systems*, Berlin: Lit-Verlag.

- Kowaltschjuk, A (2003). *Pravovi koliziji v zakonodavchjomu zabezpechenni kredytnoji dijalnosti*, Pravo Ukrainy 5, 62–65.
- Kurashyna, I. (2005). *Chjomu “provalyvsja” zakon pro Suspilne movlennja? Komentari ekspertiv*. Retrieved December 22, 2005, from [www.telekritika.kiev.ua](http://www.telekritika.kiev.ua).
- Lindner, R. (1998). *Die Ukraine zwischen Transformation und Selbstblockade*. Ebenhausen: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik.
- Lindner, R. (2006). *Das Ende von Orange: Die Ukraine in der Transformationskrise*. Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. Retrieved March 26, 2007, from [http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/common/get\\_document.php?asset\\_id=3219](http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/common/get_document.php?asset_id=3219).
- McKinsey & Company (1999). *Public Service Broadcasters Around the World: A McKinsey Report for the BBC*. London.
- Morozenko, S. V. (2005). “Die Ukraine unter Kutschma. Clanwirtschaft zwischen Korruption und organisierter Kriminalität.” Landeszentrale für politische Bildung Baden-Württemberg (Ed.). *Der Bürger im Staat*, Heft 4, 171–177.
- Natsionalna Rada (2006). *Tsvit Natsionalnoi rady Ukrainy z pytanj telebachennja ta radiomovlennja za 2006 rik*. Retrieved March 21, 2007, from <http://www.nrada.gov.ua/cgi-bin/go?page=92>.
- Nrada.gov.ua (2007). *Pidpysano Deklaratsiju pro stvorennja v Ukraini suspilnogo teleradiomovlennja*. Retrieved March 15, 2007, from [www.nrada.gov.ua/cgi-bin/go?node=244](http://www.nrada.gov.ua/cgi-bin/go?node=244).
- Ohne Verfasser (2006). *Öffentlich-rechtlicher Rundfunk in der Ukraine frühestens 2009*. *Epd-Medien* 74, 20–21.
- OSI and EUMAP (2005). *Television across Europe: Regulation, Policy and Independence, Summary*. Budapest: Open Society Institute.
- Ostapa, S. (2007). *Stvorennja Hromadskykh rad natsionalnykh tele radiokompaniji vidkladajetjsja*. Retrieved January 11, 2007, from [http://www.telekritika.kiev.ua/articles/188/0/8389/grady\\_opyt\\_deputaty/](http://www.telekritika.kiev.ua/articles/188/0/8389/grady_opyt_deputaty/).
- Price, M. E., and P. Krug (2002). *The Enabling Environment For Free And Independent Media. Contribution to Transparent and Accountable Governance*. Washington, DC: USAID. Retrieved April 5, 2007, from [http://www.usaid.gov/our\\_work/democracy\\_and\\_governance/publications/pdfs/pnacm006.pdf](http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/publications/pdfs/pnacm006.pdf).
- Price, M.E., and M. Raboy (eds.) (2001). *Public Service Broadcasting in Transition: A Documentary Reader*. Oxford: Kluwer Law International.
- Prutnik, E. (2007). *Pryvatitsatsyi oblastnykh teleradiokompanij ne budet, interview Nataliji Ligachevoj*. Retrieved February 1, 2007, from [http://www.tele-kritika.kiev.ua/articles/123/0/8515/ehduard\\_prutnik\\_privatizacii\\_oblastnykh\\_teleradiokompanij\\_ne\\_budet/](http://www.tele-kritika.kiev.ua/articles/123/0/8515/ehduard_prutnik_privatizacii_oblastnykh_teleradiokompanij_ne_budet/).
- Richter, A., D. Golovanov, and S. Nikoltshev (ed.) (2006). *Public Service Broadcasting Regulation in the Commonwealth of Independent States. Special Report on the Legal Framework for Public Service Broadcasting in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine*. Strasbourg: European Audiovisual Observatory. Retrieved May 11, 2007, from [http://www.obs.coe.int/online\\_publication/reports/publicservicebroadcasting\\_cis.doc.de](http://www.obs.coe.int/online_publication/reports/publicservicebroadcasting_cis.doc.de).
- ROG (2006). *Rangliste der Pressefreiheit 2006*. Retrieved March 26, 2007, from <http://www.reporter-ohne-grenzen.de/index.php?id=175>.

- Sztompka, P. (1993). "Civilizational Incompetence: The Trap of Post-Communist Societies." *Zeitschrift für Soziologie* 2, 85–95.
- Telekrytyka (2008). *Prezydent staw sojuszykom u sprawi suspilnoho movlennja?*, Retrieved April 7, 2008, from [www.telekritika.ua/media-suspilstvo/suspilne-movlennya/2008-02-22/36680](http://www.telekritika.ua/media-suspilstvo/suspilne-movlennya/2008-02-22/36680), February 22, 2008.
- Tomenko, M. (2004). "Dva rejtynhovi kanaly v rukach odnijeji politychnoji syly – ze tesh problema kontsentratsiji," *rozmovljala Natalija Lihachjova*. Retrieved March 4, 2004, from [www.telekritika.kiev.ua](http://www.telekritika.kiev.ua), March 1, 2004.
- Unian.net (2008). *28% naseleennja Ukrainy shyve za meshoju bidnosti*. Retrieved April 16, 2008, from <http://unian.net/ukr/news/news-246733.html>.

# **Actors, Evolution, and Production Models in the Commodification of Spanish Television**

*Laura Bergés Saura*

## **Introduction**

Between 1989 and 2000, Spain's television system went from being publicly owned to market-based. The public system consisted of two national channels (TVE1 and La 2) and eight regional channels. In 2000 the switch to a market model resulted in more than 100 national channels based on several different technologies—two public channels, four free terrestrial private channels, and pay-TV channels grouped in satellite and cable platforms—20 regional public channels in 14 autonomous regions, and about 1,000 local private and public channels. Since 2005, 20 more national digital terrestrial channels and at least five new public and private regional channels in each region have been licensed.

The 1990s witnessed the commodification of television. This process included several changes: new actors, other aims in television production, and new production methods, which have meant a change in the role of television. This process of commodification refers not only to the privatization of television ownership, but also to the expansion of the market to regulate the exchanges. This can be seen as a process of commodification of audiovisual goods, audiences, and work (Mosco 1996).

The process is still going on, with the development of new distribution forms such as DSL, wireless, and mobile television, but the main characteristics of the new television system were established in the 1990s. This paper presents some results of research into the commodification of television in Spain in the 1990s and its relation to the evolution of the communications industry and the general economic, political, and social environment.<sup>1</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> The research was my doctoral dissertation "Anàlisi econòmica i financera de TVE, Antena 3 TV, Telecinco i Canal Plus i del seu entorn (1990–2000): la mercantilització de la televisió espanyola." The study develops three issues: first, the economic and financial analysis of the national television in Spain in the 1990s; second, the industrial analyses, looking for competition in the communications market; and third, the contextualization in the general economic, political, and social environment.

This paper consists of three parts. First, I present the main actors in the television business, looking at how they are connected with economic changes and politics. Second, I refer to stages in the commodification of television, introducing some differences between free and pay TV. I point out how these stages are also related to economic and political evolution. Third, I identify the business models in the new television system and their results in supplying programming.

## 1. Actors

In the new scenario of privatization and commodification, television has become an economic activity involving different actors in its production, programming, transmission, commercialization, and financing. In the Spanish public broadcasting model the public companies, the U.S. film industry, and the advertising industry had the leading role. The new commercial model includes other transnational and Spanish communications groups, the telecommunications industry and the banks and other financial institutions, while U.S. firms and the advertising industry have enlarged their role. Other companies from construction, energy, tobacco, and the growing sector of national audiovisual production have also converged in the television business (Table 1).

*Table 1: Ownership of Private Channels in Spain (Percentage Shareholder)*

| Shareholders       | beginning | 2004 | Shareholders            | beginning | 2004 |
|--------------------|-----------|------|-------------------------|-----------|------|
| <b>Sogecable</b>   |           |      | <b>Telecinco</b>        |           |      |
| Prisa              | 25        | 23.6 | Mediaset                | 25        | 52   |
| Canal + France     | 25        | 16.4 | Anaya                   | 25        | 0    |
| Telefónica         | 0         | 22.2 | ONCE                    | 25        |      |
| Cajamadrid         | 5         | 5    | Juan Fdez. Montreal     | 15        |      |
| BBVA               | 20        | 3.9  | Promociones Calle Mayor | 10        |      |
| Bankinter          | 0         | 1.5  | Correo-Prensa Española  |           | 13   |
| Corte Inglés (FCC) | 5         | 3.2  | Dresdner Bank           |           | 25   |
| Inversiones Artá   | 15        |      | Ice Finance             |           | 10   |
| Imagen y Medios    | 5         |      | <b>Antena 3 TV</b>      |           |      |
| Stock market       | 0         | 25.3 | Antena 3 Radio          | 12.5      | 0    |



| Shareholders                  | beginning | 2004 | Shareholders                               | beginning | 2004 |
|-------------------------------|-----------|------|--------------------------------------------|-----------|------|
| <b>Canal Satélite Digital</b> |           |      | Talleres de imprenta                       | 12.5      | 0    |
| Sogecable                     | 85        | 82   | SEREC                                      | 10        | 0    |
| Antena 3 TV                   | 15        | 3    | Godó                                       | 22.5      | 0    |
| Warner Bros                   |           | 10   | Prensa Española                            | 2         | 0    |
| Dalbergia                     |           | 5    | Professionals of Vanguardia-Antena 3 radio | 3         | 0    |
| <b>Vía Digital</b>            |           |      | regional press                             | 18        | 0    |
| Telefónica                    | 35        |      | Others                                     | 19.5      | 0    |
| TVE                           | 17        | 0    | Planeta deAgostini                         |           | 34   |
| Televisa                      | 17        | 0    | SCH                                        |           | 10   |
| Recoletos                     | 5         | 0    | Bertelsmann (RTL)                          |           | 17   |
| TVC                           | 5         | 0    | Stock market                               |           | 39   |
| Itochu                        | 5         | 0    | <b>Retevisión/Auna cable</b>               |           |      |
| Direct TV                     | 6         | 0    | Endesa                                     | 22.66     | 33.2 |
| Telemadrid                    | 4         | 0    | Telecom Italia                             | 22.66     | 0    |
| Canal 9                       | 2         | 0    | Unión Fenosa                               | 9         | 20.8 |
| TVG                           | 2         | 0    | SCH                                        | 0         | 15   |
| Others                        | 2         | 0    | ING                                        | 0         | 11.4 |
| <b>Cableuropa/ONO</b>         |           |      | State                                      | 30        | 0    |
| SpainCom                      | 32.5      | 47   | Regional savings banks                     | 15.5      | 17.6 |
| Ferrovial                     | 17.6      | 10   |                                            |           |      |
| Santander / SCH               | 32.5      | 33   |                                            |           |      |
| Multitel                      | 17.6      | 10   |                                            |           |      |

*Source: Annual accounts of Gestevisión Telecinco, Antena 3 TV and Sogecable, and Anuario SGAE, 2004.*

The strategy and the behavior of each of these actors have been different because of their size and business characteristics. This is related to changes in the general context, including the privatization of the public sector (telecommunications, energy, and tobacco) and the liberalization of commerce and finance. This is also linked with the general process of globalization, which defines the expansion of capitalist institutions both geographically and over a broader range of activities.

*Table 2: Sharing in Financing (Corporate Capital and Loans) in National Terrestrial Channels, by Type of Enterprises (Million Euro)*

|                                 | 1990          | 1991          | 1992          | 1993          | 1994          | 1995          | 1996          | 1997          | 1998          | 1999          |
|---------------------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| Spanish information firms       | 60.39         | 81.12         | 93.07         | 93.44         | 88.18         | 73.16         | 106.97        | 63.86         | 94.15         | 115.89        |
| Foreign invest                  | 54.09         | 81.14         | 81.14         | 56.34         | 51.09         | 58.90         | 62.66         | 77.68         | 101.51        | 126.98        |
| Other Spanish firm              | 34.86         | 33.06         | 24.04         | 24.04         | 15.03         | 15.03         | 13.94         | 0.00          | 19.44         | 29.56         |
| Telecommunications              | 0.00          | 0.00          | 0.00          | 0.00          | 0.00          | 0.00          | 0.00          | 37.56         | 39.07         | 78.68         |
| Intragroup loans                | 0.00          | 0.00          | 44.84         | 27.86         | 84.78         | 173.25        | 147.75        | 105.32        | 195.16        | 269.89        |
| <i>Total financing by group</i> | <i>149.34</i> | <i>195.31</i> | <i>243.09</i> | <i>201.69</i> | <i>239.07</i> | <i>320.33</i> | <i>331.31</i> | <i>284.42</i> | <i>449.33</i> | <i>621.01</i> |
| Commercial loans*               | 208.02        | 293.17        | 441.52        | 612.87        | 598.11        | 386.02        | 361.46        | 466.57        | 356.09        | 587.15        |
| Banks                           | 62.11         | 90.42         | 83.55         | 138.75        | 156.23        | 177.51        | 239.84        | 354.73        | 330.98        | 168.83        |
| State                           | 33.81         | 33.81         | 78.65         | 61.67         | 104.77        | 181.60        | 123.95        | 245.36        | 309.20        | 329.60        |
| Others                          | 139.98        | 88.69         | 108.60        | 70.23         | 69.57         | 53.61         | 139.93        | 122.72        | 138.35        | 221.88        |
| n.d.                            | 4.81          | 5.04          | 5.53          | 88.26         | 93.63         | 82.33         | 0.00          | 0.04          | 15.96         | 12.03         |
| Total                           | 598.07        | 706.44        | 960.92        | 1,173.47      | 1,261.39      | 1,201.39      | 1,196.49      | 1,473.85      | 1,599.91      | 1,940.48      |

*Source: Annual accounts of TVE, Gestevisión-Telecinco, Antena 3 TV and Canal Plus/Sogecable. (Exchange rate: €1 = 166.386 pesetas)*

*\* Most commercial loans are from intragroup firms or from guaranteed contracts.*


The transnational communications groups (Vivendi, Mediaset, Bertelsmann, Time-Warner) are present in the Spanish television system through capital investment, commercial and non-commercial loans, and as program suppliers (Table 2). They have introduced new management models in Spain, and their large size has given stability to their investments. These groups include companies in the entire audiovisual value chain, so they can make use of stocks and financial resources from inside the group. This allowed, for instance, a quick introduction of the Mediaset channel (Telecinco), compared to the Spanish-owned Antena 3 TV. Also important is their role as creditors, which allows a high debt in the new companies, financed by the consolidated activities, therefore reducing potential competition.

But there are some differences between European and U.S. groups. The European groups (especially Vivendi and Mediaset) were responsible for private television as shareholders, searching for economies of scale by horizontal growth. Instead, the U.S. groups, and other European groups that came later, have a more important role as program providers, and address their investment towards the pay-TV platforms, where they can make profit from their diversified programming (films, animation, sports, documentary, information). Coming from the largest European audiovisual production industries (European Audiovisual Observatory 1994–2001), German and British companies also act rather as content suppliers, especially but not exclusively for TV fiction.

The advertising industry and television advertisers have an international dimension. Advertising expenditure (adspend) was the main source of income for Spanish television during the 1990s, providing autofinancing resources for the expansion of the television market. Although from 2000 onwards income from subscribers made the same or even exceeded television adspend, it is still insufficient to support the pay-TV costs. In 2000 Telecinco and Antena 3 TV revenue was €1.268 billion, with an operating profit of €370 million. The same year, the three pay-TV platforms, Canal Satélite Digital, Vía Digital, and Canal Plus/Sogecable reached €1.398 billion of revenue, but they accumulated operating losses of up to €466 million.

Omnicom, WPP, Interpublic, Publicis, and Havas together hold the majority share of the advertising market, especially in the television market, which is the most centralized. Those companies extended their investment in the Spanish advertising industry from the 1980s onwards, and even more in the 1990s, until they controlled a big share of the advertising market—in 2003, 60 percent of advertising in media was managed by 29 companies, all of them with foreign capital (Incom 2005). Transnational advertising holdings accumulate a big negotiation power, influenc-

Figure 1: Main Advertisers in Media in Spain



Source: Infoadex.

ing the schedule strategies, and they are in fact the suppliers of some of the most widely seen television content. These multinational advertising companies pushed for the privatization of television, since television is the main vehicle for marketing goods produced by multinationals for mass consumption. The economic sectors spending the most on television and total advertising are those linked with the international economy, such as transport, distribution, communications, and finance (Figure 1).

But we find the advertising industry not only as customers but also as shareholders of some important television companies. For instance, Havas is behind the formation of Canal Plus France, and Prisa was the owner of two of the main national advertising companies in Spain in the 1980s. More recently, WPP had shares in one of the most successful Spanish audiovisual companies, Mediapro, and it has now 20 percent of the new terrestrial channel, La Sexta. Furthermore, some of the greatest advertisers in the Spanish media are investors in television, like Telefonica, Auna, the banks, Altadis/Tabacalera, or the building companies.

The expansion of advertising-financed television is related to the extension of the communications capacity of the big international conglomerates. This is one of the aspects of the globalization process, where state authority is being reduced by corporate intervention (Strange 2001, Stiglitz 2003, and Galbraith 2000) through a wide range of means—advertising, lobbying, management of public services and related activities, publicity, public relations, and other communication instruments.

Foreign investment in Spanish television reflects a general process of internationalization of the Spanish economy. The transnational actors are one of the main forces pushing the privatization of television. In that sense, Spain is a foreign investment receiver and a net importer from the United States and major European countries. The Spanish economy is increasingly internationalized: In 2000, imports constituted 32.2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) and exports 29.9 percent; in 1990 these figures were 19.7 percent and 16.3 percent, respectively (BBVA 2001). Thus the internationalization of television ownership and the television market completes the value chain of international industry. Schiller (1989) explains the international extension of the advertising industry as a part of the extension of U.S. industry, since the advertising industry served the productive companies. This is also the case for television internationalization. Television is the main advertising media for the international industry. So foreign communications companies invest in Spanish television not only as a horizontal growing strategy but to defend their relationship with international advertisers.

This tendency can also be seen in the expansion of the Spanish communications groups to Latin America, following the investments of some

of their greatest advertising customers such as telecommunications companies, banks, and energy companies that invested also in those markets. Spanish communications groups' investment in Latin America was traditionally limited to the publishing industry, but in the 1990s and especially in early 2000, the Spanish communications groups entered the audiovisual industry in Argentina, Colombia, and Peru. This process must be framed in the growth of Spanish investments, transferences and sales of other sectors of the economy in Latin American countries. The geographical structuring of the audiovisual industry is then related to the general structuring of the global economy.

The internationalization of both shareholders structure and program market has little to do with the internationalization of the Spanish population during the 1990s. In that decade Spain became an immigrant receptor country, with people coming from Morocco, Algeria, Latin America and progressively from China, Romania, and the Russian Federation. This has almost no relation with the evolution of the television sector, where we find only some investment and program exchange with Latin American countries.

The Spanish communications groups based on the press are another important actor in the shareholder of television (18–30 percent of corporate capital), and progressively in loans and program supply (Table 2). All the main press editors have invested in television, extending their multimedia growth from press to radio to television. Those that have consolidated their position in the television market show a better evolution in the other markets, especially in press. That is the case for Prisa and Vocento,<sup>2</sup> two groups that concentrated 11.68 percent and 12.77 percent of press circulation each, in 1989, and 15.3 percent and nearly 20 percent in 2001. Both companies act in the television market in alliance with bigger European groups, while the Spanish press companies, like Godó or Zeta, which had led the ownership of Antena 3 TV in different stages, without foreign capital, had less growth in press, radio and audiovisual markets. Spanish communications groups are smaller than European or U.S. ones, so they have a smaller financial capacity, and their investments are more unstable. With a narrower network of companies under their control, television companies led by Spanish groups have developed a different business model, with a bigger integration of activities in the value chain.

The Spanish groups' behavior is linked to political evolution. Shareholder changes coincide with electoral cycles: When the decline of the

---

<sup>2</sup> Vocento is the name of the company created when Correo (with several regional newspapers, audiovisual production and rights, and radio) bought Prensa Española (editor of national newspaper ABC) in 2001.

Socialist Party began just before the 1993 election, Godó and Correo/Vocento, two conservative press groups, were replaced by Zeta, a pro-socialist press editor, in the ownership of Antena 3 TV. With the growth and election of the Partido Popular (People's Party) in the national elections in 1996, other changes took place in television ownership: Vocento invested in the television market again, in alliance with Mediaset in Telecinco. And after the government change, Telefónica, a privatized company where the state had a casting vote, entered the media industry, buying Zeta's participation in Antena 3 TV, among other media.

The Spanish media groups have a leading position in the political environment as they concentrate a big share of the information market through their activities in the press, radio, television, and Internet. In this sense, television is the main, if not the only, information source for a wide part of the society that is an important part of the electorate. In Spain only 15 percent of low-income people read newspapers, as opposed to 64 percent of the upper class (EGM 2004). We find a similar imbalance in Internet use and news-radio audience.

On the other hand, it is interesting to note that in an electoral context of bipartidism, we find a television market with two private national free television channels that tend to divide the audience in two groups attending the political preferences. This means not only ownership changes (especially in Antena 3 TV, the only television with no foreign capital until 2003) but also editorial changes. For instance, in the years of growing social opposition to the government and the conservative party,<sup>3</sup> Telecinco became more critical of government in its news reports, while Antena 3 TV and the public television TVE both took a pro-government position.

But this scenario of bipartidism at the national level is not reproduced in some autonomous regions, where other parties feature prominently. These political differences are a significant factor for competition in information markets. In the press and radio markets, there is more competition coming from regional companies that differentiate their products to address different political groups.<sup>4</sup> This coincides with a higher economic level in those regions. In the television market, however, Spanish

---

<sup>3</sup> Since 2001 there were important demonstrations: a general strike, and protests over fuel waste of Prestige, the Iraq war, or hydrologic planning, for instance.

<sup>4</sup> For instance, in Catalonia the top audience in press, television, and radio goes to regional media (El Periódico and La Vanguardia, and the public television and radio, Televisió de Catalunya and Catalunya Ràdio). Also in the Basque country the regional media compete with national ones, and it is precisely Vocento that has its origin in the Basque market.

law mandated a national coverage for private channels, which meant a limitation of competition between nationally and regionally based companies. Only with the introduction of Digital Terrestrial Television has the privatization of regional and local television space been considered. At this time, the main Spanish groups (Prisa, Vocento) have already developed a network of audiovisual companies. That allows them to take part in these new regional television markets in the same way the European groups initially did in the Spanish market. Instead, regional groups will have to face more supplying and financial problems.

Financial firms became the other television supporter (Table 2). Banks participate in financing of television both through investments in share capital and by debt capital (total participation in liabilities has gone from 8.7 percent to 24 percent in different periods). Banks are important advertisers in TV as well as in other media. They are an important actor that provides stability to the television system. Their investments grow when it is needed for changes. They take charge of the shares of the shareholders when they leave their positions; they provide resources for the introduction and expansion in new activities or markets; their funds allow the launching of new television forms. It is also important to note that banks favor corporate planning and reduce competition (Kotz 1978) as they have interests in many different activities. In Spain, their investments in television coincided with important bank investment in other privatized activities and with a process of concentration in banking. For instance, the two main banks (SCH and BBVA) were present in advertising financed television, in satellite pay TV, in cable services, in other telecommunications services, in transports, in the energy sector, and also in distribution. Therefore, they consider a wide range of interests and introduce a long term view over these activities.

At the end of the 1990s, however, other financial firms increased their investments in the television or audiovisual industry. Investment funds and European banks became more present in the Spanish television industry, following the internationalization of banking and the growing role of the financial market over the banks.

The growth of bank investments in the audiovisual industry and its internationalization are linked with the general process of liberalization of finances, by the agreements inside the GATT. In the Uruguay Round in 1993, the General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS) introducing liberalization policies on services and finances was adopted. Since then, there has been a higher internationalization of financial firms and the role of financial markets has been growing, affecting diverse national economic sectors, as can be seen in television.



The investments of telecommunications operators in the audiovisual industry have been included in the convergence process between telecommunications and audiovisual sectors. But it is interesting to note that this convergence already existed in the public television system, where RTVE integrated the transmission net. In 1988 RTVE was forced to give up its transmission network in order to form a second telecommunications operator (Retevisión) that would compete with Telefónica in the liberalization of telecommunications. That causes a “divergence” of telecommunications and audiovisual within the public sector, just to prepare the privatization and liberalization of both; and after a few years we found a new convergence of both activities already in the private sector.

In this new scenario, telecommunications companies invest in television. At first they invested in television financed by advertising and later in pay-TV services, which are closer to their traditional business based on domestic subscription to a service. In the case of Telefónica, we can see how its investment in Antena 3 TV coincides with the privatization period and with its greater advertising spending. Telefónica went into Antena 3 TV in 1997 and increased its investment until €78.68 million in 1999. In the same period, its adspend grew from less than €18 million in 1994 (before privatization) to €218.5 million in 1999. So the investments in television can be seen as a part of Telefónica’s communications strategy at the beginning of competition in telecommunications. However, from as early as 2000 the telecommunications investment in television was concentrated in different forms of pay-TV, combined with other telecommunications services: Telefónica is one of the shareholders of Digital +<sup>5</sup>, and offers also a pay television service by DSL; until 2005, Auna<sup>6</sup> was shareholder of cable offering television, telephone, and Internet access; and transnational telecommunications operators are also present as cable suppliers. In conclusion, the role of telecommunications operators in the audiovisual market is tied up with the liberalization that affected both activities, where there are political and industrial interests combined.

The last actor in television activities is the state. The state acts as a television provider as well as a regulatory authority. As a television provider, the 1990s has been a decade of decline. The capital investment of the state in TVE has remained the same, €60 million, although in this period TVE has had to finance important material investments (for the coverage of Olympic Games in Barcelona and the World Fair in Seville,

---

<sup>5</sup> Digital + is the pay-TV platform by satellite resulting from the merger of Canal Satélite Digital (Sogecable) and Vía Digital (Telefónica) in 2003.

<sup>6</sup> Auna is a company resulting from the privatization of Retevisión. In 2002 Auna sold the broadcasting network and concentrated in cable and mobile communications.

digitalization of equipment, thematic production for digital platforms), in addition to the new competition scenario, which reduced the TVE advertising market share and increased program prices. In this context, the restrictions to public debt and public deficit settled in Maastricht limited any effort to provide TVE with sufficient public funding. It has to be noted that the debt and deficits of public entities like RTVE were not included in the accounts to evaluate the fulfillment of Maastricht criteria, so the government opted to freeze the public contributions to RTVE and replaced them with debt that would not be counted in the public accounts.

Financed by advertising, TVE has found it very difficult to distinguish the public model from that of private television. Commercial logic forced TVE to reach a high audience share, with a schedule converging with private television. But despite this, TVE has been offering different programming, with more diversified scheduling, more information genres besides news, and a bigger production infrastructure (bigger staff and more facilities).

With the extension of the television industry—first by satellite and cable platforms and then by Digital Terrestrial Television—we find new actors in the industry. In the conventional terrestrial television we found almost no actors from outside the communications industry. The insufficient funding capacity of Spanish communications groups was supplemented by European communications companies and banks, but we find little capital from other economic activities. It changed with the setup of new broadcasting modalities, attracting new actors such as construction companies, distribution companies, or energy suppliers (Table 1).

Additionally, the growth of the audiovisual business during the 1990s allowed the growth of the national production sector, with some big companies that invested in the new television channels. During the 1990s, television companies financed by advertising invested in a weak production sector very dependent on television funding. The success of television fiction series and of some entertainment programs allowed the growth of some companies into a Spanish production industry that presents a high degree of concentration. Only about 10 companies concentrate around 80 percent of the sales to television channels. Some of these growing companies, linked by capital to the conventional television shareholders, invest in the new theme and pay-TV channels, searching for new distribution windows for their stocks. For example, Vocento has many investments in cinema and television production, and subsidiaries like Arbol or Europroducciones share capital and establish alliances with new theme and digital channels. Two of the biggest production companies—Globomedia and Mediapro—merged into a new company, launching a new terrestrial channel, La Sexta, with the Mexican Televisa.

## **2. Business Stages in Commodification Process**

In the process of commodification of television in Spain, we can distinguish the four stages defining the product lifecycle. The economic analysis of the four national television companies shows how the pay-TV market and open-TV market have significant borders, so we find some differences in their evolution:

- 1989–1992/93: introduction. Low level of investment, with a program schedule based on imported fiction (series, made-for-TV movies, cinema) and other low-cost programs like game shows, reality shows, or other programming, and with little information-based programming. Instead, investment went into the transmission network and the extension of the broadcasting schedule. Between 1990 and 1992, Antena 3 TV, Telecinco, and Canal Plus accumulated losses of close to €110 million.

- 1993–1994: the growth of private television and relocation of public television. The private free television channels achieved an audience share of around 20 percent each and increased investments in programs. Antena 3 TV started production of national TV series, although foreign cinema and foreign TV fiction remained as the major content investment. There were also innovations in entertainment programs. Competition between television channels caused increases in supplying costs and a staff reduction at TVE. In a period of high competition in advertising prices, there was not enough commercial income to fund the growth of investments and costs, so the debt of the three channels grew to the maximum level. The bank also increased its investment. The three private channels achieved a combined profit of €6 million in those years.

- 1994–1997: maturity. There was a bigger effort in product conception, concerning imports as well as the increase of in-house production. Private television developed new programs, especially national series, and there was an increase in news time. Despite this, foreign fiction was still the main section in content investment. In 1994 there was an important growth of outside productions, most of them imported, reaching a value over €600 million, in contrast to investment in in-house production and co-production, which in the same year was around €240 million. In-house production growth concentrated on cheap programming (entertainment, shows) and a few prime-time series. Staff in private television increased as it did profit margin and profitability for shareholders. The profit margin for the three private televisions rose to €168 million.

- 1998–2001: relaunching. In 1998–1999 there was a big increase in advertising spending that allowed new investments, parallel with a redefinition of the television market by pay-TV platforms. There was another increase in content investment, now concentrated on in-house produc-

tion, which rose to over €540 million by 2000, while outside production remained around €660 million. The increase in TV-channel supply changed conditions in the market of contents. It also changed the strategies of the free channels, since they took into account all the information and cultural supply to plan their activity. Thanks to the growth of advertising, the profits in 1998 and 1999 provided funds to afford the redefinition of the television market in the following two years. Redefinition includes the launch of new pay-TV channels, the diversification of the activities of shareholders and the announcement of new licenses for private free channels in national, regional, and local markets. During this period, Antena 3 TV, Telecinco, and Canal Plus accumulated a profit of €685 million.

Canal Plus distinguished itself from the other channels by product (more fiction, cultural programs and sports, fewer entertainment shows), price and distribution (encoded pay-TV), and audience target (younger, richer, urban, and male) establishing a different market where Canal Plus had a monopoly. This allowed Canal Plus to extend the growth period (growing in subscribers, income, and profit) until 1996, making neither important changes nor new significant investments. In 1995 the satellite and cable laws permitted the expansion of the pay-TV market, thus ending the monopoly of Canal Plus. So the company invested in the new digital satellite television<sup>7</sup> in order to protect its position. The amount of financial assets of the company increased from €8 million in 1995 to €39 million in 1996, and continued growing over €440 million in 2001 (compared to €18.7 million invested on material assets in the same year). In addition to financial assets, Canal Plus also increased commercial and non-commercial credits to subsidiaries, especially to afford the increase in the price of sports and cinema rights and the losses of Canal Satélite Digital. This evolution shows the relocation of the company in both the market of audiovisual rights and pay-TV broadcasts.


Stages in the development of television market show significant links with general economic and political environment. As was noted before, electoral cycles coincide with business stages and changes in television ownership. Changes in government also introduce variations on media regulation, although the Spanish Socialist Party and Conservative Party governments share an industrial or economic approach to the regulation on the basis of liberalization.

---

<sup>7</sup> In 1995 Canal Plus created some companies to operate cable in cooperation with Telefónica, but when the government changed in 1996, prospects changed as well, and Canal Plus invested in satellite television, launching the platform Canal Satélite Digital.

The evolution of the television market and companies' performance are also related to economics. The growth of adspend is linked with the evolution of the gross domestic product (GDP), as the proportion of total adspend over GDP remains between 1.6–1.8 percent from 1993 on (Figure 2). Until 1990, advertising spending grew at a rate exceeding the GDP index, as a result of the expansion of the communications market after the Franco dictatorship and the growth of non-conventional advertising media. In 1990–1993 economic stagnation was avoided in the advertising market thanks to the growth of below-the-line advertising and television adspend, which led total adspend up to 2.6 percent of GDP. Since then, adspend has evolved in relation to economic growth. Only in 1998 and 1999 did adspend once again grow at a higher rate than the GDP index, mainly thanks to increases in the advertising spending of privatized and liberalized sectors, especially telecommunications, with Telefónica becoming the biggest advertiser.

*Figure 2: Advertising Spending in Spain*



Source: Infoadex and BBVA, 2001 for GDP.

Because the increase in advertising spending was limited, the growth of the television market moved to pay TV. The expansion of pay TV was possible since people's income increased and the percentage of spending

on basic goods was reduced,<sup>8</sup> while spending on culture, shows, leisure, and communications increased from 5 percent in 1991 to 8.13 percent of total spending in 2002.

This evolution, however, is not the same for all social groups, and we can find important social differences that are also present in the television market. In the late 1990s, families earning less than €390 only devoted 3.3 percent of spending to leisure and culture, while families earning more than €3,900 devoted 8.3 percent of spending. These are the families that finance the extension of the pay-TV market and, in general, of other paid communication and cultural products and services. This happens in a decade of increasing economic differences—social Eurostat data (1998) point out that Spain, Greece, Portugal and, close behind them, the United Kingdom, are the countries with the highest inequality index—and it indicates growing social differences, with significant sectors of the population more dependent on information and culture financed by advertising (among them television and a growing free press), and other sectors that can afford the payment of a wide range of information and cultural supply.

### **3. Business Models**

Differences in product, distribution, price, and customers, evolution in income, and financing are related to changes in business models that include differences in production management. From the public model to the market model, we can find a path from public companies to private subsidiaries of the main national and international communications holding companies. Public companies are financed by advertising, and they integrate activities from production to transmission. Private subsidiaries of larger holding companies get their funding from advertising, subscribers, and content sales. They mostly deal with the final production phases (scheduling/programming, commercial distribution) and outsource other tasks (content production, advertising sales, transmission) in various ways.<sup>9</sup> In Spain we can follow this trend from the TVE model to the

---


<sup>8</sup> In 1991, Spanish families devoted 39.5 percent of spending to food, clothes, footwear, and furniture, and 22 percent to housing. In 2002 spending on basic products fell to 29.8 percent, whereas spending on housing rose to 31.4 percent.

<sup>9</sup> Rialp and Salas (2000) distinguish different degrees of control in firm relations, from market-regulated relations to relations based on ownership control, through halfway strategies like guaranteed and long-term contracts or ownership rights between allied firms. This has to do with Coase's definition of firms (1937) as the replacement of market transactions with enterprise planning.

Sogecable-Canal Plus model, going through Antena 3 TV, which is more similar to TVE, and Telecinco, which is more similar to Canal Plus.


TVE is the television company with the most production assets and the largest staff. TVE's resources allow it to diversify content, with more in-house production in news and other information programs, documentaries, entertainment, TV fiction, and cultural or direct/recorded broadcastings. TVE can maintain that infrastructure through debt, since com-

Figure 3: Material Assets of Television Channels




Source: Annual accounts

Figure 4: Financial Assets of Television Channels



Source: Annual accounts

Figure 5: Program Assets of Television Channels



Source: Annual accounts

mercial income is not enough to fund the two public channels. Production assets include offices in every autonomous region; production offices in the Canary Islands; Valencia, and Catalonia; foreign offices and correspondents and broadcasting infrastructure.


TVE is also bigger than the private companies in terms of staff size. Although it decreased by 1,300 employees from 1990 to 2000, the staff was still the largest with more than 6,000 employees in 2000, 64 percent of total jobs in the four television companies. Despite that, TVE also uses external services, especially for transmission and increasingly for production.

Though material assets are the highest in TVE, financial assets are the lowest. TVE has not diversified its activity in other companies. Only in 1997–1998 did TVE invest in the Digital platform Vía Digital and create TVE Temática, to develop theme channels for Vía Digital. TVE led the launch of the digital platform with the other public company Telefónica, competing with Canal Satélite Digital—owned by Sogecable/Canal Plus and Time Warner. But the financial difficulties in the public television company and the high losses in Vía Digital forced TVE to sell its shares in Vía Digital and to integrate TVE Temática.

On the other hand, Sogecable-Canal Plus is the television company with fewer material assets, specialized in channel scheduling, and more and more specialized in rights management as it acts to supply content




Figure 6: Working Ratios of Television Channels 1990–2000



Source: Annual accounts

Figure 7: Staff of National Channels 1990–2000



Source: Annual accounts

not only to Canal Plus but to CSD as well. Sogecable-Canal Plus also includes subscriber management and acts in practice as a financial intermediary between subscribers and producers and rights managers or deliverers. The case of Canal Plus includes all the different ways of developing an activity according to the degree of integration and hierarchical control. Canal Plus-Sogecable is the result of an alliance of different holdings, to expand in Spain a service first developed by the shareholders in France and the United States. Sogecable itself shares the ownership of other production and channel companies with its partners (such as CNN + or Sogepaq), and this hierarchical network of companies assumes different production tasks. The channels included in the group (Premium Canal Plus and CSD) establish long-term and guaranteed contracts with audiovisual deliverers, some of them also integrated in the same holdings, others independent (the main example is that of Audiovisual Sport, subsidiary of Sogecable managing sports rights, which establishes long-term contracts with the different channels of the group and others). Sogecable also establishes ownership rights with some of its content or services suppliers, and grant credits guaranteed by ownership rights. We can also find some market-regulated relations, but usually with smaller companies which have little power to negotiate and which supply few programs.

In that sense, Canal Plus-Sogecable shows a balance sheet in which material assets decreased to only about 2 percent of net assets in 2001, and had less than 1,000 employees the same year. It had less than €30 million invested in material production assets, which only increased between 1996–2000, when the accounts included investment in the decoders rented to subscribers. By contrast, Canal Plus has the highest financial assets (which represented 42 percent of its net assets plus 23 percent on debtors) and at the beginning of 2000, it had also the highest content assets (14 percent of net assets). These financial and nonmaterial assets reflect investments, credits, and exchange with subsidiaries. This is due to the structure of the firm group and the position that Canal Plus takes up within the international and national holdings controlling the ownership. Subscriber income and group structure allows Canal Plus to develop a television supply with more content, which is more diverse and elaborate than advertising-financed television.

Ownership composition brings the Telecinco model closer to Canal Plus, although it is financed by advertising. Telecinco has content stocks available (Mediaset is one of the main audiovisual importers, and has different production companies; Vocento has capital participations in production and rights-management companies too; and also had Kirch until its breakdown). Telecinco shareholders act in other television mar-

kets as well, with different pay and free channels. Telecinco has the smallest staff, with fewer than 700 employees in 2001, and outsources almost all the production and marketing activities.

This outsourcing affects all the television channels in different degrees as it provides more flexibility to adjust to market changes and also allows a reduction of work costs. This is a characteristic of commodification of television, which created new audiovisual jobs, but most of them outside the channels and with very unfair conditions. Between 1990 and 2000 a net 2,362 jobs were created directly in television channels (there were 7,331 employees in TVE in 1990, and 9,693 jobs in TVE, Antena 3 TV, Telecinco, and Canal Plus in 2000). The portion of salaries in the total operating expenditure was reduced from 27 percent in 1990 to 17 percent in 2000, although wages were high. The same year there were 18,000 audiovisual employees in local television and 22,000 in production companies (Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales, 2001). Except for some categories in a few production companies, these jobs were lower paid than those in national channels. So the creation of jobs related to the expansion of audiovisual market shares some characteristics with the general evolution of employment: There is an increase in outsourcing and job insecurity, besides the emergence of some privileged categories in the most irreplaceable positions (including some sportsmen, scriptwriters, actors, and presenters).

Going back to business models, Antena 3 TV is closer to TVE in that it is a private company with more material assets and a higher staff, with fewer links with international audiovisual companies, and with fewer subsidiaries or alliances in the audiovisual industry. Antena 3 TV had more than 1,800 jobs in 2001, and from the start it had the highest material assets among private television channels. Until Telefónica went into the company, neither Antena 3 TV nor its owners had an important network of audiovisual companies to complete the production process. This changed with Telefónica, as it was involved in pay TV and for that reason invested in audiovisual production. Planeta DeAgostini, the new shareholder since 2003, is also investing in production and distribution.<sup>10</sup> But compared with Canal Plus or Telecinco, Antena 3 TV has had a smaller network of affiliates available. This situation changed in 2003, when

---

<sup>10</sup> This company already participated in the television market: It was shareholder of Quiero Digital, the bankrupt pay-TV terrestrial digital platform; it produced theme channels for the other platforms and had created or bought cinema and television production companies.

Telefónica sold the company to Planeta DeAgostini and RTL. Since then, the Antena 3 TV model has moved closer to Sogecable and Telecinco's, as it was integrated into big Spanish and European communications groups, and it has downsized.

The structural differences between Antena 3 TV and Telecinco affect the product and audience result. Telecinco's audience has usually been more urban, younger, and richer than Antena 3 TV's audience. The targeting in Telecinco has been based on a schedule including more U.S. cinema premieres, more selected imports of series, and innovations in entertainment coming from other markets. On the other hand, Antena 3 TV's audience has been more similar to that of the public channel, although with a higher commercial value, and innovations are more dependent on in-house production, as happened with television series and some entertainment.

But both Antena 3 TV and Telecinco share a lot of characteristics, as they are private firms depending on advertising income. The structure for scheduling timetable and the main genres are nearly the same. They both, hand in hand with TVE1, divide the timetable according to extended social habits. The program spending concentrates in prime time, and for the rest of the day they search for the largest audience group at each time. Quantitative needs of advertisers of basic goods have led to this model in a market with few channels.<sup>11</sup> But advertisers have also qualitative interests, and audience data show that private channels select their audiences, searching for the commercial targets. This can be seen in the evolution of national series, from family shows to others addressed to professionals, the urban population, and selected ages (García 2003). Also entertainment programs have evolved from the classic shows (now more prevalent on TVE) to new formats, especially on Telecinco, with more selected audience (i.e., the night talk-shows or programs like *Big Brother* addressed to a younger audience).

The profit aim in private television creates incentive to push costs down, even as the largest possible audience and income is sought. As a result, television companies have to save during the hours when there is less audience. For example, the children's and youth programs in the afternoon and evening have been replaced by celebrity gossip shows on private channels, taking up 8–14 percent of total programming time. The cost-saving strategies also include other self-produced programs such as news. The trend in business model described is in contrast to news pro-

---

<sup>11</sup> Collins, Garnham, and Locksley (1988) already described the performance of television channels in markets with few actors. In that case, the channels opted to share majority audience groups rather than search for minority groups.

duction economy. Information has only short-term value, as it depends on news. TV-information production needs high investments in material assets and personnel to search, find, verify, and interpret the news, and to be able to cover and broadcast unexpected events in various places. But, as we saw, private channels tend to reduce material assets and staff and outsource production. Thus in the case of information they are more dependent on institutional sources, such as news agencies and public and private communications departments, which supply them with cheap manufactured and semi-manufactured information. They use external professionals also—self-employed or small companies—who are more pressed by economic and employment considerations than those included in the staffs of big companies such as Telecinco or Antena 3 TV.

In conclusion, in private television financed by advertising and, to a lesser extent, in the public channel also financed by advertising (TVE1), economic conditions result in less diversity in the programming timetable and less variety and elaboration in content. There is a polarization between some expensive programs (fiction for prime time, some information, sports) and cheaper contents for the less commercial audience.

## **Conclusion**

The liberalization of television channels in Spain began in 1988 with the Private Television Law, simultaneously with the beginning of privatization and liberalization of telecommunication. Although TVE and the public regional channels were already commercial as they were financed both by public funds and advertising, the liberalization of television led to a more intensive process of commodification of television. This process results in an oligopolic market, internationalized, where, more than competition, we find strong corporate planning.

There are several restrictions to a theoretical competition in the new television market. The regulation establishes a restricted number of licenses, limiting competition. The regulation also establishes the market geographical dimension, favoring the national and international market, delaying liberalization of regional and local coverage. The state regulates the new telecommunication technologies, which allow more channels in a telecommunication market dominated by a few companies. The dynamics of economics and financing in the television and audiovisual industry show different restrictions on competence, such as vertical and horizontal concentration, conflicting interests, guaranteed and long-term contracts, intrafirm financing, and lack of transparency.

The main actors in the new television system, planning and developing the activities in the value chain of television, are transnational Euro-

pean and U.S. communication holdings (from the media and advertising industry), Spanish media groups, banks, telecommunication European, U.S. and Spanish operators, and the state. Other actors with a growing presence in the audiovisual market are the energy and building companies and investment funds. These are some of the main actors in the globalization process, and their activity in the television market is a part of their intervention in public affairs.

The evolution in the commodification of television is closely related to economic and political evolution. Advertising and domestic spending on television depends on economic growth and its social distribution. In that sense, there are significant social differences that result in different access to information and communication services.

The commodification of television affected production models and output. There is a process of outsourcing and decentralization of work, but most of it within holding companies, and with very unfair conditions. Integration in big holdings, subscribers funds, and public funds allows more diversified content than advertising funds. But the profit aim in general leads to cost-cutting measures, showing important contradictions with pluralism and diversity in information and cultural supply.

## Reference List

- BBVA. *Informe económico*. Madrid: Servicio de Estudios Sociales (annual).
- Coase, Ronald H. (1937). "The Nature of the Firm." *Economica* 4 (November 1937): 386–405.
- Collins, R., N. Garnham, and G. Locksley (1988). *The Economics of TV: The UK Case*. London: Sage.
- Estudio General de Medios. *Marco general de la audiencia de medios en España*. Annual.
- European Audiovisual Observatory (1994–2001). *Statistical Yearbook: Films, Television, Video and New Media in Europe*. Strasbourg: Observatoire européen de l'audiovisuel.
- Eurostat (1998). *Social Portrait of Europa*. Brussels: European Communities.
- Galbraith, John Kenneth (1993). *The Culture of Contentment*. London: Penguin.
- García de Castro, Mario (2003). "Propiedades de la hegemonía de la ficción televisiva doméstica en España entre 1995–2000." *Zer: Revista de estudios de comunicación* 14: 151–167. Zarautz: UPV.
- INCOM (2005). *Informe de la comunicació a Catalunya 2003–2004*. Bellaterra: UAB, INCOM.
- Infoadex. *Estudio Infoadex de la inversión publicitaria en España*. Madrid: Infoadex.
- Kotz, David M. (1978). *Bank Control of Large Corporations in the United States*. California: University of California Press.
- Ministerio de Trabajo y asuntos sociales (2001). *El mercado de trabajo en la producción para televisión*. Madrid: Instituto Nacional de Empleo.
- Mosco, Vincent (1996). *The Political Economy of Communication*. London: Sage.
- Ortega Almón, M. Angeles (2002). *La empresa pública y el proceso privatizador en España*. Granada: Univesidad de Granada, Instituto de desarrollo regional.
- Rialp-Criado, Josep, and Vicente Salas Fumás (2000). *The Cost of Ownership in Governance of Interfirm Collaboration*. Bellaterra: Documents de la UAB.
- Schiller, Herbert I. (1989). *Culture, Inc.: The Corporate Takeover of Public Expression*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Stiglitz, Joseph E. (2002). *Globalization and Its Discontents*. London: Penguin.
- Strange, Susan (1996). *The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.





# **The Global Journalist: Are Professional Structures Being Flattened?\***

*Wolfgang Donsbach*

## **Introduction**

A fundamental research question in the social sciences is whether human behavior is unique in every new instant or instead follows universal laws, meaning that it repeats itself and can thus be predicted. This is true of both psychology and communications, for both the social behavior of people in situations of emotional stress and journalists who have to choose what is to become news: We want to know which aspects of social facts we observe can be grasped by fundamental laws.

Besides the replication of observations, comparisons are the key for gaining such insights. One could even say that a scientist's empirical work is at its core composed of comparisons. Every test on causality is aimed at finding differences between groups of people and tracing them back causally to the existence or occurrence of the respective characteristics of the observed groups. Of particular importance are international comparisons, because they allow for the universe of cultural, historical, economic, or political characteristics of a country or territory to be understood as independent variables.

As international integration and thereby the mutual influence of media landscapes has increased in the wake of globalization, the question has been raised as to which developments in the media and in journalism are of a global nature and which are culturally specific. Will there soon be a model of a "global journalist" who—wherever he or she is working—is choosing and editing news according to basically the same criteria? Or will factors that have been responsible for regional diversity maintain their influence on journalists' working habits? This paper first provides the reader with an account of the meaning and the origins of international comparative journalism research. Subsequently, the theoretical ques-

---

\*This paper is a revised and amended version of Donsbach (2005). I want to thank Antal Wozniak for his help in editing this paper.

tion of how independent variables can be identified and allocated in theories of news selection is raised. On this basis hypotheses on future developments towards convergence or divergence are discussed.

## 1. Origins of International Comparative Journalism Research

The workings of the McLeod group at the University of Wisconsin can be regarded as the beginning of international comparative journalism research. McLeod and Hawley's (1964) study on the "professional orientation" of American journalists, in which they wanted to provide evidence for the similarity of journalism with classic professions on the basis of role perception and professional motives, was initially not comparatively designed. However, their questionnaire and the so-called McLeod scale, consisting of around 20 statements, were utilized in a number of countries. Thus at the end of the 1980s, comparative findings about the level of professionalization of journalism in international comparison were at hand (for an overview, see Donsbach 1981, Donsbach 1982). In essence, these findings led to the conclusion that the potential of professionalization for journalists in free countries is only small-scale. The unregulated, open path to becoming a journalist (as opposed to a doctor or lawyer) as well as the impossibility of taking responsibility for the consequences of job-related behavior are pitted against this.

Another root of international comparative journalism research is the German-British Journalist Enquiry of 1980-81. This enquiry had a comparative design from the outset and was aimed at generating insights about role perceptions, professional motives, professional ethics, and criteria of news selection in both countries, in which 400 journalists, respectively, were personally interviewed. Subsequent studies were conducted in Latin America, Australia, Taiwan, and elsewhere. Weaver and Wilhoit (see below) have also used some of the questions for the American Journalist Enquiry. In this study a news selection scenario was simulated, a design that was later employed in many other studies. Among other things, the German-British Journalist Enquiry found considerable differences in role perception (which had an effect on news selection) and inquiry behavior. Renate Köcher (1986) applied the terms "watchdog" and "missionary" to illustrate these different professional models.

A third source of comparative research—also initially not comparatively designed—is the study by Johnstone, Slawski, and Bowman (1976), which was later resumed by Weaver and Wilhoit (1986) under the title *The American Journalist* and whose questionnaire was subsequently

used in a number of other countries (Weaver 1998). Besides questions about professional structure, the study also focused on role perception, professional motives, and professional ethics. On the basis of their findings, the authors developed three ideal types of role perception: “information dissemination,” “interpretive–investigative,” and “adversary” (Weaver and Wilhoit 1986).

In the early 1990s Thomas Patterson and this author conducted a written survey among news journalists that was comparatively designed from the outset. In each country—the United States, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and Sweden (plus a subsequent study in Spain)—300 actively employed journalists were surveyed. Besides a number of questions about role perception and the relationship with the political system (the results of the German–British survey were confirmed to a large extent), the study included an exercise in simulating news selection. The findings showed a stronger advocative perception of the profession, less editorial control, and at least in Germany—presumably resulting from this—a more subjective news selection (Patterson and Donsbach 1996; Donsbach 1993; Donsbach and Patterson 2004). The study is currently being repeated.

Another noteworthy comparative study is the participative observation by Frank Esser (1998), who studied the editorial procedures in German and British newsrooms and identified important structural and organizational backgrounds for the previously acquired results on role perception and news selection. Another comparative study about online journalists in the United States and Germany was conducted by Weaver and Löffelholz (see Löffelholz, Weaver, Quandt, Hanitzsch, and Altmeyen 2004).

## **2. Why Comparative Research?**

What is the particular scientific and scientific–theoretical relevance of comparative research? Comparative research offers additional insights compared to studies that are limited to a single country. The latter usually pose the problem of interpretation of the results: As with the glass that is half-full or half-empty, one does not know how to evaluate and judge an empirical distribution. This applies to structural variables (e.g., level of education) as well as for attitudes (e.g., role perception) and behavior (e.g., influence of subjectivity on news decisions). Only through comparative groups are we able to obtain a benchmark that does not necessarily serve as a normative indicator for what is supposed to be the norm, but at least gives a clue for the classification of a result within an overarching context.

However, comparative analyses are relevant not only for the description of differences, but also for the examination of the causes of these dif-

ferences. Experimental designs, in which two or more groups are exposed to different stimuli and in which the group members' subsequent behavior is measured, are the only procedures that allow a logically unambiguous verification of causality. International comparisons are the most common case of comparative studies, because systemic characteristics like a country's history, legal framework, social system, or economic structures are considered causal factors. However, these types of studies are only natural experiments in a methodological sense, in which the comparative groups can usually not be made completely parallel since they originate historically and thus not in accordance with the researcher's specifications.

Therefore, the comparative approach can be considered the central practice of every empirical research. *Comparative journalism research* is almost always centered around the explanation of news decisions by journalists—in other words, the search for causes for specific behavior at the job that leads to certain qualities of media content. Purely descriptive questions—e.g., how much freedom journalists have in their job or how satisfied they are with their job—are interesting for the pursuit of particular interests (e.g., those of occupational or labor unions), but not for fundamental research. The goal of fundamental research in the social sciences, which is geared to explication, is to assess rates of variance, that is, to determine to what extent single independent variables affect the dependent variable, in our case the news decisions of journalists. It goes without saying that normative conclusions and conclusions affecting media policy can be drawn on the basis of such acquired results, whether in the interest of common welfare or individual groups.

### **3. Analysis Problem in the Research on News Selection**

#### ***Multi-Level Analysis***


One of the fundamental methodological problems when trying to find basic laws of human behavior is the fact that the independent variables are located at different levels of social reality. The independent variables that specifically play a role in journalistic news decisions can be found on four levels: the social system, the media organizations, the occupational group, and the individual journalist (see Figure 1).

The *systems level* consists primarily of history, culture, norms, political and economic structures, and the structure of the media system. Journalistic news decisions are specifically affected by the degree of media freedom or the relationship the media has with politics. On the organizational level a number of characteristics of media organizations, such as

their economic foundation, legal form, hierarchies, and autonomies, can be discerned. The bias of the medium, commercial considerations of the organization, and the degree of editorial control, among other things, shape the behavior of journalists.

The third level refers to *journalists as a group*. Like every other occupational group, journalists have common predispositions that can be ascribed to the mode of occupational socialization, the characteristics of the profession, and the social environment. Among others, role perception and professional motives of journalists, occupational socialization, the relationships with specific sources of information, and news factors can be identified as independent variables on this level. Finally, psychological–physiological determinants of the journalist play a role on the individual level, among them subjective beliefs of journalists, the need for social validation of their judgments, and individual professional motives.

*Figure 1: Levels of Analysis in Research on News Selection*



The degree of explained variance increases with every level downwards and is highest on the individual level. Or inversely: The more one expands the population under study and thereby raises the number of included variables, the harder it gets to predict specific behavior, because additional variables have to be included in the context over and over again.


A general problem with our studies consists in our measuring the variables in different analytical units or on different social levels: on the individual, group, organizational, and the systems level. But in our analyses we often jump back and forth between these levels. With the exception of experiments, virtually all variables are always involved on all four levels. For instance, the influence of subjective beliefs belongs to the individual level and is measured at the individual journalist. In contrast, news factors are considered collective values of the group, and the extent of editorial oversight is seen as a characteristic of the media system at large (Esser 1998).

### ***Depth of Theories on News Selection***

The goals of any empirical research and therefore also of journalism research are theories that are as “deep” and “wide” as possible. “Depth” in this context means to uncover the variables underneath the surface of measured behavior or attitudes as clearly as possible. The “width” of a theory refers to identifying the competing influence of variables in a causal relationship, be it within a specific culture (e.g. the strength of influence of news factors vs. subjective beliefs) or in cultural comparison (e.g. the influence of subjective beliefs with American and German journalists). Concerning both goals, communications is still a far cry from describing and explaining the relationships adequately. What is the problem?

With respect to the depth of journalism research, we are able to model the processes of news selection quite well, but we remain weak when it comes to theory-building. We know the factors that are involved, and we are sometimes aware of the input–output relationship of the news process, but we do not know exactly what is going on in the black box (see Figure 2).

*Figure 2: Blackbox in Media Content Research*




Let us take a closer look at news factors as an example. They describe the structure of the content of news. Therefore, Schulz (1976) refers to them as the “construction principles” of media reality. However, they are not a concept explaining the very existence of these principles, i.e. why certain news factors have a specific newsworthiness and why the newsworthi-

ness of news factors changes (Kepplinger and Rouwen 2000). The sharp increase in negative news, as it was ascertained in different countries, especially since the late 1960s, is largely left to interpretation and cannot be explained by the theory of newsworthiness (Westerstahl and Johansson 1986, Patterson 1993, Kepplinger 1998).

The *influence of public relations* on news decisions is another example of the missing depth of the theories. Today we know quite precisely and with regard to different ancillary conditions (e.g., type of originator, crisis or routine situation, local vs. national news coverage) the resonance and determination quotas in the relationship between PR and journalism. Resonance quota means the likelihood of coverage of press releases. Determination quota refers to the extent to which the overall coverage about a player is determined by the player's own PR. The findings for both quotas level off at around 20 to 35 percent. To give an example: Out of all the press releases sent out by the parties represented in the Saxon State Parliament, 30 percent led to some form of news coverage in at least one of the daily newspapers published in the state of Saxony (resonance quota). These news items accounted for one-fourth of the newspapers' overall coverage about the parties (determination quota, see Donsbach and Wenzel 2002). But what is the reason for this transfer, and what determines the timing and the extent to which journalists rely on different sources? Is it pressure of time, scant resources, manipulation of journalists by PR, or even a degree of corruption among journalists?

Another example is *economic influences* on media content. These influences were obviously at play in the "Berlin newspaper war"—the dispute about the planned acquisition of the Berliner Verlag by the Holtzbrinck publishing house. As a comparative content analysis of newspapers published by the two publishing houses, Holtzbrinck and Springer, showed, newspapers belonging to the Holtzbrinck group depicted the planned acquisition rather positively, while the newspapers by Springer presented the topic in a much more negative way (Müller and Donsbach 2006; see Figure 3). In terms of content analysis, clear correlations can be revealed. It remains unsettled, however, to which influencing factors these clear patterns in news coverage can be attributed. It is known from other studies, for example, that the professional freedom of German journalists is greater than in comparable countries, meaning that German journalists are only rarely pressured towards certain news decisions by their superiors.

Figure 3: *Tone of Coverage of Statements by Journalists about the “Berlin Newspaper War”*



Basis: 130 statements by journalists

Source: Müller and Donsbach 2006

Only a few approaches try to look beneath the surface and to detect more fundamental reasons for patterns of news selection. One of these approaches is Pamela Shoemaker's attempt to ascribe newsworthiness to two underlying causes: *biological and social evolution*. The first leads to a fundamental interest in any kind of information that suggests deflection from normality and thus indicates danger (e.g., negative news). The second leads to an interest in being informed about the social relevance of persons, institutions, or issues. This concept—which, because of its deterministic view on behavior in the communication process, is advanced by Shoemaker (1996) under the label of “hardwired for news”—may be somewhat crude and hard to quantify. Yet it tries to incorporate fundamental laws of human behavior in the explanation of the communication process.

Some of the approaches that concern the *influence of subjective beliefs on news selection* attempt the same by using psychological concepts. Particularly noteworthy in this respect is the theory of instrumental actualization (Kepplinger 1989), which conceives news selection as a final




process, in which the desired results of publication among the audience determine the value of news. Similarly operating with determinants of behavior is the concept by this author, in which news decisions are thought of as the result of the need to maintain one's own predispositions (cognitive–psychological) on the one hand and as the result of the need for a socially supported perception of reality or “shared reality” (social–psychological) on the other (Donsbach 2004).

### ***Width of Theories on News Selection***

The “width” of *explicatory theories* refers to the competing influences of a variety of variables within a specific culture or in comparing cultures. However, for the most part the usual *ceteris paribus* designs only facilitate testing single or a few variables but not their comparative magnitude of impact. Furthermore, these studies focus mostly on only one country, which makes it impossible to reach general conclusions about the behavioral patterns of journalists with respect to news decisions.

Therefore it is necessary to define the scope of a theory more accurately, that is to answer the question whether we are dealing with univer-

*Figure 4: Cascade Model of Factors Influencing News Decisions*



sal laws or with more specific ones that are only applicable to certain populations. For instance, the question arises how consonant the value of news factors really is between journalists and other groups, between journalists in different media, and finally between journalists from different countries. The researcher therefore has to resort to the next higher-ranking level of comparison in order to discover proportions of variance and render theories more precisely. In such a cascade model laws become ever more universal and thus more meaningful the more comparisons are incorporated. Otherwise, analysis on higher levels always allows for lower-ranking levels to be analyzed too (see Figure 4).

#### **4. Comparative Theories and Insights**

Few studies so far have comparatively analyzed the magnitude of impact of variables on a systems level. For the most part, such studies end on the third level of the cascade model; that is, they stop short at the comparison of different media organizations. Furthermore, they are mostly *ceteris paribus* studies that draw on only one variable as the independent variable for news selection. There is also hardly any study that comparatively analyzes the variables from the different levels shown in Figure 1. But there are some exceptions.

Kepplinger—again within the framework of his theory of instrumental actualization—succeeded in quantifying the comparative influence of news factors and subjective beliefs (one-third of the variance is explained by these factors). As for the influence of public relations, we know that the formal professionalization of press releases has a stronger effect than most of the other variables.

However, international comparisons are few in number. Hallin and Mancini (2004, 2) note: “Most of the literature on the media is highly ethnocentric, in the sense that it refers only to the experience of a single country, yet is written in general terms, as though the model that prevailed in that country were universal.” Whenever international comparative research takes place, it is usually descriptive and only rarely explicative. Such research provides the raw material for a “mapping” of countries according to a variety of variables, as Hallin and Mancini did (e.g., p. 70). But virtually no approaches are interested in explication, like the explanation of how much variance can be attributed to subjective, professional, organizational, and cultural (systemic) factors.

I can identify only two exceptions. With her multi-country study Shoemaker (2002) attempted to measure the influence of “deviance” and “significance” in an international comparison. Likewise, Thomas Patterson

and this author have analyzed the impact of subjective beliefs of journalists on news selection in an international comparison for the first time. According to this study journalists from four of the five countries compared made around one-third of their decisions in correspondence with their predispositions, while in Germany the figure was 50 percent (Patterson and Donsbach 1996). To some extent one can assign to this category international comparative content analyses that collect data about the newsworthiness of events at the same time in different countries, although these studies usually go without confirmations of causality. This is also true for historical comparative analyses like the ones by Westerstahl and Johansson (1986) and Wilke (1984), in which the historical circumstances can be interpreted as comparative variables.


One fundamental methodological problem persists in international comparative studies: we *always* have to deal with a variety of analytical units and social levels (see Figure 1). Therefore it is always hard to assess which findings represent universal patterns of behavior (i.e., psychological–physiological constants), which represent the effects of socialization and social relationships, and which represent the impact of systemic variables. The aforementioned differences in the extent to which subjective beliefs of journalists affect news decisions are one example for this problem: They can be results—individually or in combination with others—of distinct cognitive behavioral patterns of journalists (less likely), of differing professional socialization, or of characteristics of the media's structure. In any case, communications has yet to find a satisfying answer to this theoretical problem of comparative research, if one ignores mere interpretations of detected distributions (see also Esser and Pfetsch 2004).

Despite these theoretical problems, comparative research is extremely beneficial and normally exceeds the explanatory power of studies that focus on single countries. It makes us aware of variation and similarity, it is conducive to building and refining concepts, and it allows to test hypotheses about interdependencies between social phenomena.

## 5. Convergence or Divergence of Journalism?

Comparative research so far allows some predictions about the way factors affect variety or consonance in statistical consideration and divergence or convergence in dynamic consideration. I want to demonstrate this issue by following the model of influencing factors on news decisions, which I have used in previous publications to identify the involved variables (e.g., Donsbach 2002, 109; see Figure 5).

Figure 5: Variable Model of Influencing Factors on News Decisions




My hypothesis for *news factors* is that they lead to homogeneity within and among news systems. Empirical results supporting this notion are usually studies in single countries that nevertheless employed similar methods. According to these, news factors reflect rather universal patterns of human attention on the one hand (see Shoemaker 1996) and global trends on the other. Among the latter are changes in role models of journalists (see, for instance, “ideology of critical journalism,” Westerståhl and Johanssen 1986) and an increasing commercialization of news media because of increasing competition at the national and international level. This leads us to expect further adjustment of media content, both nationally and internationally.

Furthermore, the *influence of commercial interests* on media content promotes homogeneity within and among news systems. The reason for this is the increasing competition of media corporations and the changing attention spans of the audience. For instance, television news in Germany, both by public and commercial broadcasters, shows a trend towards more emotionalization of its content (Donsbach and Büttner 2005; see Figure 6).<sup>1</sup> In the future we can expect a further adjustment in this area too.

<sup>1</sup> In the codebook of the content analysis, “emotionalization” was indicated by the depiction of sadness, joy, fear, or anger in the verbal or visual presentation. The variable was coded on a five-point scale ranging from -2 to +2. The codebook gave examples for emotional and unemotional presentations.


Figure 6: Increasing Emotionalization of Television News



Source: Donsbach and Büttner 2005, 30

The *subjective goals and predispositions of journalists* themselves obviously lead to variety within and among news systems. Empirical evidence for this can be found in (a few) single-country studies and one comparative study. Within media systems variety is the consequence of the different individual preferences of the journalists. Among media systems different role models and professional norms have an additional effect. For instance, in Germany a stronger advocative understanding of the occupation as well as lesser editorial control permit more subjectivity. This clearly shows in the number of news decisions made in accordance with the journalists' own predispositions (see Figure 7). For the future we can arguably expect on both levels—nationally and internationally—more homogeneity and stronger convergence, again because of increasing commercialization, declining party-political determination, and an ever-increasing editorial control.


Figure 7: Influence of Predispositions on News Decisions in International Comparison



Project: *Media & Democracy* (Patterson and Donsbach)

The need for *social validation of one's own perceptive judgments* leads to homogeneity in news decisions within media systems on principle. The starting point is the assumption that journalists are facing a dilemma: they have to make decisions about the validity, the newsworthiness, and the normative value of issues, actors, and events. And they have to make these decisions under pressure of time and competition, with the awareness of their public visibility and, above all, without any objective rules for deciding. Situations in which participants have to make a decision but in which objective criteria are missing are labeled "undefined situations" by social psychologists. In undefined situations the respective group to which the actors belong becomes especially important, because only through this group can quasi-objective decision-making be accomplished (see Figure 8).

Figure 8: Model of Perceptive Judgment



It is impossible to hypothesize about the effect of these social–psychological factors on differences between media systems, because such processes are nationally and culturally affected, by distinct agendas and frames. This heterogeneity will persist. There are a number of empirical confirmations for consonance among one country’s media. For example, Halloran, Elliot, and Murdock (1970) found so-called “frames of references” that formed among journalists during the pre-coverage of an event and that subsequently affected the coverage and the actual course of events (see also Noelle-Neumann and Mathes 1987). The impact of so-called “key events” on subsequent coverage about events of the same type (Kepplinger and Habermeier 1995) and the sequences in processes of scandalizing (Kepplinger 2001) can also be explained by these social–psychological processes. Finally, we can conceive frames and so-called “scripts” as factors that affect media content towards homogeneity (Kerbel and Ross 1999).

Finally, I want to examine one of the intervening variables in Figure 5 (see above) in terms of its influence on consonance or convergence of media content. Thinking of role perception as a factor, we can assume that it leads to homogeneity within and heterogeneity between media systems. Through comparative surveys and national content analyses, we know that the role perception within a profession of a country is similar, but that it can diverge strongly between countries. For the future we can

expect—due to the aforementioned reasons (primarily commercialization)—a convergence of role perceptions towards a less advocative type of journalism.

## **Conclusion**

There are a number of indications that something like a “global journalist” is emerging. Multiple factors that we know—drawing on insights from empirical research—have or can have a general influence on news decisions evolving into the same direction, because they are subject to the same or similar mechanisms, primarily the increasing commercial orientation of the media. That does not mean, however, that there will not be any variety in news coverage on the micro-level in international comparison, since the respective variables on the group and individual level can take very different shape.

The conclusion for international comparative research is that—however important it is for the reasons mentioned above—it does not have the ability to stringently unravel causal relationships. If, for instance, ascertained differences in the role perception of journalists are to be explained, the analytical unit of “nation” or “culture” as an explanatory variable is much too diffuse and complex to truly serve as an independent variable in empirical-analytical terms. Whether the observed differences can be attributed to, say, the Thirty Years’ War in Germany or Prohibition in the United States can be endlessly speculated about but cannot be verified.



## Reference List

- Donsbach, W. (1981). "Legitimacy through Competence Rather than Value Judgments: The Concept of Professionalization Re-considered." *Gazette* 27: 47–67.
- Donsbach, W. (1982). *Legitimationsprobleme des Journalismus. Gesellschaftliche Rolle der Massenmedien und berufliche Einstellungen von Journalisten*. Freiburg: Alber.
- Donsbach, W. (1993). "Journalismus versus journalism—ein Vergleich zum Verhältnis von Medien und Politik in Deutschland und in den USA." In W. Donsbach, O. Jarren, H. M. Kepplinger, and B. Pfetsch (eds.), *Beziehungsspiele—Medien und Politik in der öffentlichen Diskussion. Fallstudien und Analysen*, 283–315. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung.
- Donsbach, W. (2002). "Journalist." In E. Noelle-Neumann, W. Schulz, and J. Wilke. *Publizistik Massenkommunikation*, 78–125. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer.
- Donsbach, W. (2004). "Psychology of News Decisions: Factors behind Journalists' Professional Behavior," *Journalism* 5: 131–157.
- Donsbach, W. (2005). "International vergleichende Kommunikatorforschung." In J. Wilke (ed.), *Die Aktualität der Anfänge. 40 Jahre Publizistikwissenschaft an der Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz*, 158–175. Cologne: Herbert von Halem Verlag.
- Donsbach, W., and K. Büttner (2005). "Boulevardisierungstrends in deutschen Fernsehnachrichten. Darstellungsmerkmale der Politikberichterstattung vor den Bundestagswahlen 1983, 1990 und 1998." *Publizistik* 50: 21–38.
- Donsbach, W., and A. Wenzel (2002). "Aktivität und Passivität von Journalisten gegenüber parlamentarischer Pressearbeit." *Publizistik* 47: 373–387.
- Donsbach, W., and T. E. Patterson (2004). "Political News Journalists: Partisanship, Professionalism, and Political Roles in Five Countries." In F. Esser and B. Pfetsch (eds.), *Comparing Political Communication: Theories, Cases, and Challenges*, 251–270. Cambridge University Press.
- Esser, F. (1998): *Die Kräfte hinter den Schlagzeilen. Englischer und deutscher Journalismus im Vergleich*. Freiburg: Alber.
- Esser, F., and B. Pfetsch (eds.) (2004). *Comparing Political Communication: Theories, Cases, and Challenges*. Cambridge University Press.
- Hallin, D.C., and P. Mancini (2004). *Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics*. Cambridge University Press.
- Halloran, J.D., P. Elliot, and G. Murdock (1970). *Demonstrations and Communication: A Case Study*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Johnstone, J.W.C., E.J. Slawski, and W.W. Bowman (eds.) (1976). *The Newspeople. A Portrait of American Journalists and Their Work*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Kepplinger, H.M. (1989). "Instrumentelle Aktualisierung. Grundlagen einer Theorie publizistischer Konflikte." In Kaase, M., and W. Schulz (eds.), *Massenkommunikation. Theorien, Methoden, Befunde*, 199–220. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Kepplinger, H.M. (1998). *Die Demontage der Politik in der Informationsgesellschaft*. Freiburg: Alber.
- Kepplinger, H.M. (2001). *Die Kunst der Skandalierung und die Illusion der Wahrheit*. Munich: Olzog.

- Kepplinger, H.M., and J. Habermeier (1995). "The Impact of Key Events on the Presentation of Reality." *European Journal of Communication* 10: 371–390.
- Kepplinger, H.M., and B. Rouwen (2000). "Der prognostische Gehalt der Nachrichtenswert-Theorie." *Publizistik* 45: 462–475.
- Kerbel, M.R., and M.H. Ross (1999). "A Longitudinal Analysis of Television News Frames in US Elections: Some Preliminary Observations." Unpublished paper.
- Köcher, R. (1986). "Bloodhounds or Missionaries: Role Definitions of German and British Journalists." *European Journal of Communication* 1: 43–64.
- Löffelholz, M., D.H. Weaver, T. Quandt, T. Hanitzsch, and K-D. Altmeppen (eds.) (2004). *American and German Online Journalists at the Beginning of the 21st Century: A Bi-National Survey*. Schriftenreihe des Instituts für Medien- und Kommunikationswissenschaft der TU Ilmenau, Band 11. Ilmenau.
- McLeod, J.M., and S.E. Hawley (1964). "Professionalization among Newsmen." *Journalism Quarterly* 41: 529–539.
- Müller, D., and W. Donsbach (2006). "Unabhängigkeit von wirtschaftlichen Interessen als Qualitätsindikator im Journalismus. Wie Medien beteiligter Verlage über den Konflikt auf dem Berliner Zeitungsmarkt berichteten." In S. Weischenberg, W. Loosen, and M. Beuthner (eds.), *Medien-Qualitäten. Öffentliche Kommunikation zwischen ökonomischen Kalkül und Sozialverantwortung*, 129–147. Schriftenreihe der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Publizistik- und Kommunikationswissenschaft, Band 33. Konstanz: UVK Medien.
- Noelle-Neumann, E., and R. Mathes (1987). "The 'Event as Event' and the 'Event as News': The Significance of 'Consonance' for Media Effects Research." *European Journal of Communication* 2: 391–414.
- Patterson, T.E. (1993). *Out of Order*. New York: Vintage.
- Patterson, T.E., and W. Donsbach (1996). "News Decisions: Journalists as Partisan Actors." *Political Communication* 13: 455–468.
- Schulz, W. (1976). *Die Konstruktion von Realität in den Nachrichtenmedien. Analyse der aktuellen Berichterstattung*. Freiburg: Alber.
- Shoemaker, P.J. (1996). "Hardwired for News: Using Biological and Cultural Evolution to Explain the Surveillance Function." *Journal of Communication* 46 (3): 32–47.
- Shoemaker, P.J. (April 2002). *The Theory behind "What's News?"* Paper presented at "What's News?"—The Syracuse University Symposium on the Nature of News. Syracuse University, New York.
- Weaver, D.H. (ed.) (1998). *The Global Journalist: News People around the World*. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press.
- Weaver, D.H., and G.C. Wilhoit (1986). *The American Journalist: A Portrait of U.S. News People and Their Work*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Westerståhl, J., and F. Johanssen (1986). "News Ideologies as Moulders of Domestic News." *European Journal of Communication* 2: 133–149.
- Wilke, J. (1984). *Nachrichtenauswahl und Medienrealität in vier Jahrhunderten*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

# **Czech Journalists after the Collapse of the Old Media System: Looking for a New Professional Self-Image**

*Jaromír Volek*

## **Introduction**

Over the past two decades, economic and technological rationalization in journalistic performance has accelerated. The rapid rise of new information and communications technologies, along with growing economic and cultural globalization, significantly amplified the commercialization process of the whole media sector. As a result, the professional self-image of journalists has changed. A post-modern journalist tries to combine his/her traditional role of reporter and interpreter with the requirements and opportunities provided by new technologies, and the pressures generated by the necessity of economic success. A journalist's performance seems to reflect less and less the nature of testimony while representing more and more a mere administrative role in an alienated system of global communication.

In the early 1990s these trends heavily influenced the professional socialization of Czech journalists and have led to considerable instability in their professional role. In addition to new forms of technological and economic pressures, another important role has been played by the legacy of communist journalism, which has influenced some of the professional standards and routines of contemporary Czech journalists. Upon this background the professional self-image of Czech journalists has been established. This paper aims to provide basic information in the search for a professional self-definition through a current analysis of Czech journalists' professional self-image.

## **1. Journalism as an Art, Craft, or Profession?**

The term "profession" itself causes problems. Not only are there various criteria applied (e.g. Willenski 1964, Friedson 1994), but some critics legitimately point out that it cannot be used as a neutral analytical category, since it effectively contains in itself an appraising or affirmative designation of the given activity.

The debate over whether journalistic activity may be considered a professional activity with stable and settled rules shared by the overwhelming majority of journalists has been going on intensively for at least the past century, with the criterion of *professionalism* gaining status as an institutional instrument of social prestige. What is essential is not the effort to enhance the quality of work performance itself, but rather to increase the prestige of the given professional community. This prestige also leads to job stability, the option to plan further career development, and, last but not least, economic benefits. Thus, in the case of journalists, their professional status arguably allows them to increase the value of certain information sources they have and which have, de facto, a commodity character. As a result, their expert status is strengthened, and simultaneously, their labor market value increased. At the same time, however, it has been demonstrated that professionalization leads to monopolizing the practice of this profession, which has, as a result, a character of professional “defense mechanism” that legitimizes the profession’s existence through unquestioning dependence on a certain type of expert knowledge. Therefore *professional ideology* develops gradually, leading to a more or less unreflected “administrative” fulfillment of professional standards.

In general, the term “profession” arguably assumes mastering certain expertise on the basis of specialized preparation and training, providing a higher level of professional autonomy and social prestige but being, at the same time, a way to limit access to the practice of the given profession. “Professionalization” is thus a process in which specific work activities obtain a professional status. A journalist’s professional model consists of its “technical” dimension based on systematic knowledge acquired through long-term preparation, whereas it is also derived from the extent to which professionals adapt to the set of norms and rules of the given profession. They determine not only the content of the term labeled as “technical competence” but also the content of the “provided service ideal.” This model’s particularity is thus given by the implied ambiguity manifesting itself in typical professional discrepancies: between professional freedom and dependence, between the ideological character of published contents and the effort to reflect on them critically, between following private (particular) interests and public service, or between mechanical practice of their profession and creative freedom.

The classic text published by Penn Kimball (1965) illustrated this tension: the author poses the question of whether journalism is “an art, craft or profession.” To some extent, Kimball anticipated the professional journalistic typology developed by John Merrill (1977), which distinguishes between “*scientific*” and “*artistic*” journalism, thus separating basic journalistic functions, i.e. neutral and analytical (interpretative).

The discrepancies or ambiguities mentioned above have resulted in a situation where many scholars and journalists believe that a journalist's job may be considered a semi-profession only, with a typical feature being a very liberal attitude towards professional standards (Weaver and Wilhoit 1996; Hoyer-Epp 1994). In both cases it may be argued that journalism does not meet most professionalization assumptions, or meets them only conditionally. But as Hallin and Mancini (2004) put it, the degree of journalistic professionalization varies across media systems, making it useful to compare media systems in terms of the degree and form of professionalization of journalism.

## 2. Research Questions and Sampling

In our research we tried to answer the following questions:

- 1) *To what extent do Czech journalists fulfill the basic criteria of professionalization?*
- 2) *To what extent can we speak about the deprofessionalization and proletarianization of the Czech journalistic profession?*
- 3) *What is the basic professional self-image of Czech journalists?*

To answer these questions, we used data from our project entitled "Czech Journalist" (2003–2005), which contained the following: (a) a quantitative representative survey of journalists, (b) a representative opinion poll of the adult population concerning the journalistic profession, and (c) in-depth interviews with selected journalists.

To define the probability sample, we proceeded in three basic steps. First, a database of domestic print and audiovisual media that operate on a nationwide and regional basis was used. The basic criterion of choice was a marked share of the specific media on actual *journalistic* production for a wide audience. In the category of "journalist," technical or service professions (i.e. proofreaders, cameramen, photographers, etc.) were not used. The basic sample included 109 units (editorial offices) characterized by the predominance of news/public affairs outcome.

The second step involved asking selected editor's offices to fill out a screening questionnaire that included information about the basic socio-demographic characteristics of journalists in the office.<sup>1</sup> We thereby obtained the basic sample, amounting to 2,585 journalists (see Tables 1 and 2).

---

<sup>1</sup> The following characteristics of those members of the editor's office who participate directly in producing media content (writing and editing employees in full and part-time jobs) were traced: a) the number of members in the office, b) sex, c) education, d) age, e) working position, and f) number of freelance contributors.

*Table 1: Czech Journalists: Structure of the Socio-Demographic Characteristics—Primary Sample*

| <b>Sex</b>   | <b>%</b>   | <b>N</b>     | <b>Age</b> | <b>%</b>   | <b>N</b>     | <b>Education</b>           | <b>%</b>   | <b>N</b>     |
|--------------|------------|--------------|------------|------------|--------------|----------------------------|------------|--------------|
| Male         | 60         | 1,510        | 18–29      | 34.8       | 900          | University graduate        | 47.9       | 1,238        |
| Female       | 40         | 1,075        | 30–39      | 30.9       | 799          | University without degree? | 3.8        | 135          |
|              |            |              | 40–49      | 18.8       | 486          | Studying at university     | 5.2        | 99           |
|              |            |              | 50–59      | 13.0       | 336          | High School                | 40.9       | 1,057        |
|              |            |              | 60 +       | 2.5        | 64           | Elementary                 | 2.2        | 56           |
| <b>Total</b> | <b>100</b> | <b>2,585</b> |            | <b>100</b> | <b>2,585</b> |                            | <b>100</b> | <b>2,585</b> |

*Table 2: Czech Journalists: Chosen Technical and Organizational Criteria—Primary Sample*

| <b>Job position</b> | <b>%</b>   | <b>N</b>    | <b>Type of media</b> | <b>%</b>   | <b>N</b>     | <b>Media range</b> | <b>%</b>   | <b>N</b>     |
|---------------------|------------|-------------|----------------------|------------|--------------|--------------------|------------|--------------|
| Superior position   | 19         | 491         | Print                | 63         | 1,603        | Nationwide         | 71         | 1,835        |
| Employee            | 81         | 2,094       | Audio–visual         | 37         | 982          | Regional and local | 29         | 750          |
| <b>Total</b>        | <b>100</b> | <b>2585</b> |                      | <b>100</b> | <b>2,585</b> |                    | <b>100</b> | <b>2,585</b> |

In the third step we constructed a probability sample using the method of statistical projection, which represented the basic sample as a whole (see Tables 3 and 4). A total of 406 journalists were questioned.

### **3. Theoretical Frame of a Journalist's Professional Self-Image**

Sociological research engaging in the typology of a professional role or the professional self-image of journalists has been published in many quantitative and qualitative studies.<sup>2</sup> Among the most important research

<sup>2</sup> There are many more variations and specifications on the aforementioned types. Dunn (1969) identified four types of reporters: The “traditionalist,” “interpreter,”

*Table 3: Czech Journalists: Structure of the Socio-Demographic Characteristics—Probability Sample*

| <b>Sex</b>   | <b>%</b>   | <b>N</b>   | <b>Age</b> | <b>%</b>   | <b>N</b>   | <b>Education</b>    | <b>%</b>   | <b>N</b>   |
|--------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|---------------------|------------|------------|
| Male         | 60         | 243        | 18–29      | 37         | 149        | University graduate | 48         | 192        |
| Female       | 40         | 163        | 30–39      | 30         | 122        | High School         | 50         | 206        |
|              |            |            | 40–49      | 20         | 81         | Elementary          | 2          | 8          |
|              |            |            | 50–59      | 11         | 46         |                     |            |            |
|              |            |            | 60 +       | 2          | 8          |                     |            |            |
| <b>Total</b> | <b>100</b> | <b>406</b> |            | <b>100</b> | <b>406</b> |                     | <b>100</b> | <b>406</b> |

*Table 4: Czech Journalists: Chosen Technical and Organizational Criteria—Probability Sample*

| <b>Job position</b> | <b>%</b>   | <b>N</b>   | <b>Type of media</b> | <b>%</b>   | <b>N</b>   | <b>Media range</b> | <b>%</b>   | <b>N</b>   |
|---------------------|------------|------------|----------------------|------------|------------|--------------------|------------|------------|
| Superior position   | 19         | 79         | Print                | 63         | 257        | Nationwide         | 71         | 287        |
| Employee            | 81         | 327        | Audio–visual         | 37         | 149        | Regional and local | 29         | 119        |
| <b>Total</b>        | <b>100</b> | <b>406</b> |                      | <b>100</b> | <b>406</b> |                    | <b>100</b> | <b>406</b> |

is that of Johnston, Slawski, and Bowman (1976), which suggests two main professional types: “neutrals” and “participants.” Eleven years later, Weaver and Wilhoit identify three types they call “disseminator,”

---

“representative of the public” (similar to Weaver and Wilhoit’s “advocate”) and “participant in policy making.” Argyris (1974) differentiates between the “reporter/activist,” who does not feel a duty to say more than his own opinion, the “reporter/researcher,” intent on an interpreter’s role, and the “reporter/traditionalist,” who stresses the professional side of journalism. Likewise, Culbertson (1983) differentiates between “traditionalists,” “interpreters,” and “activists.” Janet Bridges (1991) has divided American editors-in-chief into three types and three sub-types. Along with the traditional variations mentioned above, she identified “reader-oriented businessperson,” whose professional orientation reflects, above all, the pressure of commerce under which journalists/editors increasingly have to work. Other works about the typology of a journalist’s role worthy of mention include McLeod and Hawley (1964), Ismach and Denis (1978), and Cherry (1985).

“interpreter,” and “adversarial.” The first type correlates with “neutral” but emphasizes the rapid spread of information to the widest possible public. The second one is close to Johnston’s “participant” but emphasizes the interpretational role of the journalist. The last one represents the professional self-image of a journalist who prefers a critical view of government representatives and big business. Both surveys agree that the “pure” types are very rarely represented. We define the concept of the professional self-image of *current* Czech journalists as a complicated network of subjective and inter-subjective attitudes motivated by education, life experience, surroundings, historical consciousness, and life projections and perspectives. On a general level, the concept of professional self-image has an (a) *objective* and (b) *attitude-related* character. In other words, this includes certain objective historical conditions that have shaped the birth of the journalistic profession, but also one’s own attitude to the profession or to what a professional considers to be the core of his job.

Therefore, in the search for a new professional self-image, the following social variables and their acceptance to Czech journalists have played a key role:

- 1) the influence of massive commodification and commercialization of the media (including journalism);
- 2) the fast rise of new information and communication technologies that have changed professional journalistic routines;
- 3) the awareness of responsibility to cultural identity within the context of growing economic and cultural globalization;
- 4) the influence of new professional models coming from traditional liberal democratic societies in the 1990s;
- 5) and finally, the consciousness of social responsibility towards the weak and oppressed.

All of these variables have served as a background upon which the professional self-image of Czech journalists has been re-established.

#### **4. Professionalization of Czech Journalists after the Collapse of the Media System: Key Demographic Parameters and Political Attitudes**

Few occupations in the Czech Republic have changed their professional standards over the last 70 years as frequently as the occupation of journalist. Journalists’ work has been regularly exposed to power and ideological “purification.” Inevitably, the eras beginning in 1939, 1945, 1948,




and 1968 always brought “new,” ideologically motivated redefinitions of the journalist’s professional role. The social role of Czech journalists has faced many changes and turns in the distribution of political power. Their story is one of incessant attempts to win professional emancipation, always ending up, inevitably, back at the beginning.

Its latest transformation took place after the collapse of the old regime in 1989, when a dramatic institutional and professional change took place, starting with a serious disruption of the state monopoly over the media system. New media ownership structures were established, changing the composition of the journalistic community: Many journalists left the profession, while others adapted to new circumstances. Furthermore, many experienced journalists returned to their profession after a 20-year involuntary break, and a new generation of novice journalists appeared. This transformation created four atypical features in the Czech journalistic community.

First, Czech journalists are younger on average than their colleagues in developed Western European countries and in the United States (see Weaver and Wilhoit 1996, Weaver 1998). Czech news media are managed by very young journalists. This implies that the Czech journalistic workforce has been weakly represented in the middle professional generation (see Figure 1).

*Figure 1: Age Distribution of Czech Journalistic Workforce (N=2585)*




Second, Czech journalists are less formally educated in comparison to members of the developed journalistic communities mentioned above. Only 19 percent of Czech journalists majored in journalism (see Table 5).

*Table 5: Formal Education of Czech Journalists (N=2585)*

| <b>Education</b>                  | <b>%</b>         |
|-----------------------------------|------------------|
| University graduate               | 48               |
| High school                       | 50               |
| Elementary                        | 2                |
| University graduate in journalism | <b>100</b><br>19 |

Thirdly, the majority of journalists are not organized in any professional union(s), which is an indicator of dominant professional liberal ideology. This can be seen as a consequence of the milieu in Czech society after the collapse of the old regime, which attempted to organize every aspect of everyday life. Only 10 percent of journalists are members of a professional union or trade unions (see Figure 2).

*Figure 2: Membership of Czech Journalists in Professional Unions (N=406)*

Last but not least is a fourth atypical feature—the majority of Czech journalists identify with right-wing political ideology (see Table 6). On a 10-point scale, 56 percent of journalists viewed themselves as right-wing, whereas just 17 percent declared themselves left-wing. However, the majority of Western European journalists are left-wing. Negative memories of the old regime and socialist ideology persist.

Table 6: Political Orientation of Czech Journalists

| left wing |    |    |    |     | right wing |     |     |     |    |
|-----------|----|----|----|-----|------------|-----|-----|-----|----|
| 1         | 2  | 3  | 4  | 5   | 6          | 7   | 8   | 9   | 10 |
| 1%        | 2% | 5% | 8% | 17% | 12%        | 20% | 22% | 12% | 0% |

All of these parameters show a low level of professionalization in the Czech journalistic community and indicate how affected it was by the process of deprofessionalization in the 1990s, during the transformation of the entire media system. We will return to this issue in the conclusion.

## 5. Professional Self-Image of Czech Journalists

To analyze the self-image of Czech journalists, we asked them to evaluate the importance of chosen aspects of their work motivation. We used a battery of questions by Johnston, Bowman, and Slawski (1976), which were modified by Weaver and Wilhoit (1996). We asked surveyed journalists to evaluate the importance of particular aspects of their profession (Table 7) chosen according to main characteristics of the types of journalistic self-image mentioned above: (a) “neutral” (journalist as mirror), (b) “activist” (journalist as interpreter of an image reflected in the media mirror), and (c) concept of the journalist’s role, which emphasizes an instrumental or “pragmatic” approach to the profession (as a consequence of the commodification of the media and of the commercialization of its content).

*Table 7: How Important to You Are the Following Aspects of Your Work as a Journalist? (N=406)*

| <b>Attributes of journalist's work</b>                 | <b>Very important</b> | <b>Rather important</b> | <b>Rather unimportant</b> | <b>Very unimportant</b> |
|--------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------|
| 1. Chance to communicate information to others         | 83%                   | 16%                     | 1%                        | 0%                      |
| 2. Chance to reveal and publicize problems             | 67%                   | 27%                     | 5%                        | 1%                      |
| 3. Chance to help people                               | 54%                   | 36%                     | 8%                        | 2%                      |
| 4. Creating connections                                | 42%                   | 42%                     | 14%                       | 2%                      |
| 5. Chance to be among the first to receive information | 42%                   | 37%                     | 19%                       | 2%                      |
| 6. Freedom, unlimited by superiors                     | 37%                   | 50%                     | 10%                       | 3%                      |
| 7. Assertion of certain values and ideas               | 37%                   | 42%                     | 18%                       | 3%                      |
| 8. Salary, financial assessment                        | 33%                   | 50%                     | 13%                       | 2%                      |
| 9. Security of regular employment                      | 33%                   | 41%                     | 20%                       | 6%                      |

| <b>Attributes of journalist's work</b>                | <b>Very important</b> | <b>Rather important</b> | <b>Rather unimportant</b> | <b>Very unimportant</b> |
|-------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------|
| 10. Chance to extend one's education (specialization) | 30%                   | 43%                     | 21%                       | 6%                      |
| 11. Chance to influence the public                    | 13%                   | 45%                     | 31%                       | 11%                     |
| 12. Chance to appear in public                        | 12%                   | 26%                     | 40%                       | 23%                     |
| 13. Chance for career progress                        | 11%                   | 41%                     | 36%                       | 12%                     |
| 14. Public appreciation                               | 10%                   | 47%                     | 36%                       | 7%                      |
| 15. Chance to influence political decisions           | 6%                    | 24%                     | 38%                       | 32%                     |

As the above-mentioned data supplied only basic information, we subjected these data to *factor analysis*<sup>3</sup> (see Table 8). The results suggest the existence of *three basic factors* of professional self-image or professional approach.

We called them:

- A) "*career approach*"—*FACTOR 1*
- B) "*opinion leader approach*"—*FACTOR 2*
- C) "*investigator/advocate approach*"—*FACTOR 3*

---

<sup>3</sup> Factor analysis solution—varimax rotation was used.

Table 8: Factor Analysis—Factors of Professional Self-Image<sup>4</sup>

| TEMS                                                   | FACTOR 1     | FACTOR 2     | FACTOR 3     |
|--------------------------------------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| 1. Chance to communicate information to others         | 0.012        | 0.017        | <b>0.672</b> |
| 2. Chance to reveal and publicize problems             | 0.014        | 0.215        | <b>0.796</b> |
| 3. Chance to help people                               | 0.002        | 0.291        | <b>0.602</b> |
| 5. Chance to be among the first to receive information | 0.261        | 0.148        | <b>0.470</b> |
| 7. Assertion of certain values and ideas               | 0.070        | <b>0.645</b> | 0.213        |
| 12. Chance to appear in public                         | 0.229        | <b>0.690</b> | 0.068        |
| 15. Chance to influence political decisions            | −0.106       | <b>0.596</b> | 0.149        |
| 11. Chance to influence the public                     | −0.016       | <b>0.740</b> | 0.133        |
| 8. Salary, financial assessment                        | <b>0.514</b> | −0.033       | −0.018       |
| 4. Creating connections                                | <b>0.465</b> | 0.117        | 0.320        |

<sup>4</sup> Factor volumes over 0.45 are in bold. The three factors explain 54 percent of the dispersion. Reliability of the first factor—Cronbach Alfa 0.686. Reliability of the second factor—Cronbach Alfa 0.654. Reliability of the third factor—Cronbach Alfa 0.610

| TEMS                                     | FACTOR 1     | FACTOR 2 | FACTOR 3 |
|------------------------------------------|--------------|----------|----------|
| 6. Freedom not limited by superiors      | <b>0.543</b> | −0.021   | 0.170    |
| 9. Job certainty                         | <b>0.686</b> | 0.084    | −0.038   |
| 13. Career growth potential              | <b>0.739</b> | 0.154    | 0.010    |
| 10. Training possibilities—special focus | <b>0.499</b> | −0.113   | 0.321    |
| 14. Social recognition                   | <b>0.502</b> | 0.250    | −0.111   |

Following this we used *correlation analysis* to describe and specify the three given professional approaches. We selected and transformed 12 independent variables: (1) lineage position, (2) physical and professional age, (3) education scope and type, (4) medium attributes, (5) specific job nature, and (6) general value orientation (political orientation). Although the values of some predictors are low, the overall predictors explain 61 percent or 34 percent of the variability of the given factors (professional approach I,<sup>5</sup> professional approaches II and III<sup>6</sup>).

---

<sup>5</sup> Approach I  $R = 0.783$ ,  $R^2 = 0.614$

<sup>6</sup> Approach II  $R = 0.580$ ,  $R^2 = 0.336$ , Approach III  $R = 0.581$ ,  $R^2 = 0.337$

Table 9: Professional Self-Image Determinants (Pearson's Correlation)<sup>7</sup>

|                                           | I. Approach accentuating individual career | II. Approach accentuating the forming of public opinion | III. Approach accentuating investigator-advocate values |
|-------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>I. Lineage position</b>                |                                            |                                                         |                                                         |
| Gender (female)                           | .065                                       | .009                                                    | -.016                                                   |
| <b>II. Physical and professional age</b>  |                                            |                                                         |                                                         |
| Physical age (lowest)                     | <b>.097</b>                                | <b>-.175</b>                                            | <b>.069</b>                                             |
| Professional age (lowest)                 | <b>.080</b>                                | <b>-.098</b>                                            | <b>.086</b>                                             |
| <b>III. Education</b>                     |                                            |                                                         |                                                         |
| Secondary school                          | <b>.063</b>                                | <b>-.083</b>                                            | <b>.077</b>                                             |
| Specialization (non-journalism fields)    | .024                                       | <b>-.097</b>                                            | <b>.064</b>                                             |
| <b>IV. Medium</b>                         |                                            |                                                         |                                                         |
| Nationwide media                          | <b>.083</b>                                | .017                                                    | <b>-.098</b>                                            |
| Print media                               | <b>-.080</b>                               | -.045                                                   | <b>.063</b>                                             |
| <b>V. Job responsibility and workload</b> |                                            |                                                         |                                                         |
| Management position                       | <b>.239</b>                                | .015                                                    | .027                                                    |

<sup>7</sup> The correlation coefficient greater than 0.060 (or -0.060) can be interpreted as significantly different from zero with approximately 95 percent confidence. In order to be able to work with each of the factors as variables, variables highly saturated with specific factors were chosen. Then, for each respondent, a score in these three factors was calculated, defined as the respondent's average answer over the relevant variables. These figures are low, but it is believed they can be used as a basic framework (as done, for instance, by Johnston, Slawski, and Bowman, 1973).



|                                                               | I. Approach<br>accentuating<br>individual<br>career | II. Approach<br>accentuating the<br>forming of<br>public opinion | III. Approach<br>accentuating<br>investigator-<br>advocate values |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>V. Job<br/>responsibility<br/>and workload</b>             |                                                     |                                                                  |                                                                   |
| Number of media<br>for which the<br>journalist works<br>(one) | -.087                                               | -.021                                                            | .075                                                              |
| Work (time) load<br>(lowest)                                  | -.061                                               | -.026                                                            | -.155                                                             |
| <b>VI. Value<br/>orientation</b>                              |                                                     |                                                                  |                                                                   |
| Left-wing<br>political<br>orientation                         | -.112                                               | .061                                                             | -.099                                                             |
| Liberal political<br>orientation                              | -.022                                               | .100                                                             | .061                                                              |

The best predictor among the specific professional approaches is *physical and professional age*.<sup>8</sup> The positive values of both variables indicate a higher probability of inclination toward a professional self-image accentuating the “*opinion-forming or educating*” role of the journalist. Conversely, a lower age determines inclination toward the other two self-images.<sup>9</sup>

*Education* (both university and special journalist training) primarily determines a proclivity toward professional values relating to “*forming public opinion*.” In the case of the first and the third factors, the situation is quite the reverse. The influence of secondary education is evident, in

<sup>8</sup> The average age of Czech journalists is 36 (the median is 34). Journalists have worked in their current profession for an average of 11.5 years (the median is nine years).

<sup>9</sup> Although there is a strong relation between both variables ( $r = 0.811$ ), physical age is considered to be a more relevant predictor.

particular, with the third professional approach (investigator and advocate role). Regarding the *media type*, the first and third professional approaches are somewhat better differentiated with medium reach. While “*career values*” appeared more frequently in nationwide and electronic media, what may be encountered more frequently on the regional and local levels is the concept of journalist as an “*investigating advocate*.”

*Job responsibility or position* proves to be the strongest predictor, but only with respect to “*career orientation*.” In this case, the key aspect is the superior position, specifically that of the person aspiring to professional growth. The values are not statistically significant for the remaining factors. It is interesting that “*career orientation*” in nationwide media is typically accompanied with a higher number of jobs,<sup>10</sup> while for “*investigating advocates*” working in the “periphery” in small media, the determining factor is a high workload<sup>11</sup> in a single media job. In the case of “*career orientation*,” this most likely includes young journalists working in bigger cities, which offer more job opportunities in journalism than provincial areas for local and regional journalists.

The value, or specifically *political preferences*, confirmed the rather right-wing orientation of Czech journalists. They determine the inclination towards both “*career orientation*” and the “*investigator-advocate role*.” Conversely, with journalists relating their professional self-image to the possibility to “*form public opinion*,” a slight split in their approach could be established; on the one hand they showed a very slight left-wing orientation, while on the other, they leaned more significantly to liberal values.

In order to supplement and extend this quantified picture of specific professional self-images, in-depth interviews<sup>12</sup> were conducted. All journalists interviewed were asked to describe their professional career, professional philosophy, and motivation for being a journalist.

---

<sup>10</sup> This is a variable that measures the number of full-time and part-time jobs.


<sup>11</sup> This is the number of hours that the journalist spends every week in his/her journalistic profession.

<sup>12</sup> The group of 38 respondents included journalists in various positions and with different professional experience. The first sub-group included *journalists in management positions*, who make decisions on work organization in the editorial office and form the editorial agenda. The second sub-group included “celebrity journalists,” i.e. major professional journalists who present the Czech journalistic profession to the public, are visible in the media, and whose opinions are perceived as authoritative. Finally, *incipient journalists* are still looking for or forming their attitude towards the journalistic profession. This sub-group could indicate what ideas of this profession the upcoming generation has. Interviews were held with journalists working in nationwide and regional media.

## 6. Three Professional Approaches: Pluralistic Professional Self-Image

The analysis of results based on the two types of described methods suggests the existence of three professional self-images or professional approaches (see Figure 3).

Figure 3: Three “Professional Approaches”



The *Investigator/Advocate Approach* combines the professional motivation of “helping others” with the need to investigate and disseminate information in a timely manner. This professional orientation is legitimized by questioned journalists as a form of public service. It is interesting that this factor represents a professional mix of two aspects that are close to the concepts of Weaver and Wilhoit (1996): the approach referred to as “adversarial” and the approach accentuating the neutral role of information “disseminator.” Journalists who identify with this approach have lower (secondary) education and work in the “periphery” (regional or local media). Since these journalists are de facto self-educated, this concept can be understood as an intuitive idea of what the journalistic profession requires (and it is apparently supported by their closer contact with recipients, i.e. by more direct feedback on their production). These journalists declare a slightly right-wing and liberal orientation, which, however, does not prevent them from approaching their profession from the position of defending the weak. This attitude is apparently

also influenced by their closer contact with local and regional audiences. The greatest number of journalists identified with this approach.

The *Career Approach* represents those who seek primarily to accommodate individual needs connected with career and self-realization. The strongest motivating variable is the “professional career potential” of a job in journalism. It is associated with both high financial remuneration and a certain level of freedom. The self-realization nature of this approach is underpinned by the possibility of further training and establishing social contacts. This professional approach proved to be the strongest motive of young journalists just getting started. These journalists explicitly rejected the traditional “educating–cultivating” role and see consumers of media as independent in forming their own attitudes and opinions.

The *Opinion Leader Approach* represents journalists who want not merely to reflect reality, but to form actual public opinion. They are not satisfied with role of “mirror” and want to interpret an image reflected in the media mirror. These journalists are most critical towards what they consider the real situation of journalists following the collapse of the old regime. They are not satisfied with the liberal concept of journalism that permeated the Czech media environment in the early 1990s. They are not quite certain about this approach in the given situation in Czech society, however, so they partially hide behind liberal–neutral professional ideology. This approach is seen most often among those who are older and possess greater professional experience as well as university education with a major in journalism. There is a relatively strong predictor indicating an inclination towards liberal values and very slight left-wing beliefs. The lowest number of journalists identified with this professional role.

We must finally stress that the majority of Czech journalists are pluralistic, most of them identifying with some aspects of two or three core professional approaches. In other words, the representation of “pure” professional approaches is very low. Only one-third of journalists (34.3 percent) identified themselves solely with one approach.

## **7. The Unanticipated Consequences of the Great Transformation of the Czech Media System: Deprofessionalization and Proletarianization of Journalists**

The data presented here indicate that the transformation of the Czech media system in the 1990s started two processes which have weakened the fragile professional status of the Czech journalists. We named these processes *deprofessionalization* and *proletarianization*.

The deprofessionalization of journalists can be defined as a process of abandoning elementary professional standards. In the Czech Republic this process has been directly connected to a radical decrease in the authority of professional journalistic unions and the lowering of professional standards and criteria that have defined conditions for admission into the journalistic community.

The second anti-professionalization process—the proletarianization of journalists—is characterized by a massive personnel transformation of editorial staff in the first half of the 1990s. A new generation of professionally untutored and easily manipulated journalists—novices—appeared, and the middle generation disappeared. This trend was especially significant in local and regional media, where we identified the strongest effects of proletarianization. Journalists working here are not only less educated but are also overworked, and their average income rates are below the rest of the population. Lastly, they have no support from professional organizations and trade unions, which have low socio-political status and very little respect among journalists.

Taking the three dimensions of professionalization defined by Hallin and Mancini (2004),<sup>13</sup> we can conclude that Czech journalists meet them only conditionally. On the one hand they feel free in selecting and processing the news. About 40 percent of them “have almost absolute latitude.” Their *professional autonomy* is in this sense relatively high. When we asked journalists about the “importance of pressure from management,” only 7 percent of them answered that such pressures are “very important,” and 14 percent perceive them as “quite important.”

On the other hand, they are very dissatisfied with the pressure of commercial and marketing logic. Table 10 shows that the most important reason for disillusionment in their career is the pressure of commercial and marketing logic. What is interesting is that they do not relate it to the loss of professional autonomy. In this sense we can speak about a specific type of *instrumentalization*. In contrast to the definition<sup>14</sup> given by Hallin and Mancini (2004), economic goals do play a key role here. Naturally, they have political consequences too.

---

<sup>13</sup> They distinguish (a) *professional autonomy* which they devote not only as that of individual journalists, but of the corps of journalists taken as a whole; (b) *distinct professional norms* which are obviously related to autonomy; (c) the *public-service orientation* of journalism as a “public trust” (Hallin and Mancini, 2004).

<sup>14</sup> They defined this concept as a control of media by outside actors seeking political influence (Hallin and Mancini, 2004).

The changes in working conditions mentioned above indicate a fundamental change in the philosophy of journalism. A specific type of “technological proletarianization” has arisen, related to a rise in new ICT and to a “technicalization” of journalists, who are increasingly employed as trained executors of some specific technical skills and routines. New ICT technology has transformed the status and skills of the journalistic workforce. Braverman (1974) speaks about de-skilling in this context, a process that has caused a shift from the creativity of personal journalism to the routine of objective reporting, where events rather than ideas direct professional practice. This shifting notion of skill raises questions concerning the nature of professionalism in general.

*Table 10: What Is the Strongest Reason for Disillusionment in Your Profession?*

| REASONS FOR<br>DISILLUSIONMENT          | Very important<br>+ quite important |
|-----------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Commercialization of content            | 47%                                 |
| Low salary                              | 45%                                 |
| Political shaping of content            | 36%                                 |
| Low professional autonomy               | 21%                                 |
| Low prestige of journalistic profession | 18%                                 |

The second Hallin and Mancini (2004) professional dimension—the existence of *distinct professional norms*—is related to professional autonomy. Among Czech journalists, however, there exists only a weak consensus on journalistic standards and shared norms distinct to the profession. The majority of them follow a naive interpretation of the liberal professional approach—anything goes. In particular, “codes of professional ethics” are perceived by journalists as being only a formal tool or *defensive professional mechanism* that has to be demonstrated to the public, but which actually inhibits the activity and creativity of journalists.

To make a final point, Czech journalists’ reaction to a *public service orientation* is intuitive and ideological. A significant number of them are very skeptical toward any definition of “public interest.” They perceive it as a hidden leftist ideology justifying the journalistic style of the old regime, which authoritatively defined what was good or bad for the general audience.

This skepticism is indicated in the above-mentioned description of professional “self-images” of Czech journalists as well. Cluster analysis showed that the smallest cluster includes journalists who see the purpose of their work in “changing the world.” The journalists included in this cluster were socialized according to a professional model of journalism as a *mission*. However, it is important to note that journalists declaring this “educational” focus are afraid that this professional approach will not be acceptable for both the journalistic community and generally for media audience. They resolve this professional dilemma by adhering to liberal values. Under their “liberal mimicry,” though, flashes an “activist” conception of journalism as a profession that should “change the world” (Volek and Jirák 2008). These journalists sense a clear conflict between what they consider the “real” situation (in which, they believe, a career approach self-image prevails in the present community of journalists) and what they consider as a “desired” situation (they believe a professional self-image should prevail). It is important to mention that these journalists are older than journalists in other clusters, having achieved on average the highest education and professional experience. Generally speaking, they most intensively identify with the public service orientation. Nevertheless, the trend of the previous decade indicates that this approach to journalistic profession is on the wane. It has been displaced by the rationalizing strategy of *professional career orientation* (the strongest cluster), virtually based on the principle of denying responsibility for the potential consequences of one’s activities. This obviously stems from the declared liberal concept of journalism that permeated the Czech media environment in the early 1990s as the ideological and ethical foundation for the ongoing privatization and commercialization of Czech media. The journalists explained the pragmatism in this professional self-image by citing the pressure of media production, which eliminates potential idealistic ideas. The key argument mentioned in this respect was a reference to the ongoing commercialization of journalistic work. These journalists explicitly rejected the traditional “educating–activating” concept and added an exonerating statement incorporating the implicit idea that readers form their own attitudes and opinions independently. These journalists identify only slightly with their profession, which they understand as a means of individual professional growth, in many cases not within specific media. This professional self-image rejects the journalistic trauma historically arising from the conflict between pressure on increasing media sales and the journalists’ social function as creators of standards. This is not a relevant dilemma for these journalists. They perceive journalistic profession as a “lift” to an individual career in a different profession. This suggests that the attractiveness of the journalistic profession is

changing; it traditionally concerned the model of “independent journalist,” member of the “fourth estate,” “watchdog” of society, or the “voice of the people.”

## **Conclusion**

In the early 1990s Czech journalists were rather quickly confronted with structural transformation of their work environment—a radical change in media ownership, transformation of regulatory norms, and above all the pressure of economic and technological rationality. These new trends have made the professional socialization of Czech journalists more complicated and have led to considerable instability in their professional self-image. Some of the professional attributes of contemporary journalists are still determined by the old heritage of communist journalism.

In other words, Czech journalists meet the basic criteria of professionalization only partly. They still lack qualities that are assumed in the theory of professionalization to be necessary for a group to feel that it is imperative to act as professionals. Czech journalists are young, inadequately educated, and trained, while being hard-pressed, stressed, low-paid, and not organized in professional and trade unions. All of these attributes represent indicators of an anti-professionalization process. Last but not least, they do not share a common professional identity.

In speaking about the two processes of anti-professionalization that began during the transformation of the Czech media system in the 1990s, we must still take into consideration that the deprofessionalization and proletarianization of journalistic activity are not the only effect of that transformation. A deeper explanation is connected to the conflict between the processes of bureaucratization and professionalization.

News media act as bureaucratic organizations antithetical to the freedom of activity traditionally imputed to the professional. The increased complexity of the specialized division of journalistic activity makes journalists dependent on other specialists who claim authority for themselves and contest control over some portion of the formal knowledge and skill that was established and monopolized in the traditional conception of journalism. Our research demonstrates that Czech journalists as professionals are dissatisfied, even alienated, in bureaucratic media organizations. Our last study confirms this conclusion. Editors in particular are not satisfied with their professional autonomy (Volek 2008). The subsequent introduction of new ICT not only strengthened management control, but also increased the anonymity of the work process and reduced the expectations of journalists to be recognized for their unique personal quality. Generally speaking, a fast rise of new information and communi-



cation technologies and a “technicalization” of the journalist has changed professional routines and led to their “technological proletarianization.” Such journalists still carry the old label of independent intellectuals, but without an individual voice. The result is not only an increasing sense of alienation, but also a changing perception of what constitutes a journalist’s self-image and the journalistic profession generally.

The answer to the last research question confirms to a certain extent this skeptical diagnosis. Our research indicates that, apart from traditional professional self-images (advocate, public opinion leader), there is a growing new individualistic and pragmatic, “career-oriented” approach to the profession of journalist. These journalists identify themselves to a small degree with their occupation, which they take as a “lift” to an individual career in different professions where they expect true self-realization. To a certain extent it is a response to the bureaucratization of journalistic work, the commercialization of media generally and the loss of an individual journalistic voice. The nature of the journalistic profession has been radically changing. Old professional self-images are waning, but new ones have yet to be forged.

## Reference List

- Argyris, C. (1974). *Behind the Front Page*. San Francisco: Josey-Bass.
- Braverman, H. (1974). *Labor and Monopoly Capital. The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Bridges, J.A. (1991). "Daily Newspaper Managing Editors' Perceptions of News Media Functions." *Journalism Quarterly* 68 (4): 728–742.
- Cherry, D.L. (1985). "Newspaper People's 'Significant Others.' Ethics as a Function of Reference Groups." *Newspaper Research Journal* 6 (3): 33–46.
- Culbertson, H. (1983). "Three Perspectives of American Journalism." *Journalism Monographs* 2: 28–40.
- Dunn, D.D. (1969). *Public Officials and the Press*. New York: Addison-Wesley Publishing.
- Friedson, E. (1994). *Professionalism Reborn. Theory, Prophecy and Policy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Glasser, T. (1992). "Professionalism and the Derision of Diversity: The Case of the Education of Journalism." *Journal of Communication* 42 (2): 131–140.
- Hallin, D.C., and P. Mancini (2004). *Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hoyer, S., and L. Epp (June 1994). *On Professionalization of Journalism and Civic Society: A Historical Perspective*. Paper presented at the International Convention, Riga.
- Ismach, H.A., and E.D. Denis (1978). "A Profile of Newspaper and Television Reporters in a Metropolitan Setting." *Journalism Quarterly* 55 (3): 739–743.
- Johnston, W.C., E. Slawski, and W. Bowman (1976). *The News People: A Sociological Portrait of American Journalists and Their Work*. Chicago: University of Illinois Press.
- Kimball, P. (1963). "Journalism: Art, Craft, or Profession?" In K. Lynn (ed.), *The Professions in America*, 242–260. Boston: Beacon Press.
- McLeod, H., and S. Hawley (1964). "Professionalization among Newsmen." *Journalism Quarterly* 41 (3): 529–539.
- Merrill, J.C. (1977). *Existential Journalism*. New York: Hastings House Publisher.
- Volek, J. (2008). *Quality Press and (or) Economic Success? Professional Attitudes of Czech Editors to the Commercialization of Press*. Paper presented at the International Media and Communication Conference on Political and Communication Sciences, Ksiaz-Wroclaw.
- Volek, J., and J. Jiráček (2008). "Professional Self-Image of the Czech Journalists: Selected Attributes." *Czech and Slovak Media Studies* 4: 358–375.
- Weaver, D. (1998). *The Global Journalist: News People Around the World*. New York: IAMCR.
- Weaver, D.H., and G.C. Wilhoit (1996). *The American Journalist in the 1990s: U.S. News People at the End of an Era*. New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum.

# Preserving Journalism

*Auksė Balčytienė and Halliki Harro-Loit*

## Introduction

Theorists agree that critical and transparent communication is essential for any modern state. To a great extent this role (of a watchdog or a fourth estate) has been delegated to journalism. But in these neoliberal times, media systems are dominated by private capital. Media convergence and homogenization of journalism is taking place all over the world, posing a threat to democratic communication. In our networked world, distinctions between journalism and other forms of communication (such as advertising, promotional and marketing communication, and news management) are disappearing, and the traditional idea of journalist as an autonomous gatekeeper is vanishing, thus challenging the function of meaningful agenda-setting and serving the public.

Still, in this rapidly changing situation, in spite of all the challenges that journalism is facing, professional journalistic culture may be able to withstand economic and political pressures and to fulfill the role of “critical independent analyst.” Therefore, the chief argument of this paper is that in a democracy it remains of crucial importance for journalists to (a) *define* and (b) *preserve* journalistic discourse so that citizens can recognize certain characteristics of professional journalism and distinguish them from other texts. Thus the standards of a journalistic discourse are the preconditions for journalism professionalization.

For this goal—to answer the question of how to preserve autonomous journalism—a comparative discussion on the main threats to journalistic discourse (distinguishable from other public communication discourses like PR, advertising, and political news management) and possibilities to develop the national journalistic culture are presented.

In order to shed light on the challenges currently facing journalism, structural changes in the media of two Baltic states—Lithuania and Estonia—are assessed, and a few cases of changing journalistic discourses are examined. In this respect, the comparative perspective becomes decisive. The universal phenomena reported as taking place in media systems worldwide (news commercialization, infotainment, media instrumentalization, technological and generic shifts) constitute different matrices in

different national settings. These matrices are related to political and economic preconditions. In Estonia, the commercial forces seem to be taking over in journalism, while in Lithuania the situation looks more diversified, with indicators of both economic and political media instrumentalization (Balčytienė 2006).

In this paper, the degree of “media instrumentalization” means the extent to which journalism is penetrated by external actors and interests (political, economic, religious, or other). In the same way, the concept of “journalistic discourse” is used to refer to the specific information management machinery, based on processing methods and routines, formats and consumption of factual and non-fictional phenomena in the form of mediated messages in different media outlets (Harro 2001, 13). Our understanding of “journalistic culture” includes normative regulation, professional ideology, and conventions that determine what we expect from journalism (Balčytienė 2006).

## **1. Baltic News Market: Small, Concentrated, and Vulnerable**

A common understanding in contemporary media studies is that convergence of media systems is becoming a worldwide trend (see, for example, Humphreys 1996, and Hallin and Mancini 2004). A gradual and ongoing process of commodification of news, rapid shifts towards mixed media and entertaining reporting, increasing professionalization in political communication towards news management, strategic communication and market-oriented politics, as well as many other processes which have affected public communication over the past few decades, have contributed to the fact that media systems in contemporary societies are becoming more and more similar. Some scholars have even gone further by warning that economic power is among the strongest factors contributing to media assimilation.

The news markets in Estonia and Lithuania are small, and media regulation is very liberal. This creates a dichotomy. On the one hand, liberal media regulation (no laws against media concentration or cross-ownership) opens new fields and forms for media development. On the other hand, liberal regulation and the virtual absence of state intervention in the matters of mass media encourage the proliferation of market-oriented logic. In addition, in both countries media accountability is weak (Harro-Loit and Balčytienė 2005).

The Estonian news market is highly concentrated. The mainstream news media is owned by two Scandinavian conglomerates (Schibsted/

Eesti Meedia and Bonnier) and one Estonian multimedia conglomerate (Ekspress Group). Media ownership in Lithuania is more diverse: While two strong groups (Lietuvos Rytas and Respublika) dominate the print media market on a national level, the local media (both print and broadcast) is still managed by an abundance of small owners. Concentration has started to take place in the Internet media, albeit slowly: The top leading online news portals Delfi.lt (also Delfi.ee) and Balsas.lt are maintained by companies in all kinds of business (catalog publishing, IT, and telecommunications), while other frequently visited news portals (Lrytas.lt, Lrt.lt, Alfa.lt) are attached to mainstream print or broadcast media. As reported in 2005, Lithuania had mostly nationally owned media, while Estonia was strongly oriented toward foreign ownership (Harro-Loit 2005). However by 2007 the situation changed in both countries towards more concentrated and much more mixed ownership forms in media business.<sup>1</sup>

## **2. Conditions Inhibiting (or Favoring) Journalism Professionalization**

In recent years Baltic journalism has faced strong pressures for change. The overall circulation of dailies has decreased, while the circulation of tabloids has multiplied. The number of news broadcasts has increased in both countries. All media companies (including those on the Internet) have faced economic challenges. The number of news outlets (the number of free publications, broadcasting time, online news portals, magazines) has increased much more than the resources available. Moreover, the costs of digitalization have been huge, and in this context, the public service mission of national broadcasting companies (LRT and ETV) has been questioned. Entertainment has become an essential part of the mainstream media.

Three factors in particular—ongoing media concentration, proliferation of hybrid media through commercialization of journalism, and an increase of source power through news management—have influenced journalistic culture, journalistic content, journalistic practices, and the values on which Lithuanian and Estonian journalism are based.

<sup>1</sup> Compared to a few years ago, the media in Lithuania and Estonia today is already more controlled by foreign multimedia groups (Schibsted from Norway with investments in newspaper, magazine, and free-daily publishing) and local industrialists (who often have political alliances).

## 2.1 Media Watching over the Media

Within an ongoing discussion about rapid changes in media structures and the news market, the Baltic states are facing one particular dilemma. For small news markets (Lithuania has a population of 3.4 million and Estonia one of 1.4 million), it is important to find a balance between two essential elements. On the one hand, a few large and wealthy media firms could provide more, and more innovative, media products, and with better editorial content, than many highly competitive small suppliers with limited resources. On the other hand, a highly concentrated media ownership and business logic based on the economic management of news production and distribution poses a threat to pluralism by concentrating more power into the hands of just a few suppliers (Doyle 2002, 17).

Thus, in the rapidly changing media situation currently faced by these two Baltic states, we cannot avoid a public discussion of media concentration. It is crucial to assess how the media itself constructs journalistic culture and journalism discourse (for example, how the media reports about structural changes in its own field).

In different media cultures, when such issues as media commercialization and concentration are reported to a wider audience (from the perspective of media policy), it becomes crucial to evaluate how the mainstream media themselves present media mergers or other critical issues related to media performance to a wider audience: as purely commercial events, as infotainment, or as events with sociopolitical repercussions. Merger coverage in the domestic media can provide citizens with the means to judge whether media consolidation is advisable or dangerous. Alternately, it can simply “naturalize” these events (e.g., merging and power-concentrating) as strictly economic matters and thus irrelevant to the life of an ordinary citizen.

According to Davidson (2006), who has assessed media merger reports in two different contexts, such as France and the United States, it appears that in different journalistic cultures media concentration is framed fairly similarly—mainly as economic matters. Findings from the Baltic states, too, confirm that media mergers, if they are discussed in public at all, are mainly reported from an economic perspective in newspapers’ or news portals’ business-news sections (thus not particularly targeting the average citizen<sup>2</sup>). Moreover, news sources cited in the reports are mainly

---

<sup>2</sup> Indeed there are a few notable exceptions. Recently, in Lithuania, an online project “Projektas Ž” (Project “J”; J—for journalism) was initiated by a media scholar from Vilnius University to discuss journalism and media performance, while in Estonia a national daily, *Eesti Päevaleht*, occasionally reviews media matters.

business executives and managers. The coverage of the ownership change in Lithuania's biggest regional daily *Kauno diena*, which had been owned by Norwegian Orkla Media since 1998, serves as a good example. Thirty-eight news reports (in both print and Internet media) were collected in the period between October 2006 and February 2007. All news reports about the withdrawal of Norwegian owners from the Lithuanian print media market were mainly framed as business events filled with facts about the company itself (only stressing that the newspaper is the strongest regional daily in Lithuania, providing its weekly circulation numbers, its budget, staff numbers, etc.) and removed from the realm of socio-political contention. In all reports, commercial frames and commercial sources (managers, experts) took up a majority of the coverage. Aside from traditional media, the online news of the same event (ownership change in *Kauno diena*) on Delfi.lt generated substantial reader interest, and around 500 reader comments on the issue of newspaper acquisition were collected and coded. One might claim that online reader comments have brought more scrutiny and acted as external watchdogs monitoring and questioning the case (e.g. what the change from foreign to Lithuania-based capital ownership means for the media climate in Lithuania) and accuracy of media reporting, that reader commentaries compensated for the lack of views and critical perspectives in journalistic reports. However, this kind of information can be classified only as claims and rumors. Critical analysis is lacking.

Examples from Estonia also suggest that changes in the media are not addressed by the media with the same level of attention as changes in other fields of society. There is a lack of attention both to the fact, for example, of ownership change, and adequate framing. Changes in the media field are reported as economic events (for example, "to create a strong national radio network"), stressing public interest on a national level ("public concerns such as problems of public transport or county governor assignments are commonly important everywhere, not just on a local level"), thus giving the impression of being a positive event for local inhabitants.

Indeed, mediated discourses from Lithuania and Estonia suggest that changes in the Baltic media are described only as events happening inside the field. Business news reports focus on economic data (facts and figures that offer little background information for an average citizen) or media personalities involved in the matter. There may be different reasons for this, including lack of expert knowledge by journalists to cover and question financial events professionally (this signals a need for adequate training in business news reporting), top-down influence from the management, media instrumentalization (media affiliation with business

and/or political fields), professional ideology (“to protect the field from outsiders”), and many others.

Regardless of the reasons, lack of public knowledge and debate on this sort of change in the field and growing power may become problematic for democracy.

## **2.2 Exploiting Journalism**

Scholarly debates are now focusing on the process of journalism *homogenization*. This process becomes evident in practices of journalistic genre mixing, more sensational and more entertainment-oriented reporting, blurring boundaries between news and advertising. Mixed discourses (hybrid discourses of PR, advertisement, and journalistic texts) proliferate in magazines, broadcast media, and online editions of newspapers. Radio as an outlet is changing and is used more for broadcasting music than news. The critical side of this practice is that the wide availability of hybrid discourses *legitimizes* the diminishing border between advertising (promotional text) and journalism.

Indeed, different newsrooms (in both conventional and Internet media) can (and do) have systems to separate journalism from advertising (for example, by separating the marketing department from the newsroom) and to filter the promotional material as it comes in. But, at the same time, these offices say very little about the fact that there are economic reasons and mechanisms behind the scenes that work against the border’s existence. Also, there are different ideologies and organizational policies among news organizations towards what should be considered promotional material, whether it should be avoided, tolerated, or even looked at.

In their study, Harro-Loit and Saks (2007) argue that the diversity of the existing attitudes within the media market towards the definition and maintenance of the above-mentioned border indicates that “the physiology of the border is a sophisticated mixture of economic and ideological factors.” To put it more precisely, in very small media markets, where for some media survival on the market means overlooking the difference between paid-for and independent information, the discussion should not be reduced to a matter of ethical conduct. The magazine, broadcast, and online media, for example, may find it beneficial to legitimize the deletion of the border to avoid confusing their audience (Harro-Loit and Saks 2007).

This raises the critical question as to whether such a wide range of attitudes works to protect the journalistic integrity that is needed for a democratic society or instead helps to further the commercialization of the media and the total diminution of the border.



What is worrying is that in both Baltic states the systems of media accountability and self-regulation are weak—the control mechanisms of legislation, the Code of Ethics, and the concept of good journalistic practice are either ignored or misused. The border that separates journalism from advertising is, as a result, losing its definition and purpose. In addition, for the audience, distinguishing the border becomes especially complex as the independent journalistic material and promotional writing is mixed across outlets, formats, and publications.

The biggest problem, however, is that the journalistic community does not see this diminishing border between journalism and advertising as unethical. Baerug (2005) provides evidence on this issue from a comparative study. He studied the answers of TV journalists from the three Baltic states and Norway working for national, regional, and local TV stations concerning whether they would accept payment for inviting political figures on their programs. This study and the current events show that this practice is quite widespread in the Baltic-Scandinavian context. For example, in March 2007, before the parliamentary elections in Estonia, the commercial channel TV3 aired a political debate program where two prominent party leaders discussed their platforms. Newspapers covered the event, but it was only mentioned in passing that the two political parties paid for their time on TV3. The audience was not otherwise informed that the program was a paid-for (thus not conventional) TV debate. Another research study from Estonia gives evidence that, as a matter of fact, the demands the media (especially TV channels) receive from advertisers are much bigger than TV stations, magazines, and online media can offer. As a result, “all the magazines are filled with hidden advertising [...] Some do not even try to create journalistic content any more. For example, in *Ärielu* [Business Life], all the texts are seemingly journalistic, but everyone knows these are paid texts” (Lepp 2005, 51–53).

Baerug (2005) concludes that, no matter what national settings journalists work in, they see the need for various means to control this practice. These means range from stricter supervision (for example, court cases for breaking the law against hidden advertising: According to journalists from the Baltic states, since there has been no court trial over the issue of hidden advertising, nobody is afraid of placing hidden advertising on TV), legalizing the practice,<sup>3</sup> having thorough public discussion, and better education of journalists.

---

<sup>3</sup> In Lithuania, requirements for political advertising and the procedure for announcing and designating it in the media are established by the Law on Funding of Political Parties and Political Campaigns and Control over the Funding (enacted in 2004).

Indeed, the commercialization of the media has created new challenges for journalists. It has also exacerbated potential weaknesses in the profession such as weak professional values and norms, and absence of media accountability. Thus media professionals can be considered an indirect link to the current situation.

The convergence of problems seems to confirm a kind of homogenization of journalistic cultures, extending beyond divergent institutional constraints (state participation, for example, is stricter in Norway than in the Baltic states) and market constraints (there seem to be differences emerging between small news markets, such as Norway, and very small news markets, such as the three Baltic states) within media systems.

The authors of this paper believe that the media organizations that operate in small media markets are especially vulnerable to the intervention of promotional and advertising materials as the media organizations are becoming eager to collect all the advertising money available.

The counterbalance to economic pressure could be the ideology of professional independence. However, in societies undergoing transformation, the journalistic community and the professional culture seems too weak to resist such pressure.

Furthermore, the media concentration and a very small job market make the ideology of professional independence extremely vulnerable. Thus the journalists, instead of being loyal primarily to their professional ideals, become more loyal to the ideology of their employer. As a result, journalism as a cultural practice is subordinated to the economic rationale of marketing. Ongoing secularization<sup>4</sup> and commercialization dictates the nature of journalism and prescribes limits of public interest. Thus the locus of news is clearly seeking a more immediate connection to the everyday life of individuals.

### ***2.3 Growing Power of (News) Sources***

Not only are market pressures and the hypercommercialization of journalism responsible for the quality shifts in journalistic discourse, but the quality of interaction between journalists and their sources has also changed substantially. This trend is well-observed in political communication culture. On the international scale, some scholars assess these

---

<sup>4</sup> Generally, secularization is understood as the decline of a political order based on collective political actors and identities (such as religion, political parties, or trade unions), and their replacement by a much more fragmented and individualized society. For example, in a secular society the locus of news pulls away from politics and seeks a more immediate connection to the everyday life of individuals.

changes in the light of general professionalization of political communication (Negrine and Lilleker 2002). Indeed, there is a sense of a “permanent campaign” happening in political communication, and such things as campaign professionalization, political marketing, and source professionalization are observed (Norris 2000). The question that Negrine and Lilleker (2002) raise is related to two things: “professionalization” as related to the growth of specialized knowledge on political issue management and techniques around new technologies and media, or “professionalization” as a real shift in the communication of politics in both quantitative and qualitative terms.

For our discussion on changes in journalistic discourse in the Baltic states, the former aspect—the “professionalization” of political (or economic) sources in terms of becoming effective media agenda controllers—is of particular importance. For the news media it becomes a tempting challenge to exploit ready-made information offered free of charge. This has an impact on structural changes in the media organization as well. Many conventional media have become content-production companies instead of news media: They publish newspapers, books, online news portals, and catalogues, and also organize conferences. In short, they simply re-package information into different forms, formats, or outlets.

Research studies also show that for political journalists nowadays, the biggest challenge remains the ability to avoid the less relevant coverage of political affairs, to get beyond the spin and controlled access, to rely on one’s own investigation, to be able to sort out the truth, to be able to report the facts behind the scenes of political decision-making, and to be able to withstand and to overcome political manipulation of the press. In other words, in view of the increasing ability of political elites to control the agenda, the core challenge is to preserve the autonomy of journalists and to withstand pressures from political (or economic) sources. Another problematic question that journalists face is how to preserve the trust of the public while getting behind closed doors and using anonymous sources.

Communication drawbacks at the European level also demonstrate the universality of these problems, i.e. of changes in relationship between journalists and their (political) news sources. Research data from the project “AIM—Adequate Information Management in Europe” on a comparative scale (across 11 countries in Europe) demonstrates that, while working in Brussels, foreign correspondents face numerous challenges. Although there is no question about the *quantity* of information that reaches journalists through numerous sources and outlets, the *quality* of information remains a very problematic issue for all journalists—both from old and new EU member states (AIM research consortium 2007a

and 2007b). Indeed, while having facts and data (from press releases, Midday Briefings at the European Commission, the Internet web sites), journalists do not have an overview, i.e. they lack information on prioritized issues under political discussion. In short, they lack a broader understanding on what is going on the political level of the EU. The AIM project concludes that, in addition to general change in political communication cultures due to source professionalization and the arrival of image-oriented politics, there is a serious structural communication problem at the EU level: There is a lack of transparency, and the information communicated is very complex. At the moment, the European Commission does not assume the role of a clear strategic player; instead it prefers to be seen as neutral (following a one-voice policy), not involved in polemics and avoiding national views and debates. Journalists, in contrast, are looking for conflicting views and details of political decision-making processes. Journalists favor unsolicited and unhampered access to all available material and want to rely on their own interpretations. Thus the general role of journalist as a watchdog of politics and political institutions is institutionally hampered within the European context. On the EU level, it appears that a central problem of European information is connected to the extent and will of the EU institutions to accept political controversies as a matter of course and, therefore, a matter of public discourse. The contribution of journalism in enhancing transparency and openness could be improved considerably if journalists would gain access to better insight into the very mechanisms and procedures of decision-making, i.e. the background information.

To conclude, it is not easy for journalists to cope with these many challenges since, with the professionalization of sources, they are increasingly denied direct access to important issues. Compared to earlier years, this relationship is said to become more distant. Opportunities for confidential off-the-record talks are lacking, and access to politicians is more controlled.

## 2.4 *Synthesis*

Having said all this, the tendencies within changes in journalistic discourse signal *inadequate journalism*, or, as some call it, hypercommercialized or exploited journalism. Indeed, hybrid media is cheaper to produce than good journalism. For the mainstream media operating under a strong commercial impetus, this works well, because hybrid news is cheaper to produce; it also helps to grab audience attention and deliver these audiences to advertisers, thus it fits media organizational goals. In addition, audiences are shrinking for all kinds of journalism—TV pro-

grams, newspapers, and online media. The media managers are facing challenges of finding and addressing these audiences.

The causes of hybrid media are indeed quite plain. The quality of journalism suffers due to bottom-line pressures. As the expenses for serious coverage are extremely high, some media cannot and will not pay for them. Journalists gradually anticipate more mixed journalism that is treated as a commodity, and which in turn furthers the trend toward cheaper media production, in contrast to in-depth and investigative reporting by professional journalists (Plasser 2005). Scott (2006), also in the same direction, argues that in favor of expanding profit margins, the commercial press has gradually abandoned the public service mission of journalism. Large corporations have colonized both offline and online media. There is a fundamental shift of newsworthiness that is based upon the judgment of serving the public absolutely on the one hand, and, on the other, serving the public as long as it is profitable and promises to become more profitable. This is how the market (but also the Internet—the so-called 24/7 logic) operates. At the same time, this signals a qualitative shift in journalism.

### **3. What Can Be Done?**

It seems that in an open, frenetic, and overcrowded media environment, the news organizations are losing their role as gatekeepers and agenda-setters. Old responses to the question of who is a journalist based primarily on roles associated with the process of gathering and disseminating information no longer apply. Instead, journalists in such an environment become “interpreters of what is both credible and valuable—with the notion of independence keeping those interpretations from becoming compromised by partisan loyalties” (Singer 2006, 12). On the assumption that independent and professional journalistic discourse is worth preserving (especially in the era of homogenization of media content, commercialization, and the trend towards hybrid discourses), one should ask about the possible means to counterbalance the disappearance of journalism.

So the question is: What must be done and by whom (and how, if possible) to preserve the journalistic discourse in the midst of all the changes that endanger it (media convergence and concentration, the increasing power of political and economic news sources, the professionalization of political communication)?

The fact that the members of the EJTA, the European Journalism Training Association (journalism schools and media, communications or journalism departments at various universities), accepted the standards

of journalism education (the Tartu Declaration<sup>5</sup>) in summer 2006 is symptomatic of the notion that liberal and only market-oriented vocational training might not be sufficient to counterbalance economic pressure. For example, the first competence goal of the Tartu Declaration (“the competence to reflect on the societal role of and developments within journalism”) refers to the graduate’s ability to have insight in the role and influence of journalism in modern society and to have an understanding of the values that underlie one’s professional choices.

Thus in this changing situation, academic journalism studies and journalism education could be one counterbalancing factor. Academic studies could provide the analytic methods and vocabulary necessary for the *deconstruction* of processes that influence the context of journalistic performance. For example, such concepts as “intertextuality,” “promotional writing,” and “discourse analysis” make the phenomena of hybrid discourses more apparent. In the same way, “political economy” provides a frame for analysis of media policy (the public should be able to understand more about the economic background of news production).

In spite of emerging possibilities, journalistic training and academic media research in the Baltic states face some serious challenges. In both countries, higher education is being rearranged into the two-level (B.A. and M.A.) model. This means that in both countries journalism training is still in the process of dismantling old programs into undergraduate and post-graduate degrees.<sup>6</sup> Another problem is related to higher education reform: The ranking system of academic publications, favoring only the most renowned international publications, does not encourage scholars to publish in their national (Lithuanian or Estonian) languages. This is

---

<sup>5</sup> The Tartu Declaration—a document of professional journalistic principles—was accepted at the Annual General Meeting of European Journalism Training Association (EJTA) in 2006 in Tartu, Estonia, puts a strong stress on journalistic training and education from the normative idea that journalists should *serve* the public by providing a critical insight into political, economic, and sociocultural conditions, by strengthening democracy at all levels, by stimulating their own professional autonomy and accountability. Consequently, journalism education should put a very strong emphasis on the training of certain professional competences such as critical reflection, analysis, assessment as well as organization of professional journalistic work. More information can be found online at [www.ejta.eu/index.php/website/projects](http://www.ejta.eu/index.php/website/projects).

<sup>6</sup> One crucial problem with journalism training is that the number of students at MA levels is relatively low. In addition, many of the students have full-time jobs before they graduate from university. Thus, although MA programs fit the training standards supported by EJTA (containing courses on self-reflection, critical discourse analysis, and media internships), this professional and academic knowledge is not really disseminated among media professionals. In short, there is a gap between the available knowledge at academia and the knowledge that is actually spread among professional journalists.

one reason why academics have little motivation to cultivate the culture of adequate media critique. As a result, many critical concepts for media analysis are not popularized and remain understandable only in the context of academic scholarship. In addition, this knowledge is not accessible to other interested parties, namely schoolteachers (who could use popular texts in media literacy classes) or media policy makers. And the third problem is related to the lack of critical mass of media scholars—both countries have only a limited number of journalism professors.<sup>7</sup>

In short, journalistic education must provide critical reflection on the professional ideology and competences necessary for a critical analyst in a rapidly changing media environment. In addition, for both parties—audiences and the policy makers—modern journalism (which is vulnerable and rapidly changing) needs to be deconstructed by critical research.

## **Conclusion**

Rapid restructuring within the media industry, professionalization of political communication, and the impact of new technologies (which was not addressed here) affect journalistic discourse in three ways in particular.

First, conventional genres belonging to journalism are being used for other—promotional and political—purposes. This has gradually become a legitimate practice among media professionals.

Second, though demanding transparency from other institutions of society, journalism remains the most opaque. The media seldom discusses media matters (changes in the field such as media convergence, mergers, and acquisitions) from a public-interest point of view. This puts public interest under attack.

Third, the small media market cannot avoid concentration; hence, the question of diversity of journalistic content remains a vulnerable issue. In a small market the national professional community is also rather small. Thus the impact of one medium or one person on the public agenda may become very influential.

The problems of professional journalism are both new (addressing structural changes in the national media systems, initiating public discussions, dealing with commercialization and image-oriented politics) and old (performing the role of a watchdog). The journalistic culture of Lithuania and Estonia is influenced by the Liberal media model. But weaker historical journalistic traditions and weaker self-regulation (lack of respect and social responsibility) has caused significant divergences from British or Nordic examples. Journalistic culture in the Baltics today is characterized by secularization, competition, and consumerism.

---

<sup>7</sup> This problem is even more obvious in Lithuania.

## Reference List

- AIM Research Consortium (ed.) (2007a). *Understanding the Logic of EU Reporting from Brussels: Analysis of Interviews with EU Correspondents and Spokespersons*. Adequate Information Management in Europe (AIM)—Working Papers, 2007/3. Bochum/Freiburg: Projekt Verlag.
- AIM Research Consortium (ed.) (2007b). *Final Report*. Adequate Information Management in Europe (AIM)—Working Papers, 2007/4. Bochum/Freiburg: Projekt Verlag.
- Balčytienė, A. (2006). *Mass Media in Lithuania: Changes, Development and Journalism Culture*. Berlin: Vistas.
- Harro-Loit, H., and A. Balčytienė (2005). "Media Accountability Systems: Ecological Viewpoint." In R. Baerug (ed.), *The Baltic Media World*, 25–40. Riga: Flera.
- Baerug, R. (2005). "Hidden Advertising and TV Journalism in the Baltic States and Norway." In R. Baerug (ed.), *The Baltic Media World*, 58–90. Riga: Flera.
- Davidson, R. (2006). "'An Insider's Game': Framing Media Mergers in France and the United States." *International Communication Gazette*, 68 (4): 331–346.
- Doyle, G. (2002). *Media Ownership*. London: Sage.
- Hallin, D., and P. Mancini (2004). *Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics*. Cambridge University Press.
- Harro, H. (2001). *Changing Journalistic Conventions in the Press: Empirical Studies on Daily Newspapers under Different Political Conditions in 20th-century Estonia*. Acta Humaniora No. 100: Universitiet i Oslo.
- Harro-Loit, H., and K. Saks (2007). "The Diminishing Border between Advertising and Journalism in Estonia." *Journalism Studies* 7 (2): 312–322.
- Humphreys, P. (1996). *Mass Media and Media Policy in Western Europe*. Manchester University Press.
- Lepp, A. (2005). "Reklaami ja ajakirjandusliku diskursuse segunemine kommertstelevisioonis ja ajakirjades" (Mixing advertising and journalism at television and magazines). Unpublished B.A. thesis, Tartu University.
- Negrine, R., and D.G. Lilleker (2002). "The Professionalization of Political Communication: Continuities and Change in Media Practices." *European Journal of Communication* 17 (3), 305–323.
- Norris, P. (2000). *A Virtuous Circle*. Cambridge University Press.
- Plasser, F. (2005). "From Hard to Soft News Standards? How Political Journalists in Different Media Systems Evaluate the Shifting Quality of News." *Press/Politics*, 10 (2): 47–68.
- Scott, B. (2005). "A Contemporary History of Digital Journalism." *Television & New Media* 6 (1): 89–126.
- Singer, J. (2006). "The Socially Responsible Existentialist: A Normative Emphasis for Journalists in a New Media Environment." *Journalism Studies* 7 (1): 2–18.



# **Main Professional Dilemmas of Journalists in Poland**

*Lucyna Szot*

## **Introduction**

The main professional dilemmas of journalists are shaped by their role and place in the media system. Therefore they reflect wider economic and political conditions. There are also numerous contradictions in the very essence of broadcasting and publishing activity among the state, the publisher, journalist, and the citizens. The social status of a journalist and his position in public life is determined by political and structural relations, as well as—especially nowadays—proprietary relations. This position marks the real limits of journalistic liberties and freedoms. The media system in Poland operates under strong political and economic pressure. Pressure from the political system is visible in the process of media politicization, and pressure from the economic system takes the form of media commercialization. A journalist is not, at least in principle, a political subject. At the same time, he is a channel and a filter through which political reality permeates society (Dobek-Ostrowska 2006, 180–181). Because of this function, a journalist is under dual pressures. The first one is the pressure from political parties and the law (external pressure), and it is visible in political parties' desire to be present in the media. The other one is the internal pressure (orders and bans—in force in the media institutions) that depends on capital and business relations. Apart from proprietary relations, activities of the media institutions are determined by advertising contracts. Print publishers and TV and radio broadcasters are dependent on advertisers and companies acting on their behalf because, even if a newspaper is popular with readers, it might not make a profit without advertising revenue. The phenomenon of commercialization and the economic conditions in which the processes take place cause the pauperization of the journalistic profession in Poland. A journalist is under constant pressure, and if he wants to stay in the job, he cannot cross the political and business boundaries defined by the owner.

One of the most significant professional dilemmas of a journalist is his mission of providing information. A journalist must decide if he wants to serve the interests of the citizen, the state, or the owner. In large media

institutions a conflict is evident between the interests of the owner and the inalienable civil right to freedom of speech. The dilemma comes down to the answer to the following question: Is it more important for a journalist to develop his creativity and perform independent and original tasks connected with his mission of providing information, or to adjust to the needs of the editing organization determined by its management to fulfill the interests of the owner (often politically conditioned)?

The phenomenon of media commercialization also causes problems for a journalist when he has to decide on his orientation and professional role. He needs to decide if he wants to work for the audience's sake, or for society, or to try to satisfy the audience's demand for commercial products (Mrozowski 2001, 242). He also needs to decide if undercover operations are justified, what the limits of privacy protection are, and so on.

The role of a journalist to inform society is also based on his ability to choose the right criteria and select information. All too often, Polish journalists choose to be active participants in political and social life instead of taking a neutral, information-oriented role.

Most media professions are characterized by a low level of professionalism, meaning a lack of clearly defined qualifications and rules of action determining the level of professionalism, which, along with the cult of individualism and talent, fosters the development of different ideologies (Mrozowski 2001, 242). Additionally, each journalist works in different fields of expectations, evaluates his own work in a different way, and has different criteria for success.

## **1. Duty to Serve Society, the State, or the Owner?**

The main dilemma of journalists is connected with their mission of providing information. Journalists must decide which is more important: developing their own creative skills and carrying out original conceptions, or just adjusting to the needs of the owner to fulfill its interests.

According to Article 10 of the Press Law Act in Poland, "it is a journalist's duty to serve the society and the state" (Ustawa z 26 stycznia 1984 r. prawo prasowe, Dz.U. z 1984r, art. 10). The law mentions community service first, regarding journalism as a public mission. An independent journalist in a democratic country should fulfill this mission. Therefore expanding the boundaries of journalists' freedoms is in the society's interest. In fact, the range of journalists' restraints and their liability is widened all the time, and it is primarily the publishers' interests that are realized. The power of the owner is the most important factor determining conditions within the broadcasting institution and the ways in which it functions. Certainly it depends on a type and size of that insti-

tution. In small or medium-sized commercial media, the owners can directly run their broadcasting or editing activity or at least control it. Together with the growth and expansion of the organization structure, the possibility of direct managing decreases and large media institutions have to be run indirectly. Media owners must restrict themselves to setting long-term policy, leaving direct managing to professionals who have proper knowledge and skills for it. If managers are to achieve something, they must have freedom of action, limited only by the rules of professional managing and marketing considerations. Their main goal is to achieve success on the market. Public service media must reconcile the rules of effectiveness with the purposes of the society and managers' interests. As M. Mrozowski has stated after D. McQuail, freedom of decision on different levels of management in public service media is smaller than in private media because it is limited by bureaucracy and budget, though in the frames of those limitations, artistic and professional freedom is wider than in private media (McQuail 1992, 241). For example, in Russia one of the fundamental instruments of power is the control over mass media, especially television. Information that is independent of politics reaches only 2 percent of Russian society (Zaucha 2006). What is remarkable is that not many people in Russia feel the need to have free media. A society without the tradition of freedom, with constant censorship, cannot appreciate the meaning of independent journalism. Bureaucratic methods of public service media managing are also present in Poland.

Freedom of speech can exist only if a demanding, independent and rational receiver exists. A professional and independent journalist is a guarantor of freedom of speech.

According to media experts such as B. Michalski and J. Sobczak, nowadays the model that considers the media and journalists the only owners of laws and freedoms related to communication and information is changing into a model in which citizens and democratic society are seen as the final owner of laws and freedom of speech. This change shows that not only the media and journalists should be the center of attention but that the citizens and the general public should be as well. Thus professionalism in journalism means serving society.

Media experts also claim that with the excess of information, traditional journalism will evolve to give citizens the possibility to "assess information." There will be pressure for information quality, not quantity.

A journalist's basic activity will not be unilaterally providing information, but bilateral communication. This might soon be journalists' most important task, and it will require responsibility and the right skills. Having proper professional training and legal and economic guarantees of independence will be essential for journalists. Tabloids threaten this idea.

## **2. Journalism—Profession or Calling (Mission)**

Until the Press Law Act was passed in 1984, there was a dispute about the meaning of the word “journalist.” Media experts presented three conceptions of how to define this concept:

- the first was connected with the notion of employment,
- the second was connected with carrying out the journalistic profession, i.e., publishing articles in newspapers,
- the third was based on the membership of the right association (membership of the journalists’ association) (Dobosz 1998, 12).

The dispute ended when the Press Law Act accepted a definition that combined the first and second conceptions. According to Article 7, Section 2, Point 5 of the Press Law Act in Poland, “a journalist is a person who edits, creates, or prepares press articles and is in a relation of work with an editorial office or just dealing with it on behalf of and from the editorial office’s authorization” (Ustawa z 26 stycznia 1984 r. prawo prasowe, Dz.U. z 1984r., art. 7 ust. 2 pkt. 5). A legal definition of who a journalist is can be found in this regulation. Furthermore, regulations related to journalists divide them into two categories: employed journalists and others who act on behalf of and from the editorial office’s authorization—one can be considered a journalist if he has a membership card (Ustawa z 26 stycznia 1984 r. prawo prasowe, Dz.U. z 1984r., art. 7 ust. 2 pkt. 5). Legally speaking, in Poland there are no professional journalists outside a press unit. Consequently, journalists are entirely dependent on their owners.

The current definition of a journalist indicates the following objective and subjective criteria:

- someone engaged in a combination of activities such as gathering, writing, editing, assessing, and preparing press materials for publishing (objective aspect);
- a person engaged in this profession, rather systematically, who earns a living (subjective aspect) (Kononiuk 1998, 12).

Undoubtedly, the training system and professional preparations have a crucial influence on the professional situation of journalists.

In spite of numerous controversies about running journalism schools, in my opinion, they boost professionalism in the field. The first higher school of journalism was established in Warsaw in 1917. Since 1950 there has been a steady development of journalism programs at universities.

In the 1970s and 1980s in Poland there was a common acceptance of higher education in journalism. T. Kupis, I. Dryll, and J. Szczepański were the champions of higher education in journalism and professional specialization (Kupis 1970). Regulations in *Zakładowa Umowa Zbiorowa dla dziennikarzy zatrudnionych w redakcjach i agencji RSW "Prasa—Książka—Ruch" z 13 lipca 1989 r.* were the results of those opinions and aspirations of the journalistic environment. Article 7, Section 1, of this agreement states that "a journalist should identify himself with higher education and should have a training completed with an exam" (*Zakładowa Umowa Zbiorowa...*, 1989).

Currently these regulations are not in force. Higher education is not required when a young journalist is employed. Various paths lead to journalism—it is an open profession. Nowadays in Poland, among all intellectual professions, only journalistic and literary ones are open—others require university degrees. It is hard to accept the idea that journalists should have knowledge about everything. Therefore, we must not forget about the responsibility and the social role of the profession. (Classification on journalistic professionalism associated with technical skills is possible to achieve.) The increasingly complicated technique, greater competition, and more difficult work conditions favor the continued specialization and professionalism of hired employees (journalists). Media professions and specializations are slowly being separated, i.e. journalists, technical support staff, administrators, managers, etc. (Mrozowski 2001, 52–53). Although more and more often professionalism in media and journalism is required, especially in larger institutions, talented writers and journalists without proper education also have access to the institutions. In that sense this profession is and will be open for gifted reporters, regardless of their education. Nevertheless the combination of talent and knowledge is the best guarantee of success or at least promotion at work. Those who come to work in the media, because of their skills or predispositions, usually extend their knowledge in a particular domain, acquiring proper qualifications.

Descriptions of the journalistic calling as a "service to society and the state" sometimes sway the young and the idealistic. Undoubtedly, all dilemmas connected with this profession, such as the dependence on the owner, are disregarded. Contradictions inside editorial offices divide the journalistic environment. Commercial and marketing success requires not only skill and cold calculations from managers, but also disciplined business actions along with artistic imagination. Each journalist works in different fields of expectations, has different criteria for the evaluation of his or her work, and must make a choice.

In large media institutions basic contradictions can be seen between:

- criticism and creativity requirements, and specialization and routine at work;
- owners' interests and citizens' right to freedom of speech;
- payment for the quality of work or product and for labor time.

All those contradictions are in the very nature of publishing activity, which always combines elements of prototypes and serial production. The phenomenon of commercialization and economic conditions in which those processes are accomplished result in the deterioration of journalism in Poland. The insufficient activity of creative societies causes this situation. Journalistic associations are weak and divided. They are not capable of representing the interests of journalistic environments efficiently in parliament. Currently they are not an influential group that could present journalists' ventures properly. Current legal regulations do not guarantee professional rights and protection for freelancers. Because of unemployment, more and more journalists are on their own. However, freelancers have limited rights to information (Ustawa z 26 stycznia 1984 r. prawo prasowe, Dz.U. z 1984r., art. 4, 11). Most media professions are characterized by low professionalism, i.e. lack of clearly defined qualifications and rules of actions determining the standards of professionalism, which, together with the cult of individualism and talent, fosters the development of different ideologies (Mrozowski 2001, 242). Besides, each journalist works in different fields of expectations, evaluates his own work in a different way, and furthermore, has different criteria for success and career patterns. Journalists must make their own choices and define their own work directions. Despite all professional diversities and functions, which can be found in media institutions, we can point out, after D. McQuail, four main directions and sets of success criteria referring to them, i.e.:

- private broadcasting organization (success criteria: appreciation from supervisors, progress in personal career, economic success);
- occupation or trade (success criteria: appreciation in journalistic society, inner satisfaction);
- society (success criteria: status outside association, political, cultural and social influence);
- audience and readers (success criteria: fame, popularity, influence on social behavior) (McQuail 1987).

In editorial offices we can find representatives of all the professionals mentioned above—some of them try to combine several of the directions (and sets of success criteria) or sometimes all of them. Journalists' conflicts

that appear while choosing their professional directory and future status are connected, among others, with solving the main dilemma: The execution of communication tasks for the audience's sake, or for society, or for the audience's demand for commercial products (Mrozowski 2001, 242).

The main journalists' dilemmas include:

- a duty to serve the society, the state, or the owner?
- choosing between the importance or the mass appeal of information;
- giving in to time pressure or caring for the quality of press materials;
- obeying the rules of providing information fairly or giving in to the client wishes (phenomenon of commercialization, ratings pressure, or public mission);
- "to show or not to show" (privacy protection, boundaries of public discussion);
- can journalists go undercover in order to get information and reveal social pathological behaviors, etc.

These dilemmas cannot be arbitrated without raising doubts, and those issues are the beginning of endless disputes over the meaning of the job. The above-mentioned professional roles that divide journalists are the reason for the permanent conflicts typical of broadcasting institutions. A category that helps clarify the discussion is the expectation, within the limits of professional journalism, of possessing technical skills but also obeying the norms and standards and ethical qualifications.

### **3. The Duty to Inform and the Need to Select the Right Information—The Role of a Journalist**

In fact, a journalist has two approaches to choose from: that of an active participant in social and political life (involved journalism) or a neutral, information-oriented approach.

Facing an abundance of information, a journalist creates reality by selecting certain stories. The choices made by a journalist are significant because of the overwhelming amount of information received by each editor's office from various sources and the pressure to select the "right" material. It is hard to imagine that this kind of selection is accidental. One should instead speak of certain rules which allow fast decision making, usually under pressure to meet deadlines.

The context in which a certain story is told or a fact is presented is another vital factor in this process. The selection of the "right" information might be affected, for instance, by the restrictions on the flow of

information (such as the political or economic situation in the country or the decisions made by the owners of broadcasting corporations, etc.).

The process of producing news is also subject to inner distortion. Journalists' subjectivity—their attitude as well as the system of values they believe in—must also be taken into consideration. Individual preferences and prejudices have a vital role in this process (Schulz 2006, 39). It is assumed that in an average daily paper in the United States, more than 75% of potential news is rejected and never appears in print (Pratkanis and Aronson 2005, 235). The selection of information (gate-keeping), that is, the choice of certain stories considered to be worth publishing from the whole amount which reaches the editor's office, is the most important stage in the process of information policy. At this stage a piece of information becomes the news, a story about a certain event, which is made public in a specific radio or TV program or in an issue of a certain paper.

For journalists and other individuals who make decisions about the selection of certain information and the form in which it should be presented to the public, the crucial dilemma concerns a general definition of their attitude towards the stories on which they work. It is a dilemma over whether to be involved or stay neutral. The attitude of a neutral observer who is trying to stay objective certainly makes the process of informing society about some events and ideas concerning the sphere of public life more reliable. At the same time, the media are supposed to control the actions of the government, which requires the attitude of an analyst who is willing to contribute to the common good and who is responsible to society. The majority of journalists maintain that it is impossible to separate the two attitudes and, in practice, one of them always predominates over the other. On the basis of this statement, three main roles of a journalist have been suggested:

- an interpreter (who analyzes and explains different aspects of reality and who carefully follows the actions of the government);
- a distributor (who provides the information fast and to as many viewers or readers as possible—neutral observer);
- an adversary (who criticizes the actions of the government and businesspeople /economists).

The roles of the interpreter and adversary reveal the attitude of involvement in events and only differ as far as the level of the involvement is concerned. In general, journalists who belong to only one of the categories are in the minority. Cultural differences and various professional traditions may result in the predominance of one of the "roles," for instance,



that of a neutral informer who analyzes and explains different aspects of reality, in opposition to the involved attitude.

The system of public communication is multi-level and diverse. Each level has different individuals responsible for the selection of information. The autonomy of journalists is greatly limited. At the editorial level the people in charge are the board or the editor-in-chief, who describes the policy and also the means and methods of executing it. He organizes the work of the editorial office and the criteria according to which the information should be selected as well as the form in which it should be transmitted (Ustawa z 26 stycznia 1984 r. prawo prasowe, Dz.U. z 1984r., art. 7, 25).

In the editorial office the professional role of a journalist–interpreter or journalist–adversary is limited. In practice, public service (state) media are constantly exposed to covert political infiltration, while commercial (private) media resist the pressure of the government and serve as a means of political power that represents the owners of broadcasting corporations and influences the government. The media are not a neutral intermediary of political communication. They fulfill their tasks under the command of their own logic and goals. This logic relies on personalizing politics and turning it into a show with a lively plot and surprising turns. It ought to be an attractive show, well understood, exciting, and pleasant, and it should gain popularity among the audience (Mrozowski 2001, 135). Politics becomes a media show in which politicians are the main characters (Dobek-Ostrowska 1998, 72).

### ***Pressure for Ratings, or a Public Mission***

Freedom of the press has always been connected with certain obligations towards society. M. Kunczik and A. Zipfel (2000, 45) define six fundamental functions of the media:

- the improvement of the functioning of the political system through the publicizing of information, discussions, and disputes, and elevating them to the status of public affairs;
- raising the awareness of public opinion in order to get society to take the actions they themselves have decided on;
- the protection of the rights of individuals through constant monitoring of the actions of the authorities;
- the improvement of the economy, making contact between producers and consumers easier through advertising;
- providing the audience with entertainment;
- retaining financial autonomy in order not to yield to the interests and pressure of individual sponsors;

The basic tasks of a journalist include providing the audience with information and knowledge about different aspects of reality (the cognitive function), shaping the public attitudes towards this reality (the persuasive function), and providing the listeners/readers with entertainment (the entertaining function). At the same time, finding a balance between all those functions is what editors expect the journalists to achieve. However, the main criterion for verification that journalists use is the marketing criterion, as well as the need to achieve higher and higher viewing or reading figures. The basic sources of the editorial income are advertisements, announcements, and all types of sponsored information.

On the Polish press market the factors that determine the contents of published information are, among others, the sources of income and the type of the broadcasting unit. For example, public service media concentrate first on providing the audience with information, then persuasion, and finally, entertainment. The political background and the outline of such an institution are no less crucial in this process. The struggle for viewers or readers becomes fiercer and fiercer, and it is the light and entertaining material which becomes most popular. The media pay less and less attention to difficult and vital social problems such as reducing unemployment or juvenile crime, or creating job opportunities for disabled people or farmers. As the media becomes increasingly commercial, the audience is left with a fragmentary view of reality, instead of striving to transmit too many different themes.

## **4. Media Commercialization**

### ***Importance or Mass Appeal of Information***

The introduction of formal changes in the editing of information services, including the editing of newspapers, was caused by the activity of the 19th-century press agencies. Information services, which were “goods” sold to publishers, had to satisfy everyone (a liberal conception of press) (Keane 1992, 27–30). Telegraph fees forced agencies and publishing houses to eliminate redundant discussions about events, interpretations, and comments. Condensed information was cheaper, and thus easier to sell. The method of information transfer via agencies had a direct influence on the editing rules of the newspapers related with the agencies. The principle of separating a piece of information from an opinion entered the canon of objective journalism. Conciseness and the limited quantity of information services resulted in the need to care about precision and reliability in transferring them. The objective journalism style

required tougher discipline and a better technique from journalists and correspondents. The theory of the public responsibility of the press (the 1950s), the New Journalism concept (Doktorowicz 1989, 76–89), and the media doctrine of the development or democratic participation (Mrozowski 2001, 206–209) are the streams critical of the concept of objectivity.

Cultural changes resulting from the new means of transferring information—which provide much wider access than before—have become the subject of recent research. Each recipient of information mentally filters it in his or her own way. More and more people have an incoherent, divided, and fluid image of reality. Because of that, emotions, the context of receiving the news or the reliability of the source, are more important. “Nowadays we think more and more like calculators, and less logically. Rational and analytical thinking is being replaced by emotional reception” (Sarelo 2000, 34).

Media reporters have their own areas of interest—they report what happened in the institutions with which they are affiliated. For citizens, this means a never-ending stream of information about the events in a given area. News from outside the area is reported very rarely and is not considered news. This fact is the first source of the tendentiousness of information selection. What happens outside the area of interest or between the areas has less chance of being shown in the media unless it deals with a great disaster or a spectacular event.

Most reporters are supposed to meet their deadlines. They must collect a specified amount of information in a limited period of time, regardless of what happens. Editorial offices give journalists and reporters much tighter deadlines nowadays and they usually prepare and complete several assignments per day. In order to finish on time, they favor informants whom they can contact easily. This is another cause of bias. For example, a reporter responsible for criminal news learns to search for information in sources such as police reports, and he establishes relations with the police and prosecutors, which guarantee an inflow of current information. Other sources are usually ignored. The consequence of the reporting routine is the situation in which similar people appear in the news (some points of view are not represented in discussion).

The main criteria for the contents and the form of the press information transfer (rotation, circulation) is its mass appeal and showiness. In order to guarantee high viewing ratings and profits, TV shows content should be light and not demanding for the viewer. It should be exciting, and it should also involve the viewers’ feelings. Most important of all, it should entertain. Thus when people who are responsible for the contents of information services decide what events to include, decisions are based

on the events' entertainment value. A report from a flooded city is much more spectacular than a report dedicated to the construction of a dam that can prevent such floods. However, the information about the dam may be more important. Other standards are chosen when it comes to the press—information must refer to important or interesting events. The criteria for material selection were pointed out by M. Mrozowski. He indicated that the news is more valued when it is current, significant, clear, essential, negative, compatible with viewers' expectations, unexpected, connected with other information, focused on details, personalized, concrete, coming from a reputable source, exclusive, and connected with important issues (Mrozowski 2001, 261–262).

Reporters and editors usually look for stories that are new and current, related to a conflict or a scandal, about odd or unusual events, happening to famous people, dramatic and personal, simple enough to be presented in a condensed format, visual (especially for television), and corresponding with issues currently discussed in informational programs and in society (Pratkanis and Aronson 2005, 239).

### ***Time Pressure or the Quality of Press Material***

Only occasionally do journalists have the opportunity to carry out a bigger, long-term project, which involves traveling. Even then, as they arrive at their destination, they must send back materials and photographs almost immediately. As a result the quality of such material is compromised—the journalists cannot study their subject thoroughly. Nowadays speed and efficiency are the most important considerations. Texts and photographs must be created to enable immediate publication on the Internet. The reporter or photographer is expected to work almost uninterruptedly, without time to ponder the task. One of the reasons for this situation is the expanding use of technology, such as computers or digital cameras.

Sometimes new computer systems complicate and slow down the process. The advent of mobile journalists, equipped with notebook computers with wireless Internet access, has reduced the need for teletypists and proofreaders. Until recently the journalists reporting events from outside the editor's office often dictated dispatches to the teletypists, which helped speed the publication of the story. For short news or dispatches, it is rather difficult to observe, for example, a violent demonstration and at the same time write in your notebook on the street, transmit the dispatch to the editorial staff, and safeguard your equipment. Most of the material is read by only one editor, who sometimes does not even have a good grasp of the subject.

Tabloids are defined by their sophisticated layout, numerous photos, simple language, and extended titles.

Reportage is still considered more interesting than fiction, so the sale of factual literature in Polish bookstores is increasing. The reader wants to understand the world, its past and present. The editions of the reportage books are impressive. In the era of soap operas, telenovelas, and reality shows, which do not show the reality but only a strange caricature of it, readers turn to reportage. Reportage portrays the world, life, and people in all of their colors, types, and varieties.

### ***Providing Reliable Information, and Pressure from Advertisers***

Commercialization is a typical phenomenon of the media. Control over what is disseminated is exerted by the editor (he influences how the story is presented). The editor often holds a monopoly on distribution and information. He determines a partial policy of placing (running) the advertisements. The owner may sometimes be dependent on politics. The means of exerting pressure on the editor which is undertaken by the establishment, the international corporations are more troublesome than the limitations provided by the law (Łopatka 1993, 25). The complicated capital structure on the media market is the cause and, at the same time, the result of the clashes between specific groups of interests. The phenomenon of commercialization is a vital threat to freedom of the press, as it sometimes influences journalists more powerfully than the law. The basic weakness of the media system is its dependence on the business world, which has its interests and political sympathies.

No matter how hard it seems to bear the numerous limitations and pressures, the journalist also faces one more test, which can cost him/her the loss of the job (the social censorship). All television programs, including the news, must strive to earn income, which requires providing sufficient ratings and winning the viewers who will attract the advertisers. What makes people watch the news? The studies concerned with the reasons for watching the news showed that a majority of viewers expect fun and entertainment. The desire to be well-informed is of secondary importance (Pratkanis and Aronson, 238). As the director of the BBC indicated, the news is just another form of entertainment. Television coverage of a political campaign resembles the next episode of a popular soap opera more than a dispute on the essence of democracy and leadership. In a soap opera the image is more important than the substance—as much as in a political campaign. Advertisers, politicians, and journalists pass on their messages in the form of eye-catching spectacle and short interview clips. This practice distorts and simplifies reality and excludes

all but the flashiest bits of information. Violence is visually more captivating than peaceful actions, which is why more air time is given to riots, abductions, massacres, and acts of violence than to stories about people who help others or try to stop violence. News agencies place their reporters in places where action is traditionally covered, such as courthouses, sports stadiums, and police stations, but not at schools, churches, or laboratories, where more important events might take place.

These factors demonstrate that the phenomenon of media commercialization is influenced by the importance and mass appeal of information, the pressure of time, and the pressure from advertisers. As a result, the quality of information is affected (hard news is replaced by soft news).

## **5. Privacy Protection**

According to Article 14, Section 6 of the Press Law Act, "It is not allowed to publish information or data referring to the private area without the consent of the interested person unless the information or data refer directly to public activity of that person." More and more often, tabloids enter the lives of celebrities by manipulating the facts. The danger lies in manipulating their comments and statements. The law protects the good name of people who have been presented in an unfavorable light (Ustawa z 26 stycznia 1984 r. prawo prasowe, Dz. U. z 1984 r., art. 14). Many celebrities believe that taking legal action against tabloids is beneath their dignity. The legal rules do not specify the limits of privacy protection. It seems that only court rulings have the ability to stop the media from violating the good name and reputation of the people described in tabloids. Analysis of the contents of Polish tabloids has shown that they inform about the private lives of famous people much more rarely than their European equivalents.

A precise line should be drawn between journalism and entertainment media. The employees of entertainment media should not be treated as journalists. Their invention and creativity would then not be limited by journalists' codes or legal acts. Made-up stories should be published on clearly identified entertainment pages.

The legislator does not settle the conflict of the laws protecting the rights of an individual, such as dignity, privacy, and freedom of speech, leaving this issue to be addressed by journalistic practice. The court has the competence to make the final verification and the opinion on the journalist's ability to balance the protection of the good name (as a component of the right to privacy) with freedom of speech (as a component of an open and pluralistic society).

The judicial decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg specifies that placing restrictions on the media must always be treated as a justified exception to the rule. The lack of limitations must be the rule because only in such situations can the media contribute to the public dispute and stigmatize actions that should not take place and which, without the media's intervention, would not have been revealed to the public.

More and more claims of libel and slander are investigated by the courts, yet the dispute continues: Where does freedom of speech end and a crime begin? According to Article 226 of the Criminal Code: "A person who, in public, insults or humiliates the authority regulated in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland will be punished with a fine, penalty of restricted liberty or imprisonment for up to two years" (Ustawa kodeks karny, Dz. U. z 1969 r., Nr 13, poz. 94, art. 226).

The official statement of the Helsinki Committee is worth noting. This institution, which helped protect human rights, declared that "Apart from the prosecution, there are also other means of calling the members of parliament to order when a parliamentary debate is becoming impolite" (Brunetko 2006). It is often recalled in the media dispute that in 2001 there was a proposal to create a specific civil court procedure to investigate the verbal excesses of members of Parliament. It was patterned after the summary procedure of investigating similar claims during electoral campaigns under an electoral system. Unfortunately, the rules regarding the freedom of parliamentary debate and the proceedings in case of abuses by the members of Parliament have not yet been developed.

The limitations of a public debate and the responsibility for words in Poland should not be defined by a prosecutor. In such a case any precedent could be used by politicians to impose limitations on the media.

A decision (IC336/93) made by the District Court in Wrocław might be an example of an incorrect cautionary judgment. According to the verdict, the defendant was expected to stop spreading false and unverified allegations concerning the plaintiff's behavior and character. Similarly, the District Court in Szczecin (IC 991/99) ruled that the sued editorial office should stop publishing the articles that damaged the reputation and good name of the plaintiffs.

## 6. The Obligation to Search for the Truth and Limited Access to Information

### *The Issue of Undercover Journalism*

A journalist is not allowed to pass on untrue information if he is aware it is untrue; in such a case his actions are not protected by freedom of speech. However, a journalist cannot be found guilty of libel for passing on untrue information if he was attempting to gather and pass on truthful information with due diligence and conscientiousness (honesty and thoroughness).

The Polish Criminal Code is restrictive because it determines that libel committed in mass media is a graded offense. Journalists face the threat of imprisonment, which discourages them from a critical analysis of reality and weakens their importance as public interest guardians. The low level of Poland's legal culture results in the overuse of Article 213, Section 2 of the Criminal Code, which is treated as a useful means of fighting political opponents. The judicial practice is an excessive intervention in freedom of speech. The tendency to increase punishments will have a chilling effect on communication between society and the free, independent, and critical media. It might threaten the pluralism, tolerance, and openness that are essential for a democratic society.

Sometimes a reporter works on a story for several months, all the while fulfilling his standard, everyday editorial obligation as well, because he has no guarantee that his efforts will succeed. In reality, more and more often the courts restrict journalists' access to the files. Although the trials are open, the files of specific cases are often inaccessible. In most courts it is the president of a specific department who decides if a journalist gains access to case files. The denial is often justified by reference to the Personal Data Protection Act (Ustawa o ochronie danych osobowych z dnia 29 sierpnia 1997 r., Nr 133, poz. 883, ze zm.) and social (family) reasons, but even more often the denial results from the reluctance and fear that the journalists may judge the matter before a sentence is pronounced (Ustawa prawo prasowe z dnia 28 stycznia 1984 r., Dz.U. z 1984 r., art. 13). A judge is not obligated to justify his denial to make the files available; his decision is totally arbitrary. Journalists usually have to wait a very long time for the judge's decision, so they decide to look for other sources of information.

Judges who expect a critical article refuse to make files available to journalists. However, journalists are also responsible for the mutual distrust. They are often disorganized and unprepared and do not know how to behave in a courtroom. All too often, journalists pass the sentence



before they start to investigate. They often lack professional knowledge and conscientiousness.

Each journalist faces the liability under Article 241 of the Criminal Code, which states that “Anyone who, without permission, publishes any information derived from preliminary proceedings before they are made public during an open trial will be punished with a fine, penalty of restricted liberty, or imprisonment for up to two years.”

Choosing the right information to be published in a magazine or aired on television is a matter of high importance. When there is no chance of getting an authorized statement or proof of violations of the law, journalists sometimes prepare sting operations. This is one of the means of fighting crime. No legal act regulates or even defines it. Only the law enforcement authorities are entitled to use it. Such an operation by journalists may be considered a crime, and a journalist who commits it is threatened with punishment. Under Article 24 of the Criminal Code, they could be charged with “instigation.”<sup>1</sup> In practice, such actions are taken by journalists in the social interest and, as such, lead to the discontinuance of legal proceedings because of the low social harm (Kwasigroch and Mikołajczyk, 2005).

### ***Legal Restrictions/The Boundaries of the Law***

The media cannot cross certain boundaries, and its liberty to pass on information is restricted. The range of acceptable limitations is determined by Article 31, Section 3 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland and Article 10, Section 2 of the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Liberties. The first document emphasizes that the restriction should be set by a bill of Parliament and must be indispensable for the safety or the public order of a democratic country, for the protection of the environment, morality, or the rights of others. This regulation states that the restrictions of a certain liberty or right cannot violate their essence. According to Article 10 of the Convention, the limitation must be regulated by the law. In a democratic society they have to be set to protect the country’s safety, its territorial integrity, or public safety.

---

<sup>1</sup> Ustawa kodeks karny, Dz. U. z 1969 r., Nr 13, poz. 94, z późn. zm., art. 24: “Anyone who induces another person to commit the action restricted by the law in order to direct penal proceedings against that person is liable as an instigator. Articles 22 and 23 do not refer to such situation.”

A journalist who is also an employee of the editorial office or who acts on behalf of the editorial office and in its interest (Ustawa prawo prasowe z dnia 29 stycznia 1997 r., Dz. U. z 1997 r., art. 7) cannot act against his employer's interest. If he does, his employment contract may be terminated, and he could be subjected to material liability. Freedom of speech not only grants a journalist privileges but also imposes on him specific obligations and responsibilities.

These obligations set precise limits on journalists' freedom of expression. They require that journalists avoid harming the state (state and official secrets), strengthen the independence and territorial integrity of the country and its defense, strengthen positive and democratic values, deepen knowledge, and serve society. Among the specific obligations imposed on a journalist is the protection of personal goods, protection of the informers acting in good faith, and the protection of other people who trust them. The following are the examples of formal limitations put on journalists in their search for information:

- The obligation to respect the rights and the good name of third parties (Article 14, Section 6 of the Media Law Act).
- The Civil Code (Articles 23 and 24) also protects personal rights and does not allow statements that break those rights.<sup>2</sup>
- The Copyrights Act (Article 52) prohibits the violation of the author's personal rights, and so does the inventive and improvement law.<sup>3</sup>
- In advertising law there are numerous restrictions regarding health protection (the regulation prohibits the advertising of alcoholic beverages, drugs, and medicines that can be prescribed only by a doctor; the law also sets some restriction on the advertising of tobacco products.<sup>4</sup>
- There are also some restrictions regarding the protection of public morality. The Criminal Code prohibits the publication of any kind of pornographic material (texts, magazines, and photographs).<sup>5</sup>

It is not easy for a journalist to act according to this catalog of limitations and still fulfill the fundamental obligation of journalists, which is to pro-

---

<sup>2</sup> Ustawa kodeks cywilny, Dz. U. z 1964 r., Nr 16, poz. 93 z późn. zm., art. 23.

<sup>3</sup> Ustawa o prawie autorskim i prawach pokrewnych, Dz. U. z 1994 r. Nr 24, poz. 83, art. 52.

<sup>4</sup> Ustawa o wychowaniu w trzeźwości i przeciwdziałaniu alkoholizmowi, Dz. U. z 1982 r. Nr 35, poz. 230 ze zm.; Ustawa o zapobieganiu narkomanii, Dz. U. z 1985 r. Nr 4, poz. 15 ze zm.; Ustawa o środkach farmaceutycznych, materiałach medycznych, aptekach, hurtowniach i nadzorze farmaceutycznym, Dz. u. z 1991 r. Nr 105, poz. 452.

<sup>5</sup> Ustawa kodeks karny, Dz. U. z 1969 r., Nr 13, poz. 94, z późn. zm.

vide reliable information about every aspect of social life. That is why ambitious and inquisitive journalists often put themselves at risk of legal liability and disciplinary proceedings. Sometimes an editor does not take the foregoing restrictions into consideration, especially if the restrictions do not serve their interest. Editors often deliberately break the law because the penalties are not severe.

### *A Journalist's Conscience*

Journalists should be impartial but not indifferent to vital social issues and interests of their readers. To avoid partiality, journalists are prohibited from accepting free services or gifts of any kind. The Journalists' Code of Conduct insists on differentiating between information and opinion, bans direct comments on politicians' and social activists' opinions, and forbids any emotional terms. It orders the protection of the personal rights of informers and third parties that trust the journalist (Michalski 1998, 33).

Almost all restrictions on and regulations of particular behavior are both regulatory laws and moral codes. Compromise between the limitation of the freedom of the press and the need for press responsibility is expressed in the idea that journalists, editors, and publishers should be responsible for setting limits on their own behavioral norms (Kononiuk and Michalski 1998, 96). Nowadays this idea is acknowledged more and more widely. It is confirmed by Resolution 1003 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe from 1993: "(...)the media have to undertake to develop ethical norms that can guarantee freedom of speech and the fundamental right of citizens to receive true information and reliable opinions" (Zeszyty Prasoznawcze 1994, 155–160).

That resolution determines that the goal of the media is a kind of intermediary role—to serve as information services. Freedom must also be protected in the media, in case of internal pressure. Thus publishers and journalists have to cooperate. Both sides need to be involved in order to arrive at accurate information and ethical opinions.

The influence of ethical codes on journalistic practice in Poland is limited. These codes are expressed as ideal proposals. The exceptional document of press deontology in Poland is the Ethical Card of the media, accepted in 1995 by all journalists' societies as well as some broadcasters' organizations. The card includes seven rules: the rule of truth; objectivity; separation of fact and opinion; honesty, respect and tolerance; the priority of the audience's welfare; and freedom of, and responsibility for, the form and content of the news story. One can be summoned to appear in court for the contravention of the law; in the same way one might be

made to appear in journalistic court for the violation of the rules of the code of social norms, and for the abuse of the Ethical Card of the media one might be judged by the Council of the Ethical Card of the Media. The effectiveness of these liability rules should not be overestimated. The essential question is—how can professional responsibility be enforced if the role of the journalists' ethical codes and journalistic jurisdiction in Poland is on the decline?

Human-resources policy in editorial offices, low incomes (especially in local media), and bad working conditions lead to excessive turnover in the field. The journalistic profession is marked by considerable stratification. Not many people are ready to devote themselves to journalism. One cannot be creative without being in touch with a creative environment. In the everyday battle to present news, with quality and opinion-making content, it is easy to transgress the rules of journalistic reliability and honesty. The media tend to exaggerate while presenting important and serious news, which in turn leads to a deterioration in journalistic standards. The most important question is whether the material is professional, what kind of message it provides, and what emotions it evokes. Although extreme cases should be regulated by legal norms, civil mechanisms—such as consumer rights and market rights—turn out to be the most effective. Financial penalties and rewards are also more convincing than legal orders and prohibitions.

## **Conclusion**

The diagnosis of journalistic activity in the public sphere results in dilemmas that point up fundamental questions about the essence and the quality of journalism and also about the state of the journalistic profession in Poland. Those dilemmas cannot be resolved without any doubts, and those doubts are the source of never-ending debates about the significance of the job. In practice, a journalist uses his or her conscience to decide, aided by his or her ethics and values.

These problems faced by journalists in carrying out their professional duties directly affect the quality and implementation of the media's information-providing and opinion-making tasks. The pauperization of the journalistic profession is increased by commercialization and prevailing economic conditions. The very low activity of professional associations makes the situation worse. Journalists' organizations are too weak and divided. They are not able to articulate group interests or represent their profession effectively in Parliament.

Contemporary journalism is often a secondary tool for the analysis and processing of information gathered by others. The media, despite their

seeming variety, imitate each other, which often leads to uniformity of opinion and loss of the originality that should characterize their own materials. The convergence of the media is intensifying.

Polish journalists find it difficult to define their own identity. The tradition of Polish journalism is developed by the professionally active generation that has been shaping the Polish media since 1989. The ideal all journalists should aspire to is a position of independence, impervious to both political and business pressure and enjoying a well-established professional status.

## Reference List

- Bagart L. (1995). *Commercial Culture*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Barta, J., and I. Dobosz (1989). *Skrypt: Prawo prasowe i autorskie*. Kraków.
- Brunetko, K. (2006). "Cienias z hochsztaplerem." *Polityka*, No. 22, June 3, 2006.
- Dobek-Ostrowska, B. (1998). *Współczesne systemy komunikowania*. Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego.
- Dobek-Ostrowska, B. (2006). *Komunikowanie polityczne i publiczne*. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN.
- Doktorowicz, K. (1989). *Obiektywizm w amerykańskiej doktrynie prasowej*. Katowice: Uniwersytet Śląski.
- Dryll, I. (1969). "Przypadek rządzi... kadra dziennikarską," *Biuletyn ZG RSW "Prasa"* 1969, No. 123.
- Dyoniziak, R. (1997). *Sondaże a manipulowanie społeczeństwem*. Kraków: Universitas.
- Gluz, R. (2006). Wybrnę. Rozmowa z Kamilem Durczakiem nowym szefem "Faktów" w TVN—ie, *Press 5* (124), May 15–June 14, 2006.
- Grzelka, M. (1997). *Ochrona dóbr osobistych w orzecznictwie*. Sopot: Wydawnictwo Stowarzyszenia Komorników Sądowych "Currenda."
- Heath, R. (2006). *Ukryta moc reklamy*. Gdańsk: Gdańskie Wydawnictwo Psychologiczne.
- Hohenberg, J. (1978). *The Professional Journalists: A Guide to the Practice and Principles of the News Media*. Kansas.
- Keane, J. (1992). *Media i demokracja*. London: Aneks.
- Kobylińska, Z., and D. Grabowski (1996). *Dziennikarski etos*. Olsztyn: Lux Mundi.
- Kononiuk, T., and B. Michalski (1998). *Problemy prawne zawodu dziennikarskiego*. Warsaw: Dom Wydawniczy Elipsa.
- Kowalski, T. (1998). *Media i pieniądze*. Warsaw: Przedsiębiorstwo Handlowe TEX.
- Kunczik, M., and A. Zipfel (2000). *Wprowadzenie do nauki o dziennikarstwie i komunikowaniu*. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar.
- Kupis, T. (1970). "Kadrowe problemy zawodu dziennikarskiego dziś i jutro," *Biuletyn ZG RSW "Prasa"* 1970, No. 126.
- Kwasigroch, A., and E. Mikołajczyk (2005). *Czy wolno?* Warsaw: Telewizja Polska S.A.
- Lippmann, W. (1922). *Public Opinion*. New York: Harcourt, Brace.
- Lubański, M. (1990). "Pojęcie informacji i jej charakter społeczny." In *Kościół a środki społecznego przekazu*. Warsaw.
- Łopatka, A. (1993). *Prawo do swobodnego wyrażania opinii*. Warsaw: Agencja Scholar.
- McLuhan, M. (1968). *Środek jest przekazem*. Warsaw.
- McQuail, D. (1987). *Mass Communication Theory*. London: Sage Publications.
- McQuail, D. (1992). *Media Performance: Mass Communication and the Public Interest*. London: Sage Publications.
- Michalski, B. (1998). *Podstawowe problemy prawa prasowego*. Warsaw: Dom Wydawniczy Elipsa.
- Mocek, S. (2005). *Dziennikarstwo media społeczeństwo*. Warsaw: Collegium Civitas Press.

- Mrozowski, M. (2002). *Media masowe. Władza, rozrywka i biznes*. Warsaw: Oficyna Wydawnicza Aspra.
- Niczyperowicz, A. (1996). *Abecadło dziennikarza*. Poznań: Wydawnictwo Kontekst.
- Pisarek, W. (1988). *Retoryka dziennikarska*. Kraków: Ośrodek Badań Prasoznawczych RSW "Prasa—Książka—Ruch."
- Pratkanis, A., and E. Aronson (2005). *Wiek propagandy*. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN.
- Sareło, Z. (2000). *Media w służbie osoby, Etyka społecznego komunikowania*. Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek.
- Sobczak, J. (1993). *Polskie Prawo Prasowe*. Poznań: Oficyna Wydawnicza Book Service.
- Schulz, W. (2006). *Komunikacja polityczna*. Kraków: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego.
- Zaucha, A. (2006). "Kremlowski knebel," *Newsweek*, October 29, 2006, 41.
- Zeszyty Prasoznawcze 1994*, No. 3–4, 155–160.

### *Laws and Regulations*

- Ustawa z 26 stycznia 1984 r. prawo prasowe, Dz.U. z 1984r., Nr 5, poz. 24, ze.zm.
- Ustawa kodeks karny, Dz. U. z 1969 r., Nr 13, poz. 94, z późn. zm.
- Zakładowa Umowa Zbiorowa dla dziennikarzy zatrudnionych w redakcjach wydawnictw i agencji RSW "Prasa—Książka—Ruch," Warsaw, July 13, 1989, 3.





# **Comparing Media Systems and Media Content: Online Newspapers in Ten Eastern and Western European Countries**

*Hartmut Wessler, Malgorzata Skorek, Katharina Kleinen-von  
Königslöw, Maximilian Held, Mihaela Dobрева, Manuel Adolphsen*

## **Introduction**

How similar or different are journalism cultures in Europe today? Are we witnessing the emergence of a homogeneous Western style of journalism based on an Anglo-American model? Or do national traditions of journalism persist? Can we identify groups of countries in Europe with similar journalism styles? Or do we find a dispersed pattern of national peculiarities? And how does the democratization of Eastern European countries—and their recent accession to the European Union—change the face of journalism in Europe? How do Eastern and Western European countries relate to the EU and to each other in their coverage of political matters?

We address all of these questions through a comparative content analysis that systematically includes both Western and Eastern European countries. The study covers national and international political coverage in 30 online newspapers (both quality and tabloid) from 10 countries—Austria, France, Germany, Ireland, Spain, and the United Kingdom in the West, and Bulgaria, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania in the East (for details on country and newspaper sampling, see Section 2 below). We set out to describe differences and similarities in reporting styles as well as levels and patterns of Europeanization in the content of these online newspapers. And we attempt to explain these by systematically considering a range of explanatory factors.

The questions mentioned in the beginning relate to two different strands of theorizing. On the one hand, they touch on the debate about the degree of international homogenization in journalism cultures, or as some have claimed, their Americanization. On the other hand, these questions address the discussion about the emergence of a European public sphere, or more broadly, the Europeanization of national public spheres. We will briefly review both strands before describing our empirical study.

## 1. Homogenization of Journalism Cultures?

In their seminal study *Comparing Media Systems*, Hallin and Mancini (2004) group the national media systems of Western Europe and North America into three models: the Democratic Corporatist, the Polarized Pluralist, and the Liberal Model. The authors examine the historical, political, and social developments of each country and suggest four dimensions according to which they can be differentiated: 1) the degree and shape of the development of media markets, with an emphasis on the newspaper press; 2) political parallelism—the degree to which the media system reflects the major political currents in society; 3) the development of journalistic professionalism; and 4) the degree and nature of state intervention in the media system.

Hallin and Mancini define as Liberal those countries where press freedom and mass-circulation press developed early but where newspaper circulation is now moderate. Liberal countries are also characterized by low political parallelism, dominant internal pluralism in the media, the strong professionalization of journalists, and a limited role for the state. Commercial pressures rather than political instrumentalization are the forces that are more likely to limit journalistic autonomy. The United States, Canada, Ireland and—with some qualification—Britain are grouped under the Liberal label.

The Democratic Corporatist model includes countries with an early development of press freedom, high newspaper circulation, and strong journalistic professionalization. Although diminishing, the historically strong political parallelism in the media has left a legacy of some external pluralism and commentary-oriented journalism that has been mixed with an increasing emphasis on information and neutral professionalism, according to Hallin and Mancini. State intervention is aimed mainly at protecting press freedom and therefore promotes rather than restricts the development of the press. Many countries located in Central and Northern Europe (Scandinavia, Germany, Austria, Switzerland, and the Benelux countries) are Democratic Corporatist countries.

The Polarized Pluralist countries feature an elite-oriented press with limited overall circulation, while the media market is dominated by television. Press freedom developed relatively late here. Newspapers are largely focused on politics and are distinguished by relatively strong external pluralism and a commentary- or advocacy-oriented style. Political parallelism in the media is comparatively strong, the political instrumentalization of media is not uncommon, and the professionalization and autonomy of journalists are more limited. Hallin and Mancini classi-

fy Greece, Spain, Portugal, Italy, and (to some degree) France as Polarized Pluralist countries.

While this classification takes up the bulk of Hallin and Mancini's argument, they also suggest that as a result of the processes of globalization, commercialization, and secularization, media systems in Western Europe and North America have homogenized over the past decades (2004, 251–295): the differences between the three groups of countries have diminished over time, and all media systems have developed towards the Liberal model. In particular, commercialization has led to a remarkable decline of the party press in favor of commercial newspapers and to a shift in styles of journalism from a focus on political issues to an emphasis on personal and popularized subjects. This factor, along with the process of secularization, has changed the social function of journalism. Its aim is no longer to propagate ideologies and create social consensus, but to inform and entertain individual consumers. The ties between the media and the political order have loosened, and the media systems have started to function following their own logic instead of party politics, according to Hallin and Mancini.

While Hallin and Mancini do collect empirical evidence for both the existence of distinct models of journalism and the process of homogenization, the relative importance of the two is still somewhat uncertain. And matters are further complicated by a third element: the specificity of online vis-à-vis print newspapers. There are theoretical arguments (backed up by some initial empirical findings) suggesting that similarities between online newspapers across national borders cannot be interpreted as the result of a process of homogenization but instead are caused by the technological conditions of the Internet. According to Barnhurst and Nerone (2001), these conditions reduce online newspapers' distinctiveness and propel a process of content convergence. While modern print newspapers have always maintained a specific identity recognizable in editorial standpoints, the recruitment of authors, or the selection of topics, their online outlets offer a "potentially endless multiplication of options for the reader [that] makes it impossible for the Web newspaper to impose a voice on its matter" (290). Essentially, the unlimited availability of space in the online world relieves newspapers of their gate-keeping function by offering a comprehensive portfolio of authors, perspectives, categories, functions, and services. The unique profiles of print newspapers, necessitated by the limited availability of space, disappear in the online world; instead of gate-keeping, online newspapers engage in "gate-opening" (see Boczkowski 2002) and thus feature more similar contents.

This theoretical argument has been supported by initial empirical findings. Van der Wurff (2005) presents the results of an exploratory content

analysis of print newspapers, their online outlets, and online-only news services in four European countries. One category used for comparison was that of the *types* of news items featured in various media (i.e. teasers, briefs, caption stories, news stories, analyses, and others). The results show that print newspapers tend to present a large variety of news item types (with each newspaper featuring a unique combination), while online newspapers are much more similar in their choice of such types. Using a different methodology, Barkho (2007) classified the political coverage on the online news sites of BBC, CNN, and Al-Jazeera English in terms of the “discourse layers” used (paraphrasing, quoting, background, and comment). His results show that regardless of how different these three channels are in terms of their broadcasting content, on their online outlets there are no stark differences, as they all use the four discourse layers to comparable degrees. While this analysis did not deal with online newspapers in the traditional sense, its results might still support the above argument that newspaper contents in the online world are much less differentiated than in the print world. Similarities between online newspapers from different countries can thus either be attributed to convergence (to the Liberal Model) or to technology. Caution will thus have to be exercised in interpreting any such similarities.

Since one of the main ideas of journalism in the Liberal model concerns neutral professionalism and the separation of news from commentary, we will compare the factualness of news reports in online quality newspapers between countries from the three models (see Benson and Hallin 2007 for a similar comparison between U.S. and French print newspapers).<sup>1</sup> In the light of diverging theoretical arguments, it is unclear how much similarity in factualness we should expect in the first place. We therefore settle for a research question rather than a hypothesis here:

RQ 1: Does the degree of factualness in news reports from online quality newspapers differ according to the three media system models, the Polarized Pluralist, the Democratic Corporatist and the Liberal Model respectively?

If we find such differences in factualness that conform to the Hallin and Mancini models, we expect the following pattern: Elements of opinion and interpretation in news reports will be highest in Polarized Pluralist countries, because the press there is more likely to involve policy advocacy or political judgments in its reporting. Opinion and interpreta-

---

<sup>1</sup> The literature does not offer clear hints on the degree of factualness to be expected in Eastern European online (or print) newspapers. So we opt for an empirical assessment first, aimed at possibly grouping Eastern European outlets with one or more of the Western models.

tion will be found less frequently in news reports from Democratic Corporatist countries, but because of a residual element of political parallelism and external rather than internal pluralism, they will contain more opinion and interpretation in news reports than the dailies from Liberal countries. Therefore, our first hypothesis reads:

H 1: In case of model-specific differences in factualness of news reports from online quality newspapers, factualness will be lowest in Polarized Pluralist countries and highest in Liberal countries.

## 2. The Emergence of a European Public Sphere

While the question of homogenization is concerned with differences and similarities between countries, a second recent strand of theorizing about journalism has concerned its transnationalization, or more specifically its Europeanization (Risse 2002; Trenz 2004; Pfetsch 2004; Koopmans and Erbe 2004; Machill, Beiler, and Fischer 2006; Sifft et al. 2007). In an attempt to systematize existing research, Wessler et al. (2008) distinguish four dimensions of the Europeanization of national media content and have presented data on each dimension. First, national media coverage can Europeanize by what is called *monitoring EU governance*, i.e. by reporting on EU policies and institutions, or by making the EU the main topic of news items. Second, Europeanization can also mean that national media agendas and frames become more similar over time (see, for example, Medrano 2003; Trenz 2000). Such *convergence of discourse* can lead to more similar perspectives on similar topics, and possibly even to more similar cleavage structures in national debates. But contrary to what some authors insinuate (e.g. Trenz 2004), this does not in itself constitute the emergence of Europe-wide media debate. For this to happen, national media coverage must Europeanize on a third dimension: *discursive integration*. This entails that a) national media observe developments in other European countries (mutual observation) and b) they integrate statements and contributions by actors from other European countries into their own national media debates (discursive integration). Fourth, Wessler et al. (2008) argue that Europeanization also involves some degree of *collective identification* with Europe publicly displayed in media coverage.

In this paper we will focus on an empirical assessment—and explanation—of the Europeanization of national media coverage in online newspapers by systematically comparing Western and Eastern European countries. We are focusing on (indicators of) the two most prominent dimensions: monitoring governance, also called “vertical Europeanization,” and mutual observation, also called “horizontal Europeanization.” (For a

similar approach, see Koopmans and Erbe 2004, as well as Pfetsch 2004.) Vertical Europeanization occurs between the national and the European level, with the media of member states observing events and affairs on the European level. No less important is the mutual observation of developments in different member states, since in an interdependent community like the EU, policies in one country may affect the situation in others. We will examine these two dimensions of Europeanization in Western and Eastern European online newspapers, and we will test possible explanations for the patterns found on both dimensions. It is difficult at this relatively early stage of *explanatory* research into the European public sphere to specify definite hypotheses. Considerations of plausibility do suggest, however, that the Hallin and Mancini classification of countries will not be a good predictor of levels of Europeanization, but that EU membership status will offer better explanations. We expect countries that have joined the EU a long time ago (called old members here) to show different levels and patterns of Europeanization than countries that have joined the EU only recently.

For *vertical Europeanization* it seems that old member states may have had more time to grow accustomed to the importance of EU politics and to appreciate the interconnections between domestic reality and EU policymaking. Media and audiences in those countries may have gradually changed their habits and perceptions over the years and may have become used to reporting and learning about the EU regularly. This would lead to higher levels of vertical Europeanization in old member states. On the other hand, there may also be a reverse argument. Since changes in the domestic situation will be most dramatic for those countries just joining the EU or close to joining it in the future, media attention to the EU may also be expected to be stronger in new member states, thus leading to higher levels of vertical Europeanization around accession time.

For *horizontal Europeanization* (i.e. mutual observation) we can also specify plausible, if contradictory, expectations. On the one hand, the European Union, not only through its economic unification but also its decision-making mechanisms, dramatically increases the degree of interdependencies among the member states. Events in one country gain significance over the domestic reality of another country. Hence it appears reasonable to assume that news items from countries that have had a comparatively long experience of these interdependencies are most likely to feature references to other European countries. Also, EU membership may alter the identity constructions prevalent in any member country, possibly converging—albeit slowly—towards a more Europeanized identity, a process that may further increase the perceived relevance of

events in other European countries. On the other hand, however, the need for new member states to adapt and integrate may cause newspapers from those states to include ample references to other countries, possibly in order to compare domestic reality with that of other—existing or new—members. Also, the fact that the “Iron Curtain” had isolated most of Central and Eastern Europe from the rest of the continent for so long may give rise to a certain “catch-up” phenomenon and thus to higher levels of mutual observation in new member states. We will look into the validity of these contradictory explanations summarized in our second research question.

RQ 2: How does the duration of EU membership affect the levels of vertical and horizontal Europeanization in national online newspapers?

In addition, in the context of horizontal Europeanization, it is interesting to also ask which countries *attract* most observation from others (rather than which countries observe others more). EU membership of the observed country may play a role here as well: There may be a built-in propensity to look at those countries that have been in the EU for a longer time, possibly in order to profit from their experience, thus giving Western European countries a lead in being observed. Alternatively, it is also conceivable that EU membership may not play a role for attracting observation from other countries, but that country-specific characteristics such as the size or the power of a country determine observation irrespective of the duration of membership or the location in the East or the West. Research Question 3 therefore reads:

RQ 3: How do the duration of EU membership, the size and power of a country, or its location in Eastern or Western Europe affect its propensity to attract observation in other EU countries’ online newspapers?

### 3. Study Design

#### *3.1 Countries and Newspapers under Study*

To fully account for the changing face of the EU with 12 new members, mostly from Eastern Europe, that have joined in 2004 and 2007, we aimed for a country sample that represents the old and the two waves of new member states roughly by proportion. Within the older member states it was important to also represent the three models differentiated by Hallin and Mancini (2004)—Liberal, Democratic Corporatist, and Polarized Pluralist systems. The result was a sampling grid with five categories of countries (see Table 1). In order to avoid possible biases from individual countries, we decided to select two countries per category. In the case of Liberal media systems there were only two possibilities in

Europe: Ireland and Britain. The same applied for the countries that joined the EU in 2007, Bulgaria and Romania. The sampling of countries for the remaining three groups was based on the aim of selecting the biggest country in each of these groups (Germany, France, and Poland, respectively) as well as on the language skills of the available coders (leading to the selection of Spain, Austria, and Lithuania).

*Table 1: Selection of Countries*

| Old Member States |                        |                     | New Member States 2004 | New Member States 2007 |
|-------------------|------------------------|---------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| Liberal           | Democratic Corporatist | Polarized Pluralist |                        |                        |
| United Kingdom    | Germany                | France              | Poland                 | Romania                |
| Ireland           | Austria                | Spain               | Lithuania              | Bulgaria               |

For each of the 10 countries, we selected the online editions of three national dailies: ideally two high-circulation broadsheets, one more on the left and one more on the right of the political spectrum, and the most widely read tabloid newspapers (Table 2).<sup>2</sup> The initial classification of online newspapers as broadsheets or tabloids was based on previous publications (Pfetsch 2004; Curry 2003; Gross 2003; Jakubowicz 2004; Lukosiunas 2003) as well as online information sources (i.e. the entries on the European Journalism Centre's "European Media Landscape" website). An inspection of the online newspapers' layout and median article length was then used to confirm the classification. Indeed, articles from newspapers classified as tabloids were clearly the shortest compared to those classified as broadsheets in the given country; the tabloids also had more colorful and flashy layouts. The ideal sampling scheme was, however, satisfied only in half of the countries analyzed (Austria, Germany, Poland, Romania, and Britain). For the remaining countries pragmatic solutions had to be found.

The first special case was the Bulgarian press, where there is no clear distinction between broadsheets and tabloids, and a mixture between the two is prevalent. Hence, next to one broadsheet we have selected the two

---

<sup>2</sup> We are using the traditional labels "broadsheet" and "tabloid" interchangeably with "quality" and "popular" press even though we do not mean physical broadsheets or tabloids, since we are dealing with online versions of the newspapers.



“broadloids,” which are the two most widely read newspapers in the country. The term broadloid is used for those quality newspapers that borrow their style from tabloids (Franklin 1997, 10; see also Kelly, Mazzoleni, and McQuail 2003, 27). The lack of tabloids—or the lack of a clear distinction between tabloids and broadsheets—was also encountered in the Spanish and French newspaper markets. In Spain, following Pfetsch (2004), we have selected an additional quality newspaper instead, as there is no real tabloid press in this country. In the case of France, the third quality newspaper chosen (*Ouest France*) is a regional one, but it has the largest circulation in the country. For the same reason, a Lithuanian regional newspaper *Kauno Diena* was selected in lieu of a national quality newspaper. Finally, Irish tabloids do not seem to invest much in online versions, and since British tabloids are abundant and widely read in Ireland, we have made an exception and selected one of them for Ireland.

*Table 2: Selection of Online Newspapers, Number of Articles Analyzed, and Median Article Length (Number of Words per Article)*

| Country  | Title                      | N   | Median<br>Article Length | Country   | Title                  | N  | Median<br>Article Length |
|----------|----------------------------|-----|--------------------------|-----------|------------------------|----|--------------------------|
| Austria  | Die Presse                 | 85  | 273                      | Lithuania | Lietuvos Rytas         | 11 | 180                      |
|          | Der Standard               | 132 | 275                      |           | Kauno Diena            | 31 | 424                      |
|          | <i>Neue Kronenzeitung*</i> | 33  | 241                      |           | <i>Lietuvos Zinios</i> | 33 | 96                       |
| Bulgaria | Trud**                     | 172 | 147                      | Poland    | Gazeta Wyborcza        | 10 | 344                      |
|          | 24 Chasa**                 | 215 | 144                      |           | Rzeczpospolita         | 67 | 293                      |
|          | Monitor                    | 150 | 261                      |           | <i>Super Express</i>   | 26 | 176                      |
| France   | Le Monde                   | 93  | 620                      | Romania   | Evenimentul Zilei      | 16 | 221                      |
|          | Le Figaro                  | 98  | 598                      |           | Adevarul               | 18 | 163                      |
|          | Ouest France               | 46  | 485                      |           | <i>Libertatea</i>      | 46 | 125                      |

| Country | Title                    | N  | Median<br>Article Length | Country | Title          | N       | Median<br>Article Length |
|---------|--------------------------|----|--------------------------|---------|----------------|---------|--------------------------|
| Germany | Frankfurter Allgemeine   | 70 | 616                      | Spain   | El Pais        | 92      | 593                      |
|         | Süddeutsche Zeitung      | 87 | 452                      |         | El Mundo       | 64      | 553                      |
|         | <i>Bild</i>              | 28 | 334                      |         | ABC            | 17      | 514                      |
| Ireland | The Irish Times          | 78 | 459                      | U.K.    | The Times      | 71      | 605                      |
|         | The Irish Independent    | 79 | 362                      |         | The Guardian   | 14<br>8 | 630                      |
|         | <i>The Mirror</i> (U.K.) | 61 | 422                      |         | <i>The Sun</i> | 17      | 184                      |

\* Tabloid newspapers are printed in italics

\*\* *Broadloid newspapers*

Newspapers' online editions differ greatly in terms of their style of presentation, their connection to the print edition, and the maintenance efforts devoted to them. As a consequence, online newspapers do not constitute a homogeneous type but are a mixed bag of websites featuring different formats and production. It is important to keep this diversity in mind when interpreting the results of our study. A prime dividing line among online newspapers lies between 1) those websites that simply mirror the respective print edition's content but do not possess additional editorial resources and 2) some newspapers' semi-independent online branches, which often seem to be produced by separate editorial teams and only partially rely on the print edition's content. While websites of the first type are usually updated only once a day (usually at night, when the paper issue goes to print) and can be seen as an electronic archive of the paper issues, websites of the second type are regularly updated and constitute flexible news services, many of which also offer breaking news bulletins via e-mail or interactive features. But even among those semi-independent online branches the differences are still great: While some of these news sites are almost entirely based on reports and pictures by news agencies like Reuters or Deutsche Presse Agentur, other websites of the second type generally feature pieces written by their own online

editors. Despite these variations in formats and production, we should reiterate that there are reasons to believe (see above) that online newspapers are more similar to each other in terms of editorial positions, featured topics, and so on, than print newspapers, which possess more clearly differentiated identities.

### 3.2 Coding Procedures and Indicators Used

Our study focuses on news and opinion items referring to either EU politics, national politics in the home country of the newspaper, or politics in other European countries.<sup>3</sup> As a first step a list of all content sections found on the newspaper websites was created, and sections potentially containing political news and commentary were selected.<sup>4</sup> Within each section, only those articles were chosen that contained references to the three areas of politics (EU, domestic, or other European) in their headlines and lead paragraph. The respective articles were downloaded from the newspaper websites for the week of November 9–15, 2005. To create a sufficient degree of comparability, we used the same nightly sampling time for all downloads.

Choosing a natural week is of course not an ideal sampling method, even though it has been used in internationally comparative content analyses before. While we would have preferred to sample a constructed week, this was not possible in the present study for organizational and resource reasons. In retrospect, the week of November 9–15, 2005, can be considered a fairly ordinary week, with only one major European event that drew attention to one country at the expense of others: the riots in the French *banlieues*. It is obvious that this event will privilege France in the analysis of horizontal Europeanization, a fact that we will come back to when we interpret the results for that dimension. We cannot completely rule out distortions in the other dimensions we study (vertical Europeanization and factualness—see below). But since this was a routine week, we also do not see strong reasons to believe that there are distortions, particularly not with respect to factualness, which is a rather stable feature of news reporting.

---

<sup>3</sup> Including all foreign news items would have massively increased the sample size but would not have added much to the specific focus of the study. Regional news, on the other hand, is subsumed in most online newspapers studied under the label of national news or “home” or the like.

<sup>4</sup> For instance, in the Austrian *Die Presse* the following sections were studied: “politics—Austria,” “politics—Europe,” “commentary,” and “opinions.” In the Romanian tabloid *Libertatea* it was “news of the day,” “events,” “current news,” “panorama,” and “the wide world.”

After intensive and repeated coder training, the material was coded by a group of 23 student coders. Most of the material was coded by native speakers. In parallel with the coder training, successive inter-coder reliability tests were conducted on selections of English-language material coded by all coders until satisfactory results were reached for all indicators used.<sup>5</sup> The coding protocol was partly revised several times in order to enhance inter-coder reliability, primarily by making indicators as simple and straightforward as possible and reducing coding ambiguities through detailed instructions and anchor examples.

Our study includes four dependent variables on three dimensions derived from our theoretical considerations outlined above (for an overview, see Table 3). First, the *similarity of reporting styles* is measured by the factuality of news reports in quality newspapers (tabloids were excluded here as were commentary and opinion pieces). Following a method previously used by Benson and Hallin (2007), each paragraph of a news report was coded with respect to its main function: Did the paragraph primarily provide information (either facts or reported statements), did it convey an interpretation of a given fact or statement, or did it primarily offer opinion, i.e. evaluations of factual elements?

Secondly, *vertical Europeanization* was measured by assessing (on a four-point scale) the extent to which an article focuses on the EU.<sup>6</sup> An EU focus was coded when the European Union or any of its institutions (including the euro as a common currency and “Brussels” as a shorthand for EU institutions) were mentioned in the headline or the lead paragraph.<sup>7</sup>

Finally, *horizontal Europeanization*, i.e. mutual observation, was measured by references made in an online newspaper to other European countries (other than the home country of the newspaper). As mentioned earlier, both directions of mutual observation were measured here. The intensity of engaging in observation of other countries is measured by

---

<sup>5</sup> Holsti's coefficient of reliability was for: text genre 0.90; total number of paragraphs 0.98; number of factual paragraphs 0.90; number of interpretive paragraphs 0.81; number of opinion paragraphs 0.93; EU focus 0.98, EU role (side topic, reference to EU) 0.82; references to individual European countries: between 0.80 and 0.97.

<sup>6</sup> For this indicator, two initially separate variables were combined: EU focus (yes/no) and EU role (comprising no reference to the EU, short reference to the EU, and EU as a side topic).

<sup>7</sup> The study featured an additional variable that is neglected here due to space constraints: the degree of domestication of EU coverage, i.e. the mentioning of domestic actors in the headline or first paragraph and the share of paragraphs focusing on domestic matters in an article. Tabloid newspapers generally domesticate EU issues more than broadsheets and thus put them in a strongly national frame.

whether an article features one or more country references (and to how many different countries), while the intensity of being observed was measured by the number of references a particular country attracted in the online newspapers of the other countries.

*Table 3: Overview of Dimensions, Variables, and Indicators Used in the Study*

| <b>Dimensions</b>              | <b>Dependent variables</b>        | <b>Indicators</b>                                                                                                                                            |
|--------------------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Similarity of reporting styles | Factualness of news reports       | Share of factual paragraphs as compared to paragraphs containing interpretation and opinion                                                                  |
| Vertical Europeanization       | Focus on the European Union       | Degree of EU focus in an article<br>0 = no mention of the EU<br>1 = short reference to the EU<br>2 = the EU is a side topic<br>3 = article focuses on the EU |
| Horizontal Europeanization     | Observing other countries         | Reference to other European countries in an article                                                                                                          |
|                                | Being observed by other countries | Number of references to found in newspapers from other countries                                                                                             |

As independent variables we use the Hallin and Mancini classification of countries, the EU membership status of the respective country (old member, new member 2004, and new member 2007) and the type of online newspaper (broadsheet, broadloid, tabloid). For explaining levels of Europeanization, each country's general level of support for the EU as measured by the Eurobarometer survey is used as an additional variable.

## 4. Results

### *4.1 Similarity of Reporting Styles*

In order to assess the degree of factualness in news reports, we coded each paragraph of a news report with respect to its main function: information (either facts or reported statements), interpretation, or opinion. Tabloid newspapers were excluded from this analysis because the norm of factualness does not apply to them as it applies to broadsheet (and broadloid)

newspapers. It turns out that the remaining 23 online newspapers did not display big differences with respect to the share of factual paragraphs. The corridor spans from 85 percent (*El Pais*, Spain) to around 99 percent (*El Mundo* and *ABC*, both Spain; *Rzeczpospolita*, Poland; and *Lietuvos Rytas*, Lithuania). In this relatively slim margin, did newspapers systematically cluster according to the country groups derived from Hallin and Mancini or, alternatively, according to membership status in the EU?

A cluster analysis was conducted to identify homogeneous groups of newspapers. This analysis identifies a set of groups that both minimize intra-group variation and maximize inter-group variation. A first cluster analysis with an automatically defined number of clusters grouped all online newspapers together in one cluster because of the small range of factualness found in the newspapers. Therefore, a cluster analysis with a fixed number of three clusters was performed in order to check whether newspapers would cluster as predicted by the Hallin and Mancini classification. The percentages of facts, interpretation, and opinion were entered as continuous variables, and the newspaper title as a categorical variable.

In effect, the newspapers did not cluster according to the models of Hallin and Mancini (see table 4). Online newspapers from the Polarized Pluralist countries were equally divided between the three clusters. The Democratic Corporatist newspapers were allocated to the clusters with lowest and highest percentage of factual paragraphs, and those from Liberal countries were found in the clusters with lowest and medium percentage of factual paragraphs. In addition, EU membership status or the East/West divide also did not predict newspaper groupings: Of the Eastern European newspapers, six were allocated in the group with the highest factualness, two in the group with medium factualness, and one in the group with lowest factualness. Finally, the clusters did not even show strict country differences. Only three out of the 10 countries had their newspapers grouped in the same cluster.<sup>8</sup>

---

<sup>8</sup> In order to further corroborate these results, an additional cluster analysis with two clusters was performed but did not support the expected country groupings either. Online newspapers from Democratic Corporatist as well as the Polarized Pluralist countries were divided between the two clusters. All Liberal newspapers clustered in the group with a lower percentage of factual paragraphs and a higher percentage of interpretation and opinion paragraphs. The Eastern European newspapers were also divided between the two clusters.

*Table 4: Newspaper Clusters according to Factualness of News Reports  
(Cluster Analysis with Three Clusters)*

| <b>Cluster 1</b>                                                            | <b>Cluster 2</b>                                                            | <b>Cluster 3</b>                                                            |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>Mean values:</b><br>Fact: 97.8%<br>Interpretation: 0.7%<br>Opinion: 0.5% | <b>Mean values:</b><br>Fact: 94.6%<br>Interpretation: 2.6%<br>Opinion: 1.7% | <b>Mean values:</b><br>Fact: 89.3%<br>Interpretation: 8.8%<br>Opinion: 2.7% |
| ABC (Spain)                                                                 | 24 Hours (Bulgaria)                                                         | El Pais (Spain)                                                             |
| El Mundo (Spain)                                                            | Le Monde (France)                                                           | Evenimentul Zilei (Romania)                                                 |
| Der Standard (Austria)                                                      | Ouest France (France)                                                       | Frankfurter Allgemeine (Germany)                                            |
| Die Presse (Austria)                                                        | The Guardian (U.K.)                                                         | Süddeutsche Zeitung (Germany)                                               |
| Monitor (Bulgaria)                                                          | The Irish Independent (Ireland)                                             | Le Figaro (France)                                                          |
| Trud (Bulgaria)                                                             | Gazeta Wyborcza (Poland)                                                    | The Irish Times (Ireland)                                                   |
| Kauno Diena (Lithuania)<br>Lietuvos Rytas (Lithuania)                       |                                                                             | The Times (U.K.)                                                            |
| Rzeczpospolita (Poland)                                                     |                                                                             |                                                                             |
| Adevarul (Romania)                                                          |                                                                             |                                                                             |

Basis: All news items from 23 online broadsheets/broadloids in 10 European countries, November 9–15, 2005 (N=1217)

#### **Kruskal-Wallis H Tests**

Fact:  $\chi^2 = 17.323$ ,  $df = 2$ ,  $p < 0.001$

Interpretation:  $\chi^2 = 16.093$ ,  $df = 2$ ,  $p < 0.001$

Opinion:  $\chi^2 = 15.077$ ,  $df = 2$ ,  $p < 0.01$

A *Kruskal-Wallis H* test was used to test the differences among the three groups, because the distribution of the variables was not normal. The results showed that the differences between the clusters are significant at the 0.1 percent level for factual and interpretation-focused paragraphs and at the 1 percent level for opinion paragraphs. However, this result does not prove that there are still three separate media systems in Europe

that can clearly be differentiated from each other. The three groups differ significantly but, as we have seen, they do not conform to the Hallin and Mancini (2004) models or EU membership groups, and online newspapers from one and the same country were even grouped in different clusters. Furthermore, the newspapers from Liberal countries did not show the highest percentage of factual paragraphs in their news reports, nor did newspapers in countries from the Democratic Corporatist model show consistently higher percentages of facts in comparison to the Polarized Pluralist countries. As the range within which the papers are positioned is quite small (85 to 99 percent factualness), the exact placement of each online newspaper on this dimension seems to depend on newspaper specifics rather than country or media system characteristics. Research Question 1, which asked for such systemic differences in factualness, must therefore be answered negatively, and Hypothesis 1 (positing the highest levels of factualness for Liberal and the lowest for Polarized Pluralist countries) does not apply because it builds on such nonexistent systemic differences.

This finding does not preclude that the Hallin and Mancini classification may still have explanatory power on other dimensions of media content, but it indicates that with respect to factualness in online news reporting, systemic explanations do not work. Instead, a convergent pattern of factual reporting seems to exist in online quality newspapers across Europe. On the basis of our one-point study we cannot, however, decide whether this pattern is the result of a process of actual convergence or of stable technological features of online newspapers *per se*.

#### ***4.2 Levels of Vertical and Horizontal Europeanization***


If there are no consistent country differences in the factualness of news reports, what about levels of vertical and horizontal Europeanization? Let us first look at how our two measures of Europeanization—degree of EU focus and reference to other European countries, respectively—are distributed overall (Figures 1 and 2).<sup>9</sup>

---


<sup>9</sup> Cases were weighted to control for different numbers of articles per newspaper and per country. The variable for weighting articles per newspaper was computed as follows:  $(1 / \text{news items per newspaper}) * (\text{news items of that country} / \text{number of newspapers per country})$ . The variable for weighting articles per country was calculated similarly as  $(1 / \text{news items per country}) * (\text{total news items} / \text{number of countries})$ . The product of both weighting variables was used in all analyses presented below, so that news items from all countries and all newspapers would have the same influence on the results, no matter what their original frequencies were.



*Figure 1: Degree of EU Focus in Online News and Opinion Articles (N= 2759)*




*Figure 2: Number of Other European Countries Mentioned per Article (N = 2908 Country References)*



It is apparent that most articles feature neither any reference to another European country nor to an institution of the European Union.<sup>10</sup> The two dependent variables are significantly correlated (Pearson's  $r = .324$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ), obviously because news items that feature references to EU institutions are almost by definition more likely to also feature references to other member states who are involved in the dealings of the EU. But the measures for vertical and horizontal Europeanization also retain some degree of independence, providing empirical support for our assumption that the two dimensions are not equivalent.

*Figure 3: Different Patterns of Europeanization in Online Newspapers—Deviations From Mean*



Basis: All articles in the sample  $N=2759$ . Values represent the deviation of each newspaper from the overall mean for the indicators of vertical Europeanization (i.e. share of articles with any reference to EU) and of horizontal Europeanization (i.e. share of articles with one or more country references to other EU countries). All values are percentages.

The relationship between the variables: Cramer's  $V$  .276, significant at 0.01 level ( $p=0.000$ ).

Triangle symbols indicate tabloid newspapers.

<sup>10</sup> Both figures suggest that the dependent variables are not distributed normally. Thus we will rely on non-parametric tests in the following.

Figure 3 plots all 30 online newspapers according to how their respective level of vertical and horizontal Europeanization relates to the overall mean. The indicator of vertical Europeanization is a newspaper's share of articles with *any* reference to the EU (degree of EU focus variable, as above), and the horizontal dimension is measured by the share of articles with *one or more* country references to other European countries. The mean share of articles with any reference to the EU is 21.1 percent, while the mean share of articles with one or more references to other EU countries is 42.9 percent. Four patterns of Europeanization are used to distinguish between different levels on the two dimensions (see Brüggemann, Kleinen-von Königslöw 2007): *Comprehensive Europeanization* combines high scores of both vertical and horizontal Europeanization measures. Conversely, a *parochial public sphere* is characterized by below-average scores on both dimensions. *Segmented Europeanization* means that newspapers refer to the EU more than the average, but mention other European countries to a lesser degree. The opposite pattern, finally, with above-average scores on the horizontal but below-average scores on the vertical dimension, denotes a pattern of *Europeanization aloof from the EU*.

Three broad groups of online newspapers can be distinguished. The majority of the online tabloids (*Bild*, the *Sun*, *Libertatea*, *Super Express*, and the *Mirror*), plus the high-circulation regional (*Ouest France*) and a German online broadsheet (*Süddeutsche Zeitung*), are comparatively parochial in that they do not devote much attention to either the EU or their European neighbors. At the other end of the spectrum, we find a group of online quality newspapers that show a pattern of comprehensive Europeanization. The majority of them are more left-leaning (the *Irish Times*, *El Pais*, *Le Monde*, and *Gazeta Wyborcza*), but some more conservative ones are also in this group, and two tabloids also linger at the fringes of this cluster. A third group of newspapers clusters around the means of both dimensions and thus does not display strong tendencies in either direction.

The online newspapers do not generally cluster according to their country of origin. Only German and English newspapers stay in the same quarter while the newspapers from the other countries are located farther apart. Apparently, the level of Europeanization for each newspaper is not predetermined by common country characteristics but rather by its type (quality vs. tabloid) and, partly, its political orientation (left vs. right). This general finding, however, does not preclude that EU membership status will also play a role in determining the pattern of Europeanization. Even if the newspapers from the same country are far apart, their relative position vis-à-vis newspapers from other countries may well be influ-

enced by the time that has elapsed since the country joined the EU, as suggested by Research Question 2 above. We pursue this question in the next section.

### ***4.3 Explaining Europeanization***

Turning to vertical Europeanization first, we assumed, as was outlined above, that the relative significance of European politics and policies for news media in any given country varies with the relation of the country towards the Union. But it seemed unclear whether old member states or members close to accession time should be expected to feature higher levels of vertical Europeanization. As can be seen from Table 5, news items from member states that joined the Union in 2004 (Poland and Lithuania in our case) feature the strongest EU focus (15 percent), followed by those from member states joining in 2007 (9.6 percent) and from old member states (8.1 percent). If we combine the three values containing any kind of reference to the EU (EU focus plus EU as a side topic and EU reference), countries that joined in 2004 still come out first (25.7 percent) and ranks 2 and 3 are reversed, with old members (19.3 percent) slightly outnumbering members joining in 2007 (18.7 percent). Considering that our period of investigation was in late 2005, these results suggest that closeness to accession does play an important role in explaining levels of vertical Europeanization. It seems that this increased EU focus mirrors the particular dependency of accession countries from the EU institutions and possibly a heightened debate about their decisions. Conversely, the evidence for the habitualization thesis, according to which old member states should show more vertical Europeanization than new member states, is inconclusive at best. Old members only come out second when all references to the EU are counted, and old members are much closer to countries joining in 2007 than to the leading group of countries joining in 2004.

As for horizontal Europeanization, we had again identified contradictory explanations. Older members may be thought to have had more time to grow accustomed to the interdependencies between EU member states and have possibly developed a more Europeanized identity. On the other hand, new members may have a greater need to compare themselves with other countries and may still want to catch up with realities in their Western counterparts. Our data suggest that by a marginal but significant difference of 1.7 percentage points articles from old member states are most likely to feature one or more references to other European countries, followed by those from new members joining in 2004 (41.3 percent) and,

Table 5: Degree of EU Focus per EU Membership Status Groups

|                    |                  | EU membership status group |       |                  |       |                  |       | Total |       |
|--------------------|------------------|----------------------------|-------|------------------|-------|------------------|-------|-------|-------|
|                    |                  | Old members                |       | New members 2004 |       | New members 2007 |       |       |       |
|                    |                  | N                          | %     | N                | %     | N                | %     | N     | %     |
| Degree of EU Focus | EU not mentioned | 1,338                      | 80.8  | 410              | 74.3  | 449              | 81.3  | 2,197 | 79.6  |
|                    | EU reference     | 116                        | 7.0   | 43               | 7.8   | 38               | 6.9   | 197   | 7.1   |
|                    | EU side topic    | 70                         | 4.2   | 16               | 2.9   | 12               | 2.2   | 98    | 3.6   |
|                    | EU focus         | 131                        | 7.9   | 83               | 15.0  | 53               | 9.6   | 267   | 9.7   |
| Total              |                  | 1,655                      | 100.0 | 552              | 100.0 | 552              | 100.0 | 2,759 | 100.0 |

Basis: News, opinion, interview, and other items from 30 online newspapers in 10 European countries, November 9–15, 2005 (N=2759). Cases were weighted by combined weight variable (unweighted N for country groups are: old members [1452], new members 2004 [372], new members 2007 [935])

Chi<sup>2</sup>=30,362; df=6; p<0.001

Table 6: Reference to Other European Countries per EU Membership Groups

|                                                       |     | EU membership status group |       |                  |       |                  |       | Total |       |
|-------------------------------------------------------|-----|----------------------------|-------|------------------|-------|------------------|-------|-------|-------|
|                                                       |     | Old members                |       | New members 2004 |       | New members 2007 |       |       |       |
| Article refers to at least one other European country | yes | N                          | %     | N                | %     | N                | %     | N     | %     |
|                                                       |     | 711                        | 43.0  | 228              | 41.3  | 187              | 33.9  | 1126  | 40.8  |
|                                                       | no  | 944                        | 57.0  | 324              | 58.7  | 365              | 66.1  | 1633  | 59.2  |
| Total                                                 |     | 1,655                      | 100.0 | 552              | 100.0 | 552              | 100.0 | 2,759 | 100.0 |

Basis: News, opinion, interview, and other items from 30 online newspapers in 10 European countries, November 9–15, 2005 (N=2759). Cases were weighted by combined weight variable (unweighted N for country groups are: old members [1452], new members 2004 [372], new members 2007 [935])

Chi<sup>2</sup>=14,210; df=2; p<0.01

lastly, those countries joining in 2007 (33.9 percent). It appears that a shared history of interdependency is a slightly better explanation for mutual observation in the press than closeness to accession.<sup>11</sup>

As an additional possible explanation we also tested the impact of public attitudes towards the EU on vertical and horizontal Europeanization. The attitude variable was based on the question “In general, does the European Union conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image?” from Eurobarometer Survey 62.0 (field time October–November 2004). Individual scores were aggregated to compute a mean according to country. However, no significant relationship was found between attitudes towards the EU and either vertical or horizontal Europeanization in online newspapers. Our expectation that there is no relationship between the Hallin and Mancini country groups and levels of Europeanization was also confirmed. In answering Research Question 2 we can therefore safely say that EU membership status does influence vertical and horizontal Europeanization, albeit in two different patterns as described here.

#### ***4.4 Being Observed: East–West Pattern of Mutual Observation***

In the previous section we have seen that the intensity of mutual observation varies with EU membership status. Newspapers from old member states feature more articles that refer to other European countries than new members. Here we examine the reverse question: Which countries are the preferred objects of observation and thus of horizontal Europeanization? In this analysis we include all 27 EU member states, because all of them can be the object of country references (even if some of them are not studied as originators of country references here).

Table 9 shows that Western European countries attract the vast majority of country references in both Eastern and Western European newspapers. This emphasis on Western European countries is even stronger in newspapers from that region (84.9 percent) than in newspapers from Eastern Europe (76.5 percent). But even in Eastern Europe online newspapers devote three-quarters of their country references to Western European countries, three times as many as to their Eastern neighbors.

---

<sup>11</sup> Note that when we treat mutual observation as a continuous variable for each news items (by measuring the number of different countries referred to), the new member states (2004) rank highest, followed by old members and new members (2007), a pattern consistent with the above findings on vertical Europeanization. However, the number of countries referred to appears to be a weaker operationalization of mutual observation than the fact of referring to another country at all.

*Table 9: Number of Country References Present in Western and Eastern Online Press*

| Countries referred to are in the ... | Western online press |              | Eastern online press |              |
|--------------------------------------|----------------------|--------------|----------------------|--------------|
|                                      | N                    | %            | N                    | %            |
| ... West                             | 827                  | <b>84.9</b>  | 492                  | <b>76.5</b>  |
| ... East                             | 147                  | <b>15.1</b>  | 151                  | <b>23.5</b>  |
| <b>Total</b>                         | 974                  | <b>100.0</b> | 643                  | <b>100.0</b> |

Basis: All references to European countries in news, opinion, interview, and other items from 30 online newspapers in 10 European countries, November 9–15, 2005 (N=1617). Cases were weighted using the combined weight variable (unweighted N are Western press [929], Eastern press [756], Total [1685]).

Cramer's V=0.105,  $p < 0.001$

To give a more precise picture we have disaggregated the data to the country level. The countries most referred to by newspapers in both Western and Eastern Europe were France, followed by Germany and the United Kingdom (401, 283, and 213 references, respectively). This result is close to the findings by Kevin (2003, 108), who studied only Western Europe and found that the United Kingdom emerged as the country most often mentioned, followed by France and Germany.<sup>12</sup> Among the Eastern European countries, in our study Poland and the Czech Republic were mentioned most often in the press from both parts of the continent; in the Western press alone, Poland and Romania were referred to most often.

Do our results point to a problematic neglect of Eastern Europe in the Western press? And how can the general pattern of mutual observation be explained? Three alternative explanations present themselves. Following the neglect thesis, we could simply hypothesize that the location of a country in the East or the West will explain the frequency of its being observed. Secondly, we might again assume that older member countries are mentioned more often due to their experience and a particular “model” character they might assume in the European Union. The year of accession would then explain the differences in the number of references a country can muster. A third possible explanation might be the size and power of a country, with bigger and/or more powerful countries attracting more references than others. Since in the EU the size of a country's

---

<sup>12</sup> The fact that France is first in our study is probably due to the fact that during our period of investigation the riots in France were attracting particularly strong coverage all over Europe. This finding should therefore not be generalized.

population translates into (voting) power, we have chosen to measure this factor by the countries' population figures. A linear regression analysis was conducted including all three explanatory factors (Table 10).

*Table 10: Regression of Influence Factors on Total Number of References for Each EU Member Country ("Observation Received")*

| <b>Influence factors</b> | <b>B</b> | <b><math>\beta</math></b> | <b>Adjusted R Square</b> |
|--------------------------|----------|---------------------------|--------------------------|
| Population size          | 3.363    | 0.814***                  | <b>0.670</b>             |
| Country is in the West   | —        | —                         |                          |
| EU accession date        | —        | —                         |                          |
| Constant                 | 5.667    |                           |                          |

Basis: All countries in the sample (N=30)

OLS-Regression (Method: Enter) in SPSS

\*\*\*p < 0,001 (t-test)

The achieved model includes only one significant influence factor but still explains an impressive 67 percent of the variance in the total number of references to a given country. The country's population size is the only influence factor remaining in the model with a beta of 0.814 ( $p < 0.001$ ). The other two factors do not have any explanatory power. In answering Research Question 3, therefore, we can conclude that population size is a good predictor of the number of references to a given country: The bigger the population of a country, the more references to this country are found in the political news of European online newspapers.

## Conclusion

A summary of our analysis yields a complex yet instructive picture. First, news reports in European online quality newspapers do not differ systematically in their degree of factualness. The average share of factual paragraphs per newspaper lies in a relatively narrow corridor of 85 percent to 99 percent. While this suggests a rather strong overall commitment to factualness in news reports, the existing differences cannot be explained by a country grouping based on journalistic traditions of more fact-centered versus more advocacy and interpretative journalism. The Hallin and Mancini typology of media systems (Liberal, Democratic Corporatist, and Polarized Pluralist) does not predict the level of factualness found in online newspapers in November 2005, nor does the loca-



tion of the country in either Western or Eastern Europe or the time of accession to the European Union. Across Europe a dominant style of factual reporting seems to have established itself in online quality newspapers that incorporate only variations from individual newspapers, not from countries or country groups.

Secondly, EU membership status does explain both the intensity of EU coverage (vertical Europeanization) and the strength of mutual observation (horizontal Europeanization). However, the patterns are different in the two dimensions. The vertical EU focus proves to be strongest in those countries that entered the EU a year before our period of investigation (new members in 2004: Poland and Lithuania), while old member states and the countries entering the EU later (Bulgaria and Romania) display a weaker EU focus. In contrast, on the horizontal dimension of mentioning at least one European country in a news item, it is the older member states that have the highest scores, followed by those entering the EU in 2004 and in 2007. Thus it seems that (online) newspapers focus on EU institutions most during and around the time of accession, possibly mirroring the dependency of the acceding countries from EU regulations and decisions. Mutual observation, however, intensifies with the duration of membership, with a more horizontal, decentralized view on political developments in European countries only developing over time. It seems that the integration of newly acceding countries in a horizontal network of communication in Europe will take time. However, we do not yet have long-term data yet to support this claim empirically.

Thirdly, the intensity of both vertical and horizontal Europeanization also depends on the type of newspaper studied. On average, broadsheets have higher scores on both dimensions than broadloids and tabloids (see also Pfetsch 2004). Interestingly, long-term analysis shows that in (print) broadsheet newspapers vertical Europeanization has increased since the early 1980s, while mutual observation and other measures of horizontal Europeanization as well as collective identification with Europe show almost no change over time (Sifft et al. 2007, Wessler et al. 2008). This discrepancy points to a somewhat surprising pattern of (nationally) segmented Europeanization, at least in Western European broadsheets: Newspapers increasingly look to Brussels, but so far they have not integrated horizontally more intensively. However, vertical and horizontal Europeanization in tabloids has not yet been studied in the long term. Thus the question remains open whether tabloids will follow the broadsheet pattern of increased EU coverage or whether there will be no change over time even in the vertical dimension.

Finally, a more thorough look at the patterns of mutual observation in Europe shows that Western European countries predictably get the bulk

of attention in European online newspapers. While Western European countries have about 80 percent of the European population, and they accrue 76.5 percent of the country references in Eastern European newspapers, their share is even higher in Western European newspapers (about 85 percent). Most of the media attention goes to the Big Three—Britain, France, and Germany. In Eastern Europe, Poland and the Czech Republic get the most attention from newspapers across the continent, but their overall share is much smaller than for the big Western countries. There is a clear explanation for the pattern of mutual observation: It is the size of a country that largely determines the attention paid to it. Eastern European countries attract so few references not because they are Eastern European or because they have joined the EU late, but because on the whole they are much smaller than the Western European countries.

What do we learn from our study in theoretical terms? Hallin and Mancini's threefold typology of media systems cannot explain reporting styles in European online newspapers. To be fair, Hallin and Mancini did not explicitly predict this relationship to hold, but it appears to follow logically from their argument. Of course, the factualness of news reports is but one indicator of journalism cultures, albeit an important one in previous scholarly discussions. There may be persisting differences between Liberal, Democratic Corporatist, and Polarized Pluralist countries in other aspects, but systematic comparative data on this question do not exist yet. (See, however, the study by Benson and Hallin (2007) about France and the United States, and Ferree et al. (2002) on Germany and the United States.) As was pointed out throughout the paper, we cannot rule out the possibility that the homogeneity that we find might only apply to online reporting and that traditional print newspapers are still more influenced by different journalism traditions with respect to factualness. The empirical research on this question is limited so far and should be expanded.

In addition, our study clearly points to the necessity of more thoroughly theorizing the significance of accession to the EU and its impact on media content in general and political news in particular. We have made one first step here by showing that the EU membership status does play an important role in explaining levels of vertical and horizontal Europeanization in news. But we could only speculate about why exactly this is so, and what the causal mechanisms are that link accession to patterns of Europeanization in the media. More generally, the research on the emergence of a European public sphere suffers from an overly descriptive focus and a lack, correspondingly, of explanatory models and research designs. We hope to have provided some important insights and additional justification for engaging in detailed and process-oriented causal analysis in the future—as well as for including Eastern Europe systematically.

## Reference List

- Barkho, L. (2007). "Unpacking the Discursive and Social Links in BBC, CNN and Al-Jazeera's Middle East Reporting." *Journal of Arab and Muslim Media Research* 1 (1): 11–29.
- Barnhurst, K.G., and J. Nerone (2002). *The Form of News: A History*. New York: Guilford Press.
- Benson, R., and D.C. Hallin (2007). "How States, Markets and Globalization Shape the News: The French and American National Press, 1965–97." *European Journal of Communication* 22 (1): 27–48.
- Boczkowski, P.J. (2002) "The Development and Use of Online Newspapers: What Research Tells Us and What We Might Want to Know." In L. Lievrouw and S. Livingstone (eds.), *Handbook of New Media*. London: Sage.
- Brüggemann, M., and K. Kleinen-von Königslöw. (2007). *Let's Talk About Europe: Explaining Vertical and Horizontal Europeanization in the Quality Press*. TranState Working Paper 60. Bremen URL: <http://www.state.uni-bremen.de>
- Brüggemann, M., S. Sift, K. Kleinen-von Königslöw, B. Peters, and A. Wimmel (2006). *Segmented Europeanization. The Transnationalization of Public Spheres in Europe: Trends and Patterns* (TranState Working Papers, 37). Bremen: Sfb 597 "Staatlichkeit im Wandel."
- Curry, J.L. (2003). "Poland, Status of the Media in." In *Encyclopaedia of International Media and Communication* (Vol. 3), 495–504. Burlington, MA: Elsevier Science.
- European Commission. (2004). *Eurobarometer Survey 62.0*. Brussels.
- European Journalism Centre: *European Media Landscape*. Retrieved February 27, 2006, from <http://www.ejc.nl/jr/emland/>.
- Ferree, M.M., W. Gamson, J. Habermas, and D. Rucht (2002). *Shaping Abortion Discourse: Democracy and the Public Sphere in Germany and the United States*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Franklin, B. (1997). *Newszak and News Media*. London: Arnold.
- Gross, P. (2003). "Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania, Status of the Media in." In *Encyclopaedia of International Media and Communication* (Vol. 4), 91–101. Burlington, MA: Elsevier Science.
- Habermas, J. (2001). "Braucht Europa eine Verfassung?" In J. Habermas, *Zeit der Übergänge*, 104–129. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
- Hallin, D.C., and P. Mancini (2004). *Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Jakubowicz, K. (2004). "Poland." In M. Kelly, G. Mazzoleni, and D. McQuail, *The Media in Europe*, 169–179. London: Sage Publications.
- Kelly, M., G. Mazzoleni, and D. McQuail (eds.) 2003. *The Media in Europe: The Euromedia Handbook*. London: Sage Publications.
- Kevin, D. (2003). *Europe in the Media: A Comparison of Reporting, Representation, and Rhetoric in National Media Systems in Europe*. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Koopmans, R., and J. Erbe (2004). "Towards a European Public Sphere? Vertical and Horizontal Dimensions of Europeanized Political Communication." *Innovation* 17 (2): 97–118.

- Lukosiunas, M. (2003). "Baltic States, Status of the Media in." In *Encyclopaedia of International Media and Communication* (Vol. 1), 77–85. Burlington, MA: Elsevier Science.
- Machill, M., M. Beiler, and C. Fischer (2006). "Europe—Topics in Europe's Media." *European Journal of Communication* 21 (1): 57–88.
- Medrano, J.D. (2003). "Qualitätspresse und europäische Integration." In A. Klein et al. (eds.) *Bürgerschaft, Öffentlichkeit und Demokratie in Europe*, 191–212. Opladen: Leske+Budrich.
- Pfetsch, B. (2004). *The Voice of the Media in the European Public Sphere: Comparative Analysis of Newspaper Editorials (Integrated Report WP3)*. Retrieved July 15, 2005, from <http://europub.wz-berlin.de>.
- Risse, T. (2002). "Zur Debatte um die (Nicht-)Existenz einer europäischen Öffentlichkeit." *Berliner Debatte Initial* 13(5/6): 15–23.
- Sifft, S., M. Brüggemann, K. Kleinen-von Königslöw, B. Peters, and A. Wimmel (2007). "Segmented Europeanization: Exploring the Legitimacy of the European Union from a Public Discourse Perspective." *Journal of Common Market Studies* 45: 127–155.
- Trenz, H.J. (2000). "Korruption und politischer Skandal in der EU. Auf dem Weg zu einer politischen Öffentlichkeit?" In M. Bach (ed.), *Die Europäisierung nationaler Gesellschaften*, special issue 40 of the *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie*, 332–359.
- Trenz, H.J. (2004). "Media Coverage on European Governance: Exploring the European Public Sphere in National Quality Newspapers." *European Journal of Communication* 19 (3): 291–319.
- Van der Wurff, R. (2005). "Impacts of the Internet on Newspapers in Europe: Conclusions." *Gazette* 67 (1): 107–120.
- Wessler, H., B. Peters, M. Brüggemann, K. Kleinen-von Königslöw, and S. Sifft (2008). *Transnationalization of Public Spheres*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

# Political or Commercial Interests? Poland's Axel Springer Tabloid, *Fakt*, and Its Coverage of Germany

Maren Röger

## 1. Introduction

When Axel Springer Polska, the Polish branch of the German publishing house Axel Springer, announced the introduction of a new daily in the beginning of 2003, the Polish media scene took notice. Axel Springer Polska had already been successful in different segments of the Polish print media market with its approximately 30 magazines and was considered one of the most powerful publishing houses in post-communist Poland.<sup>1</sup> Despite Springer's extensive attempts at secrecy concerning the character, target group, and name of the announced product (Nalewajk 2003, 47), both the media industry and the public speculated about it. The assumption that a copy of the well-known German Springer tabloid *Bild* was planned (Janicki 2003, 104) intensified the debate, and later proved to be true.

The tabloid *Fakt*—which took its structure and approach from the German *Bild*—started publication on October 22, 2003. Within only two months, supported by an expensive marketing campaign and the low newsstand price of one złoty,<sup>2</sup> it suddenly became the most widely read daily in Poland. It beat out not only the left-liberal *Gazeta Wyborcza*, previously the market leader, but also *Super Express*, the only tabloid published before *Fakt*.

---

<sup>1</sup> Many of them are carbon copies of well-known, successful magazines (on the German and Western European market, respectively) such as the *Bild* series (*Computer-Bild*, *Auto-Bild*, *Bild der Frau*), which is recognizable and available on the Polish market as well (*Komputer Świat*, *Auto Świat*, etc.).

<sup>2</sup> The Springer pricing policy caused a debate on dumping prices. Media Express, publisher of the competitive tabloid *Super Express*, filed a lawsuit at the cartel office against the pricing politics of Axel Springer Polska (Nalewajk 2004, 38; "Preiskampf: Polnische Konkurrenz gegen Springer" 2004, 40). The economic power of the German parent company was and is relevant for the pricing strategy as well as for the introduction of the new tabloid all over the country.

### **1.1 *Fakt* as Polish Tabloid from the Notorious German Publishing Company Springer—Discussions about the Publisher**

Besides discussions among media experts about *Fakt* which, above all, focused on the consequences of the introduction of a successful tabloid, a debate erupted in Poland and Germany about the “German” publisher. While German journalists bristled at what some called the continuous stereotypical representation of the Federal Republic and the Springer company’s ostensible lack of morals and ethics (Hinz 2006, 30; Scholz 2005),<sup>3</sup> their Polish colleagues discussed the German publisher from another perspective. Right-wing Polish publications speculated about the dangers of German intervention in Polish politics when *Fakt* was introduced. *Super Express* supported them, trying to discredit the rival as a subsidiary of the “anti-Polish” *Bild* (Puhl 2003, 124).

A growing dominance of Western European, particularly German, publishing companies in the Central Eastern European media markets caused apprehension.<sup>4</sup> The presence of the former “enemy” Germany in this critical field of public life led the weekly magazine *Wprost* to publish a polemical article on October 26, 2003, just after the launch of *Fakt*. Entitled “German Press: Poland Has Become a German Media Colony” (Sieradzki 2003, 22), the article depicted the German presence in Polish media as a danger to Polish interests. “The Germans” are gaining control over Polish public opinion, said *Wprost*’s polemic, an argument typical of those opposing German ownership. Janusz Dobrosz, deputy of the nationalist party the League of Polish Families (Liga Polskich Rodzin), even feared that Silesians would be exposed to German disinformation against the background of a planned takeover of the regional press market by a German group: “If *Słowo Polskie* and *Wieczór Wrocławia* are taken over by a German group, the Polish community living in Lower Silesia will, to a great extent, lack access to true information about Polish political and cultural tradition and about current Polish political and economic-cultural interests.” (as cited by Nalewajk 2004, 36).

---

<sup>3</sup> Criticism of Springer publications has been well-established in the Federal Republic since the student movements: Objectors saw *Bild* as the epitome of conservative political restoration and the potential for manipulation by the powerful Springer publishing house.

<sup>4</sup> Since post-communist (media) markets have gained certain stability, foreign publishers have made significant investments there; high profits are expected there in contrast to the saturated markets in Western Europe. The expansion to Poland was therefore an important and, thus far, successful strategy of German publishing houses. In addition to Passauer Neue Presse (PNP) and Axel Springer Polska, influential investors include Bauer Verlag, Burda, and Gruner & Jahr.

Figure 1: “By Buying Fakt You Support a Company of Hitler!”—Anti-Fakt Sticker, Found in a Student Hostel in Ślubice in February 2006.



From time to time, such populist attempts put German dominance in the print media sector on the agenda. Beyond these attempts, it seems that the Polish public is only partly aware who owns various newspapers (Jachimowski and Gierula 1998, 92).

In the case of *Fakt*, it can only be conjectured if the readers know about its “German” publisher—a question which, however, is elementary for the credibility of its press coverage of Germany. Figure 1 shows a sticker that—although encountered only once by this author—indicates a (problematic) public awareness, at least among some students.

While some of the Polish public assumed that the “German” press products and therefore also *Fakt* in general were pro-German, voices in the Federal Republic complained that *Fakt* took an anti-German position. *Spiegel* correspondent Sundermeyer summarizes (rashly) in an article recently published in *Osteuropa*: “In *Fakt* Springer mainly peddles [...] an open anti-German attitude [,] [...] the anti-German line of Springer in Poland can be verified by a casual glance in the paper [...]” (2007, 267–268).

The results of my quantitative and qualitative analysis of the news coverage of Germany in *Fakt*, however, reach a different conclusion. Sweeping generalizations about *Fakt* being pro-German or anti-German obscure the more subtle areas of conflict caused by the German ownership.

## 1.2 Research Design

Before presenting the results of the study, I need to explain how the research was designed. The analysis is based on the first two years of *Fakt*. All articles on Germany, except the sports section and the last page

*Świat* (World), have been included.<sup>5</sup> The first step was a standardized content analysis of the material, particularly an analysis of topics,<sup>6</sup> followed by an in-depth text analysis on the basis of categories derived theoretically and checked inductively—such as the accusation of hegemony, the use of stereotypes, the dichotomy of interests, and identity. I then selected articles, particularly about current German–Polish debates on history and analyzed them again in more detail through close reading. With theoretical grounding in the cultural studies approach, the design also includes work in areas of media research, especially on tabloid journalism, and media identity constructions.<sup>7</sup>

### ***1.3 Fakt as a Producer of a Certain Image of Germany***

To anticipate a central (quantitative) result of the study: *Fakt*'s glances at its neighboring country are mostly neutral. Most articles are not sensational or emotionally charged, and most of the time Germans are not judged negatively or evaluated at all. Hence, the accusations of German journalists that *Fakt* stirred up opinion against Germany are superficial. There are even examples of positive judgments about prominent Germans, such as the new pope, Joseph Ratzinger,<sup>8</sup> and cabaret artist Steffen Möller,<sup>9</sup> who lives and works in Poland and is regarded as the most popular German. The small sample size of pro-German comments contradicts, however, the Polish fear of a paper serving German interests.<sup>10</sup>

Quantifying the negative view, it is important to notice a critical base of roughly one-fifth of all articles checked. Those articles criticize the

---

<sup>5</sup> *Świat* has not been included, as it does not seem helpful in analyzing the image of Germany. The sports section has been ignored for practical reasons, with respect to the research process. Supplements have also been omitted, as *Fakt* experimented with various supplements in the initial stage and therefore the basis for the analysis was not consistent.

<sup>6</sup> Characteristics like the length and the author of the article were also taken into consideration.

<sup>7</sup> For a better reading of the analysis, all citations referring to *Fakt* are in the footnotes. Editors are identified just as *Fakt* does, including abbreviations.

<sup>8</sup> E.g. ME, TP, and EK, "The Pope Learns Polish! Today He Welcomes Pilgrims," *Fakt*, April 27, 2005, 5.

<sup>9</sup> See KJM, "Steffen Möller Returns Home," *Fakt*, March 16, 2004, 16; KJM, "Steffen Möller with German Decoration," *Fakt*, May 28–29, 2005, 15; MOL, "Don't Take Steffen away from Us!" *Fakt*, September 22, 2005, 18.

<sup>10</sup> In all, 64.7 percent of the articles do not judge Germans or can be described as neutral; 11.3 percent of the articles evaluate Germans or Germany in an ambivalent way; and 12 articles (4 percent) present a positive picture of the neighboring country.



neighbor, reproach hegemonic behavior and use stereotypes. The critical view focuses on certain discourses such as the German–Polish relationship in the European Union, German property claims, and Polish demands of reparation. Negative value judgments and historical clichés are repeated in those contexts, and anti-German campaigns are mounted sporadically. This confirms the results of previous tabloid studies that claim a general ideological flexibility, while at the same time, in singular discourses, ideological unity is present (Bruck 1990, 20).

The news coverage of Germany focuses on historical topics as well as the German–Polish interaction on the EU level. Furthermore, the bilateral relationship, business relations, and German–Polish stars and prominent figures appear on the agenda.

Accordingly, the EU and history are the topics treated in most cover stories—a further formal argument for its centrality. These cover stories mostly have an inherently negative coverage, which confirms present research results.<sup>11</sup> Another constructing element concerning the presentation is what I call “structural sensationalization,” that is, provocative and at times racist aggravations in headlines and the use of photographs that create threatening scenarios. Examples will be given in the discussion about the creation of emotions.

#### ***1.4 Fakt as Participant in German–Polish Conflicts***

*Fakt* acts very differently on the various fields of conflict between Germany and Poland that have caused major discord since the late 1990s. During the period under research, the tabloid simultaneously campaigns against Germany while also employing a strategy of conflict avoidance. The following will go into those aspects in more detail.

##### ***Anti-German campaigns***

Stories about German–Polish EU-interactions were anti-German, especially during the early months of the tabloid, from November 2003 until January 2004. In numerous articles political representatives of the Federal Republic are presented as if they were striving for predominance at the

---

<sup>11</sup> According to a study by Hömberg and Schlemmer (1995) about the news coverage of asylums in German daily papers, negative articles about foreigners appear on the cover, while less sensational articles are published in the middle pages.

expense of Germany's eastern neighbor.<sup>12</sup> The debate on the voting system of Nice hardened this accusation and expanded it into a general critique of the supremacy of Germany and France.<sup>13</sup>

For instance, when one of the last EU Monitoring reports before Poland finally entered the EU was published in November 2003 and mentioned the country's lagging progress, *Fakt* was deeply critical of France and Germany. The headline "Berlin and Paris Take Revenge on Poland!"—taking up half of the front page—is used by the author, Anna Sarzyńska, almost to construct a conspiracy theory: The report had been so grim because Gerhard Schröder and Jacques Chirac wanted to punish Poland for its resistance in the row on the voting system. The cover shows photos of the accused duo, Schröder and Chirac, posing fiercely and aggressively. The text below reads: "They want to soften the Polish government up [...]" Additionally, the article says: "Germany and France cannot forgive us for not letting them assume power over the EU." Editor-in-chief Grzegorz Jankowski repeats this view in his commentary, whose headline reflects the stance of *Fakt* on EU conflicts: "We Will Not Give in to Pressure" or, as written on page one, "*Fakt* urges: Let's keep our chin up [...]"<sup>14</sup> Another article about the monitoring report cites Jarosław Kaczyński, then leader of the opposition party Right and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość), who sees the manner of appearance of the German European Parliament Deputy Elmar Brok in a historic continuity: "Brok's bold statement shows that the Germans have not gotten over certain diseases. They are back to the old way that has always been a misfortune for Europe."<sup>15</sup>

In advance of the summit conference, which is supposed to decide about the Nice voting system, France and Germany—to name another stark example—are accused of planning a dictatorship. The article, following the accusatory tag line "Germany, France! What Are Your Signatures Worth!" speculates:

---

<sup>12</sup> In one-seventh of all articles checked, Germany is accused of hegemony (which will be discussed later), in particular on the level of the EU. Twenty-six of 55 articles about this subject reproach the Germans for acting aggressively.

<sup>13</sup> One of the most important and controversial issues of the Treaty of Nice, which reformed the internal structure of the European Union in response to Eastern enlargement, was the voting system. Countries with large populations, including Germany, demanded more votes, causing countries with smaller populations to fear political domination.

<sup>14</sup> A. Sarzyńska, "Berlin and Paris Take Revenge on Poland!" *Fakt*, November 6, 2003, 2; G. Jankowski, "We Will Not Give in to Pressure," *Fakt*, November 6, 2003, 2.

<sup>15</sup> Jarosław Kaczyński, as cited by A. Sarzyńska, "The Bold German," *Fakt*, November 7, 2003, 4.

“What do the governments of Germany and France really want? An EU with similar rights for small and large states, or a dictatorship? [...] Tomorrow, top diplomats of the EU will decide in Naples if Europe is an alliance of equals or an organization subordinated to two countries.”<sup>16</sup>

This reproach alleges that Schröder and Chirac wanted to demote Poland to a second-class country. Editor-in-chief Jankowski develops the accusation in the commentary of the day: “*The Germans intimidate us and push for changes. [...] Our resistance causes anger in Berlin, Paris, and their belittled satellite nations. But we must not get down. If we do it today it will always be that way.*”<sup>17</sup>

In the course of the Nice debate, *Fakt* distanced itself from the strict line of opposition leader Jan Rokita of the right-liberal Citizen Platform (Platforma Obywatelska), who wanted to set the agenda with the declamatory slogan “Nice or death.” Nevertheless, the accusations of hegemony remain. Again and again, the specter of the everlasting German aggressor appears in *Fakt* reports about the EU.

EU conflicts sharpen in *Fakt* to a German–Polish antagonism. While France is named in the texts as one of the opponents, the photos mainly show the former German chancellor, or the headlines only refer to the conflict with Germans: Schröder wants to convince Poland,<sup>18</sup> Schröder threatens Poland,<sup>19</sup> Schröder ruthlessly defends German national interests<sup>20</sup>—the political interest of Germany is highly stylized as blackmail.<sup>21</sup> In this period the paper sensationalizes in content and form. By presenting Germany as a hegemonic aggressor that seeks the eventual subjugation of Poland, *Fakt* stokes fears and outrage—both emotions that are central for tabloids (Bruck and Stocker 1996, 29).

<sup>16</sup> ASA, “Berlin and Paris Reneged!” *Fakt*, November 27, 2003, 1.

<sup>17</sup> G. Jankowski, “It’s Only a Matter of Honor,” *Fakt*, November 27, 2003, 2. Emphasis in original.

<sup>18</sup> See “Chancellor Schröder: We Will Convince Poland,” *Fakt*, December 22, 2003, 5.

<sup>19</sup> See, e.g., M. Jurek, “Be Careful with Closer Integration,” *Fakt*, January 5, 2004, 2; BUG, “Chancellor Schröder: Poland Has to Give in,” *Fakt*, January 5, 2004, 3.

<sup>20</sup> See EK, “Chancellor Gerhard Schröder Wants to Create a Supercommissioner in the EU,” *Fakt*, February 18, 2004, 4.

<sup>21</sup> “Blackmail of Joschka Fischer,” *Fakt*, December 20–21, 2003, 4. A similar headline appears on the interview with Jarosław Kaczyński in *Fakt*, December 17, 2003, 5: “We Must Refuse to be Blackmailed.”

The discourses about German property claims and Polish demands of reparation are publicized in an anti-German way. Here it also becomes obvious that *Fakt* acted especially aggressively in the first year of publication. Several emotionally charged articles are published that interpret various situations as threatening. Hardly any distinction is made between activities of the Prussian Claims Conference (Preußische Treuhand) and the social consensus that dislikes or ignores them, respectively. On the contrary: A claim of the organization is presented as a German campaign,<sup>22</sup> one article titled “Attack by Prussian Trust” is subtitled in bold, “Thousands of Estates and Houses in Poland—That Is What the Germans Want”<sup>23</sup>—to only name a few examples.

After the former chancellor Schröder basically followed the request of *Fakt* “Chancellor, it is high time for the Germans to waive the claims on Poland!”<sup>24</sup> with his speech in Warsaw in August 2004 by rejecting Steinbach’s plans of establishing a Center against Expulsions (Zentrum gegen Vertreibungen) as well as demands of reparation and threatening the Prussian Claims Conference with legal steps, the tabloid eased its reporting about this subject.<sup>25</sup> This dilution, which is visible in a separate analysis of this discourse, should, however, not be overestimated, as the news coverage of German property claims is closely connected to the Sejm resolution of September 9, 2004. *Fakt* at first presents a reading of the Sejm resolution that this was the fair (and overdue) answer on German tenures. While the tabloid concentrated on the “German campaign” from October 2003 until August 2004, at the same time some articles sympathetic to Polish reparation claims appeared. The resolution was then welcomed with satisfaction: “For the first time in history of the Polish Parliament, the deputies agree. Politicians finally unanimously said what Poles have said for a long time: It is not we who owe the German

---

<sup>22</sup> A. Kaniwski, BB, and PCH, “German Campaign—They Threaten Poland with Strasbourg,” *Fakt*, February 23, 2004, 5.

<sup>23</sup> See AK and PCH, “Pawelka: Return Our Properties! Thousands of Estates and Houses in Poland—That Is What the Germans Want.” *Fakt*, February 26, 2004, 5.

<sup>24</sup> See EK, ME, and ASA, “Chancellor, It Is High Time for the Germans to Waive the Claims on Poland!” *Fakt*, July 31–August 1, 2004, 4.

<sup>25</sup> The emotionally charged discourse, however, is not given up altogether. On August 4, 2004, a short article is published that announces “German claims already this year” and on August 9, 2004, a poll of *Spiegel* is cited that says “25 percent of all Germans want money from us.” The August 4, 2004, article, as well as a later report (October 19, 2004) about the meeting of the presidents of parliament of both countries, both point out that the German government has distanced itself from reparations demands, but the seriousness of this is clearly doubted.

citizens reparations. The Germans must pay us for the destruction of the country during World War II.”<sup>26</sup>

Editor-in-chief Jankowski in his comment, as well as the editors of the article, are pleased about the resolution and back the interpretation of a just and overdue reaction.<sup>27</sup> The following day German reactions are presented, whereas outrage and anger are shrugged off as improper, as it was the Germans’ own fault.<sup>28</sup>

After the first days, which were affected by aggressive reporting backing Polish claims, the presentation became more differentiated. State Secretary Cimoszewicz explained in an interview the background of the resolution and gave more details, whereas the quintessence of the article remains: “I told the Germans it would turn out badly.”<sup>29</sup> *Fakt* then reports in a neutral way about the denial of the demands by the Polish and German governments.<sup>30</sup> The announcement of the Kaczyński brothers, who announced that they would fight for reparations after their election victory, is also not judged positively.<sup>31</sup> Schröder and Belka’s abdication of reparation claims was then received by *Fakt* as an overdue “peace declaration.”<sup>32</sup> Under the headline “Poland and Germany Come to Terms,” editor-in-chief Jankowski comments positively about the shoulder-to-shoulder stance and signals that German–Polish reconciliation had been his and the tabloid’s utmost concern: “It is good news. The German–Polish fight over the past began to assume a dangerous shape. Emotions took the place of facts and substantiated statements. Good for politicians for understanding this. [...] It is time for the German–Polish relations to end those discussions about history. History cannot be changed; it is enough to remember it. This is the only basis on which we can build a shared future.”<sup>33</sup>

This commentary can definitely be read programmatically. After the commentary’s publication at the end of September, the issue of repara-

<sup>26</sup> M. Elmerych and AW, “Unanimous about the War,” *Fakt*, September 13, 2004, 1.

<sup>27</sup> See G. Jankowski, “There Must Not Be Any Doubts,” *Fakt*, September 13, 2004, 2.

<sup>28</sup> “War Reparations: We Don’t Want Any Conflict,” *Fakt*, September 14, 2004, 3. See also “Germans Outraged,” *Fakt*, September 14, 2004, 3.

<sup>29</sup> “Interview with Włodzimierz, Cimoszewicz: I Told the Germans It Would Turn out Badly,” *Fakt*, September 23, 2004, 14 f.

<sup>30</sup> See, for example, EK, “Government Won’t Exert Pressure on Germans for Reparations,” *Fakt*, September 15, 2004, 4; EK, “Poland and Germany Jointly against Reparations,” *Fakt*, September 27, 2004, 3.

<sup>31</sup> See EK, “Brothers Kaczyński: Germans Have to Pay for Destruction,” *Fakt*, September 23, 2004, 4.

<sup>32</sup> See M. Elmerych and TD, “Belka and Schröder Announce Peace,” *Fakt*, September 28, 2004, 2–3.

<sup>33</sup> G. Jankowski, “Poland and Germany Come to Terms,” *Fakt*, September 28, 2004, 2.

tions is only dealt with in short reports with little sensationalization or advocacy. The discourse, however, is not abandoned. When a German comment was perceived as provocative, the tabloid expressed indignation: Lech Kaczyński's threat to settle a score with Germans was an appropriate answer to the announcement of Stoiber to enforce property claims, said *Fakt* in May 2005.<sup>34</sup>

*Fakt* here tends to employ fear and indignation, confirming the theses of the Austrian media scientists Bruck and Stocker that those are the most important emotions of tabloids. Polish attacks are reported in positive terms. Only the last commentary on those discourses is not strictly anti-German anymore, and *Fakt* presents itself as the precursor of German–Polish reconciliation. Polysemy and ideological flexibility, according to media theories the central elements of tabloids (Bruck and Stocker 1996, 24; Fiske 1999, 251), can hardly be found within this topic—until the change in the end.

## 2. Avoidance of Conflicts

News coverage of Germany by *Fakt* shows striking omissions. Important bilateral fields of problems are ignored. The Berlin–Moscow axis, attentively watched and emotionally discussed by the Polish public, is only marginally touched on by *Fakt*. Surprisingly, only two cases are evident in which the tabloid presents German–Russian relations as a conspiracy of arrogant great powers. On October 9, 2005, the only large article was published about the planned German–Russian pipeline, which led to great resentments between Germany and Poland and was named a “second Rapallo” or “second Hitler–Stalin pact” by politicians and other Polish media.<sup>35</sup> Beneath the headline “Is Russia Pulling the Plug on Us?” Putin and Schröder are visible in a friendly conversation, showing how they “agreed over our heads.” According to *Fakt* editor Pompowski the intention of the project was to marginalize Poland.<sup>36</sup> At the end of 2004, a short article was published pointing to similar directions of impact, dealing not with Poland but with Ukraine: “Over a cup of coffee” the politicians had chatted about the fate of Ukraine, whereas even Putin’s

---

<sup>34</sup> See SR, “Is Lech Kaczyński Settling a Score with the Germans?” *Fakt*, May 17, 2005, 5.

<sup>35</sup> In July 2005 *Wprost* published an article on the pipeline titled “Putin–Schröder Pact: The Gas Orbit of Poland.” The German–Russian project was compared to the Hitler–Stalin pact (Nowakowski and Woźniak 2005, 84–91).

<sup>36</sup> See T. Pompowski, “Is Russia Pulling the Plug on Us?” *Fakt*, September 9, 2005, 4 f.

approach to forbid free elections only provoked little protest from Schröder.<sup>37</sup> This is intended to remind of historical great-power behavior, when those states decided over the fate of other countries at the conference table, especially at Poland's expense. Besides shorter reports about the German–Russian rapport which contain little snipes,<sup>38</sup> no critical articles are published in the period surveyed, which leads to the thesis that *Fakt* is avoiding this explosive subject.

Additionally, the German minority in Poland—always a controversial subject in German–Polish relations—and the Iraq war are rarely reported on. Even the Center against Expulsions (CaE), which caused great discord in the bilateral relationship, is only picked out as a central theme when the issue is personalized by coverage of Erika Steinbach. The previously cited articles about property claims do not mention the planned CaE, and other articles focusing on Steinbach present her in the context of her position in the League of Expellees (Bund der Vertriebenen) or without context. One example is the report in the sixth issue of *Fakt* with the headline “Steinbach—We Don’t Want You in Rumia.” Steinbach is presented as persona non grata, someone who, although she came to Poland as the daughter of an occupying soldier, “yells loudest in Germany that the cruel Poles drove her and other Germans out of their homes.”<sup>39</sup> Only in four articles that focus on CaE property claims are the plans for the Center picked up, in two of them only marginally. It is stated succinctly that Steinbach “suggests that she will build the center in Berlin whether the Poles like it or not”<sup>40</sup> or only mentioned that she wants to build this center against the will of the Poles or the German government.<sup>41</sup> The demonstration of support from the then-candidate-for-chancellor Merkel

<sup>37</sup> See EK, “About Ukraine over a Cup of Coffee,” *Fakt*, December 22, 2004, 5.

<sup>38</sup> It is once reported that Germans are fed up with Schröder's puffery about the “democrat Putin” (see “Schröder Gets Punched,” *Fakt*, December 3, 2004, 5). Another time one author smugly points out that Schröder probably forgot when he complimented Putin's contribution to the democratic transformation of Russia that Putin had restricted freedom of opinion and information (See “Schröder Praises Putin,” *Fakt*, January 5, 2004, 4). Additionally, the short report on Putin's presence at Schröder's birthday and on the adoption of a Russian girl goes without criticism (*Fakt*, April 19, 2004, 5, and April 18, 2004, 5). The last report in the period of research is also mild. Although it is about the controversial offer of the pipeline group Gazprom to employ Schröder as a consultant, *Fakt* only published a relatively neutral short message (see “Schröder at Gazprom?” *Fakt*, October 11, 2005, 7).

<sup>39</sup> Ł. Wróblewski, “Steinbach—We Don’t Want You in Rumia,” *Fakt*, October 28, 2003, 4 f.

<sup>40</sup> KK, “Köhler Eases, Steinbach Poisons,” *Fakt*, July 16, 2004, 4.

<sup>41</sup> See ME, “Steinbach, We Don’t Want to Talk to You!” *Fakt*, July 24/25, 2004, 4.

for Steinbach's plans of the CaE is only published in a short notice.<sup>42</sup> Another approach of Steinbach about the locality of the Center is reflected in only a few lines: Steinbach provokes Poland by wanting to open the Center, which shall remember the German expellees, in central Berlin.<sup>43</sup> This February 2005 report is indeed the first about this subject that actually states what the foundation of the CaE is planning.

Two interpretations are possible: Firstly, the debate about the CaE and its main initiator, Erika Steinbach, had already been underway for a long time when *Fakt* entered the market, and thus the name Steinbach sufficed as a stand-in for the CaE. Information on the content was not necessary if the assumption of previous knowledge was right. Secondly, it is possible that Steinbach has been scapegoated to consciously omit the debate about the CaE, not least to avert suspicion about being pro-German. This underlines the theses that *Fakt* forgoes several German–Polish subjects of conflict.

*Fakt's* abstention is even more striking, considering that the peak of the debate (especially the cover of *Wprost*<sup>44</sup>) had only passed a few weeks before the tabloid came on the market and that the idea of the CaE was rejected, not only collectively by those who create Polish media, but also by the vast majority of journalists who are interested in Polish–German rapprochement (Urban 2005, 193; Bachmann 2005, 198).

### 3. Comparative Disinformation

In other areas the tabloid forgoes insights by its reporting, e.g. when another article on crimes of the Wehrmacht in Poland suggests that the myth of the innocent soldier of the Wehrmacht still exists in Germany.<sup>45</sup> This supports an anachronistic image of Germany. Finally, with its (non-)reporting of another historic event, the forced migration of Germans, *Fakt* peddles a Manichaeian view of history: There are only Polish victims and German perpetrators. Most articles on property claims do not mention the prehistory in a narrower sense. If the expulsion of Germans is mentioned, as in reactions to Steinbach or anti-Polish pamphlets, *Fakt* uses strategies of exculpation. In Rumia, for example, the town Stein-

<sup>42</sup> See "CDU Supports Steinbach," *Fakt*, December 7, 2004, 5.

<sup>43</sup> See "Steinbach Again Provokes Poland," *Fakt*, February 28, 2005, 4.

<sup>44</sup> The cover showed Steinbach as a dominatrix in an SS uniform, riding Gerhard Schröder. *Wprost*, September 21, 2003.

<sup>45</sup> J. Pęcherska, "The Forgotten Massacre of Torzeniec," *Fakt*, September 1, 2004, 4.



bach visited, “many Germans stayed, they survived and had a good life in the Polish People’s Republic.”<sup>46</sup> A Polish citizen of Jelenia Góra remembers: “No one killed anyone. We even became friends.”<sup>47</sup>

Those different patterns of coverage confirm that there is no permanent anti-German and certainly no permanent pro-German reporting. The quantity of coverage reinforces this conclusion. The image of aggressive Germans beyond those emotionally charged campaigns seems to serve as a bogeyman.

### 3.1 Germany as Bogeyman?—Emotionalizing

Emotions are central to the news coverage of Germany by *Fakt*. The tabloid provokes concerns about Poland’s western neighbor by sensationalizing the articles (particularly in headlines and the use of threatening photographs) and by reverting to stereotypes. Sensationalist examples can be found in articles on Polish working migrants in Germany. Though the text is mostly balanced,<sup>48</sup> biased headlines are sometimes used to describe tightened measures against illicit workers as “Prey on Foreign Workers in Germany” or “Germans Prey on Polish Cleaning Ladies.”<sup>49</sup> Similar examples are reports on neo-Nazism and anti-Semitism in Germany. Superficially read, one gets the impression that the situation in Germany is dramatic, whereas a closer reading shows something different. While the subject of the headline is at times sensationalist by its structure (“German Politician Blames Jews for Crimes,” “German Neo-Nazis Rearm,” “Nazis Want to Return to Power,” “Nazis Take to It Like a Duck to Water”), a closer look reveals a comparatively neutral way of reporting.<sup>50</sup> The publishing dates show that articles are sensationalist in structure, especially from the tabloid’s introduction until July 2004.

The most dominant stereotype in *Fakt* articles on Germany is the accusation of hegemony. Behind this is the motif of Germany as arrogant

<sup>46</sup> See also note 38.

<sup>47</sup> MS, “Scandal—Anti-Polish Threats on Lanterns,” *Fakt*, May 13, 2004, 8.

<sup>48</sup> German employers are praised for their satisfaction with Polish workers; German offices are critically and attentively watched. Altogether, political decisions concerning Polish working migrants are of special interest to *Fakt*.

<sup>49</sup> “Prey on Foreign Workers in Germany,” *Fakt*, January 5, 2004, 3; and ME, “Germans Prey on Polish Cleaning Ladies,” *Fakt*, July 10–11, 2004, 5.

<sup>50</sup> See “German Neo-Nazis Rearm,” *Fakt*, October 30, 2003, 4; EK, “Nazis Want to Return to Power,” *Fakt*, September 27, 2004, 4; “Nazis Take to It Like a Duck to Water,” *Fakt*, October 4, 2004, 5.

aggressor that enforces its interest with might and too often runs over its eastern neighbor. *Fakt* refreshes this stereotype, as already shown, mostly on basis of the EU, but also repeats the accusation of interference from the sidelines. This becomes clear in the following extract of a cliché-loaded article on the Christopher Street Day gay parade in Berlin: “To Berlin’s mayor Klaus Wowereit (51) it is not enough to see scenes like that on the streets of the German capital. He also wants to see them in Warsaw. [...] The sexual preferences of the mayor are up to him. But did he forget that he is not the mayor of Warsaw?”<sup>51</sup>

Beyond this dominant hegemony-stereotype there are only a few articles that exploit the Nazi past, which indicates that the assumption theoretically derived and confirmed by statements of the publishing world, that the Polish tabloid by Springer would be full of Nazi-Germany stereotypes, is not true. Pertinent negative examples are a three-part series on the plans in Poland of a mortician named von Hagens, whose father had been an SS member, one article on a trip of then-Prime Minister Miller to EU negotiations with the German VIP squadron (*Flugbereitschaft*) and one article about growing support for neo-Nazis in eastern Germany. While SS runes catch the reader’s eye in the headlines of the serial about von Hagens and continuity is interpreted from Nazi Germany to von Hagens junior,<sup>52</sup> the scandal about the flight of Miller not only uses Nazi associations but even reverts to the Teutonic Order. The symbol of the German VIP squadron, a stylized Iron Cross, is transferred without further ado to the symbol of the Order, which is remembered as bloodthirsty in Poland. Miller, says *Fakt*, flew with “a German plane with a black cross on its airfoil!” recalling well-known caricatures of Adenauer from communist propaganda. Those had shown him with regalia of the Teutonic Order, a black cross on white ground, to express the continuity from historical expansionism to the Federal Republic. The text of the article cites Roman Giertych, leader of the nationalist party the League of Polish Families, who asks if Miller would turn up in Dublin “in full regalia, with the helmet and uniform of an officer of the Wehrmacht.”<sup>53</sup> In the article on German neo-Nazis, below the headline “Elections in Germany,” a scary photograph shows a figure carrying the flag of the neo-Nazi National Democratic Party and shaking his fist aggressively at

<sup>51</sup> EK, “The Mayor of Berlin Also Wants This Here,” *Fakt*, June 28, 2004, 4.

<sup>52</sup> See M. Staniszewski, “SS Man Wants to Arrange Bodies in Poland,” *Fakt*, February 28, 2005, 12 f.

<sup>53</sup> E. Konefał, “We Don’t Want This Kind of Thrift,” *Fakt*, April 20, 2004, 4 f.

the camera. The “brown plague” (as the headline has it) had arrived at the Polish frontier, and Poles had every reason to be frightened of the developments in Germany, the *Fakt* editor stressed.<sup>54</sup>

The reporting of the authorities taking action in Darmstadt against undocumented Polish workers is presented with Nazi associations as well.<sup>55</sup> The bitter aftertaste of the affair is intensified in another article of *Fakt*. Only two days later the cover said that Germany built a prison for Eastern Europeans. The reason was the paranoia of hordes of Eastern European criminals, intensified by anti-Polish resentments: “Those plans contain many anti-Polish feelings, without any reason. It is the Germans who gave reasons for that by their mortifying way of treating Poles.”<sup>56</sup> In this article *Fakt* includes several stereotypes to sharpen criticism and to broaden the incident’s significance. Thus the editor objects in an interview with an employee of the Polish chancellery of the prime minister: “Besides those myths, there are facts. Namely, the German police organizes cruel game-hunts on Polish workers, and politicians appeal for the establishment of a prison for Eastern Europeans.”<sup>57</sup>

Apart from those problematic articles, there were eight articles that broke with typical stereotypes.<sup>58</sup> The cliché of hard-working Germans that some observers of Polish–German relationship characterize as dominant (Fałkowski 2002, 22)—this paper will return to this subject when it comes to dichotomous constructions of identity—is particularly countered.

As long as *Fakt* does not campaign in an anti-German way, the tabloid only occasionally stresses the specter of the hegemonic neighbor in order to sensationalize articles and give them an emotional charge. Periodical-

<sup>54</sup> E. Konefał, “Brown Plague on Our Border,” *Fakt*, September 21, 2004, 3.

<sup>55</sup> D. Ożarowska, and A. Sady, “Germans Catch and Band Poles,” *Fakt*, February 19, 2004, 10 f.; see also ASA, “They Talk about Branding of Poles Even in Brussels,” *Fakt*, February 25, 2004, 11.

<sup>56</sup> E. Konefał, ASA, and AK, “Prison for People from Eastern Europe,” *Fakt*, February 27, 2004, 2 f.

<sup>57</sup> “Not the Moment to Intervene: Interview with Tadeusz Iwiński,” *Fakt*, February 27, 2004, 3.

<sup>58</sup> Here one article is to be mentioned in which it is pointed out that Germans are shocked by neo-Nazi incidents (EK, “Nazis Want to Return to Power,” *Fakt*, September 27, 2004, 4). It contradicts the still-circulating image of Germans as inveterate Nazis. This motive is repeated in an article about international press reactions on the election of German cardinal Ratzinger to become pope. The reporting of English tabloids, with headlines such as “From Hitler Youth to...Papa Ratz” (*The Sun*) and “God’s Rottweiler: Now He Is Pope Benedict XVI” (*Daily Mirror*), is denounced as unacceptable. See P. Semka, “Leave the New Pope Alone!” *Fakt*, April 23–24, 2005, 2.

ly *Fakt* plays up scandals concerning Nazis and uses headlines with angles that make Poles fear the worst. In this context Germany sometimes appears as a nation at the edge of nationalism and fascism. The implementing of Nazi stereotypes serves to hype rather insignificant events. Sensationalist and melodramatic, strategies typical of the genre, are used to create scandals in articles on World War II and its legacy today. The Nazi era can be exploited to arouse emotions and bridge holes in news coverage.

Individuals like Erika Steinbach also act as a bogeyman in *Fakt*. The present results of the analysis reconfirm the importance of emotions for an understanding of tabloids (Bruck and Stocker 1996, Vogtel 1986, Voss, 1999). It is evident that historical fear, catchwords with negative associations, and figures of conflict-filled discourses are exploited to evoke the emotions of tabloids: fear and outrage.

### **3.2 “The Pole Can Do It!”—Boosting Poles and Disparaging Germans**

*Fakt* often compares Germans and Poles or “German and Polish,” e.g. in the ability to work and general characteristics of Germans and Poles, but also labor time, price levels, and the quality of products. The tabloid seeks comparisons particularly in “soft” topics such as consumption and work migration and sports to play off Polish against German identity. Poland’s western neighbor here acts as “the Other,” and *Fakt* often promotes the idea of diametrically opposed identities. It also uses a time-tested strategy of boosting one’s own community and simultaneously disparaging “the others.”

*Fakt* especially likes to report that Germans love Polish groceries. The Polish collared pork was much tastier and only half the price,<sup>59</sup> and even Berliners came to Poland as groceries were cheaper and better, as confirmed in an interview with a German woman: “I go shopping here, as everything is cheaper and better than in Germany. Fruit and vegetables are always fresh and taste exquisite, and the same with meat.”<sup>60</sup>

Not only groceries seem to be better in Poland but also pets. One arti-

---

<sup>59</sup> See J. Uryniak, “We Conquer Europe with Collared Pork,” *Fakt*, May 29–30, 2004, 10.

<sup>60</sup> Interview with Margot Knitz, *Fakt*, July 13, 2004, 10 f.

<sup>61</sup> See J. Żebrowska, “Dog-catchers Snatch Cats and Sell Them to Germans: In Berlin They Pay up to 120 Złoty for One Cat,” *Fakt*, September 2, 2005, 13.

cle on trafficking in cats interviews German customers, who point out that “we don’t have as nice-looking cats in Germany.”<sup>61</sup>

This matches established patterns: Germans are presented as well-off materially but poor in quality of life—in other words, rich but lazy. The Polish workload is higher, as is employee morale: This is emphasized several times. One article about economic–political discussions in Germany says: “They work 35 hours per week (we work 40). Additionally, they have 30 days’ holiday per year and between 11 and 13 public holidays. This is a world record.”<sup>62</sup>

The coverage of Polish harvest workers also sets up a contrast. Dawid is happy to earn 27 złoty an hour, and he “absolutely cannot understand why Germans don’t want to do this work.”<sup>63</sup> In the accompanying commentary the *Fakt* editor hits the nail on the head: “[...] Unemployed Germans don’t like the work. But the Pole is up to it!”<sup>64</sup> Polish men are harder-working, and Polish women are better in all respects: “Assiduous, intelligent, practical, honest, and fabulously beautiful. No, this is not the description of a princess from a fairy tale. This is the opinion of German men about Polish women. And this is not exaggerated in any way. This is absolutely true. Our girls are the best in the world.”<sup>65</sup>

The text quotes a German who admits: “I have always fallen in love with Polish women. They are much prettier than German women and very delicate. You can rely on them; they don’t betray their husbands.” *Fakt* highlights his opinion and describes the ability to look after home and family, being pretty, and knowing how to cook as central characteristics of Polish women.

The tabloid repeats the idea of fixed national identities, whereas the Polish and German identity seems incompatible. Polish or German identities are played off against each other, particularly in the tabloid’s extensive coverage of sports, which has been included in this analysis in only a cursory manner. Players originating from Poland in the German soccer league are focused on, and articles or interviews rarely skip the question of which national team and therefore which nation they feel they belong to. The wish to play for Poland is registered with satisfaction,<sup>66</sup> and when a player is already “lost,” the emotional connection to Poland is pointed out.<sup>67</sup> National identities are presented in a stereotypical way and

<sup>62</sup> BUG, “Germans, Go To Work!” *Fakt*, November 4, 2003, 4.

<sup>63</sup> Interview with Dawid, *Fakt*, May 5, 2004, 7.

<sup>64</sup> MGL and AK, “To Germany for Asparagus,” *Fakt*, May 5, 2004, 6 f.

<sup>65</sup> SK, “Polish Women Take German Men by Storm,” *Fakt*, July 20, 2005, 11.

<sup>66</sup> E.g. R. Janas, “Dominik’s Dream,” *Fakt*, May 13, 2004, 20 f.

<sup>67</sup> E.g. T. Burnos, “With the Heart in Poland,” *Fakt*, May 5, 2004, 20 f.

seem incompatible, as shown by the following extract of an interview. A player confirms it when *Fakt* editors Kowalski and Wołosik state that he blossoms in Poland: "That's true. I am a typical Pole and there is no way of me becoming German, like Miro Klose. [...] Germans usually aren't spontaneous. I always care about my fellow men, care about others. I am not a lone wolf. The club is not just a workplace. They only care about themselves and their affairs."<sup>68</sup>

This glance at sports coverage confirms the theses of Langer (2003, 222), who researched the image of Germany in the Danish media, that the sports section in particular reproduces dichotomic identities.

An oddity appears in the coverage of sports in February 2004. An article on the soccer player Lukas Podolski, who has Polish roots, explicitly refers to *Bild*. The German Springer tabloid had alleged—following also the idea of a fixed national identity—that the talented player was German. *Fakt* answered: "Podolski is a Pole," colored this line red and white (the national colors), and included a bold headline: "BILD is Wrong."<sup>69</sup> *Fakt* similarly showed its ignorance in announcing an interview with Aleksander Kwaśniewski (then president of Poland), which he gave to *Fakt* and *Bild* jointly (it is mentioned nowhere that both tabloids belong to the same publishing company): "It is an exceptional gesture! In the middle of the German–Polish debate about reparations, President Aleksander Kwaśniewski welcomed the chiefs of the largest daily papers of Poland and Germany. In the interview with the Polish *Fakt* (8 million readers) and the German *Bild* (12 million readers), the President explains why Germans and Poles should settle their differences as soon as possible [...]."<sup>70</sup>

Besides strategies of comparison and construction of identity dichotomies, the difference between Poles and Germans is created by assuming that all Germans want to implement their interests on Poles, and both nations always pursue different goals. Therefore, in the discourse about property claims, all Germans seem greedy. All Germans want Poles to feel the heat in the European Union. The tabloid construes Germans as a group of "Others" who threaten Poland in its interest and identity. The narrative of "threatened unity" (Vogtel 1986, 56) is stressed here, and Germans are presented as aggressors. Only some exceptional cases show a difference between the political interest of the German government or a

<sup>68</sup> Interview with Kamil Kosowski, *Fakt*, May 31, 2004, 24 f.

<sup>69</sup> T. Burnos, "Bild is Wrong: Podolski is a Pole," *Fakt*, February 6, 2004, 22.

<sup>70</sup> K. Diekmann and G. Jankowski, "Interview with Alexander Kwaśniewski," *Fakt*, September 29, 2004, 1.

lobby such as the Prussian Claims Conference and the attitude of the society.

### **Conclusion: Neither Pro- nor Anti-German—The Influence of “German Ownership”**

Describing *Fakt*'s news coverage as pro- or anti-German, then, is far too simplistic. This analysis has shown that some discourses present an anti-German attitude, and the construction of identity by *Fakt* is influenced by anti-German elements, but that *Fakt* nevertheless does not have a consistent anti-German position. The most critical articles, in which the tabloid creates and repeats resentments, appear in the tabloid's first months. Given the context of *Fakt*'s introduction on the market in October 2003, the media debate about German dominance in the media landscape, and the intensity of German–Polish debates about history during that time, it seems only logical to conclude that the driving forces behind *Fakt* listened to the warning of *Süddeutsche Zeitung*'s Poland correspondent Thomas Urban that “a paper with the label ‘German friendly’ [can] close down” (2003, 19). In its first year *Fakt* took a firm stand on the main debates involving Germany, in line with its economic interests: Polish interests were defended and Germans styled as dangerous aggressors. In particular, the voting system of Nice and the alleged sellout of Polish soil allowed the tabloid to present itself as a representative of Polish interests. By staking out clearly pro-Polish positions the publishing house tried to resist the accusation of being a German instrument. Hence the general flagwaving attitude and the attempt to boost Polish identity while simultaneously disparaging the Germans is part of the strategy. The anti-German news coverage in the tabloid's early issues can be seen as a strategy of Axel Springer Polska, seeking to pre-empt speculations about a pro-German attitude, stealing the right wing's thunder and achieving credibility in the readers' eyes. Furthermore, it can be understood as a method of gaining readers. The target audience probably supports anti-German resentments more than the elites, and Axel Springer Polska had surely examined potential customers' image of Germany when it exhaustively researched the market and adjusted to it. Since *Fakt* proved to its critics that its reporting was not pro-German, the tabloid seems to use its freedom: Opportunities for sensationalism are sometimes skipped and, interestingly, some fields of conflict are only lightly touched upon. *Fakt* only discusses the CaE when covering Steinbach and almost keeps its readers in the dark about the German–Russian pipeline. The ritualized reporting connected to anniversaries does not use false equivalences or historical stereotypes, and in the case of the affair of the

alleged Wehrmacht career of Citizen Platform candidate Donald Tusk, *Fakt* even refuses attempts at exploitation. If these omissions are deliberate editorial policy, it is not confirmed by the publishing company. They also deny having profited from anti-German attitudes at the beginning (Hinz 2006, 30).

But in general, the potential influence of the publishing countries should not be overemphasized in analyzing the media coverage. Mono-causal explanations about the content of the coverage are misleading; what mainly shapes the news coverage of Germany in *Fakt* is (tabloid) media logic of selection and presentation. The general historical–political Polish discourse about Germany plays an important role as well. In a nutshell, *Fakt* is geared to the market and profit rather than the ideological basis of its parent company.



## Reference List

- Bachmann, K. (2005). "Zweierlei Asymmetrie: Deutschland–Polen und Deutschland–Tschechien. Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit und die politischen Beziehungen." In Wolff-Powęska, A., and D. Bingen (eds.), *Nachbarn auf Distanz. Polen und Deutsche 1998–2004* (197–215).
- Bajka, Z. (1998). "Kapitał zagraniczny w polskiej prasie—lata dziewięćdziesiąte." *Zeszyty Prasoznawcze* 153–154: 21–35.
- Bruck, P.A. (1991). "Das österreichische Format: Eine Einleitung." In Bruck, P.A. (ed.), *Das österreichische Format: Kulturkritische Beiträge zur Analyse des Medien Erfolges "Neue Kronen Zeitung,"* 7–23.
- Bruck, P.A., and G. Stocker (1996). *Die ganz normale Vielfältigkeit des Lesens: Zur Rezeption von Boulevardzeitungen*. Münster: LIT Verlag.
- Fałkowski, M. (2002). "Polen als Osten und als Westen: Gegenseitige Wahrnehmung von Polen und Deutschen—Neuere Forschungsergebnisse." *Dialog* 16: 19–22.
- Fiske, J. (1999). "Politik: Die Linke und der Populismus." In Bromley, R., U. Göttlich, and C. Winter (eds.), *Cultural Studies: Grundlagentexte zur Einführung*, 237–280.
- Hinz, O. (2006). "Die Geschichte spielt mit." *Rheinischer Merkur*, June 8, 2006. Retrieved June 30, 2006, from [http://www.merkur.de/13214.0.html?&no\\_cache=1](http://www.merkur.de/13214.0.html?&no_cache=1).
- Hömberg, W., and S. Schlemmer (1995). "Fremde als Objekt: Asylberichterstattung in deutschen Tageszeitungen." *Media Perspektiven* 1, 11–20.
- Gierula, M., and M. Jachimowski (1998). "Stosunek społeczeństwa do kapitału zagranicznego w mediach. Przykład Śląska." *Zeszyty Prasoznawcze* 1–2: 153–154.
- Janicki, M. (2003). "Nowy 'Fakt' prasowy." *Polityka*, November 25, 2003, 104–105.
- Langer, R. (2003). *Die Darstellung Deutschlands in dänischen Medien: Eine Mediendiskursanalyse*. Wiesbaden: Deutscher Universitätsverlag.
- Nalewajk, A. (2003). "Codzienne gry wojenne." *Press* 8, 47–50.
- Nalewajk, A. (2004). "Dominacja." *Press* 3, 36–40.
- Nowakowski, J.M., and P. Woźniak (2005). "Gazowe Okrążenie Polski." *Wprost*, July 10, 2005, 84–91.
- "Preiskampf: Polnische Konkurrenz gegen Springer" (2004). *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, February 20, 2004, 40.
- Puhl, J. (2003). "Scharmützel an den Grenzen." *Spiegel* 43: 124.
- Scholz, R. (2005). "Die Preußen kommen... Die Angst der Polen vor einer Rückkehr der Deutschen." *Deutschlandfunk*. Retrieved November, 10, 2005, from <http://www.dradio.de/dlf/sendungen/hintergrundpolitik/285023/>.
- Sieradzki, S. (2003). "Niemiecka Prasa: Polska się stała już niemiecką kolonią medialną." *Wprost*, October 26, 2003: 22–28.
- Sundermeyer, O. (2006). "Zwischen Markt und Macht: Deutsche Medienkonzerne in Polen." *Osteuropa*, 11–12: 261–269.

- Urban, T. (2003). "Bild' Dir eine Meinung!" *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, October 14, 2003, 19.
- Urban, T. (2005). *Der Verlust: Die Vertreibung der Deutschen und Polen im 20. Jahrhundert*. Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung.
- Vogtel, R. (1986). "Die Gefühle der BILD-Zeitung." *Psychologie und Gesellschaftskritik* 10: 41–70.
- Voss, C. (1999). *Textgestaltung und Verfahren der Emotionalisierung in der BILD-Zeitung*. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.

# Contributors

## Editors

**Bogusława Dobek-Ostrowska** is a professor of communication and chair of the Department of Communication and Journalism at the University of Wrocław in Poland. She is a founder, and the president of the Polish Communication Association. She has published several books and articles. She is interested in the theory of mass communication, political communication, and transformation of media systems in post-communist Europe.

**Michał Głowacki** holds a PhD in political science from the University of Wrocław in Poland. Since 2008 he has been an associate editor of *Central European Journal of Communication*, the official journal of the Polish Communication Association. His research interests are concentrated on media systems, media policy, and governance. He has been awarded scholarships by CIRIUS (an agency under the Danish Ministry of Education), the Swedish Institute, and the Research Council of Norway.

**Karol Jakubowicz** is chairman of the Intergovernmental Council of the UNESCO Information for All Programme. He worked for academia (at the University of Warsaw and as a visiting professor at the University of Dortmund and the Amsterdam School of Communication) and as a journalist for many years. He has extensive experience working as an executive in the Polish press, radio, and television, as well as for the National Broadcasting Council of Poland. He has been active in the Council of Europe, in part as chairman of the Steering Committee on the Media and New Communication Services (2005–2006). He has been a member of the Digital Strategy Group of the European Broadcasting Union and is an expert working with the Council of Europe, UNESCO, the European Union, and OSCE. His scholarly and other publications have been published widely in Poland and internationally.

**Miklós Sükösd** is associate professor at the Department of Political Science at Central European University in Budapest, Hungary, and academic director of the university's Center for Media and Communication Studies. Presently, he is on leave at the Journalism and Media Studies-Centre at the University of Hong Kong where he serves as associate professor. His research concerns political communication, media policy, and environmental communication, especially in Central and Eastern Europe and other post-communist countries. Sükösd also served as chair of COST A30 Action, East of West: Setting a New Central and Eastern European Media Research Agenda (2005–2009), and as key researcher of the EU project, Indicators for Media Pluralism in the Member States: Towards a Risk-Based Approach (2008–2009) He has published over 20 books and several book chapters and articles about media and politics.

## Authors

**Auksė Balčytienė**, PhD, is an associate professor of journalism at Vytautas Magnus University in Kaunas, Lithuania. Her research and teaching activities focus on the comparison of media structures and journalism cultures, media policy and journalism online, European journalism and the European public sphere. Her publications include three books and more than 70 academic articles.

**Laura Bergés Saura** is a lecturer of media management and media economy at the Faculty of Communications Sciences at the Autonomous University of Barcelona. She holds a PhD in the field of economic and financial analysis of audiovisual media and communication industries. Her research fields include media economy, media management, media policy, and media structure. She is a research collaborator with several institutions, including the Catalan Audiovisual Council.

**Hedwig de Smaele** is a professor in journalism studies and communication sciences at the Hogeschool-Universiteit Brussel. Her areas of interest are media policy, journalism, and political communication. Her PhD dissertation (2001) looks at the transition of the mass media in Russia. Her recent research projects include the study of the Russian information climate, audiovisual policy in the enlarged European Union, impact of EU media policy on the programming of European broadcasters, media and democratization processes and political communication in new democracies. She has published in journals such as *European Journal of Communication*, *Trends in Communication*, *Javnost–The Public*, *European Studies*, and *Europe-Asia Studies*.

**Knut De Swert** is a researcher and assistant at the University of Antwerp, Belgium. His research interests are media and politics, agenda-setting, issue-ownership, the extreme right in the media, and television news content in general. He is preparing a doctoral dissertation about balance and objectivity in television news coverage in an international perspective.

**Wolfgang Donsbach** is a professor of communication at the Department of Communication at Dresden University of Technology, Germany, of which he also has been the founding director. He received his PhD and his postdoctoral dissertation (Habilitation) at the University of Mainz. Prior to his current position he taught at the universities of Dortmund, Mainz, and Berlin. In 1989–90 he was a fellow at the Gannett Center for Media Studies, Columbia University, New York, and in 1999 Lombard Visiting Professor at Harvard University. From 1995 to 1996 he was President of the World Association for Public Opinion Research (WAPOR) and from 2004 to 2005 President of the International Communication Association (ICA). Donsbach has been managing editor of the “International Journal of Public Opinion Research” (Oxford University Press) from 1988 to 1994 and 1999 to 2007. He is general editor of the twelve-volume *International Encyclopedia of Communication* (Wiley-Blackwell, 2008).

**Isabel Fernández Alonso** is a researcher in media policy at the Institute of Communication of the Autonomous University of Barcelona (UAB). She is a lecturer in the analysis of media systems at the Departments of Journalism of the UAB, the Ramon Llull University, and the Abat Oliba-CEU University. Her PhD dissertation was on Spanish media policy and the transition to democracy from 1975 to 1982. She has been a researcher at the Université Libre de Bruxelles, ULB (1997–2000). Her research interests are focused on digital terrestrial television (DTT) implantation in Europe and press subsidies in Europe.

**Adrian Hadland** is a director of the Democracy and Governance research program of South Africa’s statutory research organization, the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC). Hadland was a political editor, author, and columnist during South Africa’s transition from apartheid to democracy and worked as a journalist for local and international news organisations for 15 years before moving into research and policy. Hadland has a masters degree from the University of Oxford and was awarded his PhD in media studies by the University of Cape Town in 2007. He

has published 15 books, including several on the media and on South Africa's political landscape.

**Daniel C. Hallin** is a professor at the University of California, San Diego. He holds a PhD in political science from the University of California, Berkeley. His research areas include political communication and media and war, as well as the role of mass media in contemporary democracies. His latest research focuses on comparative analysis of the news media's role in the public sphere, concentrating on Europe and Latin America. He is the author of several books, including *Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics* (Cambridge University Press, 2004) (co-authored with Paolo Mancini).

**Halliki Harro-Loit**, PhD, is an associate professor of journalism at the University of Tartu, Estonia, and head of the Institute of Journalism and Communications. Her research and teaching activities include journalism studies, media law and ethics, journalism and communication history, media economy and politics, and discourse analysis. Her publications include three books and about 40 academic articles.

**Olexiy Khabyuk** was born in Yalta, Ukraine. He studied business administration at the University of Cologne, Germany. In 2007 he finished his PhD studies at the Ukrainian Free University in Munich, Germany. At present he is a research associate at the Institute for Broadcasting Economics at the University of Cologne.

**Hans J. Kleinsteuber**, born in 1943, is a professor of political science as well as of journalism and communication at the University of Hamburg, Germany. He is also director of the university's Research Centre for Media and Politics. He earned his PhD in economics from the Free University of Berlin in 1975. His research interests are focused on media systems, politics, economics, and technology, and political communication in Germany as well as in comparative perspective. He has worked at universities in the United States, Canada, Australia, and Japan and has been active on the broadcasting board of Deutsche Welle. His most recent books include a handbook on journalism and media (2005), a book on travel journalism (2008), and one on radio (2009).

**Carles Llorens** is a junior lecturer on media policy and economics in the Communications Faculty at the Autonomous University of Barcelona. He won a Marie Curie Fellowship from the EU's Fourth Framework Pro-

gramme for Research and Development. He was assigned as a pre-doctoral researcher to CRID (Centre de Recherches Informatique et Droit), University of Namur (Belgium) from 1996 to 1998. He finished his PhD in 2001 on European Union media policy and pluralism. He was an academic visitor at the Centre for Socio-Legal Studies and PCMLP (University of Oxford) from March 2006 to January 2007. His research interests are focused on European media policy, particularly media pluralism, competition, and public service broadcasting.

**Paolo Mancini** is a professor of the sociology of communications at the University of Perugia and contributing editor to the *European Journal of Communication*. He is the author of several books, including *Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics* (Cambridge University Press, 2004) (co-authored with Daniel C. Hallin). He has been active in many international workshops and projects dedicated to comparative studies on media systems and journalistic professionalization, including “Comparing Media Systems Beyond the Western World” and “Foreign News on TV.”

**Maren Röger** is a PhD student in contemporary history and member of the DFG-funded (*Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft*) Research Training Group (*Graduiertenkolleg*) “Transnational Media Events from Early Modern Times to the Present.” She earned her M.A. in cultural sciences from the University of Lüneburg, focused on contemporary history and media studies. Her dissertation project analyzes German and Polish media debates and representations since 1989 of the post-war forced migration of the Germans.

**Lucyna Szot** has a PhD in media law and copyright law. She is a lecturer at the Institute of Political Sciences at the University of Wrocław (Department of Communication and Journalism). She has worked as a journalist and executive at the newspaper *Ślōwo Polskie*, and as a freelance human rights consultant specializing in the area of freedom of expression and media. She has written analyses of media law and practice in Poland after 1989 and various articles on censorship, freedom of expression, and journalistic professionalism.

**Volkan Uce** is a research assistant at the University of Antwerp, Belgium. At the Department of Political Science, he takes part in the research unit Media, Civil Society and Politics. Recently he joined the Electronic News Archive and guides several students and other colleagues through the

archive. His main interests are television news broadcasts and framing in particular.

**Jaromír Volek** is a mass communication theoretician and the head of the media studies program at the Department of Media Studies and Journalism at the Faculty of Social Studies of Masaryk University. Since 1995 he has worked in that faculty as a senior lecturer, giving lectures on media theory and specializing on the issues of media audiences and their relations to new ICT. He graduated with a degree in sociology. In recent years he has been researching the professional role of Czech journalists.

**Hartmut Wessler** is a professor of media and communication studies at the University of Mannheim, Germany, and an adjunct professor of mass communication at Jacobs University Bremen. His work focuses on comparative communication research as well as issues of transnationalization in media and communication. He is one of the five authors of *Transnationalization of Public Spheres* (Palgrave, 2008), and co-authored (with Manuel Adolphsen) an article “Contra-flow from the Arab World?” in *Media, Culture & Society* (2008).

**Malgorzata Skorek** is a graduate student in international communication at Jacobs University Bremen.

**Katharina Kleinen-von Königsłow** is a research associate in the School of Humanities and Social Sciences at Jacobs University Bremen.

**Maximilian Held** is a graduate student of public policy at the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin and a fellow at the Berlin Studies Centre.

**Mihaela Dobрева** is a graduate of Jacobs University Bremen and currently works in sales and marketing.

**Manuel Adolphsen** is a research associate in the Department of Media and Communication Studies at the University of Mannheim, Germany.



# Index

- BBC, 97–105, 111, 112, 117, 221, 236
- Central and Eastern Europe, xi, xiii, xiv, 6, 23, 25, 29, 32–35, 44, 45, 56, 239, 254, 255, 257, 258
- change, xiv, 1, 11, 12, 14, 16, 18, 19, 23, 24, 26–29, 31–33, 35, 37, 42, 44, 56, 70, 77, 78, 82n1, 84, 85, 87–89, 92, 101, 102, 105, 111–13, 120, 121n15, 127–29, 134–36, 140, 142, 147, 159, 164, 177, 190, 192, 195, 197–200, 203–05, 207, 211, 218, 219, 238, 257, 267, 270
- civil society, xiii, 18, 26, 32, 36, 44, 58, 103, 110, 117, 118n4, 120, 123
- commercialization, viii, xiv, 44, 57, 78, 82, 87, 90, 97, 128, 164, 165, 168, 171, 176, 179, 190, 191, 193, 195, 197, 198, 200, 202, 205, 207, 209, 210, 214, 215, 221, 222, 228, 235
- comparative research, 92, 154, 155, 162, 163, 168
- conflict of interests, 101
- content analysis, 64, 74, 75, 159, 164n1, 233, 264
- democracy, xiv, 7, 12, 14, 17–19, 25, 27, 28, 31, 37, 42, 43, 45, 77, 78, 80, 84–86, 88, 89, 93, 106, 107, 195, 200, 206n5, 221, 285
- democratic corporatism, xi–xiii, 35, 41, 45, 54, 58, 64, 66, 72, 74, 234, 236, 237, 239, 246, 248, 256, 258
- democratization, 23, 26, 27, 31, 37, 38, 44, 51, 86, 93, 233
- development of media market, 41, 46, 64, 65, 234
- Europeanization, 42, 233, 237–39, 243–45, 248, 250–52, 254, 257, 258
- factualness, 236, 237, 243–46, 248, 256, 258
- Hallin and Mancini, viii, ix, 1, 4, 9, 10–12, 30, 32, 34, 35, 41, 44–47, 50–53, 56–58, 63, 64, 66, 67, 71, 72, 74, 75, 77, 78, 83, 84, 86–93, 112, 162, 173, 189, 190, 234–36, 238, 239, 245, 246, 248, 254, 256, 258
- hybrid discourse, 200, 204–06
- international comparative research, 115n1, 153, 154, 163, 168
- journalism
- convergence vs. divergence of, 36, 79, 87, 93, 97, 137, 154, 163, 165, 167, 168, 195, 196, 202, 205, 207, 229, 235–37, 248
  - culture, 233, 234, 258
  - research, 153, 154, 156, 158
- journalists, viii, xiv, 14, 27–34, 37, 38, 41, 44, 50–53, 56, 64, 69, 71, 73, 80, 81, 87, 112, 117, 121, 153–68, 171–79, 185–93, 195, 199, 201–06, 209–29, 234, 262, 264, 272
- conscience of, 227
- Czech, 171, 173, 176–79, 185n8, 186, 188–92
- deprofessionalization and proletarianization of, 173, 179, 188, 189, 192
- professional dilemmas of, 209, 213, 215, 228
- Latin America, 23, 24, 27, 29–32, 35, 38, 86, 133, 134, 154
- Eastern and Western Europe, 233, 254
- EU membership, 238, 239, 245, 246, 248, 254, 257, 258

- liberal drift, 78, 87, 89, 93
- liberal model, xi, xii, 5, 10n2, 33, 34, 45, 55, 58, 64, 66, 72, 78, 87, 90, 93, 234–36
- media
  - and politics, xi, xii, 44, 63, 64, 71, 72
  - commercialization, 198, 209, 210, 218, 222
  - models, 41, 45
  - policy, xii, 25, 156, 198, 206, 207
  - typologies, ix, 1, 6, 8, 11, 12, 14, 19, 41, 172, 174, 256, 258
- mission of providing information, 209, 210
- news selection, 154–58, 160, 162, 163
- objectivity, 52, 74, 117, 219, 241, 285
- online newspapers, 233, 235–42
- ownership and shareholders, 131, 133, 134, 136–40, 146
- polarized pluralism, 10n2, 45, 67, 93
- political parallelism, viii, 30, 35, 41, 44, 45, 50, 52, 57, 64, 65, 67–72, 78, 88, 93, 112, 234, 237
- politicization, viii, 9, 30, 56, 57, 209
- post-communism, vii, viii, 23, 32, 33, 35, 42–45, 49, 51, 52, 56–58, 261, 262n4
- preconditions for public service
  - broadcasting, 115, 119, 122, 123
- press theories, vii, 1, 3, 4, 7, 8, 13, 44
- privacy protection, 210, 215, 222
- privatization of television, 127, 128, 133, 136, 137, 149
- professional ethics, 53, 154, 155, 190
- professional self-image, 171, 173, 174, 176, 179, 181, 185
- professionalism, 16, 28, 41, 44, 45, 52, 64, 69, 71, 81, 93, 98, 172, 190, 210–14, 234, 236
- public television, 97, 99, 112, 135, 137, 139, 144
- RTVE, 105–112, 137, 138
- Russia, vii, 6, 25, 33, 41–52, 54–58, 69n2, 121, 122, 211, 270
- small market, 200, 202, 207
- South Africa, vii, 77–79, 81–83, 85, 86, 89, 91, 93
- Southern Europe, 23, 25, 27, 35, 36, 45, 47, 56, 86, 88
- Spain, vii, 6, 25, 27, 29, 30, 45, 48, 54, 67, 97, 98, 101, 106–08, 110, 112, 113, 127, 131, 133–36, 139, 142, 146, 149, 155, 233, 235, 240, 241, 246
- state, viii, xiii, 6–10, 16–18, 23, 27, 28–33, 35, 37, 41, 42, 44–48, 53–58, 64–67, 69–71, 73, 74, 78, 79, 81, 84, 85, 87–93, 98, 100, 102, 107–12, 115–22, 133, 135, 137, 149, 150, 159, 177, 195, 196, 202, 209, 210, 213, 215, 217, 226, 234,
  - Baltic, 195, 198, 201–03, 206
  - broadcasting, 33, 35, 74, 118–20, 123
  - role of, viii, xiii, 17, 43, 53–55, 58
- tabloids, viii, 197, 211, 221, 222, 240, 241, 244, 251, 257, 267, 270, 275n55, 276, 278
- television
  - business model, 128, 134, 142, 147, 148
  - news, 63, 71–75, 164
  - output, 150, 158
- transformation, 10, 23–38, 44, 77, 85, 88, 97, 121, 177, 179, 188, 189, 192, 202
- Turkey, 6, 63–75
- Ukrainian society, 122, 123
- United Kingdom, 8, 64, 74, 97, 99, 101–03, 112, 113, 142, 233, 255

This is an excellent collection of essays that are built on Hallin and Mancini's 2004 seminal framework for comparative media systems analysis. This volume expands the perspective by bringing together studies on media systems from around the world including Europe, both East and West, Turkey, Russia and South Africa. The editors also did a great job in complementing country-specific analyses with conceptual chapters that further develop the theoretical and methodological framework of comparative media research. This is a must-read for everybody—scholars and practitioners alike—looking for a global understanding of the changing relationship between the media industry, journalism and politics.

—**Katrin Voltmer**, Senior Lecturer in Political Communication, University of Leeds (UK)

From the papers in this collection, we have learned a great deal about the media and politics in specific countries. More importantly, this collection has given us new suggestions for continuing and deepening the research and the theoretical discussion that we started.

—**Daniel C. Hallin** and **Paolo Mancini**, the authors of *Comparing Media Systems* (Cambridge University Press, 2004)

**C**entral **E**uropean **U**niversity **P**ress  
Budapest – New York

Sales and information: [ceupress@ceu.hu](mailto:ceupress@ceu.hu)  
Website: <http://www.ceupress.com>  
ISBN 978-963-9776-54-8

